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Abstract 
The thesis contributes to the policy transfer literature through the examination of 
narratives presented by policy actors engaged in policy transfer. The actors’ 
policy narratives are analysed through the application of the Narrative Policy 
Framework (NPF). With the use of the NPF, the research investigates the 
portrayal of narrative elements, including, setting, character, plot, and moral, by 
the transfer actors, in depicting their perception of the transfer process and object, 
and of the other actors involved in the policy transfer. The investigation is aimed 
at having a better understanding of factors that facilitate the occurrence of policy 
transfer i.e. transfer mechanisms, such as, conditionality, obligation, and 
persuasion, and how they manifest and drive the transfer process.  
To examine how policy narratives may inform the manifestation of transfer 
mechanisms, the research studies two cases of policy transfer involving 
international governmental organisations (IGOs) as transfer agents. These are i) 
the transfer of renewable energy policy by the European Union to the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and ii) the transfer of disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) policy by the United Nations International Strategy for DRR 
(UNISDR) to ECOWAS. The thesis argues that the mechanisms of conditionality 
and persuasion were involved in the transfer of renewable energy policy, while 
the mechanism of obligation can be observed in the transfer of DRR policy. It 
further argues that the portrayals of the narrative setting, character, plot and 
moral, in the policy narratives of the transfer agents and recipient, shaped the 
manifestation of these transfer mechanisms. The application of the NPF to the 
two case studies enabled the identification and association of different policy 
narrative elements that will likely characterise specific transfer mechanisms. In 
addition, the study highlights the opportunity of broadening policy transfer 
research beyond a limited geographical reach, through covering two instances of 
policy transfer to a region in sub-Sahara Africa. It also broadens the group of 
actors that are often studied in the literature by considering policy transfers 
initiated and led by IGOs. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
Once upon a time, there was severe famine in a village. So, one 
day, the tortoise suggested to the other animals that they should 
go to the neighbouring village to find food to eat, and they agreed 
to this proposition. The animals set out very early the next morning, 
and as they approached the village, the tortoise again suggested 
that they should all identify specific names by which they will be 
addressed by the villagers. All the animals took turns to mention 
what they would like to be called and when it was the tortoise’s 
turn, he named himself - everybody. Upon narrating their plight to 
the villagers, the animals were welcomed and settled in a house. 
Then, the villagers took all kinds of food to the house and said, “all 
this food is for everybody”.  
- A West African Folktale 
 
Storytelling is a universal means of communication (Shanahan et al., 2011; Jones 
et al., 2014). According to Jones et al. (2014), human beings use stories in order 
to “organize, process, and convey information” (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 329). 
Policy actors also organise information through stories presented in policy 
narratives (Kaplan, 1986; McBeth et al., 2014b; Radaelli, 1999; Roe, 1994). 
These narratives are seen to be relatable, easy to comprehend (Shanahan et al., 
2008, 2011b), and represent “generalizable (form of) knowledge … and universal 
principles” (Hajer and Laws, 2006, p. 251). Policy narratives can also reflect 
pertinent aspects of a policy issue, as events and places are webbed around 
actors, thereby affording the portrayal of how the actors influenced the present 
state of events and/or how they are morphing the state of the events and places 
that are captured in the story. With the use of narrative elements - comprising the 
setting, character, plot, and moral - policy narratives also allow a narrator to relay 
messages in a form that is more likely easier to grasp by the audience (Jones et 
al., 2014; Jones and McBeth, 2010). 
Based on the relevance of policy narratives, this thesis investigates the role of 
policy narratives in policy transfer, particularly, how the narratives used by actors 
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shape the mechanisms that drive the occurrence of policy transfer. According to 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.5), policy transfer is “the process by which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting”. In 
line with this definition, policy transfer research is often structured around key 
research questions on why transfer, who is involved in transfer, what is 
transferred i.e. the transfer object, the degree of transfer, and the source of the 
transfer object (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; 
Marsden and Stead, 2011). The policy transfer framework, which is shown in 
Table 1.1, highlights these key research questions and the features that can be 
identified while addressing them. 
Primarily, this thesis focuses on one of the key research questions identified in 
the policy transfer framework i.e. why transfer. Looking at Table 1.1, the possible 
answers to ‘why transfer?’ can range from voluntary to coercive reasons, whereby 
voluntary reasons are often hinged on a jurisdiction’s own attempt to draw 
lessons from external sources, or persuasion by an external party to do so, 
coercive reasons are primarily based on international pressures, such as 
obligation to an international accord, conditionality for receiving external support, 
and direct imposition. These different voluntary or coercive reasons for engaging 
in policy transfer are termed as policy transfer mechanisms (Bulmer and Padgett, 
2005; Evans, 2009a; Ladi, 2011; Nutley et al., 2012; Schroeder et al., 2013). 
Specifically, the research focuses on the involvement of International 
Governmental Organisations (IGOs) as transfer agents and the transfer 
mechanisms that are often linked to this set of actors namely, persuasion, 
obligation, and conditionality (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 
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2000; Stone, 2004). Focusing on IGOs as transfer agents addresses a gap in the 
policy transfer literature on studying policy transfers that do not occur at the 
national level. This is discussed further in the next section.  
Given that these mechanisms of themselves cannot materialise in transfer 
instances outside of its expression by actors, this makes the examination of 
interaction among policy actors imperative. It also presents the need to focus on 
what was communicated by the actors in relations to their perception of the 
transfer object, the recipient jurisdiction, and expectations of what the transfer 
would accomplish. To investigate how policy narratives shape policy transfer 
mechanisms, two instances of policy transfer are used as case studies. These 
cases are:  
I. Transfer of renewable energy policy to the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) by the European Union (EU)1 
II. Transfer or disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy to ECOWAS by the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) 
                                                          
1 The European Union supported the development and adoption of a renewable energy policy in ECOWAS through the 
European Union Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF). 
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Table 1.1 - Policy Transfer Framework 
 
Source: Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.9) 
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The two cases are examined by applying the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to 
identify and analyse the narratives used by the transfer agents and recipient involved 
in the process. Using the NPF, specific narrative elements including, setting, 
character, plot, and moral, are identified in communication materials authored by the 
actors prior to the adoption of the transfer object. This application of the NPF to policy 
transfer case studies enabled making arguments about the transfer mechanisms that 
facilitated the two cases and the narratives that led to the emergence of these 
mechanisms. I argue that the portrayal of the narrative characters of heroes and allies; 
the plot of rags to riches; moral of incentives and sanctions, and situating a 
bureaucratic and community setting shaped the manifestation of the transfer 
mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion in the transfer of renewable energy 
policy to ECOWAS by the EU. I also argue that the portrayal of the narrative character 
of allies and victims; plot of overcoming the monster; morals of value reorientation and 
managing cost and benefit; as well as situating a bureaucratic setting shaped the 
manifestation of the transfer mechanism of obligation in the case of transfer of DRR 
policy to ECOWAS by the UNISDR.  
With regards to the focus of this thesis, the research contributes to the literature by 
presenting a basis for delineating policy transfer from its analogous concepts, primarily 
through exploring the stories told by policy transfer actors. It also draws attention to 
other transfer instances that are not solely state-inclined and emphasises the 
involvement of IGOs as transfer agents. In addition, the study covers a geographical 
region that has hitherto been given limited attention in the policy transfer literature and 
highlights the experience of a less developed jurisdiction as a recipient of obligatory 
and conditional transfers. The next section discusses in more detail the gaps in the 
literature which are addressed by this thesis. 
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1.1 Gaps in the Policy Transfer Literature 
1.1.1 Limited Focus on the Interaction among Policy Transfer Actors 
The policy transfer framework has often been criticised for having limited additionality 
to public policy studies because of the challenge of distinguishing the process of policy 
transfer from its analogous concepts i.e. lesson-drawing, policy diffusion, and policy 
convergence, and rational decision making (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012a; Lodge and 
James, 2003). The concept is also sometimes questioned as implying a literal package 
and delivery of policies from one jurisdiction to another (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012a; 
Massey, 2009). To address these concerns, Evans (2004, p.4; 2009a) emphasises 
the need for policy transfer research to “focus on the … intermediation of agents of 
policy transfer”. Also, Wolman and Page (2002, p.477) state that policy transfer should 
be “conceptualized as occurring through a communication and information 
framework”. In addition, Evans (2009b) recommends the recognition of a multi-level 
dimension that typifies the movement of ideas from one jurisdiction or system to 
another e.g. from transnational to national level, or from national to sub-national level, 
in order to give distinction to the budding concept and ensure its recognition as a 
research agenda. Building on the multi-level approach, scholars have drawn from 
other theories, frameworks, and concepts to address policy transfer research 
questions. For instance, to address who is involved in policy transfer, different 
approaches including, epistemic community, information theory and public relations 
theory have been applied (Dunlop, 2009; Park et al., 2014; Stone, 2004; Wolman and 
Page, 2002). Also, in addressing the constraints to policy transfer, the concepts of 
institutionalism, cultural theory and Europeanization have been applied (Common, 
2013; Greener, 2002; Ladi, 2011; Lodge, 2003). With respect to this development, 
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Benson and Jordan (2011, p. 374) conclude that “[e]vidently a concept like policy 
transfer has an innate capacity to combine with many different theoretical toolkits”. 
However, the application of other concepts and frameworks to policy transfer research 
has been mostly channeled towards explaining policy transfer outcomes (Greener, 
2002; Jordan et al., 2003; Common, 2013), resulting in a limited focus on examining 
the “the intermediation of agents of policy transfer” (Evans, 2004, p. 4). With less 
attention on the interaction among policy transfer actors, there has also been a very 
limited investigation of how the communication among policy transfer actors can shape 
the transfer process. In a way, this shortcoming accounts for why the first question 
presented in the policy transfer framework shown in Table 1.1 i.e. why transfer?, 
seems to be the least addressed among the key policy transfer research questions 
(Benson and Jordan, 2011). Marsh and Sharman (2009, p.270) have also noted the 
need “to pay greater attention to the mechanisms involved in … transfer”. As 
mentioned earlier, transfer mechanisms are of themselves not tangible entities, 
instead, they can be said to be embodied in what policy transfer agents and recipients 
have expressed about their engagement in the transfer process. This highlights the 
relevance of examining the content of communication among transfer actors, 
particularly their direct or indirect references to their intent for engaging in policy 
transfer, their portrayal of the transfer process and other actors involved therein.  
It is on this premise that I draw from the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (Jones and 
McBeth, 2010), which regards narratives as a means of policy communication (Jones 
and Radaelli, 2015; McBeth et al., 2014a). Since use of narratives can represent “a 
seemingly universal device for individuals to sharpen certain elements of reality while 
levelling others” (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 329), the analysis of narratives used by 
policy transfer actors can help in understanding how the mechanisms that are 
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observed in the transfer process take form and manifest as the policy transfer 
framework posits. The NPF and how it will be applied for the purpose of this research 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. While in the next section, I discuss the 
second identified gap in the policy transfer literature that will be addressed by the 
research i.e. the emphasis on developed countries and state actors in policy transfer 
studies, resulting in limited attention to African jurisdictions and their involvement as 
recipients of coercive transfer mechanisms. 
 
1.1.2 Emphasis on Developed Countries and Statism  
The second gap identified in the policy transfer literature is its emphasis on developed 
countries leading to a focus on policy transfers that are state-led and targeted and 
giving limited attention to less-developed jurisdictions, such as sub-Sahara Africa. The 
literature’s uneven emphasis on developed countries can be observed from the 
collections of policy transfer studies published in books or dedicated journal issues. 
For example, in the January 2000 issue of Governance, the countries covered were 
primarily developed countries in North America, Europe, and Australasia. In a 2009 
special issue on policy transfer, in Policy Studies, of all the eight research articles 
published, only one article on the restructuring of Kenya Airways (Massey, 2009), 
relates to an instance of policy transfer to an African country. Two other collections 
follow this trend. The foremost academic book on policy transfer research, which is 
edited by Mark Evans (Evans, 2004), highlights the case of policy transfer in health 
sector reform in Tanzania. Also, a 2013 book edited by Peter Carroll and Richard 
Common showcases an article discussing challenges in the transfer of health policies 
to Malawi.  
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The inclusion of just a few case studies on policy transfer in Africa, in the journals and 
books, seems to be as a result of the dearth of policy transfer studies focused on 
African countries. This has also been reiterated in the literature, and there have been 
calls for increased volume of accounts of policy transfer in African jurisdictions (Evans, 
2004; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The call, in particular, has been based on the need 
for policy transfer study to not be solely hinged on the assumption of rationality by 
decision makers, and narrowly focused on the participation of state actors in voluntary 
policy transfers facilitated by the mechanism of learning (Benson and Jordan, 2012; 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003). According to Marsh and 
Sharman (2009), the reason for shying away from researching African countries may 
be due to the difficulty in gathering data and the reluctance to travel to these countries. 
However, the authors maintain that either “excuse seems thin” (Marsh and Sharman, 
2009, p. 281), and conclude that many of these countries now upload statistical data 
on government websites, and are often surveyed by international organisations. They 
also add that travelling “too far from home to examine the experiences of policy-
makers on the receiving end of Western models should represent a tremendous 
opportunity” (Marsh and Sharman, 2009, p. 281). Although the most recent collection 
on policy transfer cases features three African countries (Hadjiisky et al., 2017), none 
of these highlight the involvement of coercive mechanisms in transfers to sub-Sahara 
Africa. As such, this thesis addresses this gap by presenting cases of transfer to sub-
Sahara Africa that involve the mechanisms of obligation and conditionality. 
In addition to the bias toward developed countries, the policy transfer literature is also 
often criticised for its inadequate reference to non-state actors, especially those with 
significant influence on multiple countries (Stone 2004, 2010). It is noteworthy that 
there have been efforts to highlight the roles of this group of actors and an example of 
 
 
21 
 
this is the 2014 dedicated issue of Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research 
and Practice, which focuses on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and its role as a transfer agent (Pal, 2014). Another 
international organisation that is widely investigated in policy transfer literature is the 
EU and some scholars have proposed an integrative approach for studying the policy 
transfer dynamics within the EU (Unalan 2009; Clavier 2010).  
Despite these contributions, the focus on the role of international organisations has 
yet to fully extend to policy transfers to African countries, even though this domain of 
investigation can highlight the diversity of transfer mechanisms. For instance, 
commenting on the transfer of privatisation policy to African countries by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Massey (2009, p.389) notes that 
“African governments were persuaded and sometimes coerced into copying Western 
patterns of liberalisation and state restructuring, with loans, aid and favourable trading 
agreements being contingent upon such reforms”. From this statement, we can see 
that multiple mechanisms were employed and it highlights the opportunity for 
examining the assortment of mechanisms that can be observed when examining 
transfers by IGOs to African jurisdictions. Therefore, it is on this premise that this thesis 
investigates the observation of the mechanisms of obligation, conditionality, and 
persuasion, in transfers facilitated by two IGOs, the EU and UN, to ECOWAS, by 
examining the narratives of the transfer agents and recipient in a bid to understand 
what may have informed the emergence of the different mechanisms. 
Later in the chapter, we will look at the importance of IGOs as transfer actors, but 
before that, the next section gives a more detailed discussion on the relevance of 
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analysing narratives in policy transfer research and doing this through the application 
of the NPF.  
 
1.2. The Case for Examining Narratives in Policy Transfer Research  
Some transfer studies have recognised the need to attend to the interaction that takes 
place among actors (Evans and Barakat 2012; Legrand 2012b; Stone 2004), the 
content of their communication, and characteristics of such content (Dussauge-
Laguna, 2013a; Legrand and Vas, 2014). This attention can be regarded as 
imperative, as policy transfer of itself will likely not occur without the communication of 
the intent to do so, either among policy actors within a jurisdiction or between them 
and external policy actors. In addition, the process that ensues in introducing policy-
relevant knowledge from another jurisdiction, is also more often not, hinged on 
communication among policy actors within and/or without the recipient jurisdiction. 
This shows that communication among policy transfer actors, especially through 
conversations and documentations, seem to represent lifelines through which policy 
transfers are initiated and realised. This is not to assert that all there is to policy transfer 
is communication, but to emphasise that the “effects of interactions” (Padgett, 2003, 
p. 240) among transfer actors, constitute an integral aspect of policy transfer, as it can 
inform whether the transfer process will progress, or not (Dunlop, 2009); the form of 
policy or other transfer object that will emerge at the end of the process (Dussauge-
Laguna, 2013b); and the transfer mechanism by which the transfer process will be 
driven (Park et al., 2014; Savi and Randma-Liiv, 2013). 
With respect to transfer mechanisms, narratives used by policy transfer actors can 
highlight what they perceive of other actors involved in the process, where they expect 
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the transfer object to take effect, and what they envision the transfer will accomplish. 
Their depiction of other actors, for instance, can give an insight into the mode of 
relationship between transfer recipients and agents that will likely dominate the 
transfer process. A narrative could depict a story of a hero helping a victim; or a hero 
conquering a villain; or a hero helping victims to conquer a villain; or a hero working 
with an ally to help victims or conquer a villain, and from these different stories, we 
can attempt to decipher the relationship dynamic that will characterise the transfer 
process. Also, we can attempt to deduce the transfer mechanism that will likely 
encompass this relationship dynamic. As such, examining the narratives of actors 
provides insights into the emergence of the mechanism driving a transfer process. For 
the purpose of examining narratives, the NPF offers a coherent structure for analysing 
narratives, precisely through the identification of narrative elements, which are setting, 
character, plot, and moral. The next section further discusses the basis for drawing 
from the NPF. 
Having highlighted the relevance of the NPF to this study, it is also important to 
mention other frameworks that may have been applied to this research, what they may 
have contributed to it, and discuss why these were not selected. With respect to the 
use of the policy transfer framework, other approaches that could have been 
applicable to this research include norm diffusion, and Europeanization. It is 
noteworthy that similar to policy transfer, these two approaches are linked to the 
spread of policy-relevant knowledge. Norm diffusion addresses the propagation of 
internationally-recognised practices in the absence of a global government (Gilardi, 
2013; Hyde, 2011). It identifies the importance of international organisations as norm 
diffusers and how they influence states to adopt certain norms and practises through 
avenues of socialization (Park, S.). While norm diffusion may have helped to examine 
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the roles of the international organisations based on expectations of how these 
organisations act, and this may have led to the identification of norm entrepreneurs, 
the focus of the approach on appropriate or acceptable behaviour in the international 
community, the limitation of the interaction between the IGOs and ECOWAS to 
codification of policy ideas does not adequately fit into the broader notion of norms. 
Also, with the target of diffusion studies to highlight the path of uptake, this study would 
have understudied how the two policy areas have journeyed across multiple 
jurisdictions, and this would have limited the possibility of delving into how the 
influence of the IGOs and their interaction with a specific recipient, shaped the transfer 
mechanisms. With regards to Europeanization, this approach is often broadly focused 
on the top-down or bottom-up influence that the EU has on its member and applicant 
states, and vice-versa, in terms of policy, politics, and polity (Börzel, 1999; Börzel and 
Risse, 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Albeit, it has been contended that this 
explanation is more suitable to EU-ization (Radaelli, 2003; Flockhart, 2010) because 
Europeanization can extend to the influence of the EU on non-member or applicant 
states through policy transfer (Radaelli, 2003). Applying the concept of 
Europeanization with a view of the EU’s influence on ECOWAS may have benefitted 
this research by its likely consideration of the likelihood of if the policy transfer has 
precipitated any possibility of ECOWAS’ imbuement of EU’s values and/or culture and 
vice-versa. However, since the primary transfer agent in both cases is not the EU, the 
utilisation of the concept of Europeanization would apply to only one of the cases and 
exclude the other, as the EU was not actively involved in the drive for the official 
adoption of the ECOWAS DRR policy i.e. before 2007, even though it later became 
actively involved in the support of DRR issues in developing countries by 2009. 
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As we would later see in chapter 3, there are other approaches in the field of public 
policy that favour the analysis of narratives and could have been considered for 
examination of the two cases. Some of these approaches include the narrative policy 
analysis (NPA) (Roe, 1994), discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008), and discourse 
coalition (Hajer, 1993). NPA centres on policy formulation and the use of narratives to 
develop and streamline policy options. On the other hand, discursive institutionalism 
and discourse coalition are linked to institutions, as the former helps to identify 
institutionalised discourse, and the latter explains institutionalization of discourse. 
However, to consider the possibility of going with these approaches, there would be a 
need to find a common basis for examining the narratives of actors on both ends of 
the transfer, ensure that this basis can offer explanation for the manifestation of the 
identified transfer mechanisms, and that the approach is tenable to the two cases. The 
use of NPA will likely pose the challenge of highlighting the relations among policy 
actors in addition to focusing on the core aspects of the policy area. Also, the challenge 
with analysing the two cases on the basis of institutions would be the difficulty of linking 
what obtains in the recipient jurisdiction to that of the source, as the social and political 
contexts of the two sides differ in no small measure. The basis for use of the NPF 
instead of these other approaches is discussed further in Chapter 3. Despite 
highlighting the challenges that the use of the alternative approaches may pose, it can 
be noted that the study could also have benefitted from the possibility of delving into 
the individual context-specific discourse of the parties playing key roles in the transfer 
process. This would have allowed broadening the study’s focus from primarily the 
interaction of the actors, to cover internal complexities in the individual parties and 
how these may have contributed to what is observed in the interaction of the actors. 
Albeit, with the constraints of duration and resources, the study has focused on the 
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communication of the transfer actors and applied the NPF as the analytical framework 
for examining the communication content of the actor based on its of structure of 
narrative and possibility of providing a common basis for investigating the two cases, 
through the examination of narrative structure. 
 
1.3 Why Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)?  
The NPF is a framework for examining the role of narratives in policymaking, and 
analysing policy narratives methodically, through the identification of narrative 
elements (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones et al., 2014). It has a broad applicability 
and it has been used for explaining diverse features of the policy process, such as, 
policy change (Shanahan et al., 2011a), policy development (Lawton and Rudd, 2014), 
public opinion (Shanahan et al., 2011b), policy learning (McBeth et al., 2014b), an 
individual’s policy opinions (Shanahan et al., 2014) and policy actor strategies (Crow 
and Berggren, 2014). This potential, in a way, helps position the framework as a 
considerable tool for addressing features that are relevant to policy transfer process.  
The basis for drawing from NPF is partly because it is congruous with the call for policy 
transfer research to focus on relations among actors involved in policy transfer, and 
NPF can serve as a means for achieving this, since narratives represent a form of 
communication and “a seemingly universal device for individuals to sharpen certain 
elements of reality” (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 329).  
Applying the NPF to policy transfer research also resonates with the multi-level 
perspective presented by Evans and Davies (1999), which identifies structure – i.e. 
from where and to where is policy-relevant knowledge being transported – and 
emphasises the input of actors in the transfer process. In this regard, using the NPF 
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to examine narratives of actors will entail identifying the source of the narratives and 
who the stories are being told to. The content of the narratives can also point to what 
the transfer object will be and what it will be expected to accomplish in the recipient 
jurisdiction. In particular, with the use of NPF, many of the key questions that are 
addressed in policy transfer research can be answered, including who is involved in 
the transfer, what is transferred, why transfer, and the constraints of transfer. While 
the analysis of narrative setting can highlight where the actors will focus their efforts 
within the recipient jurisdiction and point to the transfer object, the analysis of narrative 
character can show who is taking which role in the transfer process. In addition, the 
analysis of narrative plot, which portrays a journey that a story takes its audience on, 
can give an indication of why embark on transfer and the constraints to be encountered 
in the process.  
As mentioned earlier, this research examines the use of policy narratives in the 
transfer of renewable energy and DRR policies to the ECOWAS region by the IGOs, 
EU and UNISDR, and the identification and analysis of the narrative setting, 
characters, plot, and moral, show how the depiction of these elements contributed to 
shaping the mechanisms observed in both transfers. In order to explain the emphasis 
on the involvement of the IGOs, the next section discusses the relevance of IGOs as 
transfer agents. 
 
1.4 International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and Policy Transfer 
Pal (2014, p. 195) notes that “of all the ‘hawkers’ of policy transfer, IGOs are among 
the most important: they typically have more resources than NGOs, their members are 
typically governments, they can claim special expertise and prestige, and they 
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sometimes can carry a big stick in the form of conditionalities attached to aid and 
loans.” The contributions of international actors that are backed by resources, reach, 
and access to decision makers, to the proliferation of policy problems and agendas, 
has been seen to be gaining traction across geographical and social spheres (Levi-
Faur and Vigoda-Gadot, 2006; Stone, 2010; Stone and Ladi, 2015). This often involves 
the identification of a policy problem or idea within a political setting, or by an 
organisation, or a group, which is then transported to multiple jurisdictions, either in 
duplicate or modified form. Such policy problem or idea could have been generated 
from diverse sources, including within an epistemic community, where the idea may 
have been informed by research or superior knowledge (Dunlop, 2009), or within an 
international policy arena, such as the UN or OECD, where the idea may have been 
informed by the deliberations of the conglomeration of member states (Smith, 2004; 
Turhan et al., 2016). However, notwithstanding the innovator of the policy idea, the 
incentive for the involvement of international actors in the proliferation of policy ideas 
could be a range of factors including, solving problems bound on externalities, 
controlling behaviours, ending a political or economic threat, strengthening alliances, 
or easing the distress of poor countries (Risse, 2007; Stone, 2003).  
This spread of public policy across geographical boundaries can be identified in the 
two policy transfer instances being examined. In the case of the transfer of renewable 
energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU, the transfer agent not only focused on the 
adoption of the policy to ECOWAS, but also directed efforts at ensuring that other 
regional organisations in South Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, Pacific Islands, and 
the Caribbean, develop energy policies that are favourable to the use of renewable 
energy sources (EUEI PDF, 2016a). Also, in the instance of policy transfer of DRR 
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policy by UNISDR, the policy was not only directed at ECOWAS, but also to Latin 
America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Europe (UNISDR, 2016a).  
These activities of the EU and the UNISDR can be said to be reminiscent of ‘large-
scale’ proliferation of public policy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Holden, 2016; Stone, 
2004). The peculiarity of these two actors as IGOs underpins the breadth of their 
intended reach and influence, and why it is necessary to study how the actors facilitate 
policy transfers, particularly to African jurisdictions, where they will likely have the 
upper hand in relating with the domestic policy actors in the region, as a result of their 
resources and capabilities. 
Having introduced the focus of the thesis and the gaps in the literature that it 
addresses, the next section discusses the research questions and highlights the 
research design. Afterwards, the structure of the thesis is presented.  
 
1.5 Research Questions and Research Design 
Based on the earlier discussion on NPF, we can see that the framework is aimed at 
studying “the role of policy narratives in the policy process” (Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 
453). Therefore, I will be relating this to policy transfer and will consider the role of 
policy narratives in policy transfer, and specifically, the role of policy narratives in 
shaping transfer mechanisms in the two cases of policy transfer to ECOWAS i.e. 
transfer of renewable energy policy by the EU and transfer of DRR policy by UNISDR. 
As such, the aim of this research is: 
 To examine how policy narratives influence the manifestation of transfer 
mechanisms. 
With respect to this, the overarching question is posed as:  
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 What is the role of policy narratives in shaping policy transfer mechanisms? 
Addressing this overarching question will entail identifying the transfer mechanisms 
involved in the transfer cases, the narrative elements in policy narratives used by 
entities involved in the transfer process, and the influence of policy narratives in the 
emergence of the transfer mechanisms. Based on this, the research answers three 
sub-questions outlined below. 
 Which transfer mechanisms were drivers of the transfer of renewable energy 
policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS?  
 What are the narrative elements used by transfer agents and recipients 
involved in the policy transfer instances? 
  How did policy narratives inform the transfer mechanisms operational in the 
policy transfer instances? 
To answer the research questions, a qualitative approach is adopted for investigating 
how the narrative elements used by the actors are associated with the transfer 
mechanisms. Narrative analysis of 86 documents with the aid of NVivo software, and 
six elite interviews, are used for data collection and analysis. The use of these methods 
aided the arguments made in the thesis on the mechanisms that led to the occurrence 
of the policy transfers i.e. the transfer of renewable energy policy was driven by the 
mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion, while the transfer of DRR policy was 
driven by the mechanism of obligation. In addition, the use of the methods also aided 
the argument that the narrative elements portrayed by the actors did convey messages 
that can be linked to what the mechanisms entail. The research approach adopted, 
therefore, enabled answering the research questions.  
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It is important also to highlight the limitations of the research. Firstly, in the case of 
DRR policy transfer, it was not possible to identify documents that had been generated 
directly by ECOWAS, in relations to its activities in developing and adopting DRR 
policy, as well as engaging with UNISDR. ECOWAS’ website did not have links to 
documents it may have authored prior to when the policy was adopted i.e. before 2006. 
Also, after speaking with an official of the Disaster Management Unit, it was also 
confirmed that there are no documented reports of the engagement between 
ECOWAS and UNISDR for this period (Interview 5). To address this, the study used 
documents that were authored by ECOWAS states, and had been submitted to and 
published by UNISDR, to represent the narratives by ECOWAS. In addition, the 
identification of similarities in the type of narrative elements depicted in the documents, 
highlight the shared perceptions within the ECOWAS community, on the transfer 
agent, the transfer object, and the expected involvement of the transfer recipient.  
Secondly, as a result of experiencing difficulties in gaining access to and interviewing 
more officials of the EU, UNISDR, and ECOWAS, the number of elite interviews 
conducted was limited. However, with the exception of the interview with the official of 
ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit, all the elite interviews involved key persons who 
were directly involved in the policy transfers, and they gave first-hand information on 
what transpired between the transfer agent and recipient. In addition, to investigate 
how narratives shape transfer mechanisms, it would be more beneficial to use 
documents that were authored at the time of the transfer process, rather than relying 
on recent utterances. This is because the responses of the interviewees may be 
marred by inaccurate recounting of past sentiments and activities. Lastly, this research 
has focused more on the transfer agent and recipient as the actors involved in a 
transfer process, and as such, has paid less attention to other actors that played 
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intermediary roles. Albeit, further research can assess the direct contributions of these 
other actors and investigate how they contributed to shaping the transfer mechanisms.  
In the next section, the structure of the thesis is presented. 
 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This first chapter has introduced the research topic and given the background 
information that serves as the basis for the research. It highlighted the focus of the 
research, identified the gaps in the literature that the research is aimed at addressing 
and indicated what is addressed in the other chapters. Following this, in Chapter 2, a 
review of the policy transfer literature is presented. The chapter gives an overview of 
how the concept of policy transfer evolved and the scope of the literature. It particularly 
argues that the focus on a multidisciplinary and multi-level perspective of policy 
transfer calls for the application of communication approaches. It also noted that this 
will enable the observation of various mechanisms and the roles of various actors 
involved in a transfer process. Chapter 3 introduces the Narrative Policy Framework 
(NPF), explains the aspect of the framework that will be utilised for analysis of the two 
cases, and highlights the links that can be observed between narrative elements and 
transfer mechanisms, based on an elaboration of other cases in the policy transfer 
literature. Chapter 4 presents the methodology adopted for the research. It explains 
the basis for the case selection and discusses the process of data collection and 
analysis, as well as highlight the limitations of the case selection. Chapter 5 gives an 
introduction on ECOWAS and its position as a regional body for West African 
countries. It highlights significant events relevant to the organisation and to the two 
cases examined. Based on the findings of the research, the chapter also discusses 
the involvement of the transfer agents, EU and UNISDR, and argues for the 
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observation of the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion in the case of 
renewable energy policy transfer by the EU, and the mechanism of obligation in the 
case of DRR policy transfer by UNISDR. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present and analyse the 
findings from the data collected for the research on the use of narrative elements of 
setting, character, plot, and moral. The chapters also discuss how the respective 
narrative elements used by the actors can be linked to the transfer mechanisms 
observed in the two cases. In addition, it considers the disparity or similarity between 
the two cases. Chapter 9 summarises the discussions in the thesis. It looks again at 
the research questions and shows how these have been answered. Also, it reiterates 
the conceptual and empirical contribution of the thesis and the opportunities for 
furthering the research. In addition, based on the findings of this research, the chapter 
presents a reflection on policy transfers to the region of sub-Sahara Africa. 
The next chapter presents a review of the policy transfer literature. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review: Policy Transfer 
 
Introduction 
This literature review presents an analysis of the policy transfer scholarship. It outlines 
pertinent debates in the literature, presenting different sides of the debate and 
highlighting the positions that will guide the application of policy transfer for the 
purpose of this research. Its broad objectives include i) to illustrate the concepts and 
propositions on which the field has grown, ii) to present the findings of the studies in 
the field, and iii) to highlight gaps in the literature that need to be addressed. 
Specifically, the review emphasises the mechanisms of policy transfer by elaborating 
on different mechanisms of transfer that have been identified in the literature including 
obligation, conditionality, and persuasion. It also argues for the application of relational 
approaches, which focus on the role and contributions of actors in policy transfers, as 
well as the interactions among them. In addition, the chapter does a critical review and 
coding of 18 parameters2 from a selection of research articles that were published after 
the highly acclaimed policy transfer paper by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996). 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 discusses the emergence 
of policy transfer as a research area in public policy, it showcases the growth of the 
policy transfer literature since its re-introduction in 1996, examines what policy transfer 
portends and also the delimitations of policy transfer research. In addition, it gives a 
brief description of how the articles used in the literature review were selected. After 
this, we will look at the definition of policy transfer and some of the drawbacks of policy 
transfer study based on the tendency to restrict the concept to a process guided by 
rationality. Then, Section 2.5 points to the identification and analysis of different 
                                                          
2 These parameters are listed and described in Appendix 1. 
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transfer mechanisms as one of the benefits of opening up multiple pathways to policy 
transfer study. Afterwards, the chapter refers to the incorporation of institutional and 
relational approaches in policy transfer studies and argues for the relevance of 
relational approaches based on the possibility of answering the policy transfer 
research questions and distinguishing policy transfer from its analogous concepts and 
other research areas of public policy. A summary of the various discussions concludes 
the literature review.  
 
2.1 Evolution of Policy Transfer Research and Differentiating Policy Transfer 
from Similar Concepts 
Policy transfer was introduced as a distinct research area through the first review and 
synthesis of literature on the phenomenon of different jurisdictions adopting similar 
policies, in an acclaimed 1996 journal article by David Dolowitz and David Marsh. Their 
review encompassed publications that made reference to the term policy transfer, 
such as Wolman (1992), as well as those that were deemed to have implied it, notably 
Rose (1993). It is, however, debatable to establish that Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) 
represent an inaugural paper or the first literature review on policy transfer, since prior 
to that publication, other scholarly papers had been published, which focused on the 
phenomenon policy transfer sought to explain.  
The first attempt to capture the phenomenon has been credited to the early studies of 
policy diffusion in the 1960s (Rose, 1991), but the concept has been widely criticised 
for its narrow focus on process rather than substance, and structure rather than 
agency (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). Later attempts to 
explain the observed phenomenon saw the publication of two prominent papers in 
1991. One of the papers titled ‘What is lesson-drawing?’ and authored by Rose (1991), 
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introduced the concept of lesson-drawing explaining how policymakers in a specific 
country voluntarily adopt policy features that are similar to those obtainable in other 
countries. The second paper titled ‘What is policy convergence and what causes it?’ 
was authored by Bennett (1991b). It presents the concept of policy convergence, 
which is focused on identifying changes over time in policy features of political 
jurisdictions towards increased resemblance among them. The paper also explains 
what causes the convergence observed and in particular, reviews existing literatures 
that highlight the phenomenon being addressed by the concept. Commenting on the 
literature review in Bennett (1991b), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p.343) note that their 
own review: 
is both narrower and broader than the major existing review by Bennett. 
Bennett’s approach is broader in that he concentrates upon the general pattern 
of convergence between the policies adopted by nations. In contrast, our focus 
is more narrowly upon the transfer of specific policies as a result of strategic 
decisions taken by actors inside and outside government. At the same time 
however, our approach is broader, particularly because we consider transfer 
within nations as well as between nations; acknowledge the significance of 
actors outside the government machine in the process; and place more 
emphasis upon how governments, international organizations and 
transnational companies can push other governments into policy transfer. 
 
Policy convergence can be said to be focused on a temporal approach whereas, policy 
transfer is focused more on events and actions leading on to the observed 
phenomenon of similarities in public policy of multiple political jurisdictions. 
Ascertaining policy convergence is also dependent on diverse measures, which leaves 
the concept with a “partially inconsistent theoretical literature” (Knill, 2005, p. 764), but 
occurrence of transfer is hinged on the use of policy-related knowledge from another 
jurisdiction, as stated in the definition by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000). Lesson-
drawing as presented by Rose (1991), primarily captures domestic activities in a 
government’s endeavour to learn from policies deployed in other jurisdictions, and this 
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makes it restrictive to instances of policy transfer that are recipient-initiated and led. 
Policy diffusion on the other hand, even though not limited to internal processes, is 
more concerned with the rate and direction of movement of policies among locations, 
which makes it more attuned to statistical representations rather than narrative inclined 
or content focused. Despite these differences, however, some policy scholars have 
continued to attempt to establish relationships among them or blend two or more of 
the different concepts into one.  
Evans and Davies (1999) maintain that policy convergence, policy diffusion and 
lesson-drawing are different forms of policy transfer. This assertion seems to be a far-
reaching one, considering that some of the other concepts, particularly policy diffusion 
and policy convergence, have carved a distinct research area along with 
methodologies and hypotheses (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). Also, unlike lesson-
drawing, policy convergence and diffusion are quite distinguishable from policy 
transfer, as they present snapshots of similarities among multiple countries, whereas 
policy transfer delves into the processes and causes that have led to the observed 
similarity.  
Contrary to the likelihood of policy transfer encapsulating all the other analogous 
concepts, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) refer to only lesson-drawing as an aspect of 
policy transfer, specifically, voluntary transfer. Lesson-drawing, as presented by Rose 
(1991), is limited to incidents of similarities in policies that come about as a result of 
the action of policy actors within the recipient jurisdiction, and it primarily gives sole 
attention to the recipient jurisdiction. On the other hand, policy transfer as presented 
by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), emphasises not only voluntary actions of recipient 
political jurisdictions but also, the role of external policy actors in coercively compelling 
or imposing on the jurisdiction to engage in policy transfer. As such, despite the 
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difference in the nomenclature of the two concepts, the consideration of lesson-
drawing as part of policy transfer seems plausible. This is because lesson-drawing’s 
focus on recipient-led transfers can be said to be duly within the purview of policy 
transfer’s definition of how policy-relevant knowledge in one political setting is used in 
“developing policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas” (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 2000, p. 5) in another political setting.  
Stone (2004) gives a more suitable depiction of the relationship between policy 
transfer and some of the other concepts. She notes that policy transfer can serve an 
explanatory role in understanding policy convergence and policy diffusion. This 
positions policy transfer as a possible independent variable of policy convergence and 
policy diffusion, and also negates the notion that these concepts are one and the 
same. Positioning policy transfer as an independent variable is also in line with 
Dolowitz and Marsh's (1996, 2000) situation of the concept as an independent variable 
for explaining policy development and policy change. Stone (2004) also refers to 
lesson-drawing as a form of policy transfer and based on the possibility of drawing 
negative lessons while embarking on the process, she further differentiates between 
policy transfer and policy convergence. She notes that policy transfer will not always 
lead to policy convergence since negative lessons will likely result in divergence. This 
explanation goes a long way to not only identify the differences between the concepts, 
but also specify the relationship that can exist between them, which helps to link, but 
not merge them. 
As mentioned above, lesson-drawing is largely subsumed within policy transfer 
(Legrand, 2007; Lodge and James, 2003). Also, policy transfer is now seen and 
approached as a distinct research area, while the 1996 literature review by Dolowitz 
and Marsh is regarded as an inaugural paper in policy transfer research. The 1996 
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paper can be said to have led to standardisation of what to investigate in policy transfer 
research. It achieved this by consolidating research findings over time under seven 
key questions, which are outlined below.  
Policy Transfer Key Research Questions 
 What is policy transfer?  
 Who transfers policy?  
 Why is there policy transfer?  
 What is transferred?  
 Are there different degrees of transfer?  
 From where are lessons drawn?  
 What factors constrain policy transfer? (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344) 
 
In addition, the 1996 paper led to the development of the policy transfer framework 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), which presents the classification of transfers based on 
transfer mechanisms, and has since guided empirical analysis by policy transfer 
scholars. Based on the above, this literature review sees the 1996 paper by Dolowitz 
and Marsh as a pivotal publication in positioning policy transfer as a distinct research 
agenda in public policy and christening the concept.  
Dussauge-Laguna (2012a, p.314) contends the notion of referring to Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996) as landmark, and as representing the “birth of a new concept”. He 
reiterates the view that there had been other references to policy transfer prior to the 
1996 paper and does not assign any remarkable novelty to the contributions put 
forward in the paper. The position by Dussauge-Laguna (2012a) had been prompted 
by the claim made by Benson and Jordan (2011, p.367), in their review of the policy 
transfer literature where they state that “David Dolowitz and David Marsh (1996, p. 
344) coined a new term, to encompass both ‘voluntary’ and ‘coercive’ forms of (policy 
transfer) practice”.  They had also set the 1996 paper as the commencement period 
of their literature review. A more appropriate appellation for the 1996 paper can be 
 
 
40 
 
seen in the description by Carroll and Common (2013). They recognise the paper as 
the foundation of modern policy transfer research and regard their own work as an 
addition “to the growing corpus of contemporary studies on policy transfer, whose 
modern lineage can be traced back to Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996) seminal article” 
(Carroll and Common, 2013, p.1).  
Against this background, in addition to the landmark paper by Dolowitz and Marsh, 
other studies that will be covered by this literature review comprise “post-1996” 
(Benson and Jordan, 2012, p. 333) policy transfer publications. The next section 
highlights the process of selecting the 68 articles used in the literature review and 
shows how the policy transfer literature has fared post-1996. 
 
2.2 Policy Transfer Literature Review and Evidence of Growth in Policy 
Transfer Research  
To identify the specific literatures to be included in the review, an academic search 
engine, Google Scholar, and two research databases namely, Web of Science Social 
Science Citation Index (SSCI) and Scopus were utilised3. Google Scholar was used to 
get a broad overview of references to policy transfer and after inputting the search 
term and operative “policy transfer”, and selecting the start year of the search to be 
1996, the results from the search were a total of 16,800 articles. A further search was 
then conducted on the two research databases, SSCI and Scopus, for the term - policy 
transfer, with the search start year specified as 1996. The search yielded a total of 474 
publications for SSCI and 332 for Scopus. A further limitation was done by selecting 
specific journals that included the words policy, public policy, public administration, 
politics and governance; and this reduced the results to 52 articles in SSCI and 68 in 
                                                          
3 The internet search was carried out on the 21st of January 2016. 
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Scopus. Due to the more diverse sources covered in Scopus, the inclusion of articles 
with high citation as identified from the earlier Google Scholar search, and the feature 
of journals4 with relevant policy transfer articles, Scopus was selected as the preferred 
research database. The literatures from the Scopus search, which also represent the 
articles covered in this review, comprise 61 journal articles and seven book chapters 
from the same book, making 68 publications. 
As shown in Table 2.1, of the 68 publications, about 40% had been published over 
fifteen years post-1996, while 58% were published between 2011 and 2016, over five 
years. One may say that the distribution of the publications may be dependent on the 
coverage of the research database and may not have included numerous articles 
published between 1996 and 2010. However, in 2011, David Benson and Andrew 
Jordan had suggested that the “heat had gone out of” (Hudson and Kim, 2014, p. 495) 
policy transfer research based on their findings from Google Scholar, which is 
presented here in Table 2. They mentioned that there had been a decline between 
2005 and 2010, in articles making reference to policy transfer. This led them to 
question the “analytical value of the concept” and suggest the decline might result in 
“conceptual decay” (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p. 373). Contrary to their submission, 
however, policy transfer research experienced a jolt from 2011 as Table 2.1 shows a 
percentage increase of 167% from the period 2006-2010 to the period 2011 to 2016.  
The sustained and increased inquisition into policy transfers seems to show the 
relevance and viability of the concept as a distinct research focus. Revisiting the issue 
of decline of interest in policy transfer, Benson and Jordan reneged on their earlier 
concerns and stated: 
                                                          
4 One of the significant difference in the results from both databases was the non-inclusion of book chapters on policy transfer, 
the SSCI search result at the time. 
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“How wrong we were! … As a research topic, policy transfer is very much alive 
and kicking” (Benson and Jordan, 2012, p. 333). 
 
Table 2.1 – Number of articles shown in Scopus and % increase between 1996 
and 2016 
Year Number of articles 
% Increase between 
periods 
1996-2000 6 
 
2001-2005 7 17% 
2006-2010 15 114% 
2011-2016 40 167% 
Total 68 
 
 
Table 2.2 - Number of articles shown in Google Scholar and % increase 
between 1996 and 2010 
Year Number of articles 
% Increase between 
periods 
1996-2000 20  
2001-2005 35 75% 
2005 -2010 20 -33% 
Source: Benson and Jordan (2011) 
 
Table 2.3 - Number of articles in strands of policy transfer literature 
Strand Number of 
articles 
% of total 
Conceptualisation 11 16% 
Conceptualisation and application 16 25% 
Application only 41 59% 
Total 68 
 
 
The sustained interest has also been observed and highlighted by other policy transfer 
scholars. Notably, Dolowitz and Marsh commented on the number of citations 
generated by their work and extent of application of the policy transfer framework. In 
their own words, they remark that:  
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our two articles have over 2,000 citations between them and many authors have 
used our framework in their empirical research … (policy transfer) has been, 
and should be, developed/improved by those who use it (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2012, p. 339). 
 
With reference to their recommendation for continued improvement to the concept, we 
can say that many policy transfer scholars have heeded this counsel. With reference 
to Table 2.3, this literature review identified three dominant strands of article direction. 
The first being further conceptualisation of policy transfer, the second, empirical 
application of the concept, and thirdly, articles incorporating the two strands i.e. 
conceptualising and application of the concept. Most of the articles in the first strand 
often involved the introduction of another framework or concept to explain certain 
aspects of policy transfer process and this approach can be said to have given policy 
transfer its multidisciplinary identity. Examples of this approach include drawing from 
epistemic communities to identify sources of knowledge of transfer object (Dunlop, 
2009; Stone, 2004); information theory and public relations theory to explain role of 
transfer agents and relationship between them (Park et al., 2014; Wolman and Page, 
2002), Europeanisation and accession to clarify why transfer occurs (Carroll, 2014; 
Ladi, 2011; Martinsen and Wessel, 2014) and institutionalism to explain policy transfer 
challenges (Greener, 2002; Jordan et al., 2003; Lodge, 2003; Common, 2013). Articles 
in the second strand solely rely on the policy transfer framework to address empirical 
research without drawing from other theories or concepts and such studies include 
Padgett (2003), Smith (2004), Savi and Randma-Liiv (2013), Tambulasi (2013), Blum 
(2014) and Zhang and Marsh (2015). The first and second of these three identified 
strands have also been noted in Benson and Jordan (2011) and the observation of 
nearly the same result five years after their work, tends to emphasise that the trend of 
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having further conceptualisation of the framework alongside its empirical application, 
still continues in the policy transfer literature.  
In addition to the use of the selected articles for this chapter’s examination of the policy 
transfer literature, the latter sections of the review also consider recent contributions 
to the literature. Having earlier presented an overview of the history of policy transfer 
research and of the literature landscape, the next section goes into more detail to 
explain policy transfer based on definitions developed in order to specify its 
delimitations and highlight what the concept portends. 
 
2.3 Definitions of Policy Transfer and Delimitation of Policy Transfer Process 
2.3.1 Definition by Dolowitz and Marsh 
The pioneer definition of policy transfer was put forward in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996). 
It states that policy transfer is:  
a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place. 
 
The definition was, however, modified in a 2000 article, which served as an update to 
the literature review published in 1996. The revised definition states that policy transfer 
is: 
the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in 
development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
another political setting (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.5) 
 
This definition is the most cited definition of policy transfer and it is often featured in 
policy transfer articles (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dussauge-Laguna, 2012b; Marsh 
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and Evans, 2012). As against the 1996 definition, the definition is modified to express 
where policy transfer occurs i.e. in political settings, and the presentation of specific 
policy features that can be transferred, i.e. transfer objects. The definition, however, 
seems to preclude the involvement of agents engaged in the transfer process. It 
answers the question of what is transferred, where is transfer taking place from and to 
where, but, it does not address any question relating to ‘who’ or ‘whom’. This may be 
said to be answered by the phrase ‘process by which’, stated at the start of the 
definition. However, providing for no participating actors can leave room to assume 
policy actors in the recipient political setting can stumble on knowledge of the transfer 
object, and do not necessarily interact with policy actors in the source political setting. 
Again, the primary activity identified is the use of knowledge of transfer objects, and 
this focus makes it seem as though the initiation and realisation of policy transfer is 
mainly driven by the recipient political settings. 
 
2.3.2 Definition by Evans and Davies  
To address the challenge of focusing on the recipient side of a policy transfer process, 
Evans and Davies (1999, p.383)  refer to policy transfer as “an action-oriented 
intentional activity that takes place within a multi-organisational setting”. Their 
definition highlights the involvement of multiple organisations and eliminates the 
ambiguity of where the knowledge of transfer object can be sourced, as considering 
the definition in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) can imply little or no need for examining 
other policy actors aside those in the recipient political jurisdiction. Also, in order to 
further elaborate on the involvement of multiple organisations, the authors introduced 
a multi-level structure approach to policy transfer research, shown in Figure 2.1, which 
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showcases not only the recipient political settings but the organisation that might be 
at the source end of the transfer process. 
 
Figure 2.1: Policy Transfer Pathways 
 
Source: (Evans and Davies, 1999, p. 368) 
 
 
2.3.3 Delimitation of Policy Transfer 
Another contribution from the definition by Evans and Davies (1999) is the 
specification of intentionality of the transfer agent. In line with this perspective, Evans 
(2009, p.244) refers to policy transfer as an “action-oriented intentional learning … 
which takes place consciously and results in policy action”. The inclusion of and 
emphasis on intentionality was aimed at addressing some of the criticism of policy 
transfer framework in casting doubts on its additionality to public policy research. In 
commenting on the use of lesson-drawing and policy transfer as conceptual 
frameworks, Lodge and James (2003) questioned if the frameworks bring anything 
new to what is known about policymaking. To them, being aware of and making use 
of knowledge of policy features from a different political setting can easily be identified 
as part of decision-making in the policy process. In particular, they remark that lesson-
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drawing, as presented by Rose (1991), can be easily equated with rational decision-
making, and infer that policy transfer cannot be easily ascribed a space to occupy in 
policymaking based on its unclear process and consequences. They also surmise that 
policy scholars “may be better off selecting from a range of alternative approaches 
than limiting themselves to these conceptual frameworks” (Lodge and James, 2003). 
Their criticism of the policy transfer framework, in a way, highlights the ambiguity 
associated with the initial definition put forward for policy transfer. With the 
consideration of intentionality, however, alongside conscious involvement of all sides 
involved in the transfer process, there is an implication of a relational process ensuing 
between the user of the knowledge of transfer objects and other policy actor(s) within 
whom the knowledge is embodied.  
Evans and Davies (1999) and Evans (2009) clearly distinguish policy transfer from 
rational decision-making, since the transfer agent at the onset of the transfer process, 
sets out to use knowledge that is sourced externally or to introduce knowledge of 
transfer object to an external political jurisdiction. Rational decision-making, however, 
gives limited focus to the bearer of the knowledge of alternatives and little or no 
consideration to the interaction that may be experienced in the process of applying 
knowledge of policy features. With respect to situating policy transfer in the field of 
public policy, the acknowledgement of multiple actors aside from the policy transfer 
recipient, their conscious intent and involvement in the transfer process has made it 
possible to link the framework to policy change (Cairney, 2009; Common, 2013; 
Greener, 2002; Jordan et al.., 2003; Ladi, 2011; Lodge, 2003), policy development 
(Bray et al., 2011; Carroll, 2012; Goldfinch, 2006) and agenda setting (Evans, 2009b; 
Stone, 2010). Although there is yet to be a revised definition incorporating the views 
of Evans and Davies (1999) and Evans (2009) into the pioneer definition, most policy 
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transfer articles work with the pioneer definition but take cognisance of the relevance 
of attending to intentional and conscious transfer instances. Table 2.4 shows the level 
of alignment with this recommendation and one can say that this direction has helped 
the policy transfer framework bring to fore different dimensions of relations among 
cross-national, international political jurisdictions and policy actors, in policymaking. It 
seems imperative, however, that policy transfer definition by Dolowitz and Marsh 
(1996, 2000) be revised and this feat might be achieved by putting forward a putative 
definition in a journal or book collection dedicated to policy transfer, which will be 
backed through inclusion of articles that reflect the contextual and empirical 
implications of the revised definition. 
 
Table 2.4 - Number of articles with instances of intentional policy transfer 
 
Number of 
Articles 
% of total 
Articles with only instances of intentional 
transfer 
51 75% 
Articles with only instances of unintentional 
transfer 
0 0% 
Articles with instances of intentional and 
unintentional policy transfer 
5 7% 
Not applicable (Articles with no case 
studies) 
12 17% 
Total 68 100% 
 
 
Based on the reference to rational decision-making and the contention in the literature 
on the difference between rational decision-making and policy transfer, the next 
section explores how some policy transfer research embed rationality as a 
characteristic of the transfer process, and how others distance policy transfer from 
rationality. In particular, the section argues that emphasis on rationality in early policy 
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transfer research contributed to limiting the scope of policy transfer research to 
voluntary and recipient-led transfer instances, and hindered the possibility of exploring 
multiple transfer mechanisms that could manifest in diverse instances of policy 
transfers. 
 
2.4 Policy Transfer and Rational Decision-Making 
The opening sentence in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p.343) reads, “(a)s Rose argues, 
policy transfer or lesson-drawing is common”. The statement seemed to lend itself to 
the reasoning that lesson-drawing can be juxtaposed with policy transfer, and with the 
close link between lesson-drawing and rational decision-making, as observed by 
James and Lodge (2003), many of the successive policy transfer research papers 
were hinged on the assumption of rationality on the part of the transfer agent. Dolowitz 
and Marsh (1996) drew heavily from Rose (1991)’s “What is lesson-drawing” article 
and noted that they “did not think the difference in nomenclature (was) overly 
significant” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344). However, as the paper elaborates 
further on what policy transfer entails, the authors clarify that lesson-drawing applies 
more to the voluntary form of policy transfer and specify that they “do not use the terms 
policy transfer and lesson-drawing interchangeably” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 
344). Despite this later assertion, however, the reliance on postulates from lesson-
drawing, in a way (unintentionally) made policy transfer study to be aligned with and 
sometimes undistinguishable from lesson-drawing and rational decision-making. In 
addition, it prompted the assumption of rationality and prescription of perfect or 
bounded rationality as an underlying guide by which transfer agents engage in policy 
transfers (Evans, 2004; Hudson and Kim, 2014), leaving little or no attention to other 
possibilities such as ‘policy windows’ or ‘pure interest’ (Cairney, 2009, p. 472). This 
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assumption of rationality is often portrayed with the focus on recipient-led transfers, 
and was prevalent in the early days of policy transfer research (Dolowitz, 1997; 
Legrand, 2012b; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003). 
 
2.4.1 Policy Transfer Studies Centred on Rationality 
Following this line of thought of rationality in policy transfer, Mossberger and Wolman 
(2003, p.428) propose that policy transfer should be seen as a “form of prospective 
policy evaluation” and identified key stages that will occur during the transfer process, 
including awareness, assessment and, application. Again, just like Dolowitz and Marsh 
(1996), they draw heavily from Rose (1991) and affirm that the terminology of their 
proposition was “a term coined by Richard Rose” (Mossberger and Wolman, 2003, p. 
428). Being cognisant of the limitation of attaining perfect rationality, and perhaps, in 
trying to prevent equating policy transfer with rational policymaking, they base their 
proposition on bounded rationality and avoid inclusion of a search process that may 
lead to generating alternatives, as the first step in policy transfer. Instead, they note 
that transfer agents only need to have awareness of the transfer object and prescribed 
gathering information from multiple sources, except if the transfer object only exists in 
a lone political setting. This process of information gathering is then expected to lead 
to an assessment that considers the difference in political settings of the recipient and 
that of the lending jurisdictions; the problems and goals that the intended transfer 
object was aimed at addressing and; the performance of the transfer object. It is 
interesting that upon review of policy transfer studies, Mossberger and Wolman (2003) 
find that many of the instances of policy transfer did not play out the template they 
were propounding. Of the three stages, assessment seemed the most lacking, as they 
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observed that most transfers had occurred without consideration of the concerns 
highlighted above. It was noted that this shortcoming may have been caused by 
factors such as non-readiness or availability of relevant information from the 
jurisdiction where knowledge is being sought and, transfer of policy ideas prior to 
policy implementation in source jurisdiction. Perhaps, these shortcomings represent 
the prevalent reality in policy transfer. Therefore, rather than broadly specifying a 
rationality or bounded rationality approach to policy transfer (an approach that seems 
to obscure (Lodge and James, 2003) disparity in varying forms of policy transfer 
mechanisms), it may be better to attend to rationality as an issue to observe, but not 
prescribe, since such prescriptions might best be left in the domain of decision-making.  
Legrand (2012, p.333) also maintains that “rationality and bounded rationality play a 
key role in the model of voluntary policy transfer” and refers to the search process in 
evidence-based policy-making (EBPM), guided by rationality or bounded rationality, 
as an important impetus of policy transfer. Citing his own words, he states:  
My central assertion is straightforward: I suggest that policy transfer is 
fundamentally driven by the search for evidence of what works, therefore the 
pronounced resonance of EBPM in contemporary public administration 
facilitates the possibility and scope of policy transfer.  
 
His position may be said to be the flipside to that of Mossberger and Wolman (2003). 
The latter position policy transfer as a process that can be embarked on through 
rational decision-making, while the former posits that policy transfer can be a by-
product of rational decision-making. Legrand’s (2012) position seems the more 
plausible one, particularly with respect to clarifying the link between policy transfer and 
rational decision-making. In addition, it also situates rationality as a feature to be 
observed, rather than being the prescriptive model for policy transfer. On the other 
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hand, however, Legrand’s position also in a way, obscures the entirety of policy 
transfer, as the occurrence of policy transfer resulting from EBPM, will more likely than 
not, feature only in the voluntary form of policy transfer. The case studies presented 
in both Mossberger and Wolman (2003) and Legrand (2012), mostly of voluntary, 
recipient-led transfers from the United States of America (USA) to the United Kingdom 
(UK), also go to show the restrictive coverage a rationality approach might 
unintendedly impel on policy transfer research.  
Commenting on the prevalent practice in policy transfer study, Marsh and Sharman 
(2009, p.271) point out that “[I]n most transfer literature, learning implies a ‘rational’ 
decision by governments to emulate foreign institutions and practice to the extent that 
these measures produce more efficient and effective policy outcomes than the 
alternatives”. Focusing on rationality and in effect, limiting attention to recipient-led 
policy transfer instances, in the early days of policy transfer research, could have been 
as a result of scholars being cautious of the potential for empirical incidences 
showcasing events that are otherwise. However, three major circumstances present 
munificent opportunities for policy transfer studies that go beyond the limitation of 
rationality and recipient-led transfer instances. These circumstances are: i) emerging 
economies, particularly those in South East Asia and South America, seeking to 
achieve similar economic and social development results with those of their western 
counterparts and the desire to borrow transfer objects without little or no concern for 
rationality (Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2014; Goldfinch, 2006; Nakano, 2004; Sharman, 
2010; Zhang and Marsh, 2016); ii) the increasing influence of transnational actors in 
policy development in developing countries (Legrand, 2012a; Stone, 2000a, 2004, 
2010) and; iii) accession of central and eastern European countries to the European 
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Union (Attard and Enoch, 2011; Ladi, 2011; Martinsen and Wessel, 2014; O’Dolan 
and Rye, 2012). 
In a notable criticism of the concept of policy transfer, Peck and Theodore (2015) 
maintain that the basis for the policy transfer research agenda is the assumed 
rationality of the actors involved. They also questioned the assumption of linear and 
intact transfer of policies across jurisdictions and suggest that the concept of policy 
mobility is a more suitable substitute for policy transfer. To the authors, what is 
essential in the studying the phenomenon of various jurisdictions having similar 
policies is following the movement of what is transferred and how they morph as they 
are transmitted and translated in different spaces and persons that they inhabit at 
different times. Based on this, they propose that the relevant research approach for 
studying this phenomenon should take account of the social and political complexities 
involved in the mobility of policies. Specifically, they recommend a social constructivist 
approach in a bid to take account of social and political complexities. The notion of 
giving attention to the social and political complexities of the phenomenon of uptake 
of similar policies in multiple jurisdictions is not without its merits, since policy actors 
do not act in a vacuum, and outside of their analytical minds are environmental factors 
such as social practices, that underlie their understanding of what should be or should 
not be. However, advocating for the uptake of policy mobility as against policy transfer 
is beyond the needed criticism for what the policy transfer proposes and espouses. 
Even if this was to be, the term policy mobility is unlikely to serve as an adequate 
alternative, as the focus of this area constitute an aspect of the specified phenomenon, 
and not its entirety. Also, the criticism of rationality holds policy transfer research to its 
past trends, as the research area has now broadened to accommodate transfer 
instances that are not underpinned by lesson-drawing (Evans, 2004; Park et al., 2013). 
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Nonetheless, there are beginning to emerge transdisciplinary conversations and 
collaborations across the fields of policy transfer and policy mobility (Hadjiisky et al., 
2017). Also, comments by one of the proponent of modern policy transfer studies i.e. 
David Dolowitz, on the widely-acclaimed book by Peck and Theodore (2015), Fast 
Policy, favours the relevance of considering social and political complexities in the 
movement of policies across varying jurisdictions (Dolowitz, 2017). 
 
2.4.2 Expansion of Policy Transfer Studies beyond Rational Decision-Making 
Identifying the problem of assuming rationality on the part of transfer agents, some of 
the later contributions to policy transfer literature sought to distinguish policy transfer 
from rational decision-making. In 2000, Dolowitz and Marsh introduced the policy 
transfer continuum, which is presented in Figure 2.2. The continuum identified 
rationality and bounded rationality as an occurrence that may be observed in transfers 
that are based on lesson-drawing, and gave allowance for occurrence of other types 
of policy transfer not associated with rationality. This distinction was also emphasised 
in the first chapter of a 2004 book aimed at showcasing diverse forms of policy transfer 
based on Mark Evan’s multi-level perspective. The chapter, titled “Is policy transfer 
rational policy-making?” maintains that rationality can be observed in voluntary 
transfer, but most likely not in other forms of policy transfer. In particular, it went further 
to associate transfers driven by rationality with developed countries and the other 
forms of transfer with “developing countries, transition societies” and countries that are 
“emerging from conflict” Evans (2004, p.3). 
With reference to the earlier argument, it is opined that reference to rationality do not 
necessarily need to be a requirement for identifying a transfer instance, even voluntary 
recipient-led transfers. Some policy transfer scholars have also criticised the 
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dominance of assumed rationality in policy transfer process. Hudson and Kim (2014, 
p.496) support the notion that “dominant models of transfer adopt an overly rational 
model of transfer” and they implied that this approach represents the old wave of policy 
transfer, while approaches that give less cognisance to rationality as the “new wave” 
of policy transfer literature. Based on their argument and with respect to the policy 
transfer continuum in Figure 2.2, they introduced the concept of policy tourism as a 
different approach to expatiate on occurrence of learning or lesson-drawing in policy 
transfer, without reliance on an assumption of rationality and in particular, without 
reliance on the method proposed in Rose (1991). Hudson and Kim's (2014) concept 
of tourism had also been drawn from an earlier model presented in Evans (2009) which 
is primarily focused on intentionality and relational aspects of policy transfer and how 
these lead to emergence of a policy transfer network. The model however also 
highlights the key stages that transfer agents can be involved in while engaging in a 
transfer process, notably, problem recognition, search for ideas and contact with 
potential agents of transfer and, cognition and reception of transfer object. In 
introducing the model, the author sought to dissociate the model from rationality and 
clearly states he was “making no claims … about the rationality or otherwise of the 
policy transfer process” (Evans, 2009b, p. 262). 
 
Figure 2.2: Policy Transfer Continuum 
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Source: Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.13) 
 
 
Some case studies of voluntary recipient-led policy transfer also highlight the non-
consideration of rationality by transfer agents. Cairney (2009) in a study on instituting 
smoking bans in countries of the United Kingdom, comprising England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. He finds that the transfer of tobacco control policy to the 
different countries were not founded on rationality, but on the emergence of “an idea 
whose time has come” and opening of “windows of opportunity” (Cairney, 2009, p. 
471). Drawing from the multiple streams approach developed by Kingdon (1995), 
which presents distinct streams featuring in decision-making, Cairney (2009) identified 
four windows of opportunity that led to transfer of tobacco control policy to the four 
countries. These are i) limited familiarity with policy area, ii) contributions of political 
parties and the legislature, iii) contribution of pressure groups and, iv) opinion of the 
public and media. Although Cairney’s contribution goes a long way to depict instance 
of policy transfer not focused on rationality, the application of the multiple streams 
approach however, may benefit other policy transfer studies if the streams leading to 
the windows of opportunity had been identified. This would have made room for 
explaining the intersection of these different streams and how it evolved into the 
window of opportunity that led to the policy transfer. Perhaps, some of the factors 
captioned as windows of opportunity in Cairney (2009) may have instead represented 
the streams. For example, the problem stream could be applied to policy transfer to 
imply the problem underlining the need for policy transfer and as such, this can be 
represented by the first window of opportunity i.e. limited familiarity with policy area. 
Also, the politics stream could have aptly been the second window of opportunity i.e. 
contributions of political parties and the legislature.  
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Another policy transfer case study that highlights the possibility of policy transfer not 
being guided by rationality, can be seen in the case of adoption of reform and open 
door policy in China (Zhang and Marsh, 2016). The findings from the study seems to 
reflect that of Cairney (2009) as a politics stream, which is the strong influence of the 
ruling political party; a problem streams, which is the need to end isolation and join the 
open world, and a policy stream, which is New Public Management (NPM), can be 
identified. The intersection of these streams can be said to have been operative in 
facilitating policy transfer. This observation supports the argument being made that 
not all policy transfer instances conform to rational decision-making. Zhang and Marsh 
(2015, p.1) also specifically note that “… the reforms under study have not been 
characterised by rational policy design underpinned by evidence-based policy-
making”. In addition, shifting away from the assumption of rationality also helped in the 
case study’s capture of an instance of policy transfer that is voluntary, but 
characterised by both multiple transfer mechanisms, namely, lesson-drawing and 
conditionality. This mechanism of conditionality was observed based on China’s 
engagement in policy transfer in a bid to meet conditions for its membership of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). The case study, also in a way highlights the benefit 
of not narrowing the underlying assumptions of policy transfer to rationality.  
Moving away from an instinctive assumption of rationality can be said to have 
contributed to the expansion of the policy transfer literature and its maturing process. 
This is because insisting on rationality would likely have projected policy transfer as a 
mechanical, calculated and perhaps, error-proof process. It also might have implied 
the transfer process as a literal process of seeking and receiving (Stone, 2012). Albeit, 
with the new wave of policy transfer literature, the avenue to investigate other pertinent 
issues including coercive transfers and diverse transfer mechanisms, has been 
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explored. According to Hudson and Kim (2014), this new wave is acclaimed to have 
evolved through the introduction of the multi-level perspective, shown in Figure 2.1, to 
policy transfer study and it has helped to reemphasise agency and allow focusing on 
the relationships between actors involved in policy transfer, activities of transfer agents 
and, factors that influence their contributions. In addition to the multi-level perspective, 
the new wave can also be linked to the development of the policy transfer framework 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), which elaborately highlights the different mechanisms 
and degrees of policy transfer that can materialise, alongside the distinct transfer 
agents, jurisdictions and transfer objects that will feature in the different modes of 
policy transfer.  
The next section elaborates on the contribution of the multi-level perspective to policy 
transfer analysis, particularly in directing attention to the multiplicity of transfer agents 
and transfer mechanisms. It also highlights the acknowledgement of a multi-level 
perspective in Dolowitz and Marsh’s policy transfer framework and discusses in detail 
the different policy transfer mechanisms identified in the framework. 
 
2.5 Beyond Rationality: Multiplicity of Policy Transfer Agents and Transfer 
Mechanisms  
Building on the notion of policy transfer occurring without necessarily being informed 
by rationality, there has been further conceptualisation of policy transfer based on the 
multi-level perspective and most of the approaches developed seek to address one or 
two of the key research questions presented in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996). This new 
wave of policy transfer literature has also helped in addressing certain pertinent 
concerns raised by some critics of the policy transfer framework, which are that of 
relevance and additionality (Lodge and James, 2003; McCann and Ward, 2012; 
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McCann and Ward, 2013). It also seems as though the use of the multi-level 
perspective has been based on acknowledging the admonition by James and Lodge 
(2003, p.190) for policy transfer research to  focus “on certain elements of the ‘policy 
transfer’ concept”.  
Although James and Lodge (2003) specifically recommended themes that a new wave 
of policy transfer research can focus on, these were based on the view of policy 
transfer from the perspective of voluntary recipient-led transfers. However, with policy 
transfer scholars presenting case studies covering developing countries and 
countries-in-transition, terms such as coercive transfer are no longer being solely 
interpreted from the perspective of an internally-led process, to represent pressure 
from political parties or the public (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Lodge and James, 
2003). Instead, they are now used in expounding occurrence of externally-driven 
transfer process. In addition, with regards to another recommendation, which calls for 
possibly attending to “concrete practice or policy instrument” (James, 2001, p. 242) 
rather than knowledge and ideas, ignores the multifaceted attributes of policy transfer 
and multiplicity of types of actors that can be involved in a transfer process. For 
example, policy transfers initiated by international organisations will likely not involve 
transfer of policies or policy instruments, a policy transfer category now referred to as 
hard transfer (Evans and Davies, 1999; Stone, 2000a), but transfer of knowledge and 
ideas, a category referred to as soft policy transfer (Evans and Davies 1999; Stone 
2000b). Also, concrete practices or policy instruments as transfer objects can promote 
the notion of possible comparison of alternatives, since the transfer object will be in a 
form that is obtainable in more than one country. Aligning with this recommendation 
will likely have led to policy transfer research focusing on states; deciding on the choice 
of transfer source and object; and lesson-drawing.  
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The application of multi-level perspective without the notion of policy transfer being 
limited to domestically-initiated instances, however, enables the consideration of the 
involvement of multiple actors in a transfer process and the investigation of the 
interaction between them. In addition, considering the influence one actor may have 
over the other opens up the opportunity to examine how the influence is utilised in 
ensuring that policy transfer takes place. Importantly, these considerations have 
enabled policy transfer to serve as not only an independent variable but also as a 
dependent variable, in research. The ability to situate policy transfer as a dependent 
variable, allows for questions such as how was policy transfer facilitated?, and the 
factors that can inform the process or outcome of the transfer process, to be examined. 
Particularly, it has allowed the exploration instances of policy transfer that may be 
termed as uninformed transfer, whereby the recipient does not have sufficient 
information about the transfer object; or incomplete transfer, whereby a vital aspect of 
the model of the transfer object is omitted; or inappropriate transfer, whereby there’s 
a mismatch between the purpose and function of the transfer object (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000).  
Drawing from these possibilities, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), in a sequel to their 1996 
policy transfer landmark article, presented the policy transfer framework, outlined in 
Table 1.1. The framework showcases the diversity of transfer mechanisms, transfer 
agents, transfer sources, and degrees of transfer that can characterise instances of 
policy transfer. More importantly, it consolidates the reach of policy transfer beyond 
voluntary lesson-drawing, and in view of the relationship between transfer sources and 
intended recipients, identifies other transfer mechanisms, which are grouped as 
coercive, mixtures, and coercive mechanisms. With reference to Table 1.1, while 
coercive transfer comprise only transfer by imposition, the mixture group comprise 
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lesson-drawing (bounded rationality), international pressures, externalities, 
conditionality and obligations. After the presentation of the framework, continued 
contributions to the literature led to the identification of persuasion as an additional 
mechanism, based on the extensive works of Diane Stone (1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 
2004, 2010) on transnational actors in policy transfers.  
With regards to the policy transfer literature, transfer mechanisms are identified as 
underlying factors that drive the transfer process and explain why policy actors within 
and/or without a particular political jurisdiction engage in policy transfer (Benson and 
Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Marsden and Stead, 2011; Nutley et al., 
2012). They are also sometimes used to summarily describe a transfer process. For 
example, a reference to obligated transfer would imply a transfer process driven by 
the mechanism of obligation (Bugdahn, 2007; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005). All the 
different mechanisms are often widely classified into two groups, voluntary and 
coercive, with the mechanisms identified under mixtures in Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), 
included in the coercive category (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Bulmer and Padgett, 
2005; Park et al., 2014; Sharman, 2010). Also, many policy transfer scholars refer to 
learning as a policy transfer mechanism, rather than use the term lesson-drawing 
(Evans and Davies, 1999; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Zhang and Marsh, 2016). This 
change in appellation seems to be directed at addressing the criticism on subsuming 
lesson-drawing, and also, at differentiating the concept from which their studies are 
being drawn from. In line with this, this study will also refer to the transfer mechanism 
of lesson-drawing identified in the policy transfer framework, as learning.  
Figure 2.3 highlights the degree to which each of the transfer mechanism has been 
identified in policy transfer case studies presented in the articles selected for the 
literature review. It shows that learning accounts for the largest share of transfer 
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mechanisms covered in the case studies, while imposition has the least coverage. 
Obligation also has a limited level of coverage of about a quarter of that of learning, 
while conditionality and persuasion also share between them, about a quarter of the 
value for learning. This reiterates the focus on domestically-initiated voluntary 
transfers driven by the mechanism of learning and limited coverage of coercive 
transfers. It also highlights the need for policy transfer study to cover case studies that 
will likely feature other transfer mechanisms, to enable a better understanding of the 
diverse mechanisms, and how they are employed by transfer agents. In addition, the 
coverage of coercive transfer mechanisms can also go a long way in distinguishing 
policy transfer from rational decision-making.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Rate of Identification of Different Mechanisms in Policy Transfer 
Studies 
 
The next section discusses each of these different policy transfer mechanisms in 
detail, and also provides examples of policy transfer instances where these 
mechanisms have been observed. 
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2.5.1 Policy Transfer by Learning 
As earlier noted, many post-1996 policy transfer research implicitly assume that the 
main factor driving policy transfer is learning. Interestingly, the focus on a sole transfer 
mechanism persisted in many articles despite the continuum showing the diversity of 
mechanisms, and this can be said to have contributed to the 64% level of coverage 
for the mechanism of learning among the articles selected for the literature review. 
Based on studies on policy transfer by learning, what drives the intention to draw policy 
lessons usually include dissatisfaction and seeking legitimacy for policy ideas (Benson 
and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Dolowitz, 1997). According to the 
literature, policy transfer through learning can be prompted by elected officials. An 
example of this is the case of the UK, whereby New Labour, upon their ascent to power 
in 1997 had charged policymakers to search for what works (Evans, 2009a; Legrand, 
2012b), and this charge had informed the transfer of American welfare policies to the 
UK under the banner of the New Deal (Legrand, 2012b). It can also be prompted by 
commercial interests, as seen in the case of transfer of urban revitalization policy 
across multiple countries through the efforts of business associations and individual 
business owners (Hoyt 2006; 2008).  
Embarking on policy transfer via the mechanism of learning can involve contact with 
and/or active engagement of the transfer source, and it can also be limited to desk 
studies and ‘window shopping’ trips. Nakano (2004) presents the case of transfer of 
agencification model from the UK to Japan and he notes that Japanese embassy 
officials in the UK had prepared detailed reports of the practice of agencification in the 
UK at the time it was unfolding in the late 1980s, and government officials back in 
Japan drew lessons from the reports. By 2011, Japan had adopted agencification in 
managing its civil service and between the time the model was deployed in the UK 
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and adopted in Japan, there is no record of contacts or visits between officials from 
both countries, for the purpose of aiding Japan’s design and implementation of its 
agencification model. In contrast to this scenario, the transfer of employment policies 
to the UK in the 1980s was characterised by diverse forms of contact with transfer 
sources. According to Dolowitz (1997), the UK government sought to transfer 
employment policy from the US and efforts aimed at drawing lessons from the transfer 
source involved organising a conference to facilitate direct contact between British 
policymakers and experts from the source jurisdiction. In addition, British officials also 
“consulted with American academics and officials” and made numerous visits to the 
USA (Dolowitz, 1997, p. 31).  
The examples of policy transfer case studies highlighted above show the coverage of 
diverse transfer actors involved in voluntary policy transfer by learning, and even 
though state actors are often the transfer agents, there is also reference to other 
transfer actors such as businesses. The focus on diverse transfer agents also 
emphasises the benefit of the multi-level perspective and Dolowitz and Marsh’s 
framework, which designates policy transfer as a distinct research area different from 
decision-making.  
 
2.5.2 Policy Transfer by Persuasion 
Following the introduction of non-governmental policy transfers by Stone (2000b), the 
role of transnational actors as transfer agents have since been duly recognized in 
policy transfer literature. According to Stone, this group of transfer actors have limited 
ability to compel states or other jurisdictions to adopt a particular policy. As a result, 
the group often relies on its proximity, access to governments and credibility, to 
persuade them to engage in policy transfer. 
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Stone (2000b) discusses the involvement of think tanks in transferring privatisation 
policies. The paper notes that the promotion of privatisation ideas in the UK can be 
traced back to the 1970s, and in particular, to activities of think tanks including the 
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). These 
organisations had developed proposals detailing an implementation plan for 
liberalising certain publicly-funded and managed organisations, and were able to 
influence government to launch and follow through a privatisation program. To show 
that the transfer source in the case had been think tanks rather than another political 
jurisdiction, the paper refers to the appointment of a member of the think tank, based 
on his contribution to discussions and documents, as the head of the Policy Unit and 
charged with developing the official privatisation program. This case highlights not only 
multiplicity of transfer agents and mechanisms, but also multiplicity of transfer sources 
and objects. It will be noted that the transfer source in this instance is not a political 
jurisdiction or government, but non-state actors. Also, the transfer did not follow a 
“transposition of ‘policies’ and ‘practices’ already in operation in one system” (Lodge 
and James, 2003), instead the case features the transfer of an idea by the transfer 
agents. In addition, the case signifies the importance of policy transfer study. With the 
knowledge that Germany had already embarked on privatisation prior to the wave of 
privatisation in the UK in the 1970s, one could have swiftly assumed the transfer agent 
would be the government of Germany. Albeit, with policy transfer’s focus on 
investigating what transpired in transfer instances, it was possible to identify the 
involvement of different transfer actors. 
In addition to Stone’s contributions in highlighting non-governmental policy transfers 
and role of transnational actors, there are other studies showing instances of policy 
transfer by persuasion. However, these studies are far and in between. According to 
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Figure 2.3, persuasion as a transfer mechanism constitutes 7% of the transfer 
mechanisms referred to, across all the 68 studies included in this review. In addition, 
although voluntary transfer makes up 71% of all the transfer mechanisms identified, 
while 29% coercive transfers are reported, 90% of the voluntary transfers are focused 
on transfers driven by learning, while persuasion accounts for only 10%.  
Despite the limited number of cases, the few instances of policy transfer by persuasion 
show the variation of transfer agents and variation of transfer objects. In the case of 
policy transfer of New Public Management (NPM) to Georgia, international consultants 
and unilateral and multilateral funding organisations such as United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), were 
identified as major transfer agents (Common, 2013). Tambulasi (2013) also shows 
how a supranational organisation, the European Commission (EC), opted for 
persuasion as a preferred transfer mechanism in transfer of health reforms to Malawi.  
Persuasion as a transfer mechanism also seems to have the tendency to prompt the 
manifestation of assortment of transfer mechanisms. It can precede lesson-drawing 
instances where the recipient jurisdiction demonstrates willingness and interest in 
learning from experiences of jurisdiction prior to adopting the transfer object. Acting as 
transfer agents in policy transfer of NPM to Saudi Arabia, Ford Foundation 
consultants, with the support of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
kick-started the transfer process, but, afterwards, the Saudi government embarked on 
lesson-drawing by considering the experience of other countries such as Kuwait, 
Malaysia and South Korea (Common, 2013). Persuasion can also precede coercive 
transfer mechanisms and an example of this was observed in the abovementioned 
transfer of health reforms to Malawi. Having experienced delay in the persuasive 
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transfer process and lack of interest to release control of health services by the central 
government to regional levels, another transfer agent, DFID, opted for conditionality in 
a bid to ensure the actualisation of the transfer.  
Again, identifying multiple mechanisms has enabled the possibility of observing 
connections between the different mechanisms. Also, the examples of combination or 
evolution of transfer mechanisms in one transfer instance addresses the concern 
raised by Marsh and Sharman (2009, p.270) on the need to study the “interactions 
between them (transfer mechanisms) and how they evolve over time”. Having 
discussed the mechanisms of learning and persuasion, we will consider the 
mechanism of obligation. 
 
2.5.3 Policy Transfer by Obligation 
With increasing conglomeration of states at global and regional levels, many countries 
commit themselves to addressing pertinent economic, social, political or 
environmental concerns. In ensuring that assurances given to address these concerns 
become reality, multilateral bodies often headed by international governmental 
organisations (IGOs), act as transfer agents and facilitate policy transfers. The transfer 
agents often have to their advantage, binding or non-binding agreements that had 
been signed by the intended recipient jurisdiction, and they employ this advantage to 
compel domestic adoption of solutions agreed at the international level. In addition, 
sub-national units can also be in a position where they are bound by national legal 
frameworks to injunctions from the national government. National governments can 
thus take advantage of the existing legal provisions to facilitate policy transfer. 
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19% of the case studies considered for the literature review report on instances of 
policy transfer facilitated by the mechanism of obligation, as shown in Figure 2.3, and 
many of them refer to IGOs as the transfer agents. Eccleston and Woodward (2013) 
report on policy transfer of tax transparency initiative by Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to its member states. Based on its findings, 
the study highlights that in pursuing solutions for international challenges and 
maintaining their credibility as effective arbiters, IGOs often engage in transfer of 
policies that do not necessarily represent the best solution for addressing the 
challenge. Instead, the solutions peddled are sometimes the weak option or ‘lowest 
common denominator’ (Eccleston and Woodward, 2013, p. 216), and they referred to 
this form of policy transfer as pathological. Considering this limitation from another 
perspective, the dynamic of pathological policy transfer can also lead to increased 
policy transfer. This is because after signing-off a weak policy, IGOs are often inclined 
to continue pursuing the ideal solution for the policy problem, and as such, more 
agreements are reached, which will entail additional policy transfer instances for 
domestic alignment of the agreements. 
The position stated above on policy transfer by obligation prompting more obligated 
transfers is also supported by Bugdahn (2007), although she links such transfers to 
additional voluntary transfers. In a study of policy transfer within the EU, she notes 
that “binding EU policy of ambiguous nature and/or with a limited scope of application 
creates policy space for additional voluntary transfers in member states” (Bugdahn, 
2007, p. 123). The study presents cases of policy transfer of Access to Environmental 
Information Directive (AIE) to Portugal and Ireland and it finds that in addition to 
obligated transfer of the Directive from the EU, Portugal engaged in voluntary transfer 
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by drawing lessons from France, while Ireland also drew lessons from Australia and 
New Zealand.  
With reference to the multi-level perspective and policy transfer framework, Eccleston 
and Woodward (2013) identified a limitation that may characterise transfer pathways 
with IGOs at the source end and powered by obligation i.e. adoption of a weak policy 
option. As mentioned earlier, the feedback from this limitation may be in the form of 
additional obligated transfer and Bugdahn (2007) notes that the feedback from 
obligated transfer can be voluntary transfers. These observations go to show that 
giving attention to the involvement of both the transfer agents and recipients can 
enable studying different links between multiple transfer mechanisms. 
 
2.5.4 Policy Transfer by Conditionality 
Policy transfer can be driven by conditionality when transfer agents prescribe the 
adoption of certain policies as a condition for rendering support to the intended 
recipient jurisdiction. In developing countries, adoption of specific policies is often 
stipulated as a loan conditionality (Stone, 2010), while countries intending to accede 
to membership of an IGO, such as OECD or International Energy Agency (IEA), can 
be prescribed adoption of certain policies before they can become members of the 
IGOs (Carroll, 2014; Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2014).  
Particular reference has been made to Bretton Woods institutions, notably, the World 
Bank and IMF, with respect to instances of policy transfer by conditionality (Marsh and 
Sharman, 2009; Stone, 2010), however, there is very limited coverage of such 
instances in the literature. Commenting on the limited coverage of this form of transfer, 
Marsh and Sharman (2009, p.280) remark that “this neglect reflects the fascination 
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with the topics of Europeanization and globalization” and they emphasised the need 
for policy transfer scholars to diversify the coverage of case studies, so as to include 
studies from “states of Africa, the Middle East and most of Asia”. Studies from these 
regions will also go a long way to examine the effects of transfer mechanisms on 
attempted policy transfers, and the observation of possible feedbacks that can inform 
additional transfers or alteration of the transfer mechanism. For example, it will be 
interesting to examine if conditional policy transfers do facilitate non-transfers, or can 
inform the degree of transfer. 
Despite the fascination with Europeanization and globalization as opined by Marsh 
and Sharman (2009), instances of policy transfers marked by conditionality for 
accession to IGOs, on the other hand are also not widely reported in policy transfer 
literature, as there are more cases of post-accession transfers (which are mostly 
driven by obligation), than there are of pre-accession (Carroll, 2014). On policy 
transfers during pre-accession to IGO membership, Carroll (2014) notes that countries 
are sometimes provided with requirements to comply with, particularly in cases of 
accession to the EU and OECD. In the EU, these requirements are compiled as part 
of the EU’s acquis communautaire (Radaelli, 2000), and an example of accession of 
eight former Soviet states to the EU in 2004, show that the recipient countries 
embarked on major reforms across its political, constitutional, economic and social 
spheres, primarily to meet the accession requirements (Carroll, 2014). These radical 
changes, which border on democratisation, freeing up of trade, and opening of 
markets, are noted to be necessary in ensuring the recipient jurisdictions do not 
renege on the adopted policies, upon attaining membership status in the IGOs (Carroll, 
2014).  
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Based on the aforementioned comment by Marsh and Sharman (2009), on the need 
to extend coverage of policy transfer to African and Asian countries, one can infer that 
opening up the study of transfer mechanisms can expand the reach and sphere of 
policy transfer research. This is because the multiplicity of transfer mechanisms and 
transfer agents can elicit both geographical and economical dimensions to policy 
transfer study, whereby the possibility of observing certain diverse mechanisms can 
be associated with countries in particular geographical region or of economic status.  
The next section will discuss the mechanism of imposition. 
 
2.5.5 Policy Transfer by Imposition 
Policy transfer by imposition is situated at the end of the transfer continuum as shown 
in Figure 2.2. Imposition will play out in instances of transfer where the recipient 
jurisdiction’s sovereignty is dependent on another jurisdiction for approval of its 
policies. However, with the modern political structure of independent nation states, 
“direct imposition of policy transfer on one country by another is rare” (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996, p. 348). Its occurrence in present times may be associated with sub-
national units, in instances where a top-down approach is employed in dictating 
decisions and directions to the sub-national units. Nutley et al. (2012) give the example 
of transfer of NPM practices, specifically, performance auditing, to Scotland and Wales 
from the central government based in England. He notes that even though the intent 
was to achieve improvement of local government services, the approach to achieving 
this, as perceived by the sub-national5 units, was top-down imposition.  
                                                          
5 Scotland and Wales are individual countries within the United Kingdom. The term ‘sub-national units’ is used to depict the two 
countries as jurisdictions under the United Kingdom, and to allow the term to confer similar meaning across the document.  
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The unique hierarchical structure characterising the relationship between empire 
states and their territories in the early 20th century also present a scenario for the 
occurrence of policy transfer by imposition. In an analysis of policy transfer experience 
of Australia, Carroll (2012) refers to the imposition of policies on Australia by the United 
Kingdom, while the former was a colony under the authority of the latter. He points to 
the example of Maritime sector whereby the imperial English government overturned 
policy decisions that had been taken by local authorities within the colony. This 
example highlights a feature of policy transfer by imposition, whereby the transfer 
agent initiates and holds the reigns in the transfer process, with the transfer recipient 
having limited or no say in debating or declining the intended policy transfer. 
In the next section we will consider if, according to a claim by James and Lodge (2003), 
the identification of multiple transfer mechanisms obscure explanations of the policy 
process. 
 
2.5.6 Does Multiplicity of Transfer Mechanisms Obscure Explanations of the 
Policy Process? 
James and Lodge (2003, p.184) argue that the policy transfer continuum combines 
“forms of rationality and degree of coercion” to generate varying kinds of transfer 
mechanisms, and by doing so, obscures different dimensions for explaining the policy 
process. As stated earlier, policy transfer was viewed mainly as a process entailing 
voluntary and domestically initiated activities, and primarily involving domestic policy 
actors, in its early days, and the concept was criticised by James and Lodge based on 
this former dominant approach.  
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In their 1996 landmark paper, Dolowitz and Marsh describe coercive transfer as policy 
transfer that occurred because of pressure from within the jurisdiction of the transfer 
recipient, however in the later update in 2000, they sought to make clear the distinction 
between voluntary and coercive transfers. In doing this, they cited the identification of 
the role of transnational actors in non-governmental policy transfer and highlighted 
their influence in limiting the “degree of freedom to choose the version of … policy best 
suited to (the recipient’s) situation” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 11). Despite their 
acknowledgement of this group of transfer agents and the likely transfer mechanism 
that will characterise their involvement in policy transfers, the authors did not exclude 
internal pressure on policymakers as an explanation of coercive transfer. Instead, it 
was presented as one aspect of coercive transfer, while external pressure was seen 
as another aspect. 
Based on the above, one may say that the criticism by James and Lodge (2003) is 
tenable. Albeit, with the further conceptualisation of policy transfer and introduction of 
the multi-level perspective (Evans and Davies, 1999), intentionality (Evans, 2009b) 
and focus on externally-driven transfers (Evans, 2004), we can see that the diverse 
transfer mechanisms do not simply pertain to domestic policy process, but highlight 
the role of external policy actors on domestic policymaking. Also, by broadening policy 
transfer research beyond internal processes, one can conclude that multiplicity of 
transfer mechanism does not obscure domestic policy process of a jurisdiction. 
Instead, it plays a key role in understanding how transfer occurs and analysing the 
relations between actors involved in the process. 
As though foreseeing the future of policy transfer research, James and Lodge (2003) 
recommend that policy scholars turn to alternative concepts, particularly institutional 
approaches. At present, policy scholars do use institutional approaches, but, rather 
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than substituting these for policy transfer, the institutional approaches are used 
complementarily as explanatory variables in policy transfer research. In the following 
section, I argue that although the institutional approach does make ample contribution 
to policy transfer research, it may not guarantee it research distinction, and an 
alternative approach, a relational approach, is preferable, as it will go a long way to 
confer additionality on policy transfer, and enable investigation of its broad aspects, 
notably transfer mechanisms.  
 
2.6 New Directions in Policy Transfer Research  
As mentioned earlier, with the introduction of the multi-level perspective, a new wave 
of policy transfer literature evolved, and this opened up multiple directions for policy 
transfer study, and addressing the key policy transfer research questions put forward 
by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000). Two major directions can be observed in the 
new wave of policy transfer literature. The first direction applies institutional 
approaches, specifically to address the question: what facilitates or constrains policy 
transfer (Benson and Jordan, 2011)? While the second direction investigates the 
relational aspect of policy transfer, including how specific group of policy actors 
interact and engage with other actors in policy transfers, to address almost all of the 
key questions.  
Although the new directions in policy transfer research are not limited to these two 
approaches, many of the recent conceptual contributions to the literature either aid the 
observation of pertinent components or arenas of transfer or represent a stance, rather 
than serve as a specific approach for answering the policy transfer research questions. 
Notably is the introduction of policy mobilities and its acknowledgement as “one of the 
most recent contributions to transfer studies” (Hadjiisky et al., 2017, p. 4). This 
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approach to transfer studies enables the consideration of the evolution of the transfer 
object and process, from its originating site to its expected abodes, based on the 
influence of transfer agents, intermediaries and recipients (McCann and Ward, 2013; 
Peck and Theodore, 2015; Stone, 2012). As such, policy mobilities advances a 
“socially contextualised analyses” (Peck and Theodore, 2015, p. 4) of policy transfers 
and the examination of translation and mutation of transfer objects (Erdinç and Visier, 
2017; Stone, 2017; Vigour, 2017). In a way, policy mobility can be associated with a 
relational approach as the investigation of the “complexity of context that modifies 
exports of policy” (Stone, 2012, p. 483) often involves observation of social relations 
by conducting ethnography studies, discourse analyses, or network analyses 
(Hadjiisky et al., 2017; Peck and Theodore, 2010).  
The above-mentioned two major approaches, the use of institutional approach and the 
investigation of relational aspects in policy transfer, are expatiated in the sections 
below. I also highlight the comprehensiveness of relational approach to studying the 
different modes of policy transfer, and restrictiveness of institutional approach to 
voluntary transfers and the recipient end of the transfer process. 
 
2.6.1 Use of Institutional Approaches in Policy Transfer Research 
In answering the questions on constraints on policy transfer, many scholars apply 
institutional approaches to identify issues that mitigate transfer or shape the transfer 
process from within the recipient jurisdiction. Lodge (2003) applies the institutional 
approach to explain how recipient jurisdictions are influenced to make a choice from 
policy options they can transfer. He highlights three features namely, impact of 
coercive pressures, organisation of the political-administrative nexus and, access of 
societal actors, as institutional factors that can inform the choice of policy option that 
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will be borrowed. The inclusion of coercive pressures as likely institutional factor, 
seems to distract from the remarkable contribution of the approach presented by 
Lodge (2003) and its replicability in other policy transfer studies. Referring to the 
impact of coercive pressures as a factor that can influence choice of policy options, 
leaves one to assume that the recipient jurisdiction upon whom coercive pressure is 
being exerted, has at its disposal multiple policy options from which it can choose. 
Many case studies of coercive transfers, particularly to countries that are not 
economically buoyant, however, show otherwise. Tambulasi (2013) presents the 
transfer of health reform policy to Malawi and from his account, there were no multiple 
options from which the country could choose. The source end of the transfer process 
seems to be the side endowed with the possibility of making a choice, but with respect 
to the transfer mechanism. The study shows the EU favouring persuasion and the 
DFID favouring conditionality. Stone (2004, p.554), commenting on policy transfers 
initiated by international organisations and targeted at developing countries, argues 
that compulsion often comes to play “to ensure compliance and convergence” in 
instances where there are “no shared norms that shape collective behaviour”. She 
also refers to limited awareness of policy area by local experts in these intended 
recipient jurisdictions and as such, the possibility of having options of an unfamiliar 
policy is limited. Carroll (2012, p.659) writes on the mode of policy transfer that 
occurred in Australia in early 19th century and part of his observation can be seen in 
the quote below.  
A major characteristic of transfer trends in the period up to the middle of the 
19th century was the transfer from the imperial, British power to its new colonies 
… This was the case because the Australian colonies were regarded as “settled 
colonies,” where for the most part the laws and customs of the indigenous, 
“primitive peoples,” were considered inapplicable, with English law prevailing. 
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These examples go to show that incorporating coercive pressure as an institutional 
factor may not be relevant to all modes of policy transfer. Excluding the instances of 
coercive transfer, the other two factors on the other hand i.e. organisation of the 
political-administrative nexus and, access of societal actors; can be said to be 
applicable factors for investigating how policy transfer recipients select a choice of 
transfer object from policy options. Applying the institutional approach as presented 
by James (2001) can be said to be relevant, as it emphasises the availability of choice 
of transfer object. Albeit, this element of choice seems to be more appropriately suited 
to voluntary transfers, and not the whole scope of policy transfer research. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, other studies have applied a similar approach and they 
are highlighted below.   
Following James' (2001) use of institutional approach to examine the choice of transfer 
object, Jordan et al. (2003) also employ the institutional approach, but in addition to 
ideational and garbage can approaches to identify factors that facilitated and 
constrained the transfer of three new environmental policy instruments, comprising 
eco-taxes, eco-labels and voluntary agreements on emission reduction, to the EU. 
They find that path dependency based on EU’s character of ensuring competitiveness 
and drive for harmonization among member states (MS), shaped the transfer process 
and concluded that: 
While we see indications of elements for all three … approaches in the three 
cases, the impact of the institutional factors is strongest in affecting instrument 
choice by the EU (Jordan et al., 2003, p. 572). 
 
Greener (2002) also applies the institutional approach to explain an instance of non-
transfer. He identifies path dependency as a constraining factor in preventing the 
adoption of United States’ (US) health policies in NHS reform, thereby limiting the 
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intended policy transfer to an instance of soft transfer of ideas. He explains that 
continued relationship between the NHS and UK’s medical profession hindered the 
introduction of US market based health policies. Similar to the application of 
institutional approach by Greener (2002) to explain instances non-transfer, Common 
(2013) also draws from historical institutionalism to identify the reasons for non-
transfer of NPM to Georgia. He surmises that despite the involvement of numerous 
international agencies in promoting NPM in Georgia, nothing had changed in the 
country. He also linked this non-transfer to Georgia’s historical experience in the 
Soviet Union prior to its independence, and its influence on administrative 
arrangement and policymaking, which had informed the sustenance of a non-devolved 
public service, unreasonably large workforce and inefficient service delivery. 
Tambulasi (2013), in his study of the challenges encountered in transfer of health 
reform policies to Malawi, also notes that there was substantial delay in 
implementation of the reform as a result of history of centralized governance in the 
country and this led to central government not being comfortable with giving control to 
local governments.  
With the exception of Tambulasi (2013), all of the studies applying institutional 
approaches give more consideration to the recipient side of the transfer and voluntary 
transfers. This observation is also stated in Benson and Jordan (2011), and the 
authors make reference to the focus on peer-to-peer transfers and states. Without 
undermining the relevance of the institutional approaches used in these studies, this 
observation in a way reiterates their limitations, particularly in their applicability to all 
instances of policy transfer, and the ability to capture the multi-level dimension of 
policy transfer. These approaches further reiterate the involvement of states, while the 
contributions of transnational actors are often overlooked. This is seen from the 
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example of transfer of NPM to Georgia cited above, whereby despite the involvement 
of numerous transnational actors, little is known of their contribution and their impact 
on mitigation or facilitation of the transfer process. One can therefore infer that, on 
their own, these institutional approaches are not sufficient for capturing policy transfer 
process from the perspective of all or most of the parties involved in the transfer 
process. In addition, with respect to the issues that are addressed with the approaches 
i.e. choice of policy option and constraints of policy transfer; the question of concrete 
additionality of policy transfer might still come to the fore. This is because the 
consideration of policy options reemphasises rationality and links to rational decision-
making. Also, in addressing constraints to policy transfer, many studies make use of 
these institutional approaches to examine policy implementation (Benson and Jordan, 
2011), and this consideration can also be regarded as an aspect to be covered in 
implementation studies. These approaches can as a result, easily present an overlap 
of rational decision-making and policy implementation studies, and may not be able to 
deliver on distinct additionality to public policy research, or enable examination of 
different dimensions of policy transfer. 
Having pinpointed the limitations of applying institutional approaches in policy transfer 
research, the next section presents another approach used in the literature, the 
relational approach. 
 
2.6.2 Use of Relational Approaches in Policy Transfer Research 
The second dominant direction in the new wave of policy transfer literature is the use 
of relational approaches. This focus often involves identifying discrete parties involved 
in both ends of the transfer process that show from where to where knowledge is being 
 
 
80 
 
transferred; connection between organisations; communication by actors and; 
interaction among the actors. Based on the focus of this direction, the relational aspect 
emphasises externality in policy transfer processes. Taking cognisance of the 
contributions of external policy actors to policymaking within a particular jurisdiction, 
gives room for studying the complexities and diversity of activities and contacts 
involved in the process; and how these can impact on the possibility of incorporating 
externally sourced knowledge in policymaking, and future contributions of domestic 
policy actors. In addition, acknowledging externality can ensure that all modes of policy 
transfer can be examined within the framework, be it voluntary or coercive. It can also 
ensure the use of consistent and replicable research methodologies, since relevant 
features for utilising the methodology will more likely than not be present in policy 
transfer instances to be investigated. Externality, in a way holds the key to unlocking 
distinct additionality that policy transfer can bring to public policy research. Echoing 
this position, Evans (2004, p.5) argues: 
Policy transfer analysis must become more distinctive from the analysis of 
normal forms of policymaking if it is not to simply rearticulate other ideas … the 
survival of policy transfer as a framework of understanding relies on its ability 
to be adapted into a multi-level, interdisciplinary perspective which both 
recognizes the importance of global, international, transnational and domestic 
structures and their ability to constrain and/or facilitate policy development and 
allows for the possibility that policy transfer may purely be the product of 
interpersonal relations in a policy transfer network. 
 
Some examples of studies that have followed this approach include Stone (1999), and 
she notes that taking into account other levels of involvement beyond states, makes 
policy transfer to “escape methodological nationalism” (Scholte, 1996 cited in Stone, 
1999, p. 54), and enables the identification and examination of multiplicity of actors 
involved in a transfer process. Relational approach has also enabled the author to 
extensively expound the role of non-state actors in policy transfer. In Stone (2000a), 
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she draws from the concept of epistemic communities and highlights the strategies of 
independent policy institutes. She describes how this set of actors often assume the 
role of an epistemic community based on their expertise and how their likely insider 
status with government and elite networking enable them to contribute to the 
proliferation of policy ideas to different jurisdictions. Walker (2018) also builds on the 
works of Diane Stone and focuses on the involvement of corporatist practises in policy 
transfer, and this led to the observation of a two-way movement of ideas and 
administrative systems between the source and the recipient, which the author 
referred to as collaborative policy transfer. 
Similar to the approach in Stone (2000a), Dunlop (2009) also draws from the concept 
of epistemic communities to illustrate the role of an external epistemic community in 
policy transfer and she elaborates on the interaction between domestic decision 
makers and an epistemic community. Using a case study of policy transfer of use of 
recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST) to the EU, the paper addresses the 
complexity of learning that can take place as a result of interaction between decision 
makers and an epistemic community, and presents four main learning modes that can 
be observed based on the interaction. According to the model presented, when the 
role of an epistemic community is moderate, informal and non-formal learning modes 
can be observed; when the contributions from the epistemic community is not 
significant, then a self-directed learning is observed and; when the role of the 
epistemic community is strong, then a formal learning mode can be observed (Dunlop, 
2009).  
Stone (2004) draws attention to the involvement of international actors, and activities 
of some state-sponsored establishments, such as aids-awarding organisations and 
research institutes, in initiating policy transfer to other countries. The author refers to 
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the activities of international organisations such as the United Nations, OECD and the 
EU. These actors belong to the band of IGOs and their recognition in the policy transfer 
literature has also prompted examination of their intent in engaging in policy transfer, 
and the dynamics of their operations aimed towards actualizing policy transfer (Carroll, 
2014). Stone (2004) notes that the rationale for IGOs to engage in policy transfer is 
often the need to achieve policy harmonisation and convergence among jurisdictions 
that are influenced by the IGOs. It also highlights their proclivity to employ the transfer 
mechanism of conditionality, in impressing transfer objects on the intended recipients.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Graph Showing Temporal Increase in Number of Studies Focused 
on International Organisations as Policy Transfer Actors 
 
Attending to the identification of these sets of transfer agents have indeed led to 
broadening of the policy transfer literature to showcase activities of diverse 
international actors, as Figure 2.4 shows an increase over time in the number of 
studies capturing the role of international actors in policy transfers. In fact, the 
identification of international organisations has helped to generate sub-topical areas 
in policy transfer research. One notable branch is the dedicated research area of policy 
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transfer in the EU. Scholarship in policy transfer in the EU has contributed to further 
conceptualisation of the framework, and has shown how the use of relational 
approaches can help in addressing most of the key policy transfer research questions, 
as against only few of the research questions with the use of institutional approaches.  
Beyond identifying how different groups of policy actors engage in policy transfer, the 
relational approach also allows looking closely into what goes on or what might go on 
between different parties when involved in policy transfer and the roles that each party 
plays in the process. Deviating from the norm of ex-post studies of policy transfer 
instances, Timms (2011) introduces an approach that considers prospective policy 
transfer. He addresses five of the key questions in policy transfer research namely, 
“what is transferred?; why do actors engage in policy transfer?; who are the key actors 
involved in the policy transfer process?; from where are the lessons drawn?; and what 
restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process?” (Timms, 2011, p. 513). The paper 
sought to identify the propensity to transfer urban transport policies from the EU to 
MS, by marrying data from interviews held with state officials on information needs, 
with that of analysis of policy documents published by the EU. As explained by Timms 
(2011), this approach ensured that perspectives from both sides of the transfer 
process i.e. source (which was termed top-down) and recipient (termed bottom-up) 
were acknowledged and incorporated into the study. The study has also made a 
distinctive methodological contribution to policy transfer research in fashioning a 
prospective research that involves data collection from intended recipient through 
interviews, and data collection from prospective source through analysis of published 
policy documents.  
The unique characteristic of the relational approach, which ensures that different 
parties involved in the transfer process are not overlooked, has enabled the policy 
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transfer framework to develop from being only a descriptive concept to an explanatory 
one. In the early studies of policy transfer, the focus had been identifying and 
categorising how, why and through whom transfer had occurred, however, with 
redirected focus on some of the “complexity of the context” (Stone, 2012, p. 487), 
policy transfer framework has extended to an explanatory mode. This explanatory 
mode can be seen in attempts to establish links of process and outcome, and causal 
variables that influence the how, why and through whom transfer had occurred.  
This explanatory mode is demonstrated in the study of transfer of social policy 
(Rodgers, 2014), which considers how social policy has moved over time between 
nations. Based on the focus of the study, one may have expected an explanation of 
the progression of adoption of the target policy i.e. social policy. However, with the 
introduction of how narratives used by actors drove the transfer of social policy, there 
was a specific example of policy transfer, an emphasis on the perceptions of actors, 
and how the perceptions culminated in the occurrence of policy transfer. The author 
cites the example of social policy transfer to the USA from Germany and notes that 
“German universities opened their doors far wider to American students in the natural 
and social sciences than did the closed corporations of the elite British university 
system” (Rodgers, 2014, pp. 308–309). Some of the American students expressed 
their fascination for a “socialised Germany” and described what obtains back at home 
as “anarchic, … torn apart by the unrestrained ambitions of aggressive capital, crippled 
by the weakness of its public agencies, unable to imagine a politics larger than mere 
property rights” (Rodgers, 2014, p. 310). With reference to these observations, the 
author was able to explain that the contrast in the narratives of what Germany had as 
against what existed in USA, helped facilitate the adoption of social policy in the USA. 
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In addition to the identification of multiplicity of transfer agents and possibility of 
addressing most of the key policy transfer research questions, the relational approach 
also enables identifying different roles that actors involved in policy transfer can play, 
and the communication types that emerge from their interaction. Wolman and Page 
(2002, p.477) posit that “policy transfer be conceptualized as occurring through a 
communications and information framework”, thereby considering what transpires 
among actors in a policy transfer process, as an important substance in policy transfer 
analysis. To enable such analysis, they allotted specific roles that actors assume in 
facilitating and engaging in policy transfer. The roles are based on the reference to the 
existence of and use of policy-related knowledge in the definition of policy transfer, 
and the notion that policy transfer process is underpinned by exchange of knowledge 
among actors involved in the process. As such, they identify the roles of knowledge 
producers, receivers and senders and facilitators. These roles are briefly discussed 
below. 
 
Role of Producers of Information:  
The producers represent the person or organisation in whom or which the knowledge 
to be transferred is embodied. They may deliberately make information accessible in 
text form or have it available in ‘materialised’ form i.e. ideas that have been converted 
to policies, policy instruments or established institutions. Recognising producers 
enables the identification of the source end of a policy transfer process. It can also 
facilitate the study of how information from producers is framed and how the framing 
can inform the manner of transfer mechanism that may manifest in the event of policy 
transfer occurring.  
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Role of Senders and facilitators of Information:  
Senders are involved in peddling knowledge that had been produced, as information 
to be translated into potential policy transfer objects. Producers on their part may 
present information without directly identifying for whom the knowledge would be for, 
but senders carry out their activity from the perspective of use of the knowledge by a 
recipient. Senders play the role of disseminating or transporting knowledge, while 
facilitators play a part by initiating and supporting activities that can ensure delivery of 
the knowledge. For example, actors such as supranational bodies, international 
governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, and epistemic 
communities, can play essential roles in providing platforms for producers and 
potential recipients to meet and exchange information, through the organisation of 
conferences, exhibitions, symposiums, and exchange programs (Legrand, 2012a; 
O’Dolan and Rye, 2012). 
 
Role of Receivers of Information: 
The key parties involved in the transaction of knowledge in a policy transfer process 
can be said to be the producers and receivers. This is based on the definition of policy 
transfer, in a transfer process, there will be need for the existence policy-relevant 
knowledge, a prerequisite that can be fulfilled by producers. Another prerequisite is 
the utilisation of the knowledge, and this cannot be fulfilled without the involvement of 
a party receiving the knowledge i.e. receivers. Considering the roles of receivers can 
enable identifying factors that can influence the readiness, interest or willingness of 
intended receivers to accept knowledge borne by producers and senders. It also 
enables the identification of institutional factors that can facilitate or hinder policy 
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transfer; and also, how the transfer object fares in the new jurisdiction where it is being 
applied. 
Park et al. (2014) focuses on receivers in their case study of congestion charge policy 
transfer to Manchester and Stockholm. They extensively address the different modes 
of interaction that can transpire between receivers and other actors in a policy transfer 
process and between receivers and policy stakeholders within the recipient 
jurisdiction. They also link these communication modes to policy success and identify 
two major communication styles that can be observed namely i) one-way 
communication and ii) two-way communication. Whereas one-way communication 
involves limited or no feedback, two-way communication entails active participation 
and feedback from the different actors involved in the transfer process. The authors 
also note that the latter is the preferable choice. 
 
2.6.5 Relevance of a Relational Approach 
As seen from the above discussions, the use of relational approaches opens up 
obscured spaces, and directs attention to features of the transfer process that can 
confer additionality on the budding concept. Specifically, the recognition of diversity of 
policy transfer actors and transfer mechanisms, examination of the key policy transfer 
research questions, and identification of different actor roles, go to show that policy 
transfer process can be assessed in multiple dimensions. This is in contrast to the 
limited examination space afforded by institutional approaches; whereby there is 
primary focus on one side of the transfer process i.e. source or recipient, and 
possibility of addressing very few questions. 
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In addition, this approach confers a broader language that can be commonly used in 
the study of policy transfer. For example, the different transfer mechanisms that are 
associated with externally-initiated and led policy transfers can be more succinctly 
addressed by use of the terminologies of the roles of actors. This is because by 
referring to the roles of the actors, we can note what transpires between them, identify 
what influence an actor wields over another and over the transfer object, and how an 
actor can hamper or hasten the occurrence of policy transfer. Conversely, an 
emphasis on the roles of policy transfer actors and the interaction between the actors, 
can also promote the recognition and citing of transfer mechanisms in policy transfer 
studies, so that terms like obligation or obligated transfer and conditionality or 
conditional transfer, can remain flagbearers of the policy transfer literature. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the concept of policy transfer as presented by Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996, 2000) and explained how it evolved from analogous concepts that had 
been previously introduced by other policy scholars. It also identified the limitations 
associated with how the concept was conceived in its early days, with its assumption 
of rationality in occurrence of policy transfer, and highlighted the criticisms that have 
been targeted at policy transfer. In addressing these criticisms, the review showed that 
the further conceptualisation of policy transfer through the introduction of the multi-
level perspective, enabled a multidimensional application of the concept that allows 
paying attention to both the source and recipient ends of the transfer process. The 
review also considered institutional and relational approaches to studying policy 
transfer, and argued for the relevance of the latter, based on its “attention to … 
communicative processes” (Park et al., 2014, p. 397), possibility of examining what 
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transpired in the transfer process, its capacity to facilitate further development of policy 
transfer framework, and confer additionality by carving a research niche that makes 
ample contribution to public policy study and practice. 
In particular, viewing policy transfer from this dimension gives room for identifying and 
studying different transfer mechanisms, because as mentioned in Chapter 1, transfer 
mechanisms are of themselves not tangible, but are embodied in what is expressed 
by the actors involved in the transfer process. Based on this chapter’s argument for 
the application of relational approaches, we can attempt to unearth how transfer 
mechanisms materialise by focusing on the communication among actors. For 
instance, mechanisms such as persuasion, obligation, and conditionality, are 
underpinned by the involvement of an external actor and we can expect that the 
eventual occurrence of transfer will be dependent on the transfer agent convincing the 
prospective recipient. As such, the application of a relational approach can allow us to 
explore how this convincing is done. In addition, we can examine how the external 
actor presents the transfer object and relates with the recipient, in a bid to identify how 
specific transfer mechanisms can be perceived and strategically employed. This is a 
promising pathway for the adoption of the NPF to investigate how narratives shape 
transfer mechanisms. The next chapter explains the NPF, discusses its applications, 
and illustrates the narratives that can be associated with the transfer mechanisms 
often employed by IGOs, in facilitating policy transfers. 
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Chapter 3 – The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) and its 
Application to Policy Transfer Research 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we looked at the policy transfer framework, the different 
transfer mechanisms that are identified in the literature, and the call for the framework 
to emphasise the roles and contributions of the actors involved in policy transfers and 
the interrelations among them. Likewise, this chapter builds on the contributions from 
other policy transfer scholars who have drawn from communication approaches, such 
as information theory (Wolman and Page, 2002) and public relations theory (Park et 
al., 2014), and introduces the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF). The chapter 
presents the NPF as an approach that can be applied to policy transfer research based 
on the possibility for examining the interaction that transpires among actors engaged 
in policy transfer. Guided by the claims of the NPF that policy narratives influence the 
policy process, the chapter shows how NPF allows us to infer the meanings of what is 
communicated by policy transfer actors and how these shape transfer mechanisms. 
Particularly, with the identification of narrative elements namely, setting, character, 
plot, and moral, and explanation of what they likely imply, the NPF allows us to gain 
insights into how actors perceive their roles and expected contributions to the policy 
transfer process, their notion of the transfer object, and the narrative contexts in which 
their relationship with other actors are cast.  
With reference to this thesis, the NPF is applied for identifying narrative elements used 
by the transfer agents and recipient involved in the transfer of renewable energy and 
DRR policies to ECOWAS, and examining how the narrative elements shaped the 
transfer mechanisms of obligation, conditionality, and persuasion. This chapter 
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presents the emergence of the NPF in the field of public policy and explains what the 
NPF entails. The application of the NPF centres on delineating the narrative structure 
by identifying the key narrative elements namely - setting, character, plot, and moral. 
For the NPF, narratives constitute identifiable elements that are common in policy 
discourses and these embed depictions that portray messages which the narrators 
intend to communicate (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Shanahan et al., 2011a, 2011b). As 
such, the chapter goes on to argue that the NPF can be usefully applied to policy 
transfer research through linking the narrative elements that will likely be associated 
with specific transfer mechanisms and this can aid the conscientious facilitation of 
different modes of policy transfer like obligated policy transfer or persuasive policy 
transfer. Also, by looking again at the policy transfer literature and considering the NPF 
literature, there is a detailed discussion of the narrative elements that will likely be 
associated with the transfer mechanisms of obligation, conditionality, and persuasion. 
The next section discusses the emergence of the study of narrative in the field of public 
policy, and after this, we explore the NPF, followed by a discussion of its application 
to policy transfer research. 
 
3.1 Narratives: From Literature Studies to Public Policy Research 
The contemporary study of narratives emerged from the field of literary studies, 
through an effort of categorising folktales based on perceived similarities in story 
structures (Bal, 2009; Onega and Landa, 2014; Propp, 1968). Moving beyond the field 
of literary studies, narratives are now studied in other fields, including the humanities, 
social sciences, and natural sciences, to contribute to scholarly investigation and 
knowledge, through means such as deriving explanations from historical accounts, 
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analysing speeches of a political actor, and generating records of individual clinical 
experiences of medical patients (Czarniawska, 2004; Frank, 2010; Roe, 1994). In 
political science, the study of narratives is often employed analytically for providing 
insight into the role of discourse in politics, public policies and organisational behaviour 
(Patterson and Monroe, 1998; Shenhav, 2006). The study of policy narratives 
emphasises human participation since what is considered as the object of analysis is 
a product of an individual, group or organisational discourse (Patterson and Monroe, 
1998) and “there is something about … narrative that feels uniquely human” (Jones et 
al., 2014, p. 1). As such, narratives are said to be relevant in understanding identity 
depiction and contestation, construction of political issues by political actors, and their 
beliefs about varying issues (Czarniawska, 2010; Patterson and Monroe, 1998).  
Do narratives provide insights into the intent, actions, or perceptions of actors? This is 
sometimes considered controversial. Rorty (1989) contends that the text credited to a 
storyteller may not necessarily represent the intention of the writer or portrayal of 
actual events. van Fraassen and Sigman (1993) also refer to the analysis of an actor’s 
narratives as another process of creating a different account of narratives. Countering 
these criticisms, Czarniawska (2010) argues that from a researcher’s perspective,  
when a person writes a literature review, she will seek to present the texts in a manner 
that the readers would have the feeling that they have read through the literature, and 
also, when writing a field research report, the researcher would expect the readers to 
have the feeling that they have been on the scene of the research. As such, the subject 
being studied can be maintained as the focus of a research. She also asked, what 
would be the essence of research if facts drawn from texts produced by a research 
subject cannot speak for themselves? Patterson and Monroe (1998, p.316) maintain 
that “[n]arrative is especially useful in revealing the speaker’s concept of self” and that 
 
 
93 
 
organising information with narratives “reveals much about the speaker’s mind”. This 
line of argument can be buttressed by taking note of how the re-telling of many 
folktales often never deviates from the message embedded in the story, thereby 
preserving the original narrative. For example, several re-creations of Cinderella have 
presented the plot of rags to riches, cast the stepmother and her daughters as villains, 
and portrayed the prince as the hero who would rescue Cinderella from the shackles 
of her stepmother and stepsisters (Harris, 1991; Hickox, 1998; Robinson and 
Wildermith, 2016; Waley, 1947). Indeed, within these portrayals lie the heart of the 
story and what draws emotions when the story is told. So, while different versions may 
arise whilst analysing or retelling a narrative, the core aspects of the narrative, which 
embed the message it carries will, more likely than not, remain the same. Also, with 
respect to the possibility of irregularity in stories presented by research subjects, this 
can be addressed by accumulating stories derived at different instances and from 
multiple mediums prior to affirming the narratives being purported by the subject. 
Another consideration is that if there is a likelihood that the texts produced by an actor 
do not portray actual intent or perceptions, this observation can of itself be a relevant 
finding that is worthy of further narrative investigation to ascertain why alternative 
information is presented to mask the actual reality. 
Thus, today the analysis of narratives is a common approach across several 
disciplines (De Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2015) and the field of public policy has not 
been left out. In 1994, Emery Roe recounted a story about his admonition to the head 
of the research centre where he worked, about presenting the stories collected during 
a research at the start of a book that was soon to be published, rather than relegating 
the stories to the back of the book. Speaking with his superior at the research centre, 
Emery Roe said “[b]ut, Percy, the book should be starting with all these stories, not 
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ending with them” (Roe, 1994, p. ix). His advice was however turned down at the time, 
but Roe did not deter. He later developed the Narrative Policy Analysis (with Percy’s 
support) as an approach that integrates contemporary literary theory with public policy. 
Narrative Policy Analysis maintains that policy narratives are relevant in policy analysis 
because “stories commonly used in describing and analysing policy issues are a force 
in themselves” (Roe, 1994, p. 2) and these stories provide information that can be 
used to assess the veracity of different policy choices and help in making decisions on 
policy issues. To carry out a narrative policy analysis, policy analysts are advised to 
identify stories and non-stories or counter stories, and by comparing these stories, a 
metanarrative6 can be generated which will then be attributed to a policy option. Also, 
the metanarrative identified can be reshaped so that it is presented in a form that can 
be subjected to policy intervention (Roe, 1994). In a way, the proposition of identifying 
stories told by policy actors for the purpose of weighing the significance of policy 
options illustrates that policy actors are not immune to employing stories as a 
communicating device. Different case studies that have been examined with the use 
of Narrative Policy Analysis also go to show that policy actors do use policy narratives 
to express their notions of policy issues (Roe, 1991; Ngoasong, 2009; McBeth et al., 
2010). 
Another momentous foray into the application of narratives is credited to Deborah 
Stone. Opposing the notion of rationality, Stone (1989) introduced the four types of 
causal stories that can be associated with problem definition in public policy. These 
are accidental, intentional, mechanical, and inadvertent. She explains that the 
identification of a specific policy problem is often in line with the realisation that an 
                                                          
6 Metanarrative, as specified by Roe (1994), differs from the general connotation of the term, which often implies a foundational 
narrative that supports narratives of policies. For example, a market economy narrative underlines the preferred climate change 
policy of the USA. 
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unwholesome situation can be tackled by human action. Similarly, the type of stories 
that are associated with the problems influence how they emerge on the systemic 
agenda and/or proceed to the formal agenda. In addition, in her acclaimed book, Policy 
Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Stone (2002, 2012) demonstrates how 
policy stories can shape policy goals, problem definition, and policy solutions. Policy 
goals are said to be mainly hinged on motherhood issues i.e. values that are 
intrinsically appreciated within society; policy problems can be expressed with symbols 
and numbers, causes, interests, and decisions; while policy solutions can be 
presented in the form of incentives, rules, facts, rights, and powers. The explication of 
how stories can guide the emergence of policy goals, problems and solution highlights 
the possible use of an emotive apparatus by policy actors as they try to make sense 
of and be part of the policy process. It further emphasises that stories do matter in 
public policy and by relating with the stories told by policy actors, we can gain 
understanding into what their stories imply and what they might be aimed to attain. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, another approach that advances the relevance of 
narratives in public policy is discursive institutionalism, and it is applied for 
investigating and explaining policy choices, policy change, and the policy process 
(Cooper, 2016; Ladi, 2011; Palmer, 2010). Although this approach is not primarily 
specific to public policy but extends to the broader field of political science to explain 
institutional change, it lauds the importance of interaction among policy actors through 
its advancement of the logic of communication and claims that discourse encompass 
ideas and the conveyance of ideas (Schmidt, 2008; Schmidt, 2012). Discursive 
institutionalism therefore serves a dual purpose of extoling the relevance to ideas and 
emphasising the communication of ideas, thereby preventing the neglect of one in 
favour of the other. Based on this, discursive institutionalism aims to show that the 
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examination of discourse focused on ideas communicated and that of the 
communication of the ideas, do provide an explanatory lens for understanding 
institutional change or continuity. With respect to ideas communicated, the explanation 
could be the salience, coherence, consistency or vagueness of the discourse 
(Schmidt, 2008). Also, with respect to the communication of ideas, the causal 
inference could be the persuasive portrayal of the argument supporting the idea and 
its delivery by political actors to their counterparts and the public (Carstensen and 
Schmidt, 2016). While discursive espouses the relevance of ideas and discourse in 
politics, the NPF emphasises the role of a form of communication i.e. narratives in the 
policy process. In doing so, the NPF focuses on the affecting dimension of 
communication of ideas, through the examination of the use of story elements by 
policy actors and explaining how this emotive apparatus reflects and/or conjures 
perceptions such as alliance, disaffection, empowerment, disenfranchisement, 
challenge, victory, or flaws, with regards to a particular policy issue. With reference to 
expounding transfer mechanisms, it may be difficult to establish the institutional 
dimension of a transfer instance, since there will be a need to situate from whose 
perspective is the examination being founded? Should it be that of the source, or 
agent, or multiple intermediaries, or the recipient, or all of these? Indeed, at the level 
of examining institutional change in the recipient jurisdiction based on the adoption of 
a transfer object, we may pinpoint where to look at and what to look for. However, at 
the level of explaining transfer mechanisms, especially coercive transfer mechanisms, 
the involvement of international actors, and existence of multiple jurisdictions, 
histories, sociological backgrounds, ideas present a muddled scenario that may be 
difficult to sort through from an institutional perspective. Albeit, the interaction among 
the actors, and the narratives told about this and the transfer object, represents a 
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thread that connects the varying actors to the transfer process, and thus can serve as 
a site of examination for understanding transfer mechanisms. 
Fischer and Forester (1993, p.3) also advance an argumentative turn. They state that 
“arguments are practical productions” (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 3) and that they 
play roles in describing and substantiating claims made by policy analysts on policy 
“problems and possibilities”. Similar to the Narrative Policy Analysis, the authors 
highlight the relevance of analysing how policy problems are shaped based on 
discourse and language in a bid to understand what informed the identification of 
possible alternatives for addressing the problem. However, contrary to Stone (1989, 
2002)’s assertion that policymaking has little or nothing to do with informed choices or 
decisions, but is more based on the expressed preference of policy actors, the authors 
remark that the policy process is not all about written or oral texts, even though they 
constitute an integral part of it and are deserving of examination. In line with the 
argument by Fischer and Forrester, Hajer (1993) also introduced the discourse 
coalition approach. It explains how the similar social construct on a policy issue by 
actors, may endure and lead to its institutionalisation. A discourse coalition is said to 
constitute a set of storylines, actors that adhere to these storylines, and the practices 
that operate in line with the storylines (Hajer, 1993; Pautz, 2017). The approach 
identifies with the existence of multiple discourses, from which specific features can 
be drawn and a more coherent or whole discourse can be presented. It also advances 
the use of discourse analysis for examining how “meaning … given to social and 
physical phenomenon is reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 
2006:67). To explain policy change in the area of renewable energy in the recipient 
jurisdiction, the approach of discourse coalition and application of discourse analysis 
may have sufficed, and they may have explained the outcome as the inclusion of 
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ECOWAS’ local actors in an existent discourse coalition and adoption of an 
international storyline. It would also have helped to explain the expansion of the 
discourse coalition on environmental use of renewable energy for climate change 
mitigation with the inclusion of West African countries in the along with its storyline on 
economical use of renewable energy for poverty alleviation. However, the approach 
would not be able to serve the purpose of explaining what transfer mechanisms 
manifested during the policy transfer process and how it came about, as there will not 
be an examination of the mode of relationship between the actors. 
Building on some of the above-mentioned contributions, Jones and McBeth (2010) 
developed the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (McBeth et al., 2016). They 
introduce NPF as a framework for investigating the role of policy narratives in the policy 
process, with its application aimed at detecting the intended or unintended strategies 
that are employed by policy actors in positioning a policy issue, promoting their policy 
preference, and situating their relationship with other actors. Notably, the NPF 
encompasses a template for researchers on what to look out for in policy narratives, 
specifically, narrative elements i.e. narrative setting, character, plot, and moral, and it 
also explains the import of these elements in relations to shaping public policy.  
Over the years, the NPF has become a relatively consistent theoretical framework for 
the study of the policy process. Although it might not exist without the seminal work of 
Emery Roe, Deborah Stone and the other authors mentioned above, today, it is 
considered a distinctive framework. Unlike Stone's (2002, 2012) Policy Paradox, which 
is not aligned to major public policy theories, the NPF has been used for examination 
of case studies that are hinged on these theories. Some of the public policy theories 
that have been linked to the NPF include the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), 
Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), and Social Construction of Target Populations 
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(Husmann, 2015; McBeth et al., 2014a; Shanahan et al., 2011a; Warnement, 2016). 
Also, as against the target of the Narrative Policy Analysis being the development of 
metanarratives for the identification and selection of alternatives that can solve a policy 
problem, NPF is less normative and more far-reaching in its applicability. The 
framework has been applied for understanding how policy actors present policy 
problems (McBeth et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2014), deciphering and analysing 
conflicting positions on a specific policy issue (McBeth et al., 2010), comprehending 
relations among policy actors (McBeth et al., 2005; Shanahan et al., 2013b) and 
explaining how policy narratives can carry through a policy preference to become 
policy reality (Shanahan et al., 2013b; Smith-walter et al., 2016). In addition, the NPF 
has been applied for explaining diverse features of the policy process, such as, policy 
change (Shanahan et al. 2011), policy development (Lawton and Rudd 2014), public 
opinion (Shanahan et al. 2011), policy learning (McBeth et al., 2014b), an individual’s 
policy opinions (Shanahan et al. 2014) and policy actor strategies (Crow and Berggren 
2014). It is in this light of recognising the relevance of the NPF for the study of 
narratives in public policy, that the 2014 edition of the Theories of the Policy Process 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2014) featured a dedicated chapter on the NPF, and so did the 
4th edition published in 2017 (Weible and Sabatier, 2017). 
The interdisciplinary attribute of the study of narratives, which is also inherent in the 
NPF, as well as the alignment of the NPF to public policy theories, have informed the 
application of the NPF to policy transfer research. The rationale for drawing from NPF 
to examine how narratives shape policy transfer mechanisms i.e. how narratives 
influence the observation of obligation, conditionality, or persuasion, in instances of 
policy transfers, is partly because it is congruous with the call for policy transfer 
research to focus on the relations among actors involved in policy transfer. NPF can 
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serve as a means for achieving this since narratives represent a form of 
communication and “a seemingly universal device for individuals to sharpen certain 
elements of reality while leveling others” (Jones and McBeth 2010, p.329). Applying 
the NPF to policy transfer research also aligns with the multi-level perspective to policy 
transfer presented by Evans and Davies (1999), which identifies from where and to 
where is policy-relevant knowledge transported and emphasises agency in a policy 
transfer process. In this regard, by examining narratives used in a transfer process, 
NPF identifies the policy actors presenting narratives and their expected audience. In 
particular, with the use of NPF, most of the key questions that are addressed in policy 
transfer research, including those that require identification (such as who is involved 
in transfer? and what is transferred? i.e. transfer object), and others that call for in-
depth analysis (such as why transfer?), can be addressed. For example, by identifying 
the narrative characters that are depicted in a policy narrative relating to an instance 
of policy transfer, the parties involved and the roles they play in the transfer process 
can be identified. Also, the question of why transfer can be deciphered from the plot 
and moral of the policy narrative, as the plot portrays the change that is expected to 
occur in the prospective recipient jurisdiction and the moral will likely indicate how the 
change is expected to come to fruition. 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis draws on the NPF’s claims about the structure of 
policy narratives by identifying and aggregating narrative elements. In the next section, 
an overview of the NPF is presented and we see how the narrative elements i.e. 
character, plot, moral and setting, constitute the bedrock for the NPF. Afterwards, 
there is a detailed discussion on each of these. Then we look at how the narrative 
elements have been portrayed with specific reference to the transfer mechanisms of 
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obligation, conditionality, and persuasion, by drawing from the policy transfer and NPF 
literatures.  
 
3.2 The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) 
Similar to other approaches for narrative analysis in public policy, NPF asserts that 
“[p]olicy narratives are the lifeblood of politics” (Shanahan et al., 2011a, p. 373), as 
they are used by diverse policy actors, including elected officials, civil servants, 
interest groups, media, activists, and international governmental organisations, in 
expressing preferences, engaging in debates, disseminating information to the 
general public, and mobilising support. NPF also posits that there are identifiable 
features that constitute a narrative structure and are common to most stories. These 
features can be compiled, compared, and contrasted, for the purpose of examining 
how policy actors make use of narratives in communicating policy issues and 
assessing the role of narratives in the policy process. The identifiable features are 
grouped into narrative setting, narrative character, narrative plot, and narrative moral 
(Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones et al., 2014), and an important NPF claim is that 
narratives are based on these four major elements. According to the framework,  
[p]olicy narratives have (i) a setting or context … (ii) a plot that introduces a 
temporal element (beginning, middle, end) … providing both the relationships 
between the setting and characters, and structuring causal mechanisms …  (iii) 
characters who are fixers of the problem (heroes), causers of the problem 
(villains), or victims (those harmed by the problem) … and (iv) the moral of the 
story, where a policy solution is normally offered (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 
340). 
 
Although some of the elements have been introduced to the field of public policy 
through the works of Stone (2002) and Roe (1994), they are also identifiable 
fundamental components in the more general literature on storytelling (Booker, 2004; 
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Chatman, 1978; Ninan et al., 2016; Propp, 1968). Particularly, in relations to folktales, 
which is the origin of the study of narratives, these elements have been used to classify 
folktales across various languages and cultures (Abbott, 2016; Berger, 1997; Ninan et 
al., 2016). As such, the study of narratives through the identification of narrative 
elements can be regarded as a recognized approach (French et al., 2017) that goes 
beyond the earlier works on use of narratives in public policy.  
In addition to the narrative structure, the NPF maintains that the narrative content can 
be generalised according to belief systems and narrative strategies. These other two 
aspects of the NPF however, are primarily based on the narrative structure and the 
identification of the four different narrative elements. For example, a study by McBeth 
et al. (2005), which presents findings on measuring policy beliefs on the issue of the 
management of the Greater Yellowstone Area (GYA) in the US, identified the policy 
belief that a group can hold by quantifying the depiction of allies, which is part of the 
narrative element of character. This approach was also used by Shanahan et al. 
(2013) for the analysis of policy beliefs through the identification of heroes and victims, 
which are also part of the narrative element of character.  
With respect to narrative strategies, the NPF utilises concepts such as the angel or 
devil shift to ascertain the narrative strategy of a group. The angel shift implies that a 
group will aim to “win (or not lose) in public policy battles” (Jones et al., 2014, p. 9) by 
depicting itself as a hero and an opposing group as the villain, and likely overstating 
these positions. The devil shift on the other hand, implies that a group will portray itself 
as weaker than a strong, evil, opposing group (Crow and Berggren, 2014). These 
depictions are aimed at drawing emotions from the audience that will favour the 
particular group using these strategies, so that with the use of the angel shift, the group 
will aim to attract praise and adulation from the audience, and with the use of the devil 
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shift, they aim to attract sympathy and compassion from the audience. The 
determination of what narrative strategy is present in a policy narrative, whether an 
angel or devil shift also relies on the narrative structure, and again, primarily, on the 
narrative element of character. As such, one can say that the narrative structure 
represents a fundamental and foundational building block of the NPF. This makes it a 
highly value-adding aspect of the NPF and it is based on this that this study applies 
the narrative structure in examining narratives of policy transfer actors. In particular, 
the narrative element of character sheds light on dynamics of the relationship among 
actors, and the likely pursuit of policy actors. As this study shows from the discussion 
in chapter 6, the depiction of a prospective transfer recipient by the transfer agent as 
both an ally and a victim hints at a call to the transfer recipient to come on board and 
contribute to the efforts being directed or promoted by the transfer agent, whereby 
such joint contributions will also help to address a challenge which the recipient is 
presently facing. This further highlights the relevance of the narrative elements 
constituting the narrative structure. 
Having established that the NPF is useful, we have to be mindful that it has limitations 
too. Weible and Schlager (2014, p. 240) argue that the framework needs to present a 
consistent meaning and measurement of narrative elements and what should 
constitute a policy narrative. In particular, they note that the prescription of what a 
policy narrative is i.e. having setting, character, plot and moral, may not hold true in all 
communication content of policy actors, since not all policy narratives will likely be 
adeptly and strategically prepared to adhere to recommendations for effectively 
communicating a narrator’s views on a policy issue. They also remark that the inability 
to feature all the narrative elements in a policy narrative could be because developing 
complete narratives is resource-dependent. To address the concern of incomplete 
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feature of narrative elements, the delineation of a policy narrative has been revised. 
Notably, Shanahan et al. (2013b) states that a policy narrative must refer to a policy 
issue and should include at least one character.  
Another explanation for the presence or absence of a narrative element in an actor’s 
policy narrative can be an intended exclusion to communicate a specific intent or 
perception. For example, the findings from this study suggests that the narratives of 
policy transfer actors are often ally-seeking, whereby villains and/or victims are rarely 
portrayed. This is unlike the narratives of policy groups that are debating a domestic 
policy issue and where the emphasis is often to win or prevent losing on a certain 
domestic concern (McBeth et al., 2010; Crow and Berggren, 2014). The use of ally-
seeking narratives will mostly feature in instances of coercive policy transfer where the 
transfer recipient has less economic or political power than the transfer agent. With 
the agents in need of acquiescence from the recipients, and the recipients being aware 
that they can get support from the agents, the stories told by the actors do not employ 
policy battle tactics with effective portrayal of all the narrative elements. Instead, there 
is a careful omission of elements that may present other parties in a bad light or prompt 
uncomfortable realisations and this is aimed at depicting a state of ‘no winners, no 
losers’. The ally-seeking approach is further discussed in chapter 6.   
By delineating policy narratives to be consisting of at least one character and referring 
to a policy issue, the scope of the type of actors and scenarios to be investigated using 
the NPF broadens. It helps to ensure that policy narratives originating from diverse 
actors can be acknowledged and analysed, be they resource-rich or resource-poor. It 
also enables the application of NPF to extend beyond problem definition to other and 
aspects of public policy. 
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While much of this discussion has centred on the use of narratives for organising 
information, there is yet the limitation of what narratives can achieve beyond portrayals 
and perception. What power can they have or give? How do they, of themselves, drive 
policy transfer and prompt policy change? “Shanahan et al. (2011, p. 549) contends 
that “a new policy narrative may be so powerful in and of itself as to precipitate policy 
change”, and also, there are numerous accounts of how narratives have produced 
significant actions and positions. For example, Jones et al. (2014) relay how the stories 
publicised to the military troops of the United Kingdom and the public during World 
War II pumped their belief and ability to win the war against all odds. Also, many 
stories, which are now regarded as myths, in several cultures, were used in the past 
to exercise power over societies. For instance, stories of oceans and forests operating 
as spiritual beings gave power to rulers, such as priests and chiefs, to exercise control 
over these natural resources and sometimes own the property (Brockington, 2004; 
Fagunwa, 1982; Masquelier, 1993). According to Brockington (2004:426), stories “can 
generate money, gain the support of the elite, and prompt widespread public 
sympathy. … (Therefore,) policies underpinned by immensely powerful stories are 
almost bound to succeed”. With this assertion, the policy outcome is linked to stories 
and the certainty of success can be propelled by powerful stories. In another light, 
stories are also said to instil power dynamic and power relations. Lewis (2017:2) refers 
to power dynamic as the “specific ways in which power is exercised or experienced in 
a given context and/or interaction”, while power relations is broadly seen as 
relationships in which one party is able to direct or influence the behaviour of the other 
party (Contu and Gire, 2014; Dawson et al., 2016; Wood, 2016). “Narratives are 
inextricable from power” (Matute, 2016:127) and one contribution of narratives to the 
manifestation of power dynamic is its ability to both bestow as well as to suppress the 
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power to be assumed by actors. Stories focused on weaknesses of an actor can 
produce weakened identities (Bishop, 2003) and stories focused on strengths of an 
actor can lead to emergence of bold identities (Zeng, 2017). An illustration of how 
narratives can embolden, or undermine actors is presented in China’s policy narrative 
on its ‘One belt One road’ initiative. The narrative strategically seeks to create a “new 
type of great power relations” (Zeng, 2017: 1162), whereby China leads and Europe 
is marginalised, in Chinese domestic policy discussions.  
Underlying the above assertions however, is a conundrum. With the numerous 
accounts of how narratives have led to significant actions and positions of power, there 
is also a need for the explanation of how these come about, particularly, an explanation 
of the isolated effect of narratives. With reference to facilitating policy transfer and 
achieving policy change, while it may be easily agreeable to argue that stories give 
power and can prompt the occurrence of policy transfer and facilitate policy change, 
demonstrating such a claim may be difficult. Also, if we consider the input of actors 
with significant financial resources and their ability to use this to facilitate policy 
transfer and/or tell powerful stories, there is then the challenge of deciphering at which 
point is the outcome dependent on resources, and which point is it attributable to 
narratives. In this study, we can also observe in one of the case studies, that narratives 
of powerful actors may empower a less-powerful actor. This can be seen in the EU’s 
emphasis on the narrative character of ally in referring to ECOWAS, instead of the 
character of victim, which emboldened the recipient to engage in the transfer as 
though it was an equal partner with the transfer agent. Being that it will be difficult to 
neglect the resources of the EU, the possibility of arguing for the sole effect of 
narratives on ECOWAS’ disposition and action as a transfer recipient, therefore may 
be challenging. It is in consideration of this limitation that narrative is not regarded as 
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the one and only explanatory variable leading to shaping transfer mechanisms and 
occurrence of policy transfer, but a contributing variable nonetheless.  
The next section turns to each of the narrative elements in the NPF i.e. setting, 
character, plot, and moral. It explains these elements in more detail, how they have 
been portrayed in the literature and the connotations that are linked to their portrayals. 
It also highlights the narrative elements that will be identified in the policy narratives to 
be analysed in this research. 
 
3.3 Narrative Elements 
3.3.1 Setting 
Jones and McBeth (2010, p.340) refer to the narrative setting as a policy setting or 
context and remark that “the setting need not be bound by geography or institutional 
venue (and) … the basic assumptions of the policy controversy … will provide a 
suitable setting”. According to McBeth et al. (2014a, p. 228), narrative setting indicates 
the “legal and constitutional parameters, geography, economic conditions, and other 
factors regularly deemed relevant by policy actors involved or associated with a public 
policy”. Jones et al. (2014) also describe the settings in relation to a stage set for a 
performance, showing that the narrative setting situates the background and 
establishes the boundaries for the story that is being told. There have been varied 
directions taken by different studies in operationalising narrative setting. Ney (2014) 
operationalises setting in the study on identification of major narratives on social 
innovation to be basic assumptions about social innovations, and specifically, stances 
on what innovation means, and these7 were coded in the study’s analysis of 
                                                          
7 Examples of the different settings identified in the study are i) Innovation is more than path-breaking innovation, ii) Innovation 
is about doing good while doing well, iii) Innovation is about emancipating and empowering people (Ney, 2014).  
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documents from individuals such as academics and organisations such as the 
European Commission. Pierce et al. (2014) present findings on the extent of use of 
the NPF as an analytic framework and in order to identify the use of narrative element 
of setting, they code the policy domains and levels of government that featured in the 
19 studies. Gray and Jones (2016, p.203) present narrative setting as the “physical, 
ideational, and discursive space in which regulation takes place”, in their study on 
regulating election campaign finance, and to identify the narrative setting in the data 
collected from interview sessions, the responders’ implication of what the regulations 
should mean was used. Based on this, they identified two narrative settings namely, 
equality and individual expression. This operationalisation of settings is synonymous 
with that of Ney (2014) and is informed by using the meaning of or stance on a 
particular topic to represent the narrative setting. However, this approach seems to 
have shortcomings in aligning with some of the descriptions of narrative setting as 
highlighted above, as it does not capture underlining attributes surrounding the policy 
issue. One can also say that it implies the specificity of the narrative rather than the 
context guiding the narrative. 
Acknowledging the underlining circumstances necessitating a particular policy, 
including the nature of the policy problem and its likely target population, can help to 
contribute to operationalising narrating setting. This is especially in line with ensuring 
that the setting of a policy narrative highlights the policy context (Jones and McBeth, 
2010). French et al. (2017, pp.6–7) remarked, “(narrative) settings have not been an 
NPF research priority thus far” and “only a few NPF scholars have explored settings”. 
So, in a bid to address this shortcoming in NPF scholarship, they draw from the field 
of literary studies and argue that the designation of narrative settings needs to project 
“the spatial dimension of policy narratives” (French et al., 2017, p. 13) and imply the 
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boundaries for the influence and actions of the characters introduced in the narrative. 
To exemplify their proposition, they present a case study on the issue of disaster 
preparation on the Yellowstone River in the United States and identify these narrative 
settings – bureaucratic, community, private, and river. The actors who situate the 
setting of their narrative as bureaucratic based their narration on concerns of 
government’s broad action over a jurisdiction through coordination of the activities of 
agencies and making rules. Those who situate a community setting based their 
narrative on actions confined to a specific group or location. The private setting was 
concerned with a section of business activity or a specific practice, while the setting of 
river encompassed the influence of the river on the environment and the people within 
its reach.  
This operationalisation of narrative setting gives an insight into how we can visualise 
the focus or targeted perimeter of policy transfer actors, or the space that they intend 
to influence when engaging in policy transfer (Shanahan et al., 2017a). Following the 
introduction of spatial narrative setting in French et al. (2017), Shanahan et al. (2017b) 
identified the setting of policy narratives by asking the question - where does the action 
take place? For a policy actor who is intending to engage in policy transfer, because 
the transfer object is yet to be domiciled within the recipient jurisdiction, the question 
will more likely read – where will the action take place? This could be in a bureaucratic 
space, whereby there will be an influence on governments to alter the coordination of 
government activities or how rules are made. The setting could also be in a community 
space where the action is focused on a group of people based on their location or 
particular characteristics or in a sectoral space where influence and action will be 
bound to a sector (Shanahan et al., 2017b). Unlike the other three narrative settings, 
the setting of river can be said to be specific to the case study in French et al. (2017) 
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i.e. the Yellowstone River. Albeit, to draw insight from the space attributed to the 
setting, with the river being noted to flow through ten countries and the description of 
the river setting as “a more expansive perspective” (French et al., 2017, p.30), one 
can say that the designation of a collective setting may be more depictive. This is 
because the term helps to show that the setting encompasses a collective environment 
and population. 
With the application of these different spatial narrative settings i.e. bureaucratic, 
community, sectoral, and collective, we identify from the narratives of policy transfer 
actor, the intended extent of coverage of the transfer object, whether it will be directed 
at how government works within the jurisdiction, or at a certain group of the population, 
or at a specific sector, or focused on diverse groups within the jurisdiction. The 
identification of the narrative setting that is portrayed in the narrative of the policy 
transfer actors also helps to show where the transfer object is expected to take effect 
within the recipient jurisdiction i.e. where the action will take place, and where the 
efforts of the transfer agent will likely be directed.  
The next section discusses the second narrative element, character. 
 
3.3.2 Characters 
In NPF, there are three broad categories of policy narrative characters namely, 
“heroes (and allies), villains (and enemies), and victims” (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 
341). With reference to the origins of the NPF in literature studies, these characters 
are primarily drawn from the mainstream storytelling practice, whereby stories feature 
protagonists and/or antagonists (Booker, 2004). The application of this to public policy, 
however, in understanding the positioning of who needs to benefit from a public policy, 
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who or what is suffering from a problem, and who is capable of fixing a policy problem, 
can be credited to Deborah Stone (2012). Ascribing narrative characters to persons, 
groups, organisations associated with a policy issue relieves the limitation of capturing 
everyone under the caption of policy actors. By denoting a specific character, this 
identity carries with it the role such an actor plays or is purported or expected to play, 
in relations to the policy issue. 
Specifying the role of actors by casting them as characters in policy narratives can 
also help to distinguish who or what qualifies to assume a particular role. In particular, 
the debate on whether inanimate and non-human entities can be cast as characters 
in a policy narrative (Patterson and Monroe, 1998; Jones et al., 2014; Weible and 
Schlager, 2014) can be addressed by considering what is expected of the character 
being designated to a specific entity i.e. the role of the character. For instance, with 
the character of a hero often being specified to mean the fixer or potential fixer of a 
problem in many NPF studies, as can be seen in Table 3.1, the material and mental 
resources therefore that will need to be utilised by the character will most likely be 
available only within the reach of a human entity. So, one can say that it will be likely 
impossible to rely on non-human characters like the environment or certain animals to 
solve policy problems. This is also because policy narratives pertain to real life and 
real issues, instead of fictional stories, and as such inanimate or non-human entities 
cannot be beckoned to take on extraordinary powers and address issues such as 
disaster risk reduction or use of renewable energy for climate change mitigation.  
With a contrary stance to the exclusion of non-humans as policy narrative characters, 
Weible and Schlager (2014, p.240) state that:  
any person, place, or thing could be a character … The motivation to extend 
characters beyond humans makes perfect sense and can be justified at a 
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conceptual level as many non-human nouns are often characters in stories, 
especially animals or nature in environmental issues. 
 
The extension of the multiple capabilities to fix, cause, and suffer harm to non-human 
entities seems to be a case of overstretching what non-humans can do. Non-humans 
may readily be seen in a harmed position and in need of help, and they might also be 
responsible for causing harm to victims, but to be able to fix a policy problem, will be 
unlikely. Some of the non-human entities identified as victims in NPF literature include 
wildlife and air quality (Shanahan et al., 2011b), bison (McBeth et al., 2010), and 
sacred grounds and the environment (Shanahan et al., 2013b). Indeed, across the 
NPF studies, there are hardly studies where non-human entities are cast as heroes, 
or designated as villains (Lawton and Rudd, 2014; Lybecker et al., 2013; McBeth et 
al., 2010; Shanahan et al., 2011b), rather, the character of who is fixing or can fix a 
problem, and who is causing the problem have often been ascribed to human entities 
or entities with human reference such as corporations or society. For example, 
Shanahan et al. (2011b) finds that some policy narratives cast a named judge, a 
government agency, and environmentalists supporting the ban of use of snowmobiles 
in a national park as heroes, while Gray and Jones (2016) also show findings where 
individuals and groups fighting for freedom of expression are cast as heroes. Also, 
casting of villains in McBeth et al. (2010), Lybecker et al. (2013), and McBeth et al. 
(2014b), have focused on humans. While non-humans may be accommodated as 
victims or villains, taking on the role of hero in a policy narrative may not be easily 
agreeable because “[w]hen narrative emphasises human action that is directed toward 
goals, it provides insight on how different people organise, process, and interpret 
information and how they move toward achieving their goals” (Patterson and Monroe, 
1998, p. 316).  
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Table 3.1 - Definition of Narrative Characters in Some NPF Studies 
 McBeth et al. 
(2005)  
Shanahan et al. 
(2011)  
Gupta et al. 
(2016) 
Gray and 
Jones (2016) 
Heroes  Potential fixers 
of a problem 
Supporters of 
the preferred 
policy  
Fixer of the 
problem 
Those that will 
correct the 
situation 
Villains The groups or 
persons 
responsible for a 
policy problem 
Who are to 
blame for 
thwarting the 
policy 
preference 
Causer of the 
problem 
Those that 
perpetuate the 
harm 
Victims The one harmed 
by the villain 
and worthy of 
policy attention 
Who suffer 
without the 
enactment of 
the policy 
preference 
Those harmed 
by the problem 
Those that are 
harmed 
Source: Author’s Elaboration on Five NPF Studies  
The identification of relevant human entities as heroes of policy narratives aligns with 
the diverse definitions of the character as shown in Table 3.1. These definitions are 
taken from selected NPF studies that have slightly varied interpretation of the narrative 
characters and they show that despite having different expressions for the definitions 
of the characters, the likelihood of whether humans or non-humans can fit into the 
different characters remains the same. For example, the character of heroes, whether 
it is represented by supporters of a preferred policy or those that will correct a situation, 
will most likely only be represented by a human entity. The standpoint of which 
narrative characters human and non-human entities can represent, also helps to 
highlight what non-humans can and can’t be responsible for, since it will not be 
practical to rely on the monetary or mental capabilities of non-human entities or expect 
them to give direction on what to do to address a policy problem, as portrayed in the 
image shown below.  
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Source: Star Tribune (2015)  
 
In line with Jones and McBeth (2010), the characters identified in this study are heroes 
and allies, villains and antagonists and, victims. Their descriptions are also drawn from 
the definitions given above in Table 3.1. As such, a hero is seen as an entity 
designated as fixing or being able to fix a specified problem; an ally is an entity that 
supports or acts together with the hero; a villain is an entity that causes harm; an 
antagonist is an entity that is opposing the stance or action of another actor; while a 
victim is an entity hurt by a specified condition. 
 
3.3.3 Plot 
A narrative plot links the characters to the setting (Jones and McBeth, 2010) by 
indicating the actions that the characters will take within the boundaries of the setting. 
It also represents the basis for the provision that a narrative should have a beginning, 
middle, and an end (McBeth et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2014). This temporal dimension 
signifies the journey that the narrative characters within a story embark on and also 
encompasses the narration of events occurring within stories. Importantly, it is based 
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on the element of plot that a turn of events can be captured in a narrative, and this 
helps to identify how and/or when circumstances or actions of characters differed from 
what obtained at the beginning of the story. As such, in the application of NPF to public 
policy, the determination of causal mechanisms is often hinged on the identification of 
a narrative plot that alludes to the type of characters and their actions, alongside 
events occurring within a particular setting (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Lawton and 
Rudd, 2014; Stone, 2012), to indicate “the source of the (policy) or policy problem and 
assign blame” (Shanahan et al., 2013a, p. 18). 
The NPF does not stipulate specific plot types that can feature in policy narratives and 
these element is not often featured in NPF studies (Pierce et al., 2014). However, the 
NPF recognises the plots that are presented in Stone (2012), which are plots of 
decline, stymied progress, helplessness and control, conspiracy, and blame the victim. 
These narrative plots have been utilised only in few studies (McBeth et al., 2012; 
Shanahan et al., 2013), and in most of these, the plots did not enable the portrayal of 
the temporal dimension of the stories being told by the policy actors. As a result, in 
studies like McBeth et al. (2012), which analysed YouTube videos, the prescribed plots 
were designated as story types, and the authors had to rely on narrating the beginning, 
middle and end of the story, to discuss the plots of the narratives.  
The plots in Stone (2012) can be said to primarily depict a status quo as against 
highlighting the temporal dimension of narratives. In particular, with respect to policy 
transfer, the narratives used by transfer agents are often aimed at convincing the 
recipients that there is a need to change their present status, by indicating a current 
undesirable circumstance and highlighting the possibility of being in a more desirable 
circumstance or position. For instance, the narratives used by the UNISDR to 
emphasise the relevance of adopting a DRR policy for ECOWAS region highlighted 
 
 
116 
 
the sufferings of many West Africans from floods, desertification, and diseases, and 
then, how these sufferings can be allayed should ECOWAS governments join other 
countries and the UNISDR, in addressing the issue of disasters from an environmental 
perspective. The plots stipulated in Stone (2012) will likely not enable the depiction of 
such stories and the proponents of the NPF have also maintained that these plots 
have not been endorsed by the NPF and that it is possible to identify plots through 
other sources while applying the NPF (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Shanahan et al., 
2013; Jones et al., 2014).  
O’Bryan et al. (2014) draw from the field of literature and drama to portray the plot 
identified in their study. They note that some US policy actors portrayed a ‘doomsday 
scenario’, to insinuate that their jurisdiction was at the risk of an imminent danger of 
terrorism based on the occurrence of the Arab spring in the Middle East, and to 
encourage the US President to take action on the issue of terrorism by making 
changes to foreign aid offered to the countries experiencing the Arab Spring. The 
doomsday scenario can be likened to one of the plots stipulated as part of the basic 
plots in the literature (Booker, 2004) i.e. the plot of ‘overcoming the monster’. The plot 
also highlights the temporal dimension of storytelling by illustrating the likelihood of 
change in circumstance from peace to terror, as a result of potential acts of terror 
facilitated from the Middle East. In addition to the plot of overcoming the monster, other 
plots from the field of literature that reflect a temporal flow of events or circumstance 
can be seen in Booker (2004), and these are plot of rebirth and plot of rags to riches. 
These plots can be said to be in line with the notion that narratives “describe change 
over time” (Kaplan 1986, p.768).  
The study uses these narrative plots to identify the plots portrayed by policy transfer 
actors in the transfer of renewable energy policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS. With 
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reference to policy transfer, the use of the plots is also based on the observation that, 
stories which highlight the transition from the status quo, such as stories of policy 
reform, often project journeys leading to triumph or happy endings (Pollitt 2013; Mayer 
2014). The plot of rebirth highlights a turnaround in the perceived identity or image of 
a jurisdiction. It is based on the reorientation of values and represents a “change of 
heart” (Booker 2004, p.26). The plot of rags to riches implies an economic reference 
and a shift from a state of economic deprivation or lack to buoyancy, and the plot of 
overcoming the monster portrays a story of tackling an imminent threat to a society 
and achieving victory. 
 
3.3.4 Moral  
While the plot connects some of the elements of a narrative, the moral sums up the 
narrative by indicating what to take away from it (Jones and Radaelli, 2015). The 
narrative moral therefore is like the story’s lesson, which indicates what the story aims 
to demonstrate to or instil in its audience. This feature of the narrative moral shows its 
link to the narrative plot, as such lessons cannot be drawn from just the narrative 
character or setting on their own, but from the plot which uses a storyline to connect 
the narrative character and setting. Stating the relevance of and relationship between 
the plot and moral, although in the context of a policy battle among advocacy groups, 
Shanahan et al. (2011b), note that “the strategic use of how the plot and moral of the 
narrative are used will reveal how different groups manage conflict”. Also, Jones and 
Radaelli (2015) remark that the narrative moral “often refers to the ethical aspects of 
the policy solution proposed within the plot”. The emphasis on the plot and moral is 
also because the other narrative elements of characters and setting are embedded 
within the plot and it is from the plot that the narrative moral emanates. This also 
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highlights the relevance of attempting to identify the moral when plots are depicted in 
narratives.  
The narrative moral is often defined as a policy solution (Jones and McBeth, 2010; 
Jones et al., 2014; Lawton and Rudd, 2014; Smith-walter et al., 2016), and, in its 
operationalisation in NPF studies, the moral has been represented by policy problem 
(Pierce et al., 2014), legislation (O’Leary et al., 2017), and policy preference (Gupta et 
al., 2016; Shanahan et al., 2011a). Realising that not all policy narratives may be 
targeted at debating rival policy preferences, the specification of moral to imply a policy 
solution may be limiting on studies where policy narratives are aiding attestation rather 
than contestation. The explanation of a narrative moral by Jones and Radaelli (2015) 
as “the takeaway of a policy narrative” can be said to be more encompassing of what 
policy actors may portray in policy narratives focusing on varying public policy 
concerns or process. This is also reiterated by Gray and Jones (2016) and the authors 
described a narrative moral as what to be gleaned from the story. Also, as shown in 
the quote below, Jones et al. (2014, p.7) recognise that a narrative moral may not 
always feature in a policy narrative based on what the narrative is targeted at.  
However, it is possible that a communication would be considered a policy 
narrative without a solution. The goals of such policy narratives might include 
focusing on the uncertainty of a piece of evidence or a specification of a problem 
to which a solution is needed. Thus, some forms of communication have other 
elements of a policy narrative but no solutions. 
 
By referring to gleaning, Gray and Jones (2016) show that the narrative moral is 
dependent on the type of story being told and as such, the operationalisation of a 
narrative moral is not constrained to identifying a policy solution, but identifying what 
the narrator will like the audience to draw from the narrative. According to Verweij et 
al. (2006), the narrative moral is the culmination of the narrative, as it sums up what 
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the narrative hopes to convey through the use of the different narrative elements. 
Based on this, the study takes the moral of a narrative to imply what the narrative 
implores or recommends with regard to its specific setting, characters, and plot, and 
presents three possible morals that can be drawn from the narratives of policy transfer 
actors, namely, managing cost and benefit, incentives and sanctions, and value 
reorientation. These are premised on what the narratives suggest needs to be done, 
and what the occurrence of policy transfer can achieve within the recipient jurisdiction. 
With the moral of managing cost and benefit, the highlight of the policy narrative is on 
weighing the cost of intervening on the policy issue against the benefit to be derived 
from doing so. The moral of incentives and sanctions focuses the policy narrative on 
the possibility of offering support as an incentive to address a policy issue and the 
possibility of withdrawing the support if the issue is overlooked. Also, the moral of value 
reorientation centres the policy narrative on the need to alter a preferred policy stance.  
The next section discusses how the NPF is applied for this research. 
 
3.4 Application of the NPF  
The NPF is used in this study to analyse the narratives used by actors in the transfer 
of renewable energy policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS by the EU and UNISDR, 
respectively, by identifying the narrative elements portrayed by the transfer agents and 
recipient. This is in a bid to investigate how the actors’ narratives shaped the transfer 
mechanisms that are identified in the two instances of policy transfer. Specifically, the 
NPF is employed so as to know what to look for in documents pertaining to the policy 
transfer cases, to describe the depiction of the narrative elements, and explain how 
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the particular narrative elements depicted by the transfer actors contributed to the 
shaping of the transfer mechanism.  
It is necessary to note that there are other relational approaches that can benefit the 
examination of policy transfers, and may have been employed in this research. It is 
therefore, important to address why the NPF was utilized instead of other relational 
approaches. One of the relational approaches that was mentioned in Chapter 2 is 
discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is about studying what actors say, do, and are 
through their use of language (Brown and Yule, 1983; Gee, 2014; Hajer and Versteeg, 
2005; Van Dijk, 1997). With this approach, there is the assertion that there is a political 
sense to language use and thus, it seeks to look for deeper meaning of what is 
communicated in speech, text, and pictorial form, how these are expressed, and what 
their functions are (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008). It therefore encompasses the 
examination of what underpins the words, images, or body language that is used by 
actors. In this regard, discourse is conceived of as a social practice (Fairclough, 1992) 
and to engage in discourse analysis will require considering specific attributes 
including the cohesion of words, coherence of meaning between different parts of the 
discourse, intentionality of who is communicating, and intertextuality of the discourse 
with what has been communicated before (Gee 2014; Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 
2008). One wouldn’t necessarily say that NPF is a better framework to be applied to 
policy transfer than discourse analysis, but it is a more fitting framework for unpacking 
transfer mechanisms. This is because the analysis of discourse is often specific to the 
communication about an event, actor, or policy issue and its findings are mainly 
applicable to the matter at hand (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005), but the NPF allows the 
coordination of findings in themes that can be observed across board in diverse cases 
of policy transfer and can be linked to what different mechanisms convey, including 
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motive, expectations, and relationships. This makes discourse analysis more suitable 
for descriptive purposes (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), whereas the NPF can offer 
predictive functions to transfer actors and scholars (Jones et al., 2010; 2014). Also, 
since transfer mechanisms are built-up from various interactions and actions, making 
them pliable and fluid, but discourse analysis is more linked to wider social and cultural 
reality (Fairclough, 1992), its application would likely make it difficult to observe swift 
or subtle shifts in mechanisms, as policy transfer is a far less enduring process than 
social reality or identities. This is not to say that altogether, this study could not have 
benefitted from the use of discourse analysis, but that the use of the approach would 
be limiting in addressing the overarching research question. One way however that 
discourse analysis may have contributed to this study, is enabling another layer of 
examination i.e. of language use, in order to reiterate the findings from the narrative 
analysis. For example, the EU’s reference to the Lome Convention between itself and 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in its narratives demonstrates a feature 
of intertexuality and this is used to orchestrate the positioning of ECOWAS as an ally 
and this, but this functionality however, does not apply across board in all the texts, 
and on its own, is limited in explaining the interconnections among the actors. 
In addition to discourse analysis, another relational approach that could be considered 
for combining with policy transfer is social network analysis (SNA). This approach is 
concerned with the connections among persons, groups, organisations, or states and 
using this to explain the “important contours of opportunity and constraint that shape 
social, political, or economic behaviour” (Ward et al. 2011:246). It presents actors as 
nodes and highlights the links that join them, in order to establish the network structure 
operational in a community, field of special interest, or an institution. It also seeks to 
explain the implication of the patterns observed in the representations of nodes and 
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links (Ward et al., 2011) such as constraining or enabling intermediation in 
policymaking (Raab and Kenis, 2007). While the application of network analysis is 
recognised in the field public policy, it is now beginning to gain traction in policy transfer 
research. The combination of narrative analysis and network analysis has also been 
explored in NPF (Heikkila et al., 2014) to demonstrate the alignment or otherwise of 
actors and their narratives on a policy issue. Similarly, this combination is also used in 
the application of discourse coalition. For this study, this may have informed the 
identification of links between different international actors involved in promoting the 
policy issues in sub-Sahara Africa, as well as identify the actors that are engaged 
locally, and perhaps the ties that may be existing among them and the international 
actors. However, for the purpose of narrative analysis and particularly for attempting 
to unpack transfer mechanisms that can be linked to IGOs, the use of SNA would have 
necessitated an extended research into actions and relationships of individual transfer 
agent, recipient, and intermediaries, in order to plot the pattern of links and the 
structure of network driving the policy transfers. This can possibly be covered by future 
research and it would benefit the study of transfer mechanisms. 
Similar to the application of SNA, ethnography is another approach that holds 
possibility of application for studying transfer mechanisms and the narratives of actors. 
Although ethnography primarily emerged from the field of anthropology, it has also 
made inroads into the discipline of politics where it is often aided by semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews (Bayard de Volo, L. and Schatz, 2004). Notably, this 
approach has been used in both policy transfer and NPF research (Evans and 
Barakat, 2012; Jones, 2017). The application of ethnography entails getting immersed 
in the activities, routines, coordination, and discussions of policy transfers by the 
actors involved. Essentially, this would involve being on location and co-living the 
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experience of the research subjects in order to collect data for the study. However, 
with the field of policy transfer being dominated by ex-post studies (i.e. scholars mostly 
investigate policy transfers that have occurred), rather than ex-ante studies (where 
scholars conduct research when policy transfer is occurring or expected to occur), 
ethnography is often used when identifying new insights such as ambassadors of 
participation (Porto de Oliveira, 2017) or studying peculiar cases (Evans and Barakat, 
2012). However, the identification of transfer mechanisms is not a new notion in the 
field as different mechanisms have already been identified by other scholars (Benson 
and Jordan, 2011; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Stone 
2000b). In addition, with the focus of this research on the consideration of narratives 
for explaining transfer mechanisms, reliance on ethnography would have likely 
required having privileged knowledge of the intention of actors to engage in policy 
transfer, and particularly transfer that would involve specific mechanisms. 
The explanation of how the narrative elements depicted can inform the transfer 
mechanism observed is based on the NPF’s description of how the narrative elements 
are often used by policy actors. For instance, the depiction of a victim is mostly 
associated with the identification of a policy problem and the designation of who is 
deserving of support (Husmann, 2015; McBeth et al., 2005). While the portrayal of the 
narrative character of villain is for the purpose of identifying who should be blamed for 
a policy problem or giving a non-desirable portrayal of an actor (Gupta et al., 2016; 
Shanahan et al., 2011b). As such, when a jurisdiction is portrayed as a victim by an 
external actor that is also a potential transfer agent, one can note that the jurisdiction 
is possibly being positioned as a prospective recipient of an externally-initiated policy 
transfer. NPF case studies also help to shed light on the links between narrative 
elements. For example, in the case study of floodplains in Montana, decision makers 
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were interviewed on how they viewed the problem, who they thought was responsible 
and how they thought it should be addressed (Shanahan et al., 2017b). The study 
found that when the setting is situated as bureaucratic, federal assistance was 
considered important and the government was depicted as a hero. “Similarly, the 
private sector setting includes no federal assistance as a policy solution and remains 
silent with regard to federal assistance and public hazards education. The heroes in 
this setting are citizens and the local community, not governmental entities” 
(Shanahan et al., 2017b, p. 18). According to the authors, the study demonstrates that 
how a policy problem is viewed informs what likely solutions are proffered and who will 
be championed as capable or worthy of delivering the solution. Findings such as this 
are used to explain and buttress what is observed from the analysis of the two cases 
of policy transfer to ECOWAS. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and argued in Chapter 5, the transfer of renewable energy 
policy to ECOWAS was facilitated through the transfer mechanisms of conditionality 
and persuasion, while the transfer mechanism manifesting in the case of DRR policy 
transfer to ECOWAS is obligation. With the focus on the involvement of IGOs as policy 
transfer agents and as shown from the explanation of the different transfer 
mechanisms presented in Chapter 2, the mechanisms of obligation and conditionality 
can be seen as the go-to transfer mechanisms that IGOs often employ, while 
persuasion is also sometimes associated with IGOs like the EU and UN. Whereas with 
the use of the mechanism of obligation, IGOs rely on an existing accord with the 
intended recipient jurisdiction (Ladi, 2011; Steinbacher, 2015), the use of conditionality 
is based on a promise of support upon the adoption of the policy transfer object (Alou, 
2009; Chapman and Greenaway, 2006; Koeberle et al., 2015). Also, persuasion is 
employed when there is limited basis for exerting power over the recipient jurisdiction 
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or if the transfer agent chooses to persuasively make a case for the significance of the 
policy transfer (Schroeder et al., 2013; Stone, 2000a, 2010). To highlight which 
narrative elements have been linked to these transfer mechanisms, the next section 
draws from studies in the policy transfer literature to discuss instances of policy 
transfer that are driven by obligation, conditionality, and persuasion, and illustrates 
how the narrative elements of setting, character, plot, and moral have been depicted 
in these cases. In addition, based on explanations from the NPF literature, the 
discussion also highlights what the depiction of the narrative elements implies and 
how it may have contributed to the shaping of the transfer mechanisms observed. 
 
3.4.1 Policy Narrative Elements and the Transfer Mechanism of Obligation 
As mentioned earlier, policy transfer by obligation is predominantly a process driven 
by an external party, and as the term implies, often instigated by an organisation to 
which the prospective transfer recipient is bound by previous agreements and accords. 
The focus of this type of policy transfer is often related to policing specific activities 
within the recipient jurisdiction, for the purpose of addressing challenges that impact 
on lives and livelihoods, not only domestically, but also beyond the geographical 
borders of the recipient jurisdiction (Jordan et al., 2003; Smith, 2004; Sobaci, 2009). It 
is also often directed at ensuring standardised solutions that have been developed are 
adhered to (Bennett et al., 2015). As such, policy narratives used in policy transfer by 
obligation are often aimed at emphasising the existence of a challenge that needs to 
be addressed, and also strengthening the existing bond between the transfer agents 
and the prospective recipient jurisdiction (Bennett et al., 2015; O’Bryan et al., 2014; 
Radaelli, 2000). This is to ensure that the recipient jurisdiction aligns with specific 
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principles or policy preferences of the transfer agent, and alter prevalent domestic 
policy positions and policies.  
In the policy transfer literature, obligation is discussed with respect to a jurisdiction’s 
allegiance to agreements and accords, and in most instances, with IGOs such as the 
UN, EU, and OECD, which sometimes engage in policy transfers in order to “protect 
and expand their global relevance” (Pal, 2014, p. 196). Based on the case studies in 
the literature, the policy transfer proposition by such organisations mostly lays a stage 
for a collective action against a challenging predicament in particular sectors like 
financial, telecommunications, and environment (Humphreys, 2006; Bulmer et al., 
2007; Eccleston and Woodward, 2013). Also, because the transfer agents and the 
prospective recipient jurisdictions have an existing alliance between them, the 
narrative character of allies is often emphasised. The portrayal of this narrative 
element in obligated policy transfer cannot be better exemplified than with the 
representation of the EU and its MS. With the issues covered as case studies in the 
literature ranging from instituting ombudsman to environment concerns (Blum, 2014; 
Bugdahn, 2007; Gorton et al., 2009; Ladi, 2011; Radaelli, 2000), the EU and the MS 
are often portrayed as working together to achieve “common goals” (Blum, 2014, p. 
362). Also, in their pursuit to arrive at the common goal, the message that drives the 
initiation of policy transfer is usually directed at addressing a concern that is presented 
as a looming danger.  
For instance, in the case of transfer of telecommunications policy to EU Member 
States (MS), the drive for embarking on the policy transfer was in a bid to counter the 
perceived competitive threat from the USA and Japan (Bulmer et al., 2007). Even 
though there is no compulsory injunction for EU MS to adopt the same policies in all 
areas, these narrative tactics are employed to evoke a sense of obligation to cooperate 
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and support a policy preference. Importantly, the depiction of a looming danger, which 
can be captured with the narrative plot of overcoming the monster, portrays a dramatic 
representation (Jones and Radaelli, 2015) of what might be, should EU MS not adopt 
similar policies. An example of this can be seen in the quote below. 
If EU countries do not act together—the narrative goes on—a political time 
bomb will disintegrate the welfare state. Capital income taxes will spiral down 
to zero, corporations will move profits to special tax regimes and governments 
will be left with the sole option of asking for more revenue from low-skilled labor 
(Radaelli, 2000, p. 33). 
 
In addition to the EU, other IGOs such as World Trade Organisation (WTO), World 
Health Organisation (WHO), and other UN agencies also employ these narrative 
devices to identify a policy problem, illustrate its grimness, and call for a collective 
action to address the challenge (Chapman and Greenaway, 2006; Eccleston and 
Woodward, 2013; Nay, 2010; United Nations Development Programme, 2005). 
Studies on the adoption of tobacco control policy in signatory countries to the 
Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) help to demonstrate the narrative 
elements that underpinned the transfer mechanism of obligation in driving the adoption 
of the measures recommended by the WHO (Cairney and Mamudu, 2014; Cairney 
and Yamazaki, 2017; Kurzer and Cooper, 2016; Mamudu et al., 2015). To make a 
case for tobacco control, WHO in conjunction with the World Bank published a report 
titled Curbing the Epidemic (Mamudu et al., 2015; The World Bank, 1999), which 
linked the issue of tobacco control to public health and emphasised the negative 
effects of “direct smoking, second-hand smoke exposure, and nicotine addiction” 
(Mamudu et al., 2015, p. 864). The positionioning of tobacco use as a health crisis 
represented a shift from its hitherto economic dimension whereby tobacco production 
was viewed as a relevant source of income to countries (Cairney and Yamazaki, 2017; 
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Kurzer and Cooper, 2016). The focus on a story of health epidemic instead of 
economic sustenance can be seen to be reminiscent of the plot of overcoming the 
monster. Also, the recommendations of policy instruments including tax, price and 
non-price measures, specify a sectoral setting with its direct target of reducing demand 
for tobacco, rather than seeking to establish a new agency or administrative 
department (Cairney and Yamazaki, 2017; Mamudu et al., 2015; WHO, 2003). To 
further consolidate the argument for tobacco control, the IGOs then turn to an 
economic consideration, by arguing for the benefits that will accrue to the population 
as aganist the cost of maintaining the status quo (Kurzer and Cooper, 2016; The World 
Bank, 1999), and this presents the narrative moral, which is aimed at spurring the 
audience into action (McBeth et al., 2012). 
Narratives that express obligation also appear in a study of the South African National 
Climate Change Response, which features the expected contributions by sub-national 
jurisdictions towards tackling climate change. The jurisdictions were tasked with 
conducting a review of existing policies, legislations, regulations and plans, to ensure 
full alignment with the national policy (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2013). With regards to 
how this expected contribution was portrayed by the national government, the authors 
highlight the deliberate portrayal of a common problem and common responsibility to 
address climate change and they remark that “[w]hen expressing an obligation … 
there is a collective voice … a (depiction) of a common point of view”. A repetitive use 
of ‘we’ and ‘our’, along with casting the sub-national governments as co-heroes, 
emphasises the alliance that is expected by the national government. Notably, the 
depiction of the plot of overcoming the monster could not be missed. The national 
government spelt out a looming danger followed by a call to action. It stated that: 
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[s]hould … the average global temperature increase to below at least 2 °C 
above pre-industrial levels, the potential impacts on South Africa in the medium- 
to long-term are significant and potentially catastrophic … Given the 
significance of these impacts, it is clear that urgent and decisive … local action 
is required to achieve a real reduction of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
and in so doing limit the impacts of climate change into the future (The 
Government of The Republic of South Africa, 2010, p. 5). 
 
In another study by Lawton and Rudd (2014), the importance of the use of narrative 
elements to ensure that governments honour obligations to international commitments 
on environmental conservation is reiterated. They point out that the use of narrative 
moral will provide an argument for taking policy action and advocate for the use of 
narrative that expresses “coupling of … economic evidence to … narratives of 
ecosystem” (Lawton and Rudd, 2014, p. 854). This is in line with the moral of managing 
cost and benefits as the authors remarked that monetary quantification helps to give 
a backing to claims and prompt action. In a similar vein, Takao (2014) presents a case 
study on the policy transfer of carbon emissions cap and trade measures to 
municipalities in Japan by the national authority. He notes that part of the motivation 
that led to adoption of the cap and trade policy was the assessment of opportunities 
that will be gained and forgone, alongside the need to bring about a “change in beliefs 
(of political elites) from voluntary to mandatory reduction” (Takao, 2014, p. 326) of 
greenhouse gas emissions for combating climate change. Thus, the narrative moral in 
the policy transfer study by Takao (2014) can be seen to be managing costs and 
benefits, and value reorientation.  
The identification of narrative elements in the studies highlighted above, notably, the 
depiction of allies as narrative characters, plot of overcoming the monster, and sectoral 
or collective narrative settings, go well to show that there is “an appreciation that 
information is communicated through simple and memorable stories” (Lawton and 
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Rudd, 2014, p. 854). The next section discusses instances of conditional policy 
transfer and the narrative elements that can be identified in case studies from the 
policy transfer literature, and how these elements are portrayed in the NPF literature. 
  
3.4.2 Policy Narrative Elements and the Transfer Mechanism of Conditionality 
With reference to the discussion of transfer mechanisms in Chapter 2, the mechanism 
of conditionality is synonymous with a stick or carrot arrangement and this differs from 
the mechanism of obligation whereby the recipient is abiding by an initial commitment. 
Policy transfer by conditionality is characterised by a dependent relationship between 
the transfer agents and recipient organisation (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Delpeuch 
and Vassileva, 2017; Holden, 2016; Pereira, 2014) and hinged on a transactional 
agreement. In many instances, the prospective recipient in policy transfer by 
conditionality finds itself liable to the transfer agent and/or also in need of material 
support, military support or affiliation. However, they often have the liberty to succumb 
to or reject proposed policy transfers. To achieve an intended transfer by 
conditionality, the transfer agent takes advantage of the needs of the prospective 
transfer recipient to stipulate the adoption of a specific policy as a condition for 
benefitting from its support (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Lavenex, 2008).  
The story of conditional policy transfer is often of a policy actor being a hero to a victim, 
whereby the transfer agent possesses the wherewithal to meet the perceived need of 
the recipient jurisdiction. According to the NPF, and with regards to the earlier 
discussion on narrative character, the implication of being cast as victim is often based 
on the premise that an entity is being harmed by certain conditions or circumstances, 
or by another character that has been portrayed as a villain (Shanahan, McBeth and 
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Hathaway, 2011; Shanahan et al., 2013; Heikkila et al., 2014). The precarious situation 
of the victim, therefore, positions an entity cast as a victim as one in need of, or 
deserving of support (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2017; Weible et al., 2016). Since this 
portrayal of an entity that is being hurt by a condition or another entity emphasises the 
existence of a societal challenge that needs to be addressed, it therefore opens a 
space for the introduction of a hero in a narrative. 
Alou (2009) describes the dynamics of conditional policy transfer. He notes that the 
prevalence of “manifold economic crisis of African states” (Alou, 2009, p. 6) prompted 
the transfer of structural adjustment programs (SAP) to sub-Sahara Africa, which was 
stipulated as a condition for receiving development aid. He highlights the role of the 
World Bank as the transfer agent facilitating the conditional policy transfer and 
“proposing the desired solution for tattered African economies” (Alou, 2009, p. 6). As 
such, the dire economic condition of the African states heralds the action of the World 
Bank as the party that devises and executes a solution. Expounding further on 
conditional policy transfer to developing countries in Africa, Pereira (2014) describes 
the conditional policy transfer facilitated by the EU through the EU-ACP Lome 
Convention, as an arrangement that offers support for African, Carribean, and Pacific 
(ACP) states on account of political and institutional reforms in the recipient 
jurisdictions. By providing an incentive for embarking on reforms that will alter how 
government functions in the recipient jurisdictions, the EU laid out a bureaucratic 
setting. Also, for countries that adhered to the reforms, like Cape Verde, they 
benefitted from having special relationships with the EU, while others are left out of 
this opportunity (Pereira, 2014). A narrative of a victim in need of a hero and a plot of 
rags to riches can be observed from these descriptions. Along with the portrayal of the 
narrative moral of incentivising reforms by rewarding jurisdictions that comply with 
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specified conditions and withdrawing support from others that did not, this, in a way, 
sums up what conditional policy transfer portends.  
If we consider other examples of conditional policy transfers that do not have outright 
financial connotations, we will notice similarities in the use of narrative elements. The 
cases of IGOs facilitating policy transfers by taking advantage of accessions to 
membership of the organisations serve as good examples. One of these is the case 
of transfer of market liberalisation policy to the Republic of Korea (Carroll, 2014). Upon 
applying to join the OECD, and after agreeing to free up trade and open markets, the 
Republic of Korea became a member of the OECD. The country’s foreign minister 
narrated the process as a move from isolation to internationalisation, with the OECD 
being the medium for attaining international standing and acquiring the status of a 
developed country, thereby guaranteeing stability and prosperity for its citizens. The 
depiction of the transfer process highlights the narrative character of a hero and a plot 
of rags to riches. Another example is that of the accession of Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal to the European Economic Community (EEC) (Carroll, 2014). The narrative 
used in describing the transfer process presents a portrayal of a jurisdiction in need of 
support i.e. character of victims, as it is noted that these countries, having been under 
military rule, were faced with “significant requirements regarding their progress to 
stable, functioning democracies, as well as changes to economic policies” (Carroll 
2014, p.284). The challenge faced by the countries presented the opportunity for 
external policy actors to intervene, and “promote economic development, democratic 
government and political stability” to turnaround their “radically different political and 
economic structures” (Carroll 2014, p.284). Such narration of the intent for engaging 
in policy transfer reflects a story of a victim in need of a hero and a plot of rags to 
riches. 
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The insistence on a bureaucratic setting in most conditional policy transfer is also 
reiterated by Delpeuch and Vassileva (2017). They contrast the focus of Bulgaria’s 
policy transfer experience with the EU as against its policy transfer experience with 
USAID, which was based on the mechanism of persuasion. The authors note that 
“unlike European cooperation, which insisted on the transformation of institutional 
structures and values, American assistance stressed concrete change in work 
processes inside judicial organisations and improvement in the daily activities of case 
management and adjudication, particularly in local jurisdictions” (Delpeuch and 
Vassileva, 2017, p. 37). So, while conditional policy transfer was characterised by a 
bureaucratic setting, which called for changes in institutional structures, the setting of 
the persuasive policy transfer was confined within one sector. The next section 
discusses further, how narrative elements are portrayed in policy transfers driven by 
the mechanism of persuasion. 
 
3.4.3 Policy Narrative Elements and the Transfer Mechanism of Persuasion 
The use of policy narratives for the purpose of persuading a specific audience is widely 
recorded in NPF literature, particularly with respect to attempts of interest groups to 
convince the general public and win on a policy issue. The primary focus on interest 
groups is in a way synonymous with the categories of policy transfer actors that are 
usually transfer agents in instances of policy transfer by persuasion, including think 
tanks (Stone, 2000a), international corporations (Kolk, 2015) and, IGOs (Foli et al., 
2017; Pereira, 2014; Schroeder et al., 2013). With respect to policy transfer, rather 
than directing policy narrative elements at persuading the general public, narrative 
elements are used to convince prospective transfer recipients and make a case for the 
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validity and benefits of the transfer, rather than exploiting a possible vulnerability of 
the prospective recipient.  
According to the NPF literature, policy narratives by non-state actors often involve a 
broad use of narrative elements (Crow and Berggren, 2014; McBeth et al., 2012). An 
example that shows the use of narrative elements by this group of actors is the study 
of the policy narratives of the Buffalo Field Campaign (BFC), an American non-
governmental organisation that is dedicated to the preservation of bison in 
Yellowstone Natural Park in the US (McBeth et al., 2010, 2012). In convincing the 
general public to stand for protection of this species and curtail demands for culling 
them by ranch farmers, BFC makes use of the different narrative characters by 
situating the bison as a victim, the farmers as villains and itself alongside members of 
public fighting for the cause of keeping the bison alive, as heroes. It also advances a 
policy solution of value reorientation to view the bison as a natural world asset and the 
issue at hand, as an environmental concern rather than a commercial issue.  
The use of policy narratives in policy transfers by persuasion can be seen to manifest 
in a similar fashion. Diane Stone (2000; 2004; 2010) elaborates on non-governmental 
policy transfers. She does not use the NPF language, yet, she helpfully highlights the 
involvement of these organisations in transferring ideas and ideologies and providing 
intellectual background documents that can be used to support or represent the policy 
position. In the example of transfer of privatisation policy to the UK (Stone, 2000a), 
transfer agents including the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS) and the Adam Smith Institute (ASI), positioned a welfare system as the 
villain, the conservative party as heroes and taxpayers as victims. With their plot of 
rebirth hinged on a move from dependence on welfare to embracing market principles, 
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the organizations advocate for reorientation of the economic system in order to reduce 
government spending and save taxpayers’ funds. 
Instances of persuasive policy transfers have also been prompted by the alleged 
failure of aid conditionality in less-developed countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa 
(Easterly, 2005; Mkandawire and Soludo, 2003; Pereira, 2014; Tambulasi, 2013). 
According to Pereira (2014, p.389), the use of aid conditionality in EU-ACP accord is 
as though the EU was: 
trying to ‘buy’ political and institutional reforms through aid and cooperation 
programmes relying on political and economic conditionality. It failed. The 
failures … led to the signing of the Cotonou Agreements …  The Cotonou 
rhetoric places emphasis on the concept of ‘ownership’ and argues that the 
donor-beneficiary framework is no longer the basis for EU-Africa relations but 
rather that of promotion of common interests. 
 
As we can see from the above quote, the alleged failure of aid conditionality instigated 
the preference for employing the mechanism of persuasion by IGOs like the EU, in 
engaging with developing countries (Foli et al., 2017; Pereira, 2014; Tambulasi, 2013; 
Zardo, 2017). In particular, this persuasive approach showed a move away from the 
dominant story of victims in need of heroes to emphasise a story of heroes working 
together. The case study on the adoption of cash transfer policy to Ghana highlights 
how IGOs attempt to lay out this story. According to the findings from the study, it was 
“international partners such as the World Bank, UNICEF, … and DFID” that identified 
and proposed the need for developing a cash transfer policy in Ghana, however, the 
policy transfer was undertaken by promoting a “technical cooperation” between Ghana 
and Brazil (Foli et al., 2017, p. 6). This strategic positioning of actors de-emphasises 
the power of the IGOs over the recipient jurisdiction and the likely weak economic 
position of the recipient jurisdiction. Instead, it directs attention to a story of partners 
with similar circumstances working together within a space that will focus on the poor, 
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aged, and disabled. This space reflects a community setting, whereby the policy 
transfer is focused on a particular group in the society’s population and is designed to 
alleviate their challenges.  
From the NPF literature, actors depicted as allies are often shown to be knit based on 
a cause, rather than financial interest.  McBeth et al. (2005) depicted the character of 
allies to signify a joint stance by the actors on banning the use of snowmobiles in the 
GYA in the USA. Also, the interest group, Buffalo Field Campaign, designated certain 
individuals and groups as allies because they were involved in activities targeted 
against hunting or culling bison (McBeth et al., 2012). The depiction of heroes working 
together or that of allies in policy transfer, also highlights the commitment of the actors 
to a particular cause and their involvement in supporting the cause. By altering 
narrative elements, we can see that the overriding narrative that informs the 
relationship between two transfer actors and the basis for a policy transfer can be 
presented differently, and this goes on to inform the transfer mechanism that we 
observe as facilitating the instance of policy transfer. 
 
 
Conclusion 
As remarked by Nowlin (2011 pg. 53), “[n]arratives could … be employed by policy 
entrepreneurs to … hasten policy diffusion and adoption”. Likewise, this chapter has 
attempted to show that narratives matter in policy transfers, by drawing from the review 
of both the policy transfer and NPF literatures. Narratives matter in situating the role 
of actors, in delimiting the space where the actors will influence with their action, and 
in presenting an overview of what the policy transfer will entail. The chapter discussed 
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the study of narratives in the field of public policy and the introduction of the NPF. It 
highlighted the relevance of narrative elements in the analysis of policy narratives and 
elaborated on how these have been studied in the NPF literature. Notably, the use of 
NPF for the analysis of policy narratives for this study is shown to be based on the 
ability of the framework to capture relations among policy actors, as against the focus 
in other narrative approaches, which is mostly based on the analysis of and the 
decision-making over a policy issue. Also, the NPF can be and has been used 
alongside other public policy theories and incorporating it to policy transfer goes in line 
with the application of NPF for studying narratives of policy actors. 
In elaborating on the narrative elements, the chapter has argued for the importance of 
associating humans with narrative characters that perform roles which can only be 
assumed by humans. It has also emphasised the relevance of identifying narrative 
plots that portray a journey rather than a static position. In addition, the chapter has 
highlighted the type of narrative elements that can be identified in policy transfers that 
pertain to the involvement of IGOs as transfer agents i.e. obligated policy transfer, 
conditional policy transfer, and persuasive policy transfer. Following this, the next 
chapter presents the methodology that is employed in examining the two policy 
transfer cases investigated in this research, which are the transfer of renewable 
energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU and the transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS by 
UNISDR. 
  
 
 
138 
 
Chapter 4 – Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology employed in this thesis and details the process 
for carrying out the empirical research. It discusses the rationale for case selection 
and the process for data collection and analysis. More importantly, it demonstrates the 
relevance of the methodology and the methods applied to addressing the research 
questions.  
Chapter 1 presents the overarching research question underpinning this study i.e. 
what is the role of policy narratives in shaping policy transfer mechanisms? It also 
highlights the components to investigate in order to answer this overarching question. 
The first component is noted as policy transfer mechanisms; the second is narrative 
elements, while the third is the association between these first two components. A 
contemplation of the research question therefore prompted the need for identifying 
appropriate occurrences that will allow the observation and analysis of the three 
components highlighted above. This informed the design of a case study approach 
and the selection of two cases namely i) transfer of renewable energy policy to 
ECOWAS by the EU, and ii) transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS by UNISDR. To 
examine the two case studies, this research primarily uses a qualitative methodology 
for data collection and analysis, but, before discussing this process, it will be important 
to elaborate on what informed the use of the two cases that were investigated in order 
to address the research questions posed. Based on this, the next section explains the 
basis for selection of the two cases. 
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4.1 Case Selection 
As noted earlier, the research design follows a case study approach. Gerring (2008, 
p. 1) notes that “case‐study analysis focuses on one or several cases that are 
expected to provide insight into a larger population”. With reference to this explanation, 
engaging in a case study will likely raise the question, what is a case? Gerring (2007) 
infers that a case is a representative of a general phenomenon. Also, George and 
Bennett (2005, p. 17) define a case as “an instance of a class of events”. In addition 
to having a representative role, a case also has an investigative function and gives 
beneficial insight for understanding similar occurrences. According to Seawright and 
Gerring (2008), representativeness and analytical capability do go hand in hand in 
determining what a case is. For this study, the two cases are representative of the 
general phenomenon of the propagation of global public policy through policy transfers 
facilitated by IGOs, and they serve as typical cases (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2014) for the 
analysis of this phenomenon. There is a further discussion of this general 
phenomenon in the next chapter. 
With reference to the research questions, the investigation of typical cases aims to 
give insight into understanding the mechanisms that drive the process of propagation 
of public policy by IGOs, and the narratives that shape the transfer mechanisms. As 
shown in Table 4.1, the two cases lend themselves to comparison based on their 
similarities in terms of the category of transfer agent and recipient, and also the 
differences in their observed transfer mechanisms. The comparison of these two 
typical cases allowed the demonstration of the shaping power of narratives, 
particularly with the observation of differences in the combination of narrative 
properties that typified each of the cases as against similarities in other aspects of the 
two cases. The differences identified helped to ascertain the link between the 
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narratives used by policy transfer actors in communicating a transfer process and the 
transfer mechanism that manifests.  
 
Table 4.1 - Comparison of Features in Selected Cases  
 
RE Policy Transfer 
by EU 
DRR Policy Transfer 
by UN 
IGO as type of policy transfer 
agent 
Yes Yes 
Climate change as policy area Yes Yes 
ECOWAS as policy transfer 
recipient 
Yes Yes 
African Union as mediating 
agent 
Yes Yes 
Externally-initiated policy 
transfer  
Yes Yes 
Narrative Elements 
 Setting - 
Bureaucratic, 
Community 
 Plot - Rags to riches 
 Characters - Hero 
and ally, Victim 
 Moral - Incentives 
and sanctions 
 
 Setting – Bureaucratic, 
Sectoral 
 Plot - Overcoming the 
monster 
 Characters - Hero and 
ally, Victim, Villain 
 Moral - Managing 
benefits and cost, 
Value reorientation  
Transfer Mechanisms 
Persuasion and 
Conditionality 
Obligation 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Data Richness 
Another factor that has informed the case selection for this study is the availability of 
data. This consideration is based on the reference to logistical expediency and data 
richness as criteria that can inform case selection (Evera, 1997; Gerring, 2008). In the 
two instances of policy transfer, there are publicly available documents that present 
records of direct input of the IGOs in promoting the global propagation of renewable 
energy and DRR policies, and ensuring the introduction and adoption of the policies 
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by ECOWAS. In the case of the transfer of DRR policy, the venture was part of 
UNISDR’s Africa outreach programme (Basher and Briceno, 2005; UNISDR, 2003a), 
and this led to the establishment of an African office of the UNISDR, and subsequently, 
interactions with African regional bodies including, African Union (AU), New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and ECOWAS. To inform the different 
bodies on the relevance of DRR, and facilitate knowledge and information exchange, 
UNISDR Africa published newsletters biannually, and developed series of educational 
magazines.  
In the case of the renewable energy transfer, the venture was a definite project, which 
ran from October 2011 to May 2012, and was tagged the “development of a regional 
renewable energy policy” (EUEI PDF, 2016b). The project was delivered by the EU 
Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF), a development aid 
instrument of the EU dedicated to addressing sustainable development by facilitating 
universal access to sustainable energy. As a development aid instrument, the EUEI 
PDF also situated the policy transfer project as part of interventions under the Africa-
EU partnership. To mobilise support and create awareness for this partnership, the 
EU commenced publication of a quarterly newsletter, titled Links, in 2009. The 
newsletter covers EU’s contributions and involvement in specific areas, including 
renewable energy, and highlights its relationship with regional bodies within the 
continent. To communicate the activities of the EUEI PDF, the unit also published 
research reports, strategy documents, factsheets, and organisation reports.  
The documents published by the actors are available publicly via web repositories and 
they were downloaded for the purpose of the research. The next section discusses the 
limitation of the two cases selected. 
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4.1.2 Significance of Policy Areas 
In addition to the merits of these cases for analytical purposes, the choice of these 
policy areas i.e. renewable energy and disaster risk reduction, is based on their 
significance to addressing the environmental challenge of climate change. According 
to the United Nations, climate change is “the most systemic threat to humankind” 
(United Nations, 2018) and numerous groups of actors including states, businesses, 
IGOs, INGOs, local NGOs, and local communities continue to exert funds, time, and 
energy towards solving this challenge, particularly through introducing, advocating for, 
and applying mitigation and adaption solutions. The focus on these policy areas in a 
policy transfer research, therefore emphasises the externality trait that is associated 
with climate change, as it reiterates the importance of policy transfers, the involvement 
of international actors, as well as the need for strategically devising transfer 
mechanisms.  
Another reason for the selection of these policy areas is that, unlike other policy areas 
of similar international importance, such as HIV/AIDS, budget transparency, or money 
laundering, there is a pressing time constraint to address the issue of climate change. 
This pertinence is also in view of the crucial role of the environment in supporting 
human endeavours and subsistence. So, while these other policy areas may be of 
competing or even more importance in their analytical value and potential for 
harvesting interesting policy stories with dramatic twists and turns, especially in the 
policy content, the looming danger of climate change informs the selection of these 
policy areas despite their technical language they command. Indeed, this attribute of 
technicality also presents the two cases as worthy of examination of how narratives 
are used to portray issues that may not be easily grasped by non-technical persons. 
The study thus contributes to understanding how the communication of technical 
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policy issues are brought to fore, how concerns are presented in story terms and how 
this go on to capture an intended audience and securing interest for a policy 
preference. 
 
4.1.3 Limitations of Case Selection 
The selected cases may be said to be limiting in their capability to capture the whole 
range of policy transfer mechanisms that can be observed in both voluntary and 
coercive transfer modes. However, the selected cases are focused on policy transfer 
instances involving IGOs and, from Chapter 2, we can see that three of the five policy 
transfer mechanisms namely, persuasion, obligation, and conditionality, are most 
likely to feature in the involvement of these actors as transfer agents. The focus on 
this set of actors reemphasises the non-limitation of policy transfer to domestically 
initiated policy transfers, and non-assertion of rationality of transfer agents. Another 
omission that is predicated on the selection of these cases is the transfer mechanism 
of imposition. As remarked by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), policy transfer by imposition 
represents a rare occurrence. This rarity is also corroborated with the number of cases 
that identified this mechanism in the articles reviewed in Chapter 2. Based on the chart 
in Figure 2.3, only 3% of the total articles featured imposition as the transfer 
mechanism, this is just two of the 68 articles. With this level of rarity, the transfer 
mechanism of imposition does not seem to be prevalent in policy transfers and its 
exclusion may not directly hinder the utility of the findings of this research. 
Nonetheless, the excluded transfer mechanisms can be examined in future research, 
in order to gain more insight into how policy narratives inform transfer mechanisms. 
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Furthermore, the selection of typical cases highlights the absence of a deviant case of 
the general phenomenon i.e. case that deviates from what should be (Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008; Yin, 2014). Whereas the typical cases draw attention to the involvement 
of IGOs in a jurisdiction, which culminate in the occurrence of policy transfer, a deviant 
case would have been able to demonstrate a possible alternative outcome. The 
involvement of IGOs may not always lead to policy transfer, and attempts at 
propagation of public policy, may result in non-transfer. The inclusion of a deviant case 
can as such, prompt questions that ask – what will the involvement of IGOs in domestic 
policymaking within a jurisdiction lead to? What other policy process can be identified 
in the examination of the global propagation of public policy by IGOs, aside from policy 
transfer? Addressing these questions may also result in the identification of other 
resultant effects of the activities of IGOs within a particular jurisdiction. However, with 
the case selection targeted at answering the research questions posed in the 
introduction of this thesis, the selection of a defiant case may impede the likelihood of 
differentiating and affirming the contribution of narrative elements in shaping the 
transfer mechanisms that are observed in policy transfers facilitated by IGOs.  
In summary, the case selection demarcates the area of empirical research, denotes 
the aspects of policy transfer that will be studied, emphasises the set actors that will 
be focused on, and points to the general phenomenon which the cases represent. 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
To commence data collection, the major actors involved in the two cases of policy 
transfer were identified, specifically, the policy transfer agents that facilitated the 
instances of transfer and the recipient. In the case of transfer of renewable energy 
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policy, the EU was designated as the transfer agent, with ECOWAS being the recipient 
jurisdiction. Within the EU, the unit that was directly involved in facilitating the policy 
transfer was the EUEI PDF, and within ECOWAS, the ECOWAS Centre for 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) was responsible for relating 
directly with the EU during the transfer process. The specific unit within the EU was 
identified through the ECOWAS renewable energy policy document (ECREEE, 
2013a), as the logo of the EUEI PDF was imprinted on the document8, and the EUEI 
PDF’s website also stated its involvement in and sponsorship of the development of 
the ECOWAS renewable energy policy (EUEI PDF, 2016b). Also, in the case of DRR 
policy transfer to ECOWAS, the UNISDR was designated as the transfer agent, and 
the UNISDR African regional office based in Nairobi, Kenya, facilitated the transfer 
process. The unit within ECOWAS that related with UNISDR Africa during this process 
was the directorate of humanitarian and social affairs, and after the adoption of the 
ECOWAS DRR policy, the Disaster Management Unit was created to manage DRR 
issues in ECOWAS. In this case of policy transfer however, there was no indication of 
the transfer agent in the policy document, even though the document stated that the 
policy was developed in line with UNISDR’s Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA). The 
specific unit within the UNISDR was eventually identified from a meeting report 
highlighting the progress made by the newly formed regional office in Africa in 
establishing connection with ECOWAS and promoting the DRR within West Africa 
(UNISDR, 2008, 2003b). 
                                                          
8 The EUEI PDF’s logo can be distinctly seen on the renewable energy policy transfer document and beside it; the logo of UNIDO 
can be seen. However, the contributions of the EUEI PDF to the policy development process is more significant than that of the 
UNIDO, as the EU financed the process of developing the policy. The inclusion of UNIDO’s logo alongside that of the EUEI PDF 
may be a way of acknowledging the existing cooperation between the EU and UNIDO, whereby the EU and EU MS finance some 
of UNIDO’s activities, notably, the creation of the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE).  
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The designation of the transfer agent and identification of the specific units within the 
IGOs involved in the transfer process, enabled contacting these units directly for the 
purpose of sourcing relevant documents and requesting for interviews. After 
contacting these units, suitable documents for narrative analysis, and relevant 
individuals that could participate in interviews were identified. Eighty-seven documents 
were selected and analysed for the examination of the use of narratives by the actors 
during the policy transfer process, while six elite interviews were conducted. The next 
section describes in more detail the selection and analysis of the documents, and after 
this, the identification of interviewees and the conduct of elite interviews are discussed.  
 
4.2.1 Narrative Analysis 
4.2.1.1 Source of Documents 
As mentioned earlier, in order to identify suitable documents for the narrative analysis, 
the EUEI PDF, ECREEE, UNISDR Africa, and ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit, 
were contacted via email and social media to request for documents related to the 
policy transfer instances. At the onset of contacting these units, only EUEI PDF 
responded and they provided a web address for accessing documents related to the 
development and adoption of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy. For the others, 
the search function on their websites was used to select the appropriate documents. 
On UNISDR’s website, a dedicated search function of archived documents allowed 
the specification of type and subject of the document, and also the geographical 
continent of interest. By specifying all types and subjects of documents, and Africa as 
continent, the search yielded results from which relevant documents were selected. 
For ECREEE, the publications and news and events tabs on their website contained 
newsletters and reports with information on the development and adoption of the 
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ECOWAS renewable energy policy, and from these, relevant documents were 
selected. The webpage for the directorate overseeing the ECOWAS Disaster 
Management Unit on the other hand, did not contain links to any document pertaining 
to the development and adoption of the ECOWAS DRR policy. In addition, ECOWAS’ 
website did not include any information such as the policy document, meeting reports, 
or presentations regarding the adoption of the DRR policy and the organisation’s 
interaction with UNISDR. As a result, there was a need to fall back on the information 
available from UNISDR’s website in order to identify narratives authored by ECOWAS 
and its MS. Upon searching the documents sourced from UNISDR’s website, 22 
articles by ECOWAS countries were found published in some of the editions of the 
ISDR Informs newsletter and the content of these articles were used to represent 
contributions from the recipient jurisdiction. 
Upon establishing contacts with UNISDR and ECREEE, they referred to the weblinks 
used on their sites as the appropriate source for accessing information on the 
respective policy transfers. With respect to ECOWAS Department of DRR, one of the 
officials confirmed that there was no document available from the organisation in 
relation to the transfer process (Interview 5, 2017). 
 
4.2.1.2 Selection of Documents 
To select the documents used for analysis from the available documents accessed on 
the websites, the date of policy adoption was used as a benchmark, so that documents 
that were published after the official adoption of the policies and did not contain 
information relating to the policy transfer were removed. This is because the adoption 
of the policies by ECOWAS authorities can be seen as a consummation of the efforts 
by the transfer agent directed at introducing the policy to the recipient jurisdiction, and 
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an indication of the “use of knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) for the development of 
policies … in another political setting” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 5). Also, the 
documents unrelated to the specific policy and/or relationship between the transfer 
agent and recipient were disregarded. For example, at the time of the EU’s facilitation 
of renewable energy policy transfer, ECREEE was also working with other 
development partners including the UN and the World Bank, on projects such as the 
Strategic Program for West Africa and development of the ECOWAS Energy Efficiency 
policy. To delineate the events, discussions, decisions, relating particularly to the 
development and adoption of the renewable energy policy, documents that covered 
such other projects were not included in the analysis. In addition, documents that were 
likely not to be presented in a narrating, reporting, or descriptive styles were not 
selected. This meant that documents that contained only lists such as programme 
agendas, or presentations that contained only headings of slides and bullet points 
were not included in the narrative analysis. Documents with only technical information 
were also not selected.   
As a result, 56 documents were selected for the case of transfer of renewable energy 
policy and 31 documents were selected for the case of DRR policy transfer. These 
documents comprise newsletters, research reports, meeting reports, flyers, and policy 
documents. Although policy documents may be regarded as technical, their 
introductory sections were useful in identifying narrative elements. Regarding the 
disparity in the number of documents examined for the two cases, this can be said to 
be indicative of how long the actors involved in each case of policy transfer have been 
relating. Interaction between the EU and ECOWAS dates back to the 1975 Lome I 
Convention between the European Economic Community (EEC) and African, 
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Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (Adetula, 2008; Watts, 1998), while relations 
between the UNISDR and ECOWAS set off around 2002 when the UNISDR 
established an African regional office in Nairobi, Kenya (UNISDR, 2003b). In addition, 
the number of documents identified for the case of DRR policy transfer can be 
explained by ECOWAS’ limited documentation during the DRR policy development 
process. 
The total number of documents linked to the actors involved in the two instances of 
policy transfer is also within the range of the number of documents that is often 
assessed in NPF studies where analysis of publicly available documents is done. For 
instance, Heikkila et al. (2014) identified and analysed 177 documents from 19 
organisations9 to examine the narratives of interest groups that are for and against 
hydraulic fracturing in New York, US. In the investigation of the narratives used by 
opposing coalitions on the issue of collective bargaining rights of public sector workers, 
284 articles from 67 actors10 were assessed (Kear and Wells, 2014). Also, McBeth et 
al. (2007) examined 105 documents relating to three policy areas, to investigate the 
use of narratives by two interest groups11 in communicating about the different policy 
areas. In addition, in a study of India’s nuclear energy debate on the situation of a 
nuclear energy plant in Jaitapur, Gupta et al. (2014) analysed 55 documents from 21 
organisations12. With reference to these NPF studies, the identification of 87 
documents for the analysis of two cases of policy transfer and attributed to the four 
IGOs are within the range of the number of documents analysed in the studies. A list 
of all the 87 documents is provided in Appendix 2. 
                                                          
9 Approximately, nine documents were analysed for each organisation. 
10 Approximately, four documents were analysed for each actor. 
11 Approximately, 18 documents were analysed for each interest group per sector. 
12 Approximately, three documents were analysed for each organisation. 
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4.2.1.3 Coding Selected Documents 
According to Krippendorff (2013), analysing the content of a document is to be based 
on answering a research question. By focusing on the research questions, coding of 
the selected documents was primarily directed at identifying narrative elements as 
indicated by the NPF i.e. setting, character, plot, and moral. Table 4.2 shows the 
different narrative elements and how these were identified in the documents. A 
qualitative data analysis software, NVivo, was used to code the documents. In line 
with the recommendation of Johnson et al. (2015), the coding was informed by the 
descriptions of what to identify in the documents as presented in Table 4.2. The 
different items were setup as nodes and when statements from the documents fit any 
of the descriptions, these were added to the nodes. The primary four narrative 
elements as identified in the NPF, i.e. setting, character, plot, and moral were 
established as the nodes and they constituted the tree node used for the NVivo 
analysis. In addition, based on the different types of these elements as identified in the 
NPF literature, each narrative element was setup with children nodes. As such, for 
narrative setting, the children nodes were bureaucratic, community, sectoral, and 
collectives; for narrative character, the children nodes were hero, ally, villain, victim, 
and antagonist; for narrative plot, the children nodes were rags to riches, overcoming 
the monster, and rebirth; and for narrative moral, the children nodes were incentives 
and sanctions, managing cost and benefit, and value reorientation. Examples of 
statements linked to the different nodes can be seen in Appendix 3. Some of these 
are also cited in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, which discuss the research findings. 
In many instances, it was straightforward to identify the depiction of a narrative 
element, however, in some documents, when a statement indirectly implies the 
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portrayal of a narrative element, such expressions were coded to the relevant nodes. 
For example, in the UNISDR documents, there were references to the occurrence of 
disaster events in African countries without directly stating how the people are affected 
by these events. From such descriptions, one can deduce that the people within the 
countries would have been affected by the disaster event through the loss of properties 
and/or lives. Based on this, statements about occurrence of disaster in a location were 
linked to the narrative element of victim, to imply that the residents were victims of the 
disaster events. Also, where statistics of people lacking a service or amenity, along 
with the negative impact of such deprivation, are presented, these expressions are 
coded as the use of narrative character of victim, even though they don’t specifically 
describe how the victims are being hurt. This is because such expressions emphasise 
that a population is experiencing difficulty as a result of what they lack.  
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Table 4.2: Narrative Elements Coded in Content Analysis 
 Item Description 
1 Character: Hero 
An actor that has made a notable achievement, 
attained success, or has a remarkable capability 
2 Character: Victim Who or what is affected by a situation or challenge 
3 Character: Villain Who or what is causing or contributing to harm 
4 Character: Ally 
A supporter of another actor, in relations to its 
identity, position, policy position, vision, or project. Or 
actors that are partnering together towards achieving 
an objective 
5 
Character: 
Antagonist 
Who is antagonising/opposing another actor, or a 
policy stance or solution, or a project 
6 
Setting: 
Bureaucratic 
Situating the policy transfer as a focus on institutional 
and administrative frameworks 
7 
Setting: 
Community 
Situating the policy transfer as a focus on delivering 
service to a specific group in the population 
8 Setting: Sectoral 
Situating the policy transfer as a focus on a particular 
sector and addressing a challenge within the sector 
9 Setting: Collective 
Situating the policy transfer as a focus on providing 
service to all groups of the population 
10 
Plot: Rags to 
riches 
Telling a story of a present state of lack and the 
possibility of achieving a better economic standing or 
prosperity 
11 
Plot: Overcoming 
the monster 
Telling a story of the presence of an imminent threat 
and the possibility of overcoming it 
12 Plot: Rebirth 
Telling a story of archaic identities or positions, and 
the possibility of reinventing these. 
13 
Moral: Incentives 
and Sanctions 
Recommending award of incentives and/or sanctions 
14 
Moral: Managing 
costs and benefits 
Recommending managing cost and benefits 
15 
Moral: Value 
reorientation 
Recommending a change in stance about, or 
understanding of, an issue or identity 
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Discerning the use of narrative elements from statements that may indirectly express 
such depictions can also be seen in other NPF studies. For example, an analysis of 
the quote below linked the Legal Action Project to the narrative character of hero, and 
the family of Simone Kim to the character of victim.  
The Legal Action Project is asking the Alaska Supreme Court to reverse a trial 
courts dismissal of a case brought by the family of Simone Kim...the trial court 
incorrectly ruled that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”) 
shields the dealer from liability (Smith-Walter et al., 2016, p. 1073).  
 
The authors designated the Legal Action Project as a hero because it was taking action 
on an issue of gun violence, and referred to the family of Simone Kim as a victim 
because the family had been affected by gun violence. Even though these are not 
stated outright in the quote, they can be deduced from the statement. Such indirect 
expressions may not readily come across to the reader as a depiction of the narrative 
element, but when the description of the narrative element being coded is considered 
based on the policy issue and the actors involved, one can see that such expressions 
can imply the portrayal of the narrative element.  
However, to avoid overstretching the assumption of portrayals, there was 
conscientious referral to the codebook to ensure that the coded statements aligned 
with the given descriptions. In addition, after coding about half of the documents, a 
review was carried out to appraise what was emerging from the coding exercise. In 
looking at the coding for hero as a narrative character, certain discrepancies were 
noted. Particularly, the activities initiated and/or implemented by the actors were coded 
alongside grand depiction of actors, and this showed that there was limited 
consistency in the coding of hero. To clarify this, the activities that had been coded to 
the node were moved to annotations and then compiled with other list of events and 
activities shown in Appendix 4. In addition to the discrepancy noted, the review also 
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showed that there was nothing coded to villain under the node of character. This 
informed the decision to identify another character that seemed less malevolent than 
villain, in order to capture and observe the depiction of any oppositional or negative 
portrayals of the agent, recipient, or other actors involved in the transfer. 
Consequently, the codebook was corrected by describing the items more clearly. The 
documents containing the discrepancies were then coded a second time. The 
remaining documents were also coded and checked again based on the 
recommendations of the review session. Another means of cross-checking the coding 
exercise would have been by increasing the number of coders and determining the 
inter-coder agreement to ascertain reliability (Johnson et al., 2015). However, due to 
financial constraints, it was not possible to employ ad-hoc personnel. 
In addition to finding narrative elements, the analysis also involved identifying specific 
actions, events and decisions carried out by the actors. The information gathered was 
collated separately from the codes and used to generate a sequence of activities 
leading up to the adoption of respective policies. A list of these activities is presented 
in Appendix 4. 
After coding the documents, interviews were scheduled with relevant officials. By 
completing the coding exercise before conducting the interviews, I was in a good 
position to understand and engage with the responses of the interviewees, as I had 
gathered sufficient information about the cases of policy transfer before speaking with 
them. The use of interviews for the research is discussed in more detail below, but 
before this, the ethical consideration for the research is summarised in the next 
section. 
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4.2.2 Ethics Approval 
Following the guidelines for the involvement of humans in research, an ethics 
application was submitted to the Ethics committee of the College of Social Science 
and International Studies (SSIS) at the University of Exeter. The application was 
approved on 25th January 2017 and the ethics certificate is attached in Appendix 5. In 
line with the approved application, the interviewees were assured that their input will 
be on an anonymous basis and neither their names nor positions will be disclosed in 
the thesis or other materials that will be produced from the research. An information 
sheet about the research was also shared with them prior to the interviews. After the 
discussion, the interviewees gave their consent on the use of the information they had 
given verbally and/or on consent forms, which were signed and returned via email. 
All the interviews were held through telephone and online calling services, except one 
face-to-face meeting, and before commencing the session, the interviewees were 
informed about the recording of the discussion and their permission was sought for 
the recording to proceed. All the recordings were transcribed and the documents were 
stored on the university’s U:Drive and on Microsoft OneDrive using an official account. 
After storing the transcripts, the recordings were deleted. Also, to preserve anonymity, 
the names of the interviewees were not stated in the transcripts.  
 
4.2.3 Interviews 
When the identified units within the organisations were contacted to request for 
documents relating to the development of the respective policies, they were also asked 
about the possibility of visiting their offices to speak with relevant officials. At the initial 
contact with the EUEI PDF, the request to visit their office in Brussels, Belgium was 
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turned down on the basis that relevant information that will be required for the research 
can be readily accessed from their online repository, and that the members of staff 
were not available to give interviews because of their busy schedule. Although this 
denial was unexpected, it prompted the realisation that “it can be quite difficult to 
secure interviews with busy officials who are widely sought after” (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2002, p. 673). To counter this challenge, individual messages were sent to 
some members of staff and one of them responded and indicated interest in the 
research. The interest and willingness of the interviewee to participate in the research 
can be attributed to the interviewee’s value for academic studies and this ensured that 
the interview was not seen as a burden, but as a valuable exercise (Feldman et al., 
2003; Laurilla, 1997). In addition to the official interviewed, a past consultant and a 
past employee of EUEI PDF, who were mentioned in some of the documents 
analysed, were contacted after getting their emails through an online professional 
profile and an event organiser respectively. The interview with the past consultant was 
held through Skype, while a face-to-face interview was held with the past EUEI PDF 
employee. 
UNISDR Africa on the other hand, did not respond to the message sent to their official 
email address and a call was made to their Nairobi office at different times in a bid to 
speak with not only the front desk official, but a person with knowledge about the 
ECOWAS DRR policy transfer. Eventually, the call was directed to a senior manager 
within the organisation who agreed to be interviewed for the research. Attempts to 
contact specific persons who were past employees or consultants of the UNISDR and 
who had been mentioned in some of the documents relating to the policy transfer, 
were however unsuccessful, as there was no response to all the messages sent to the 
past officials. In addition, a past UNISDR official who was contacted via telephone was 
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not willing to freely share information if there would no compensation for his 
participation in the research, even though the past official alluded to being the author 
of the ECOWAS DRR policy document.  
The challenging experience in gaining access to the officials of EU and UNISDR, is 
similar to what is often experienced when using elite interviews in research and making 
attempts to seek, locate, contact, and secure convenient appointments with the 
officials (Lilleker, 2003; Mikecz, 2012; Rivera et al., 2002). However, these challenges 
proved more difficult when trying to gain access to relevant officials of the transfer 
recipient, ECOWAS. Getting any foot through the door (Goldstein, 2002) was arduous 
as none of the calls to the official telephone numbers connected successfully and most 
email messages were not replied. In the words of Aberbach and Rockman (2002, 
p.673),  
[t]his points to an important problem facing those wishing to interview elites. 
One must get access. 
 
Just as identifying documents to attribute to ECOWAS’ input to the DRR policy transfer 
depended on using information sourced from UNISDR’s website, contacting ECOWAS 
Disaster Management Unit was made possible through the interaction established with 
the UNISDR official based in Nairobi. The Nairobi office provided the personal 
telephone number of one of the two officials managing the department and the 
interview involved exchange of emails and a follow-up call. This was because the 
interviewee did not think the internet access available at the organisation’s location in 
Abuja, Nigeria, would allow a good connection for a Skype video or voice call.  
To get access to ECREEE, emails were sent to several officials within the 
organisation, but all of them mentioned that they were not the appropriate personnel 
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to interview and recommended a specific official. The official was contacted and an 
arrangement was made to hold the interview in Accra, Ghana during a renewable 
energy conference. Unfortunately, the meeting was cancelled due to the review of the 
ethics application and the official could not be reached until many months later. A 
Skype call was scheduled after re-establishing contact with official, but this was also 
cancelled. After rescheduling the appointment a number of times, particularly because 
of the official’s very busy schedule, the interview was finally conducted via telephone. 
Table 4.3 below gives a summary of the number of people interviewed for the 
research. 
Table 4.3: Number of Interviews Conducted 
 No of 
Persons 
Mode of Interview Duration 
(minutes) 
Date 
Case: Transfer of 
Renewable Energy 
Policy to ECOWAS 
    
EUEI PDF Official 1 Telephone 30 04/04/2017 
ECREEE Official 1 Telephone 30 18/05/2017 
Past EUEI PDF 
Official 
1 Face-to-Face 55 05/04/2017 
Past EUEI PDF 
Consultant 
1 Skype 70 09/02/2017 
Sub-Total 4    
Case: Transfer of 
Renewable Energy 
Policy to ECOWAS 
    
UNISDR 1 Telephone 30 16/08/2017 
ECOWAS Disaster 
Management Unit 
1 Email and Follow-
up on Telephone 
N/A 18/05/2017 
Sub-Total 2    
Total 6    
 
 
The above discussion highlights the constraints on the mode of interview and the 
number of interviewees. Given the EUEI PDF’s refusal to offer an invitation to their 
office in Brussels, the inability to meet ECREEE’s official at the renewable energy 
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conference in Accra, the administrative barrier in accessing senior personnel within 
UNISDR Africa’s, and the technical difficulty in reaching ECOWAS Disaster 
Management Unit, it was necessary to optimise available chances for securing 
contacts and conducting interviews. This involved reliance on use of ICTs for 
communication and ensuring the interviews are held with officials who can give 
accurate and cogent information about the relevant policy transfers. As a result, 
multiple modes of interviews were utilised and number of interviews conducted was 
limited to six, but this comprised at least one interviewee from each of the identified 
organisations.  
Looking at Table 4.3, there is a notable difference in the number of persons 
interviewed for each of the two cases. Similar to the explanation for the difference in 
the number of documents analysed for the two cases, the difference in the number of 
interviewees reflects the amount of activities that led up to the adoption of the 
respective policies based on the duration of interaction between the transfer agents 
and recipient. Within the period of engaging with ECOWAS, the EUEI sponsored 
research activities by consultants for developing a scope report for the establishment 
of ECREE and a baseline report for ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy. The EU also 
contributed significantly to the development of the first joint renewable energy policy 
document by the Anglophone and Francophone countries in West Africa. However, 
there was less activities led/or supported by UNISDR within ECOWAS compared to 
that of the EU, considering that the duration between the establishment of UNISDR 
Africa in 2002 and adoption of ECOWAS DRR policy in 2006 is four years, while the 
duration between the establishment of EUEI PDF in 2004 and adoption of ECOWAS 
renewable energy policy in 2013 is nine years.  
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As mentioned earlier, in line with the ethics approval, the participants were informed 
that the discussions will be recorded prior to the start of the interviews, and that their 
input will be confidential and anonymised. However, despite expressing this caveat, 
many of the interviewees did not mind being identified with participating in the research 
and they noted that what their contributions could be readily accessed in public 
documents. They often remarked, “[l]ook at our website” (Interview 5, 2017). 
Nonetheless, they were assured that their names or positions would not be divulged 
in the research outputs. Eschewing the offer of anonymity and reiterating the 
accessibility of relevant information, emphasises the viability of using public 
consumption documents for research. Also, contrary to the notion that public 
consumption documents do not fully express the viewpoints of policy actors, the 
referral to these documents by the interviewees shows that these sources can provide 
significant information on the perceptions of their authors (McBeth et al., 2005).  
The interviews lasted between thirty and seventy minutes. The interviewees were 
asked open ended questions. These were directed at pinpointing the intent of the 
transfer agent and recipient in engaging in the policy transfer and understanding the 
view of the interviewee regarding the policy transfer. In addition, the questions sought 
to decipher the relationship between the transfer agent and recipient and their 
perception of each other i.e. the perception of EU on ECOWAS and vice versa, and 
the perception of the UNISDR on ECOWAS and vice versa. The interview guide as 
well as the consent form are presented in Appendix 6. The duration of the interviews 
was primarily due to the availability of the interviewee, as the officials in full 
employment with the organisations could only spare thirty minutes for the interviews 
while others who were self-employed could afford to spend more time and as such, 
had longer interviews. All the interviews with current officials of the organisations were 
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held over the telephone, but others were face-to-face and via video call on Skype. 
After transcribing the interviews however, the relevance of the information from the 
telephone interviews was as valuable as that of the face-to-face and Skype interviews, 
despite the difference in the duration. With the use of open-ended questions, the 
discussion during the face-to-face and Skype interviews sometimes digressed from 
the focus of the research, as such, the extra time used on these interviews did not 
result in a major difference in the extent of relevant data from the telephone interviews. 
This observation also supports the conclusion by Holt (2010) and Mikecz (2012). They 
surmise that for elite interviewing, telephone interviews can be as useful as face-to-
face interviews and that telephone interviews can also be beneficial if the interviewees 
are located in different regions. Indeed, the use of telephones played a key role in 
conducting interviews with persons located in four countries across two different 
continents. 
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
The use of the data from the interviews centred on supporting arguments on the 
transfer mechanism that facilitated the occurrence of the policy transfers and the 
depiction of narrative elements, as well as verifying assertions for the data drawn from 
the documents. Also, when conflicting information is observed in some of the 
documents, the responses from the interviews were used for clarification. For 
example, the question of who initiated the renewable energy policy transfer was a 
tricky one. This was because some of the documents claimed that ECOWAS 
requested the assistance of the EU, while the information in other documents 
suggested otherwise. To clarify the contradictory information and identify the precise 
entity that initiated the policy transfer, specifically in a bid to identify the transfer 
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mechanism, the responses from the interviews with EUEI PDF and ECREEE provided 
the needed clarification. The interview responses gave explanation to the use of the 
term ‘request’. It also led to the knowledge of the decision made by the EU and other 
international actors at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
2002, to setup centres for renewable energy in low and middle-income countries 
(Interview 3, 2017; Interview 4, 2017; Meier and Haarstad, 2014). This helped to 
confirm that ECREEE was neither the brainchild of ECOWAS13 and nor was the 
development of the ECOWAS renewable energy initiated by domestic actors within 
West Africa.  
With regards to coding for narrative elements using NVivo, the data drawn from the 
documents was aggregated for each of the 87 documents according to the different 
nodes that were set up. The number of types of narrative elements identified in the 
documents was then summed up for each case of policy transfer. The reason for 
aggregating the use of the different narrative elements at the level of individual case 
of policy transfer instead of at the level of individual actor, was to enable linking the 
use of narrative elements directly to a specific case of policy transfer. Also, since the 
input of both the transfer agent and recipient contribute to the emergence of the 
transfer mechanisms observed, aggregating the narrative elements for each case 
emphasise the intermediation by the policy transfer actors. It also negates the possible 
presumption that the transfer agent and recipient operated in different directions during 
the policy transfer, as this would have been the situation if these were cases of non-
transfer. Rather, it is the agreement of or consent to the proposition of policy transfer 
                                                          
13 As part of the decision made at the 2002 WSSD, several centres of renewable energy and energy efficiency were setup 
across African, Caribbean, and Pacific regions including East African Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
(EACREEE), SADC Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (SACREEE), Caribbean Centre for Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency (CCREEE), Pacific Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (PCREEE) and 
ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE). 
 
 
163 
 
that culminates in the occurrence of policy transfer and allows the identification of 
transfer mechanisms. In addition, aggregating the narrative elements per case study, 
enabled the observation of the difference in use of narrative elements and 
understanding how the transfer mechanisms employed in the two policy transfers 
differ. 
To corroborate the findings from the analysis with NVivo, some basic statistical tests 
were also carried out. A chi-square test was used to assess the varying values 
generated for each type of narrative elements. The result of the chi-square (X2) helped 
to show the independence of these values. So, instead of selecting a visibly highest 
value and linking it directly to a transfer mechanism, the chi-square test ensured that 
this value was indeed different from the rest and can be linked to the respective 
transfer mechanism. Also, a t-test was carried out to ascertain the difference observed 
in the use of narrative elements between the two cases. The test assessed the values 
generated from NVivo for each of the difference types of narrative element and the 
results showed whether the difference observed between the DRR policy transfer and 
renewable energy policy transfer is significant or not. Importantly, the confirmation of 
differences in the depiction of narrative elements across the two cases helped to 
substantiate the argument for the shaping power of narratives on policy transfer 
mechanisms. The analysis of the chi-square test and t-test are presented in Appendix 
7. 
Having discussed the case selection, data collection, and data analysis for this 
research, the next section concludes the methodology chapter and highlights the 
relevance of the methods utilised.   
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Conclusion 
The chapter outlined the research design for the study and described how the research 
was carried out using narrative analysis and elite interviews. It presented the number 
of documents analysed using NVivo and discussed the identification of narrative 
elements depicted in the documents. It also stated the purpose of utilising elite 
interviews in addition to the narrative analysis. To ensure that the findings of the 
research are discussed accurately, the chapter notes the use of chi-square test and t-
test for confirming the independence of values generated from the content analysis 
and the difference observed between the two cases.  
Considering the challenges experienced in conducting the interviews, one might 
question if the analysis of publicly available documents would have been solely 
sufficient for the research. Based on the significance of the information gathered from 
the interviews and its key role in establishing the transfer mechanism operational in 
the renewable energy policy transfer, as a result of the decision made by international 
actors at WSSD, the use of elite interviews for this study is without a doubt, highly 
relevant. It is however, also plausible that none of the organisations and individuals 
contacted agreed to participate in the research and in such instance, it would be 
necessary to proceed with only the narrative analysis and refer to the absence of first-
hand information as a limitation of the research.  
This chapter also highlighted the incorporation of statistical techniques, in line with the 
practice in most NPF studies, as a relevant component for answering the overarching 
research question on the shaping power of narrative elements on transfer mechanism. 
Notably, the incorporation of NPF in this research helps to show the possibility of 
applying other theoretical frameworks with policy transfer and also demonstrate the 
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claim that “[t]he study of policy transfer has a truly interdisciplinary character” (Evans, 
2004, p. 4). 
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Chapter 5 – Renewable Energy and Disaster Risk 
Reduction in ECOWAS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the two cases to be examined. The two cases are: i) the 
transfer of renewable energy policy to the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) by the European Union (EU) and ii) the transfer of Disaster Risk 
Reduction (DRR) policy to ECOWAS by United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). ECOWAS consists of fifteen West African countries, 
and it is a supranational organisation with oversight function in diverse policy areas.  
We noted in the last chapter that the two cases represent instances of policy transfer 
facilitated by IGOs and targeted at global propagation of public policy. Chapter 1 also 
highlights the importance of IGOs as policy transfer agents and emphasises that their 
resources enable them to engage in large scale policy transfers across multiple 
jurisdictions. Following these, this chapter presents the general phenomenon that the 
two cases exemplify and gives an overview of the involvement of IGOs in global 
propagation of public policy. Secondly, based on the findings from the analysis of 
selected documents and elite interviews, it narrows in on the two specific cases that 
are investigated in this research. It describes the involvement of the two IGOs, EU and 
UNISDR, in the adoption of renewable energy policy and DRR policy respectively. It 
also focuses on the activities of actors within the recipient jurisdiction, ECOWAS, by 
presenting background information on the establishment of ECOWAS as a regional 
organisation and its activities in the specific policy areas. Importantly, by narrowing in 
on the activities of the IGOs and what transpired within the recipient jurisdiction, the 
first component of the research sub-questions is answered in this chapter through the 
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identification of the transfer mechanisms operational in the two cases of policy 
transfer.  
As mentioned earlier, the next section discusses the general phenomenon that the 
cases examined in this research represent. 
 
5.1 What are these Transfers Cases Of?  
 For this research, considering the family of cases to which the study belongs to first 
invoked the area of literature and theoretical inclinations within which the study is 
positioned, and this prompted the suggestion that these are policy transfer cases. 
Albeit, based on the possibility of engaging in policy transfer in manifold dimensions, 
as can be seen from Chapter 2, it was necessary to identify the sub-family within policy 
transfer to which the cases pertain to. To do this, the transfer mechanisms and type 
of actors involved were identified. If we consider the different transfer mechanisms, 
we can note that the transfer mechanisms of persuasion, obligation, and conditionality 
have in common, the involvement of IGOs, and being externally-facilitated policy 
transfers. This sub-family differs from policy transfers facilitated by learning, as it does 
not identify the transfer recipient as the initiator and driver of the policy transfer 
process. The sub-family also differs from policy transfers driven by imposition, as it 
does not feature a command or order from a hierarchical authority mandating the 
transferred policy as operational in the recipient jurisdiction, nor the displacement of 
the transfer recipient’s freedom to adopt or decline the proposed policy. Identifying this 
category of policy transfer, where the process is externally-initiated and often involve 
IGOs as transfer agents, is also in line with the remark by Ragin and Becker (1992, p. 
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10) that identification of cases may be informed by theoretical categories where the 
cases represent “an important subset of instances with many common characteristics”. 
In addition to conceptual categories, Ragin and Becker (1992) also state that empirical 
considerations can inform addressing the concern of what is this a case of, and 
specifying the general population that the case study can give insight to. With respect 
to the two cases being studied for this research, the empirical consideration of case 
selection is hinged on the propagation of public policy through the involvement of 
international actors14. The contributions of international actors that are backed by 
resources, reach, and access to decision makers, to the proliferation of policy 
problems and agendas, has been seen to be gaining traction across geographical and 
social spheres (Levi-Faur and Vigoda-Gadot, 2006; Stone, 2010; Stone and Ladi, 
2015). This often involves the identification of a policy problem or idea within a political 
setting, or by an organisation, or a group, which is then transported to multiple 
jurisdictions, in duplicate or modified form. Such policy problem or idea could have 
been generated from diverse sources, including within an epistemic community, where 
the idea may have been informed by research or superior knowledge (Dunlop, 2009), 
or within an international policy arena, such as the UN or OECD, where the idea may 
have been informed by the deliberations of the conglomeration of member states 
(Smith, 2004; Turhan et al., 2016). However, notwithstanding the source of the policy 
idea, the incentive for the involvement of international actors in the propagation of 
policy ideas could be a range of factors including, solving problems bound on 
externalities, controlling behaviours, ending a political or economic threat, 
                                                          
14 Based on Stone (2003), international actors encompass international governmental organisations (IGOs), international 
nongovernmental organisations (INGOs), states, and non-state actors. 
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strengthening alliances, or easing the distress of poor countries (Risse, 2007; Stone, 
2003).  
This phenomenon can be identified in the two cases. In the case of the transfer of 
renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU, the transfer agent directed efforts at 
ensuring that multiple regional organisations in West Africa, South Africa, East Africa, 
Central Africa, Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean, develop energy policies that are 
favourable to the use of renewable energy sources (EUEI PDF, 2016a). Also, in the 
instance of policy transfer of DRR policy by UNISDR, the policy was not only 
introduced to ECOWAS, but also to Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia, and Europe (UNISDR, 2016a). These activities of the EU and the UN 
can be said to be reminiscent of ‘large-scale’ proliferation of public policy (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 2000; Holden, 2016; Stone, 2004). The peculiarity of the two organisations 
as IGOs can also be said to underpin the breadth of their intended reach, as IGOs 
“typically have … resources …, their members are typically governments, (and) they 
can claim special expertise and prestige” Pal (2014, p. 195). Based on the involvement 
of the two IGOs in facilitating the transfer of renewable energy and DRR policies to 
multiple jurisdictions, and the consideration of categories of policy transfer 
mechanisms driving the transfer process, it can be surmised that the two cases are 
associated with the phenomenon of propagation of public policy through policy 
transfers facilitated by IGOs.  
Having shown the general phenomenon that the two cases represent, next, we will 
look at the specific policy transfer instances i.e. transfer of renewable energy policy 
and DRR policy to ECOWAS. However, in order to adequately demonstrate what 
transpired between the transfer agents and recipient, it is necessary to first give an 
overview of ECOWAS, its emergence as an IGO and how it relates with international 
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actors. Based on this, the next section gives a summary of how ECOWAS was formed 
and afterwards, there is a discussion on its evolution as a West African supranational 
organisation 
 
5.2 Background on ECOWAS 
5.2.1 The Formation of ECOWAS by Local Actors 
Across many African countries, the 1960s was marked by the desire for self-
actualisation and self-reliance which accelerated the drive to demand for 
independence and regain control of economic and political powers from European 
colonial powers (Biney, 2008; Ojo, 1980). In a bid to ensure that the independence 
brokered by the different countries are longstanding, many African leaders saw the 
need for strategic alliance among African countries, for strengthening ties and forming 
a strong union to surmount possible imperial incursions (Ojo, 1980; Thompson, 1969). 
In West Africa, the subcontinent comprising 18 countries15 and with English, French 
and Portuguese as dominant official languages, Nigeria and Ghana were the leading 
voices in this campaign, and deciding on how best to structure such alliance often put 
both countries and their leaders at loggerheads (Ojo, 1980).  
Most literature on ECOWAS refer to Yakubu Gowon, former Nigeria’s Head of State, 
as the frontrunner in the creation of ECOWAS in 1975 (Adeleke, 1995; Afolayan, 
2016). However, prior to the 1970s, there had been plans to establish a union among 
West African countries. As at early 1960s, the then Prime Minister of the newly-
independent Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa, canvassed for a study to be carried out by the 
                                                          
15 The 18 West African countries and their national languages are Benin (French), Burkina Faso (French), Cape Verde 
(Portuguese), Gambia (English), Ghana (English), Guinea (French), Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese), Ivory Coast (French), Liberia 
(English), Mali (French), Mauritania (French), Niger (French), Nigeria (English), the island of Saint Helena (English), Senegal 
(French), Sierra Leone (English), Sao Tome and Principe (Portuguese) and Togo (French).  
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United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA) on setting up an African 
Common Market and the creation of an African Development Bank (ADB). Although 
Nigeria’s intent in promoting African integration was for it to become “the industrial 
heart of an African Common Market” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1964, p. 24) and in 
particular to lead the West African sub-region (Akiba, 1998; Ojo, 1980), some 
members of the Nigerian Parliament and business community did not support the plan 
for a West African integration. This was because they feared that associating with 
West African Francophone countries would imply associating with France and in 
effect, the European Economic Community (EEC). Also, with Britain set to join the 
EEC, they were concerned that Nigeria may be welcoming Britain to interfere in its 
affairs (Ojo, 1980). Outside of Nigeria, Balewa’s proposal for an economic union also 
faced a gridlock (Hancock, 2015a). 
In opposition to Balewa’s proposition for an economic union, the prominent Ghanaian 
leader and president, Kwame Nkrumah, proposed a political union similar to that of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and called for the creation of a United 
States of Africa (Biney, 2008; Thompson, 1969). However, most of the countries 
feared losing their sovereignty and objected to the idea, which is often termed 
‘negative Nkrumanism’ (Biney, 2008; Kumah-Abiwu and Ochwa-Echel, 2013). Despite 
the initial unwillingness to associate with the EEC, West African leaders eventually 
drew lessons from “[t]he formation of the EEC and its undoubted success” (Gowon, 
1984, p. 8) in devising the formation and functioning of ECOWAS.  Gowon 1984 
(pp.102–103) notes that  
“[w]e were fortunate, too, in being able to draw on the recent history of 
cooperation and integration among the West European nations, whose 
Common Market stimulated much interest and debate in Africa and in other 
parts of the developing world.” 
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Fifteen West African Heads of state eventually signed the ECOWAS treaty in Lagos, 
Nigeria on the 28th of May, 1975 (Bach, 1983) and the treaty was registered with the 
UN in June 1976. Since signing of the treaty by the fifteen countries, an additional 
West African country, Cape Verde, has joined the community (Adeleke, 1995), but one 
of the founding countries, Mauritania, opted to leave (ECOWAS, 2015a), thereby 
making the total  number of ECOWAS states, fifteen16. To operationalise the new 
organisation, a secretariat was setup in Lagos, Nigeria and headed by an Executive 
Secretary. An Authority of the Heads of States and Government, which is headed by 
a Chairman, was given the mandate to provide direction to the community and control 
the activities of the secretariat (Bach, 1983; ECOWAS, 2015b; Gowon, 1984). Other 
institutions that were setup include, a Council of Ministers, Defence Council, Executive 
Secretariat, Tribunal of the Community, and Technical and Specialised Commissions 
(Gowon, 1984).  
 
5.2.2 The Involvement of External Actors in ECOWAS and the Revision of 
ECOWAS Treaty 
After its creation, ECOWAS functioned with little or no interference from international 
policy actors. Albeit, this liberty was not to last long. Based on the archives of the final 
communique of meetings of the Authority of the Heads of States and Government, the 
first and second meetings held in 1978 and 1979  respectively, had in attendance only 
leaders of ECOWAS Member States (MS) and observers from African organisations 
(ECOWAS, 2015c). However, by 1981, there was attendance of representatives of 
                                                          
16 The fifteen ECOWAS Member States are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
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international organisations such as, the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as observers. Altogether, the 1981 meeting had 
in attendance six international observers and by 1982, the number of international 
observers present had risen to ten.  
The increase in the involvement of international organisations can be linked to two 
major reasons. First is the voluntary invitation of persons from these organisations to 
work as external consultants (Gowon, 1984) and second is the 1980s global drive by 
developed countries to address the impact of 1970s oil crisis on poor countries and 
actualise accelerated development in these countries (Alter et al., 2013; UN, 1981). 
Gowon (1984, p.467) comments on the involvement of external influence in ECOWAS 
and notes that the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS secretariat was prepared “to sub-
contract ECOWAS work to other organisations already in the field and having 
compatible or parallel goals - including the entire gamut of United Nations agencies”.  
Going into its second decade, ECOWAS continued to be influenced by external actors 
and in 1993, the community went ahead with a revision of the treaty establishing the 
organisation at its summit of ECOWAS Heads of States, a decision that is said to be 
informed by external influence and aligning with neoliberal economic directions and 
market integration (Alter et al., 2013; Bach, 2004; Nwogu, 2007). The 1993 revision of 
the treaty also led to the restructuring of ECOWAS into a supranational authority rather 
than the intergovernmental arrangement favoured by the founding fathers (ECOWAS 
Commission, 2015a; Kufuor, 2006; Yaya, 2014). ECOWAS “member states agreed to 
a series of institutional changes that emulate the EU” (Alter, 2012, p. 150) with the 
1993 ECOWAS treaty establishing the ECOWAS Court of Justice, ECOWAS 
Parliament, and ECOWAS Council of Ministers. Also, in 2006, the ECOWAS 
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secretariat was “transformed” into a commission and the position of the Executive 
Secretary metamorphosed into that of President of the Commission (ECOWAS 
2015b, p.1).  
Bach (2004) opines that the revision of the ECOWAS treaty was likely imposed on it 
by external influence, in a bid to see the region align with neoliberal economic 
directions. Kufuor (2006) and Alter et al. (2013) also refer to the influence of 
conditionality of economic liberalisation given by Bretton Woods institutions such as 
the World Bank for awarding aid to the region, as the reason for the institutional 
changes embarked upon by ECOWAS. Also, the below excerpt from an official 
remark on the transformation by ECOWAS assert to the influence of international 
actors in the restructuring of the organisation.  
Changes have already been underway with the support of development 
partners. These initiatives were boosted by the Heads of State and Government 
when they endorsed institutional transformation covering all ECOWAS 
Institutions (ECOWAS 2015b, p.1). 
 
Since the revision of the ECOWAS treaty in 1993 and restructuring of ECOWAS 
institutions, ECOWAS has continued to work with international development partners 
on diverse policy issues and these relationships have often evolved into the use of 
knowledge or adoption of policies that had been operational in other jurisdictions. The 
next section gives an overview of how the policy areas of renewable energy and DRR 
have evolved within the ECOWAS community, and after this, we will delve further into 
the specific policy transfer instances to discuss the contributions of the transfer agents 
and identify the transfer mechanisms involved in the two cases. 
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5.3 Background on the Policy Areas: Renewable Energy and DRR  
5.3.1 Promoting Use of Renewable Energy in ECOWAS  
The 1975 ECOWAS treaty provided for the establishment of a transport, 
telecommunications and energy commission and Article 48 of the treaty directed 
ECOWAS MS to harmonise their energy policies and formulate a common energy 
policy (United Nations Treaty Series, 1976). Following the two oil crises in the 1970s, 
the issue of energy was of prominent concern (Chapman, 2014; Grossman, 2015) 
particularly in West Africa, considering that the region constituted “the world's largest 
concentration of least-developed economies” (Hanink and Owusu 1998, p.363). In line 
with this, energy was given special attention at the fourth summit of the leaders of MS, 
held in 1981 (ECOWAS, 2015d). The leaders made the decision to adopt an energy 
programme that will focus on “short-term ‘survival’ measures as well as a long-term 
development programme for the Community” (ECOWAS 1981, p.6).  
To ensure this survival, there was a call for support in the form of increased staffing of 
ECOWAS institutions with capable personnel from the civil service of MS, even if for 
brief periods. Also, the leaders did not hesitate to call for reinforcement from external 
sources. They considered the possibility of reaching out to international development 
organisations such as the UN, for consultancy support and for addressing a seeming 
shortage of domestic expertise (ECOWAS, 1981). Taking up the latter suggestion for 
mobilising external support, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) was invited in 1981, to provide consultancy services on an energy 
programme (USAID, 1982). As part of the programme, a symposium was held in 
November 1981 and USAID helped to setup a team of energy experts from the USA 
to serve as resource persons. It also sponsored the documentation of the proceedings 
at the symposium. The ECOWAS symposium was tagged ‘Energy for Survival’, and it 
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had in attendance representatives of all the MS alongside representatives of several 
donor organisations. The report prepared by the USAID team showed that there was 
an unanimous decision by the delegates to the symposium, that ECOWAS should 
prioritise renewable energy sources, particularly, hydropower and solar. The 
community's secretariat was also tasked with the role of policy coordination, so that 
MS would take steps "to encourage energy savings and bring renewable energy 
sources into the mainstream" (USAID, 1982, p. v). 
The 1981 symposium report by USAID (USAID, 1982) notes that it was not until 1981 
that energy was included as part of the policy areas to be covered by ECOWAS. Also, 
Hancock (2015, p.108) ascribe the introduction of energy as a policy area in ECOWAS 
to the 1993 restructuring of ECOWAS. However, as noted earlier, Article 48 of the 
1975 treaty establishing ECOWAS called for the formulation of a common energy 
policy. In addition, following the 1981 meeting of Authority of Heads of States and 
Government and the 'Energy for Survival' symposium had taken place, there was an 
increased attention to renewable energy sources within ECOWAS. ECOWAS had also 
associated with the global drive for use of renewable energy sources at the time. 
Notable West African leaders participated in the 1981 United Nations conference on 
new and renewable sources of energy, which issued the Nairobi Programme of Action 
for the development and utilisation of new and renewable sources of energy 
(Akinbami, 2001; UN, 1981). In line with the Nairobi Programme of Action, ECOWAS 
released the Conakry Declaration in 1982 where it mandated MS to setup energy 
commissions in their countries for "coordinating and supervising all energy functions 
and activities within each member state" (Energy Commission of Nigeria, 2012). In 
addition to the creation of energy commissions, ECOWAS, at its meeting of Authority 
of Heads of States and Government in 1982, also discussed the development of an 
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ECOWAS energy policy and creation of an ECOWAS Energy Resources Development 
Fund (ECOWAS, 1982). Unfortunately, neither of these initiatives materialised. 
Nonetheless, we may imply that energy was on the agenda at time ECOWAS was 
founded in 1975 and that the topic of renewable energy had been broached before the 
1993 revision of the ECOWAS treaty. 
Similar to the experience of decreased interest in renewable energy on the global 
scene as a result of glut in oil prices (Bourodimos, 1990; Cowan, 1985), there was 
also diminished interest in use of renewable energy in the region. In the late 80s, the 
notes from the meetings of the Authority of Heads of States and Government show 
that issues such as free movement within the community, cultural integration, MS’ 
financial contributions and economic concerns particularly, debt financing remained 
recurring themes on the agenda. However, with the eruption of violence in Liberia in 
1989, the 1990s was marked by attending to the brewing conflict and its spread to 
other parts of the region.  
On the other hand, the 1990s was a period of global reawakening to the use of 
renewable energy in response to the threat of climate change (Bulkeley and Betsill, 
2013; Tsoskounoglou et al., 2008). Albeit, ECOWAS did not readily identify with the 
need to address this challenge and as such, was not on board the new drive for 
promotion and use of renewable energy as at the time it regained traction 
internationally (Beg et al., 2002). In 1992, the United Nations had organised the Earth 
Summit in Rio, where more than a hundred countries committed to “changing the 
traditional approach to development” (UN, 1997, p. 1), and signed the legally binding 
convention on climate change. As part of the convention, which is domiciled with the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), countries are 
urged to promote and apply technologies in energy and other sectors that can help 
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prevent climate change. The UNFCCC also created the Africa Renewable Energy 
Initiative, to promote the use of renewable energy in addressing climate change within 
African countries. Within ECOWAS however, the issue of climate change did not 
appear as a topic discussed during the meetings of the Authority of Heads of States 
at the time the Earth Summit was organised and through the rest of the 1990s.  
ECOWAS’ non-alignment with the drive to address climate change rules out the 
possibility of the transfer of renewable energy policy being facilitated by an obligation 
to the UN’s convention on climate change in the 1990s, since the adoption of the policy 
was not an obligatory response to the requirement of this convention ( Benson and 
Jordan, 2011; Bulmer et al, 2007). In particular, at a UN meeting on climate change 
and development in Africa, an official of ECOWAS Commission stated in his 
presentation that the “issue of climate change is not addressed specifically” (Djeri-
Alassani, 2011, p. 3) within the community. Expectedly, when the issue of energy 
resurfaced on the agenda in 2003, it had no bearing with the concerns of climate 
change. 
At their 2003 meeting, West African Heads of States highlighted the persistence of 
energy challenges in the region and made the decision to develop and sign an 
ECOWAS Energy Protocol, which stipulates the guidelines for economic transactions 
of aspects of energy exploration, generation, distribution and transmission (ECOWAS, 
2003a). It was on the premise of the energy protocol that a West African Power Pool 
(WAPP) and a West African Gas Pipeline project emerged. WAPP was granted a 
status of an ECOWAS specialised institution in 2006 and has been functioning actively 
since then. The Power Pool is a conglomerate of energy companies of the MS and 
works towards a regional coordination of electricity generation and provision. The 
pipeline project involves four countries (Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo) and it seeks 
 
 
179 
 
to supply purified natural gas produced in Nigeria to the other countries. The energy 
protocol also provided for giving due consideration to “developing and using renewable 
energy sources” (ECOWAS, 2003b, p. 26), but this recommendation was not linked 
specifically to climate change. 
In 2005, ECOWAS teamed up with the dominant Francophone West African regional 
group, West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)17, to sign a convention 
on joint implementation of actions in the energy sector, and this led to both 
organisations adopting a White Paper targeted at the provision of modern energy 
services to people living in rural and peri-urban locations (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 
2006). The policy document is primarily based on the objectives of the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and is expected to augment the Energy Protocol. The 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided technical support for 
development of the White Paper, while the French government provided funding 
assistance. The White Paper heralded the accommodation of environmental and 
climate change concerns in ECOWAS’ energy-related policies, with the mention of 
sustainable development as one of its guiding principles. However, as against the 
major narrative plot often associated with the issue of climate change, which is one of 
a catastrophic threat that needs to be stopped (Lowe, 2006; Wright et al., 2006), the 
ECOWAS/UEMOA White Paper, is instead directed at ending energy poverty in 
ECOWAS MS. The excerpt below from the White Paper portrays what it aims to 
address. 
This (White Paper) reflects our vision for 2015 and will play a critical role in the 
improvement of the conditions and well-being of the ECOWAS rural and peri-
urban populations. These populations jeopardize their health and that of their 
children by burning harmful domestic fuels; they spend a great part of their day 
trekking several kilometres with heavy loads; they give birth in semi-darkness; 
                                                          
17 WAEMU consists of eight French speaking countries namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo. It is also referred to as UEMOA in French. 
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in short, they are deprived of economic opportunities because they do not have 
access to or cannot afford adequate energy services. In short, it is needless to 
say that our populations deserve better and we have to free them from these 
hardships (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006, p. ii). 
  
The involvement of the UN as a transfer agent can also be noted in the development 
and adoption of the White Paper, however, the intervention of the UN was not linked 
to ECOWAS being a signatory to an international regime or structure (Unalan, 2009), 
or to a climate change policy and renewable energy agreements, thus the transfer 
mechanism in this instance cannot be said to be obligation. Also, since the MDGs were 
developed so as to secure funds for poverty eradication from international donors 
(United Nations, 2016; United Nations Development Programme, 2005), the White 
Paper does not vie for attainment of victory over a villain, but it focuses on reducing 
the burden of victims of energy poverty (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006). 
As mentioned earlier, the White Paper signalled a renewable energy policy direction 
which is informed by the challenge of climate change, but not directly aimed at 
stopping climate change, instead, it is focused on ending energy poverty. Despite the 
targets set in the White Paper however, ECOWAS MS continue to grapple with the 
challenge of energy provision for their population and ensuring energy activities within 
the region are sustainable. Cumulatively, the region also represents the area with the 
least access to energy globally (Hancock, 2015b). Based on a 2011 assessment of 
the level of achievements of the ECOWAS/WAEMU energy White Paper, results of 
which are shown in Table 5.1, the West African region seems to continue to lag behind 
in access to electricity in rural locations and access to modern cooking fuel. Among 
developing countries globally, West Africa represents the region with abysmally low 
level of energy access at 17% in contrast to what obtains in Latin America (85%), 
Middle East (79%) and, North Africa (99%) (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2015). 
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In addition, despite the existing efforts by ECOWAS and other international donors 
involved in ensuring the availability of energy services within the region, there seemed 
to have been no visible improvement in the conditions in the region. As shown in Figure 
5.1, as at 2009, 58% of the population across the region had no access to electricity, 
and by 2011, the percentage of people living in West Africa without energy access had 
increased to 63%. It is against this background of dire circumstances and unsuccessful 
attempts at addressing the situation of lack of energy access in West Africa, that the 
EU facilitated the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS.  
Table 5.1: Achievements of the ECOWAS/UEMOA White Paper on Energy 
Access 
White Paper Goals Goals Target Achievement of Goals 
Access to modern cooking 
fuel 
100% of the population 17% of the populations 
(30% 
urban, 7% rural) 
Individual electricity access 66% of the population 42% 
Electricity access in urban 
and peri‐urban areas 
100% 70% 
Electricity access in rural 
areas 
36% 11% 
Source: Adapted from ECREEE (2012) 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Energy Access in ECOWAS as at 2009 and 2012 
 
Sources: ECREEE (2012), International Energy Agency (2015) 
 
 
182 
 
 
The next section introduces the emergence of DRR as a policy issue in ECOWAS and 
discusses how disasters was perceived within the region prior to the adoption of the 
ECOWAS DRR policy. 
 
5.3.2 Disaster Risk Reduction in ECOWAS  
Having little or no experience in managing large scale ravaging natural disasters, most 
ECOWAS countries paid little or no interest to DRR issues or pursued the adoption of 
DRR policies, at the time such concerns emerged on the international policy agenda 
in the 1960s (UNECA and UNISDR, 2013). The world’s attention was turned to DRR 
concerns after the occurrence of multiple natural disasters in Asia and the Americas 
(UNISDR, 2012a). The disasters, which included earthquakes in Iran and Macedonia, 
and hurricanes in Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, ravaged lives and 
livelihoods of thousands of people. In response to this, the United Nations General 
Assembly, in 1965, mandated the UN secretariat to assist countries experiencing 
natural disasters, by providing emergency services (Pelling and Uitto, 2001; Tchalenko 
et al., 1974; UNISDR, 2012a). However, after the occurrence of another earthquake 
in Iran, in 1968, which killed about 12,000 people, the UN General Assembly in 1970, 
identified the need for disaster prevention and reducing damages and deaths in the 
event of disasters which could not be prevented (Pelling and Uitto, 2001; UNISDR, 
2012a). The General Assembly therefore requested that the Secretary General 
propose recommendations for: 
[p]re-disaster planning at the national and international levels, including the 
definition of machinery and contingency arrangements capable of coping 
immediately with disaster situations; ... (d) The application of technology to, and 
scientific research for, the prevention and control of natural disasters, or a 
mitigation of the effects of such disasters, including arrangements to 
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disseminate effectively to all countries the fruits of research from satellites and 
other sophisticated technology with a view to strengthening international co-
operation to determine the causes and early manifestation of impending 
disasters and the development and improvement of early warning systems 
(United Nations General Assembly, 1970, p. 83). 
 
The recommendations put forward by the Secretary General in 1971, in response to 
the request from the General Assembly, led to creation of a United Nations Disaster 
Relief Office. The new arm facilitated the incorporation of disaster risk reduction into 
development objectives through the UNDP in a bid to ensure that “[n]ew International 
Development Strategy … take into account, matters concerning disaster relief, 
preparedness and prevention" (United Nations General Assembly, 1979, p. 94). 
Despite the 1971 recommendation by the UN on the incorporation of DRR to 
development efforts, ECOWAS, in its first Treaty signed in 1975, did not make 
reference to any disaster-related issue (United Nations Treaty Series, 1976). This 
omission can be based on the intent of the founding fathers of the community in 
creating an economic union hinged on intergovernmental cooperation, rather than 
instituting a supranational authority. As such, while the world continued to grapple with 
disaster issues in the late 1980s, with the occurrence of floods, hurricanes and 
typhoons across the Caribbean islands, South-East Asia and Southern Africa, DRR 
did not appear on ECOWAS’ policy agenda (ECOWAS, 2015d).  
These 1980s disasters prompted the UN to christen the forthcoming decade, the 
1990s, the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (UNISDR, 2012a). 
During the decade however, the disasters challenging ECOWAS were not natural, but 
man-made. They also were not environmental, but political. With the break out of civil 
wars and attempted toppling of sitting governments in three of its MS i.e. Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea Bissau, managing the political crises ensuing from the war and 
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ending the war altogether, topped ECOWAS’ agenda in the 1990s (Alter et al., 2013; 
Kufuor, 2006). 
 
5.3.3 Disaster Management as Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution 
To address these challenges, ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Government 
followed in the step of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), which is now 
restructured as the African Union (AU) (Souaré and Handy, 2013). In 1993, the Africa-
wide organisation adopted a Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management 
and Resolution in Africa, primarily to prevent and end eruption of violence on the 
continent, and provide legal backing for military and non-military interventions (OAU, 
1993). To stem the spread of conflicts within West Africa, ECOWAS also signed a 
Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and 
Security in 1999 (ECOWAS, 2000), which it tagged “The Mechanism” (ECOWAS, 
2015b, p. 1). The Mechanism focused on conflict issues and created new institutions 
for the community, including an armed military force, the ECOWAS Cease-fire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and a Council of Elders. In addition to addressing 
violent political conflicts, The Mechanism goes a step further than the provisions of the 
OAU protocol, and mandates the development of “effective policies that will help 
alleviate the suffering of the population and restore life to normalcy after complex 
humanitarian emergencies and disasters” (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 2).  
The adoption of The Mechanism can be described as an instance of policy transfer 
from a continent to sub-continent political setting, and informed by “dissatisfaction and 
problem with the status quo” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 346) of politically-
motivated violence. Also, The Mechanism’s target of ending violent conflicts and 
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maintaining security in West Africa seems to reflect ECOWAS’ understanding of and 
approach to reducing disasters, such that by setting up a military arm, it specifically 
sought to focus on conflict perpetrators. In addition, with the introduction of the Council 
of Elders, it hoped that complex humanitarian disasters could be avoided through 
resolving disputes between warring factions (ECOWAS, 2006).  
The adoption of the conflict prevention and resolution policy, which provides a 
humanitarian support component, can also be linked to the restructuring of ECOWAS 
to a supranational authority through the revision of its treaty in 1993, as this enabled 
the broadening of the policy areas overseen by the Community, to include issues that 
are not directly related to economic concerns. As opposed to the provisions of the 
1975 treaty, the revised treaty provided for cooperation in non-economic 
environmental issues. Article 29 of the treaty explicitly mandates the community’s MS 
to “protect, preserve and enhance the natural environment of the region and cooperate 
in the event of natural disasters” (ECOWAS, 1993, p. 21), while Article 25 on 
Agricultural Development And Food Security calls for the establishment of an early 
warning system to prevent food shortages and the “strengthening of existing 
institutions for the management of natural calamities, agricultural diseases and pest 
control” (ECOWAS 1993, p.17). With reference therefore to the humanitarian aspect 
of The Mechanism, alongside cooperation in environment and food security policies 
as stipulated in the 1993 treaty, the ECOWAS Commission setup the humanitarian 
affairs department, in 2000 (ECOWAS Commission, 2015b). 
Although the department established an early warning system, this was however, 
directed at envisaging the eruption of violence in ECOWAS MS, instead of addressing 
concerns of natural disasters. The department also dedicated efforts to managing the 
deployment of a civilian response team to locations where the armed peacekeeping 
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forces, ECOMOG, were engaged in ending conflicts. The decisions and actions of 
ECOWAS, especially, in borrowing a conflict prevention and resolution policy from the 
OAU, reiterate that the disasters that mattered to the organisation in the 1990s and 
early 2000s were not necessarily those that were prioritised by the UN in its 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, but those of non-environmental 
causes. 
 
5.3.4 ECOWAS’ Interest in DRR and Development of the Africa Regional 
Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
There was however, a turnaround in ECOWAS’ assumed policy preference on the 
issue of disasters, by 2003. Based on the occurrence of natural disasters (particularly 
floods, droughts, and pests infestations), in Africa, through the 1990s and early 2000s 
(AU and NEPAD, 2004a; ECOWAS, 2006; Olowu, 2010), the UN again called for the 
incorporation of a DRR component in development initiatives at its World Summit on 
Sustainable Development held in 2002 (UNISDR, 2012a). In response to this call, the 
AU and its New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), with the support of 
UNISDR, UNDP and Africa Development Bank (ADB), introduced activities that were 
targeted at developing continent-wide food security and disaster management policies 
(AU and NEPAD, 2004a). These efforts led to the involvement of eight sub-continental 
organisations such as ECOWAS, referred to as Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs). ECOWAS contributed to the development of the African Regional Strategy 
for Disaster Risk Reduction, which was developed in 2003 and adopted at the African 
Ministerial Conference on the Environment in 2004 (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; 
ECOWAS, 2006). In view of this commitment, ECOWAS made the decision to setup 
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its own Technical Committee on Disaster Management, in 2003. In a comment on the 
new focus on DRR issues, the organisation noted that:  
over the last couple of years, ECOWAS has increasingly focused its attention 
on disaster issues culminating in the establishment of disaster risk reduction as 
an operational theme (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 4) 
 
Also, taking note of ECOWAS’ newly pitched interest in DRR issues, the UNISDR in 
its November 2004 newsletter edition, remarked that:   
ECOWAS … [is] also planning to increase their involvement in disaster risk 
management (UNISDR Africa, 2004a, p. 51) 
 
The development of the African Strategy for DRR and ECOWAS’ interest in DRR 
issues can be linked to the establishment of an African office of the UNISDR, in 2002 
(UNISDR, 2003a; Vordzorgbe, 2006). The African office identified and worked with 
relevant stakeholders such as continent-wide organisations, like AU and NEPAD, and 
RECs, like ECOWAS. With an established relationship with the UNISDR, and 
continued involvement in continental activities, ECOWAS was able to place DRR on 
its agenda and show interest in DRR policy decisions made at the global and regional 
levels. 
Having presented the background on the ECOWAS and the two policy areas in focus, 
we will now turn to the involvement of the transfer agents in these policy areas and the 
transfer mechanisms operational in the two transfer instances.  
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5.4 Policy Transfer Agents and Transfer Mechanisms 
In addition to the direct involvement of the EU in the transfer renewable energy policy 
to ECOWAS and the involvement of UNISDR in the transfer of DRR policy to 
ECOWAS, various actors were also involved in the transfer process. The importance 
of highlighting the other international actors involved is so much so because these 
policy issues are not particular to the local recipient domain i.e. West African countries, 
but are pertinent international concerns primarily based on their link to the global 
environmental challenge of climate change. In the case of renewable energy policy 
transfer, UNIDO, the governments of Austria and Spain through their development 
cooperation arms I.e. the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC) and the Spanish 
Cooperation, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo 
(AECID) respectively, played different roles in facilitating the policy transfer, mostly 
through their contribution to the establishment and operations of ECREEE. In the case 
of DRR policy transfer, in addition to the input of the AU and NEPAD, the UNEP directly 
supports the activities of UNISDR Africa through secretariat support and also partners 
with UNISDR Africa as a member of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster 
Reduction (IATF-DR). The UNDP also partners with UNISDR Africa as part of the 
IATF-DR. The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) was also involved in 
promoting DRR through its WMO Programme for Natural Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation. A notable contribution to the promotion of DRR in ECOWAS, particularly 
the adoption of the Hyogo Framework of Action, is the Global Facility for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (GFDRR) which is a multilateral funding mechanism for managing DRR in 
developing countries. The organisation is managed by the World Bank and mainly 
funded by the EU and Japan.  
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On the receiving end of the policy transfer, the ECOWAS Member States on their own 
participated in the process through their alignment with the decisions and activities of 
the ECOWAS Commission, as well as assigning focal points for the policy issues, 
joining sub-regional coalitions to promote a particular position, and carrying out public 
awareness activities in their respective jurisdictions. The countries along the Sahel 
region of West Africa formed the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control 
in the Sahel (CILSSS), which is focused on the issue of droughts in the sub-continent 
and their influence likely led to the emphasis on drought in the policy document 
(CILSS, 2018). Also, the countries of Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, and Ghana, welcomed 
the activities of UNISDR Africa by holding formal events to sensitise local policy actors 
and the public on the relevance of DRR and creation of national platform of DRR, as 
recommended in the HFA. Notably, the Francophone West African countries, which 
are grouped under the auspices of UEMOA, contributed to the adoption of the 
renewable energy policy through their formal cooperation with ECOWAS on 
developing a White Paper on energy access, which served as the foundation for 
developing the regional renewable energy policy document.  
The involvement and contributions of these diverse actors to the transfer process 
reiterate the point that policy transfer is not a direct, facile process, but it is multilateral, 
multi-level, and multifaceted. It is therefore characterised by intermediaries or 
interlocutors co-driving or interjecting the process, which may result in halting, 
abrading, or smoothening the path to the eventual occurrence of policy transfer. 
Without undermining the activities and contributions of all the various actors, the 
significant roles of funding and driving or ‘project managing’ the transfer instances by 
the EU and UNISDR go to show that these organisations played leading roles in 
facilitating the transfer of renewable energy policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS 
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respectively. Also, ECOWAS acted as the primary contact and conduit to these 
transfer agents and other international actors, in their effort to promote these policy 
issues in West Africa. Another thing to note is the alignment of purpose among the 
international actors, and among the different countries of the West African region. This 
can be seen in the decision made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in 2002 by the varying international organisations to ensure the development and 
adoption of environmentally-friendly policies in African regions and countries. Also, the 
formal assent by individual ECOWAS countries to decisions that led to the 
development of the policies as well as the formal assent of the policy documents points 
to the actors as very likely being of one mind. It is based on this that the narratives of 
the EU and UNISDR are taken as a representative voice of the transfer agents for the 
two cases, and the ECOWAS as a representative voice of the recipient.  
The next section will focus on the events and actions facilitated by transfer actors, and 
which led to the adoption of the ECOWAS renewable energy.  
 
5.4.1 The EU and the Creation of ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and 
Efficiency (ECREEE) 
At the 2007 meeting of Authority of the Heads of States and Government, the leaders 
of ECOWAS MS raised the issue of rise in oil prices and lack of electrical power in 
some parts of the region, and in a bid to address this challenge, they endorsed the 
establishment of an ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Efficiency 
(ECREEE) (ECOWAS, 2008). At the meeting, the leaders also persistently called for 
international financial and technical support for the realisation of the objective of the 
newly formed agency (ECOWAS, 2008; Kappiah and Lugmayr, 2011).  In response to 
this, the Austrian Minister for European and International Affairs and a representative 
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from the United Nations Industrial Organisation (UNIDO), who were present at the 
meeting, pledged their support for setting up and managing ECREEE (ECREEE, 
2013b).  
In a presentation delivered by the Executive Director of ECREEE to the Austrian 
business community and experts on renewable energy, in June 2011, he announced 
that four additional partners will be supporting the agency in delivering on its mandate 
(Kappiah and Lugmayr, 2011), and among these was the EU. The EU supports 
ECREE through the EUEI-PDF’s Renewable Energy Cooperation Program (RECP). 
As noted in the earlier chapter, this funding instrument is linked to the Africa–EU 
Energy Partnership, which is also a part of the broader EU pact with ACP states and 
positioned under the international cooperation and development arm of the European 
Commission.  
 
5.4.2 The EU and the Development and Adoption of the ECOWAS Renewable 
Energy Policy 
The idea of the establishment of regional centres of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency in developing countries, primarily originated from international actors 
(Interview 4, 2017; Meier and Haarstad, 2014). The EU had also been engaged with 
the process from its introduction at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
which was held in Johannesburg in 2002 (European Commission, 2001). With respect 
to the creation of ECREEE, the EU sponsored a research study on the establishment 
of a West African regional agency for energy access in 2006 and the report from the 
study informed the setting up of ECREEE (Brew-Hammond et al., 2006). So, in 
conjunction with UNIDO and the government of Austria, the EU also contributed to the 
initiation of ECREEE. Its role however became more prominent with the launch of the 
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project ‘Development of a Regional Renewable Energy Policy’ by the EUEI under the 
Africa-EU RECP. As part of the project, a baseline report for the policy was published 
in 2012 (ECREEE, 2012a). The report identified existing institutional frameworks in 
West Africa, comprising regional and national organisations, and on-going initiatives 
that will serve as a springboard for the policy and also inform quantitative goals and 
benchmarks.  Afterwards, the policy document was developed by European experts 
who were selected by ECREEE officials, but funded by the EU (Interview 2, 2017).  
The notable input of the EU to the development of the renewable energy policy is also 
echoed by the President of ECOWAS Commission. As we can see in the below 
excerpt from his foreword address written for the policy document, he addresses the 
EU as a major partner, while the other international development partners could be 
taken to be additional supporting organisations. 
I wish to express appreciation to the European Union (Renewable Energy 
Cooperation Program (RECP) of the Africa–EU Energy Partnership with 
technical support from the Partnership Dialogue Facility of the EU Energy 
Initiative (EUEI-PDF) for their support in the development of this policy. We are 
also grateful to the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the Governments of 
Austria and Spain (ECREEE, 2013a, p. 5). 
 
The policy document developed was presented to ECOWAS Ministers of Energy in 
October 2012 at a forum held in Accra, Ghana and the policy was adopted by the 
ministers (ECREEE, 2013a). Afterwards, the Authority of the Heads of States and 
Government also endorsed the policy at their 43rd Ordinary Session which held in July 
2013 (ECREEE, 2013a). 
The ECOWAS renewable energy policy can be said to mirror the provisions of the 
2009 EU Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. Two 
key characteristics form the basis of the structure of the 2009 EU Directive (European 
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Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009). The first is the specific 
numerical targets set for MS, representing the share of renewable energy expected to 
contribute to total energy consumption in the countries. The second characteristics is 
the demand for development of national action plans by each MS and submission of 
the plans to the regional body. In similar fashion, the 2013 ECOWAS renewable 
energy policy sets numerical targets which MS are expected to align with and from 
which they can determine their national targets. It also mandates MS to develop 
individual national action plans to be submitted to ECREEE and which is to be revised 
every five years. In addition, the emphasis paid to energy efficiency in the ECOWAS 
policy reflects similar viewpoint expressed in the EU Directive. For example, the 
ECOWAS policy states that the document is aimed at “creating synergies with other 
ECOWAS policies, and particularly the ECOWAS Energy Efficiency Policy (EEEP)” 
(ECREEE, 2013a, p. 24), while the EU Directive claims that “the development of 
energy from renewable sources should be closely linked to increased energy 
efficiency” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 16). 
Also, based on the quote below from an ECREEE official, the relevance of EU’s 
renewable energy directive in the development of the ECOWAS renewable energy 
policy is noted. 
We saw from the experience of the European Union that they had a renewable 
energy policy in place, they had the renewable energy directive. Basically, we 
followed, we towed the line to replicate what had been done in the EU, to do it 
here and we thought EUEI PDF will be the right partners based on their 
experience in the EU, to support us in this endeavour (Interview 2, 2017). 
 
Although the policy objectives of both regional bodies are quite different, with the EU’s 
renewable energy policy primarily aimed at complying with the UN emission reduction 
commitments and that of ECOWAS targeted at addressing energy poverty, the 
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similarity in the approach and reference to drawing inspiration from EU’s directives 
signify an evidence of policy transfer. The approach of reviewing policy documents for 
similarities in content and style can also be seen in other policy transfer studies. Bray 
et al. (2011) analyse the transport strategy documents of five capital cities in mainland 
Australia. They identify similarities and differences in the approaches (such as use of 
scenarios and share targets), proposed programs (such as investment program), and 
language, in order to show evidence of policy transfer. Sharman (2010) specifically 
set out to identify similarities in texts of policy documents on tax blacklists from different 
countries and the study was able to reveal direct duplication of wordings of policy 
documents, including errors in some instances, in order to show evidence of 
dysfunctional policy transfer. Also, Dussauge-Laguna (2013a) presents a case study 
showing similarities in the nomenclature of new public management policies in Chile 
and Mexico, but with both countries preferring different approaches for achieving the 
same objective. In this instance, the policy transfer of renewable energy policy transfer 
to ECOWAS seems to be more suited to a case of dissimilar objectives, but analogous 
approaches. 
The next section expatiates further on the involvement of the transfer actors and 
identifies the mechanisms that led to the occurrence of renewable energy policy 
transfer to ECOWAS by the EU. 
 
5.4.3a The Transfer Mechanism of Conditionality 
Policy transfer by conditionality involves the introduction of a transfer object as a 
condition for securing particular support that is needed by the recipient. According to 
the business plan developed for ECREEE in 2011, the agency intended to generate 
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about 70% of its budget for funding renewable energy activities in West Africa from 
international donors and technical partners. Emphasising the international context of 
ECREEE’s operations, the business plan notes that:  
[i]nitiatives to support the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency 
in Africa have gained prominence in the context of international development, 
energy and climate policy processes in recent years. At … international forums, 
the world’s leading economies identified as critical priorities debt relief for Africa 
and coordinated action to address the threat of global climate change … [s]ince 
then, the major donor agencies allocated fresh resources to support renewable 
energy and climate change activities in the region. ECREEE itself is the 
beneficiary of donor programmes focused on Africa that have emerged since 
2005 (ECREEE, 2011, p. 17). 
 
With the intent of ECREEE to generate 70% of its budget externally, and the 
knowledge of the availability of fresh resources to support renewable energy in West 
Africa, the ECOWAS renewable energy policy was designed to serve as a guarantee 
for prospective funders and investors (Interview 1, 2017; Interview 2, 2017). The policy 
was aimed at giving the assurance of making provision for relevant institutional and 
regulatory frameworks for a renewable energy market, which are requirements for 
accessing funds from donors and international partners interested in the promotion of 
renewable energy in West Africa (ECREEE, 2013a; Interview 4, 2017). This signifies 
that the transfer process was driven by the mechanism of conditionality. This 
conditionality, according to one of the interview respondents, is not synonymous with 
the mechanism of conditionality which was employed by the World Bank in the 
introduction of structural adjustment programs to African countries, and could be 
referred to as indirect conditionality (Interview 1, 2017). The respondent also remarked 
that that the conditionality was more of a business arrangement whereby an investor 
is interested in ensuring that the funds to be released will be appropriately utilised. 
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Nonetheless, the EU’s basis for engaging in transfer of renewable energy policy is 
somewhat synonymous to the World Bank’s view in the 1980s, that developing 
countries needed assistance to adjust to the looming debt crisis (Koeberle et al., 
2015). For the EU, it reasoned that West Africa countries needed institutional 
frameworks to attract investments in renewable energy. This is also highlighted in the 
quote below from the baseline report sponsored by the EU.    
Funding … does not appear to be a major problem for the diffusion of clean 
technologies. Private investors have already shown their interest in those 
technologies when projects are implemented within a transparent and stable 
institutional framework and with financial guarantees. As far as the ECOWAS 
region is concerned, the lack of an appropriate regulatory framework enabling 
RE (renewable energy) promotion, constitutes a significant barrier for private 
investors (ECREEE, 2012a, p. 73). 
 
To further emphasise what ECOWAS may stand to benefit upon adoption of the 
renewable energy policy, the report shares the story of the experience of other 
jurisdictions, and how they have benefitted from funding from international funding 
bodies and private investors. It noted that: 
[i]n Turkey, IFC (International Finance Corporation) financed a 135 megawatt 
wind farm enabling an increase of 30% of the country's capacity in wind energy 
while reducing pollution levels; In Chile, IFC financed the construction of a wind 
farm, the largest to date in the country. … In South Africa, Proparco financed a 
1MW solar plant while in Burkina Proparco intends to finance a 20 MW solar 
plant (ECREEE, 2012a, p. 73). 
  
From the quotes above, the potential investors are showcased as actors with the 
means to offer economic support to those in need of energy services, while ECOWAS 
countries are considered to be in need of funds for investments in renewable energy 
infrastructure, and requiring institutional and regulatory frameworks to prevent 
hindrances to accessing the needed funds. We can see that ECOWAS was particularly 
made aware of the possibility of accessing funds through the emphasis on other 
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jurisdictions that had received similar support, and this likely made ECOWAS realise 
the significant opportunity for providing modern energy services to the citizens of its 
MS. It therefore influenced its acceptance of the condition for setting up institutional 
and regulatory frameworks and informed ECOWAS’ engagement with the EU as a 
transfer recipient. Consequently, ECOWAS’ vision for the renewable energy policy 
was to setup of institutional and regulatory frameworks in ECOWAS MS in order to 
create a flourishing renewable energy market and achieve universal energy access 
for citizens of all ECOWAS countries by 2030 (ECREEE, 2013a).  
 
5.3.3b The Transfer Mechanism of Persuasion 
As the name implies, the mechanism of persuasion involves the use of persuasive 
tactics to ensure the adoption of the transfer object in the recipient jurisdiction. Going 
back to the remark by one of the interview respondents on the difference between the 
type of conditionality engaged by the EU as opposed to the World Bank’s conditional 
transfer of structural adjustment policy to developing countries, there was indeed an 
undertone of mutual respect and dialogue in the relations of the transfer agent and 
recipient, unlike the World Bank’s ‘take it or leave it’ approach (Clegg, 2013; Phillips, 
2009).  
Based on the mode of operation of the arm of the EUEI PDF directly involved in the 
transfer of renewable energy to ECOWAS i.e. the Africa-EU RECP, the EU engages 
in dialogue with African jurisdictions on energy issues, and this is expected to lead to 
provision of advisory services on sustainable energy solutions to domestic policy 
actors, and then to policy transfer (EUEI PDF, 2016c). Primarily, this approach is to 
the end that a renewable energy market will be created in the prospective recipient 
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jurisdiction (EUEI PDF, 2016b, 2016d). The EU’s approach is succinctly illustrated in 
a 4-step engagement process and shown in Figure 5.2. With the EU providing advisory 
services to domestic policy actors, it makes the prospective recipient jurisdiction warm 
to its preferences, and accept that there is a need to develop favourable policy and 
regulatory framework for promotion of renewable energy. This also makes room for 
involving private businesses in Europe and in the African jurisdiction, in a dialogue 
expected to result in investment commitments and access to finance, as well as 
presenting the conditionality that will ensure the receipt of the funds. 
A key observation from RECP’s strategy is that the EU’s approach seeks to benefit 
both the transfer agent and recipient. The strategy, as it is presented in Figure 5.2, 
signifies a win-win situation for both the EU and the transfer recipient, with EU 
businesses gaining access to new renewable energy markets, and the recipient 
jurisdiction acquiring technical and business skills and benefitting from improved 
energy access. The strategic structuring of this engagement highlights a non-
domineering approach by the EU and signifies the involvement of the mechanism of 
persuasion in this case of transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS. 
Figure 5.2: EU RECP Strategy 
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Source: EUEI PDF (2016a) 
 
In particular, the EU’s manner of addressing ECOWAS countries and their leaders 
reaffirms the incorporation of the transfer mechanism of persuasion in the conditional 
arrangement to secure investments for use of renewable energy in West Africa. In the 
newsletters published by the EU and directed at fostering a strategic relationship with 
African countries on specific policy areas, including energy, through the Africa-EU 
Energy Partnership, there is an emphasis on working together and drawing from the 
experience of the relationship that has existed between Europe and Africa (AEEP, 
2014; European Commission, 2010). Also, the EU stressed the intended goal of 
improving access to modern and sustainable energy and building a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the recipient, instead of presenting its engagement as a ‘take it or 
leave it’ affair (African Union and European Union, 2007; The Africa-EU Partnership, 
2010). A similar approach is observed in the case of transfer of health reform policy to 
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Malawi by international organisations, whereby the EU sought a participatory 
approach in its relations with the transfer recipient, as opposed to the intervention by 
the USAID with its introduction of conditionality to ensure that the transfer recipient 
adopts the proposed health policy reform (Tambulasi, 2013). 
Another interesting observation in EU’s communication to African countries, which 
further highlights the manifestation of the transfer mechanism of persuasion, and 
reiterates how the EU related with the recipient, is the attempt to present the concern 
of energy challenge as a common problem to both continents. In trying to show that 
the EU’s proposal is not a condescending offer, there is a remark on the challenge of 
energy security in European countries and that of energy access in African countries 
(EUEI PDF, 2015). This sends the message of ‘you have problems, we have them 
too’, and strengthens the argument for the need for “mutual support” and “a move 
away from a donor-recipient relationship” (European Union Delegation to the African 
Union, 2010b, p. 4). 
In some official communication documents, the EU states that it got involved in the 
development of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy based on an invitation by 
ECREEE (EUEI PDF, 2016b). This seems to negate the suggestion of the policy 
transfer being externally-initiated and the involvement of the mechanisms of 
conditionality or persuasion. However, based on the EU’s role in the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the establishment of AEEP, 
sponsoring a scoping report in 2006 for the establishment of ECREEE, the 
commissioning of a baseline report for the renewable energy policy, and funding the 
development of the policy development, we can see the involvement of an external 
actor in the development of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy. Also, the 
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preparation and submission of the said invitation to the EU by ECOWAS, was done 
on the request of the EU (Interview 1, 2017). Perhaps, stating that the involvement of 
the EU was on the premise of an invitation by ECOWAS, was in a bid to preserve 
ECOWAS’ ego and again, prevent highlighting a victim status in regard to West African 
countries. This also suggests a conscious effort to make it seem that ECOWAS holds 
the reins in the policy transfer process, and be perceived in a good light by ECOWAS. 
Indeed, this can be said to have been achieved, as ECOWAS appears to have the 
notion that this was a partnership led by ECOWAS (Interview 2, 2017) and “spear-
headed by ECREEE” (RECP and AEEP, 2014, p. 1), even though it was funded by 
the EU. In summary, we can describe this case of policy transfer as a conditional policy 
transfer that was presented persuasively to the transfer recipient.  
The next section discusses the involvement of UNISDR in the transfer of DRR policy 
to ECOWAS and how obligation is the transfer mechanism engaged in the process.  
 
5.4.4 Actors and Transfer Mechanism Involved in the Transfer of the DRR 
Policy to ECOWAS 
In the earlier section on the emergence of DRR as a global policy issue, it was noted 
that during the course of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction i.e. 
the 1990s, there was an onset of the debate on the relevance of climatic factors in the 
increase of natural disaster events and human influence on climatic conditions 
(UNISDR, 2012a). In an AU report on the status of DRR in sub-Saharan Africa, which 
was also supported by the World Bank and UNISDR, it was stated that:  
[e]pidemics and famine, the next most significant causes of loss of life in SSA 
(sub-Saharan Africa), are strongly linked to meteorological and hydrological 
conditions. The ongoing climate change process will result in increased 
intensity, frequency and variability in the patterns of hydro-meteorological 
hazards (Bhavnani et al., 2008, p. vi).  
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This concern further highlighted the need to target regions that will likely be hardest 
hit by the effects of climate change (Adeniyi, 2016; James and Washington, 2013) and 
as a result, the decade for DRR initiative culminated in the development of an 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the establishment of UNISDR (UN 
General Assembly Economic and Social Council, 2001; UNISDR, 2012a). The 
UNISDR was mandated to coordinate disaster risk reduction activities across all UN 
agencies and ensure harmonisation of DRR activities organised and implemented by 
regional bodies (United Nations General Assembly, 2012).  
In a bid to achieve the objective of a collective global response to DRR, UNISDR 
organised a world conference in 2005, which held in Hyogo, Japan. The conference 
addressed pertinent issues, including building resilient communities to reduce 
damages and deaths during disasters, mainstreaming DRR and sustainable 
development, and implementing DRR activities at global, regional and national levels. 
The conference also referred to past global efforts at addressing DRR issues, such as 
the development of a strategy document at a world conference on natural disasters, 
the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World. In addition, there was a review of this 
document with regards to the realisation of its provisions, and based on the outcome 
of the review, five concerns were identified as the key challenges to ensuring reduction 
of disaster risks globally. These include: 
(a) Governance: organizational, legal and policy frameworks; 
(b) Risk identification, assessment, monitoring and early warning; 
(c) Knowledge management and education; 
(d) Reducing underlying risk factors; 
(e) Preparedness for effective response and recovery (UNISDR, 2005a, p. 2).  
 
Specific activities that will be carried out in order to address these challenges were 
also identified at the conference, and these were compiled in a document tagged the 
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Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA). Importantly, the HFA highlighted the need for the 
involvement of global, regional and national organisations in achieving its desired 
outcome of reduced disaster risks.  
Although ECOWAS was not present at the Hyogo conference (United Nations, 2005), 
it had earlier participated in an Africa consultation meeting on the Hyogo conference 
organised by NEPAD (UNISDR Africa, 2004b). Also, the African outreach of the 
UNISDR invited the Francophone ECOWAS MS to a workshop to sensitise them on 
the importance of DRR (UNISDR Africa, 2004a). This sustained involvement in the 
continent-wide DRR efforts helped to secure ECOWAS’ interest in DRR concerns, and 
as a result, it sought to domesticate the HFA within the community even though it was 
not present at the Hyogo conference. Notably, NEPAD identified the commitment of 
ECOWAS to DRR and stated that:  
The top leadership of the ECOWAS Secretariat recognizes the urgent need for 
a common sub-regional disaster management strategy and intends to pursue 
its development. Efforts are underway with the support of NEPAD Secretariat 
and the UNISDR to initiate this process (AU and NEPAD, 2004b, p. 16). 
 
However, despite ECOWAS’ involvement in different activities and recognising the 
need for a disaster management strategy, its interest in DRR was still with reference 
to the issue of conflict, as it notes that its contribution to the international effort 
“addresses disasters triggered by natural hazards that may be exacerbated by conflict” 
(ECOWAS, 2006, p. ii).  
Nonetheless, after the Hyogo conference, the African outreach of the UNISDR set out 
to coordinate the domestication of the recommendations from the conference in 
African countries. It setup the Africa Advisory group “to advise and provide technical 
support for mobilising political commitment and resources for DRR from national, sub-
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regional and regional authorities (e.g. ECOWAS, AU/NEPAD)” (UNISDR Africa, 
2005a, p. 44). It also broadened the membership of an existing Africa Working Group 
on DRR to include eight African RECs, thereby making ECOWAS an official member 
of the Working Group and bound to its terms of reference (UNISDR, 2011). 
In a document presenting the activities of the Working Group, it was reported that 
ECOWAS had commenced activities towards developing a DRR policy, by holding a 
meeting with DRR experts to deliberate on the content of an ECOWAS DRR policy, 
and drafting a policy document (UNISDR, 2005b). The drafted policy specifically 
focuses on the earlier stated five major issues addressed by the HFA (ECOWAS, 
2006). As stipulated in the HFA, the ECOWAS DRR policy aims for supporting the 
development of national platforms for DRR, establishing early warning systems in 
ECOWAS MS, engage in public education on DRR, incorporate DRR to ECOWAS’ 
Agricultural policy and national development programmes of MS, and develop capacity 
for effective disaster response (ECOWAS, 2006). 
In August 2006, ECOWAS presented the draft DRR policy (ECOWAS, 2006) and the 
document was approved by Heads of States of MS at their 31st summit in January 
2007 (Bhavnani et al., 2008; UNECA and UNISDR, 2013). 
 
5.4.5 The Transfer Mechanism of Obligation 
The mechanism of obligation involves reliance on previous accords and agreements 
that have been assented by the recipient, to ensure the occurrence of policy transfer. 
Unlike the case of transfer of renewable energy, whereby the involvement of the 
transfer agent, the EU, was informed by market creation for renewable energy 
technologies, the involvement of UNISDR in transfer of DRR policy was informed by 
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the need for the domestication of the HFA. Also, with the EU facilitating the transfer 
process through a direct relation with ECOWAS, the UNISDR relied on ECOWAS’ 
relationship with the AU as one of its eight RECs, for the actualisation of the transfer. 
With the intent of domestication of the HFA, UNISDR facilitated the development of 
the African strategy (ECOWAS, 2006), actively involved all the RECS, so that, even 
though ECOWAS was not a signatory to the HFA, nor was it present at Hyogo in 2005, 
it became bound by its assent of the African strategy, and this led to the development 
and adoption of an ECOWAS DRR policy.  
UNISDR’s involvement is also in line with its mandate to coordinate DRR efforts 
globally, including within the United Nations and regional organisations (UNISDR, 
2016b). In doing this, UNISDR facilitates DRR activities at different levels working with 
global, regional, sub-regional and national platforms (UNISDR, 2016c). Based on this, 
ECOWAS is referred to as a sub-regional body in the DRR policy developed. This is 
unlike the description of ECOWAS as a regional body in the case of renewable energy 
policy transfer (ECREEE, 2013a), and it emphasises the relational perception 
underlying the DRR policy transfer. While the EU related with ECOWAS directly and 
mostly on economic terms, UNISDR related with ECOWAS on account of its 
membership of the AU and NEPAD. In particular, UNISDR employed the obligatory 
apparatus of the AU with its RECs based on the hierarchical component inherent in 
the relationship. According to Bulmer and Padgett (2005), a hierarchical approach to 
policy transfer can be associated with the transfer mechanisms of obligation and 
conditionality, but if obligation is the operating mechanism, it is often directed at 
domestication of policies. As such, the transfer mechanism operational in this case 
can be seen to be obligation, primarily because the transfer agent ensured the 
domestication of the HFA through ECOWAS’ fulfilment of its initial assent to the African 
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Strategy for DRR, which was developed by the AU and NEPAD with the support of 
UNISDR. This attempt of influencing an African sub-regional organisation through a 
more highly-placed regional organisation, is an approach that is also noted to be a 
favourite of many IGOs and international donors, as shown in the quote below. 
NEPAD is primarily implemented at the Regional Economic Community (REC) 
level. It is widely used by international financial institutions, UN agencies and 
Africa’s development partners as a mechanism to support African development 
efforts (African Union, 2003, p. 1). 
 
Another observation of interest in this case of policy transfer is that the mutual 
comradeship that features in the case of renewable energy policy transfer is missing 
in this instance. Despite UNISDR providing support for the development of the DRR 
policy, this support is not acknowledged or appreciated by ECOWAS in the policy 
document (ECOWAS, 2006). Commenting on the ECOWAS DRR policy, the UNISDR 
noted that: 
UNISDR Africa provided its support in the development of the [ECOWAS] 
Policy framework, whose implementation would focus on areas of importance 
to the West African situation under the guidance of the Africa Union Strategy 
for disaster risk reduction and the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2015, 
p. 1). 
  
On the other hand, giving an overview of the DRR policy, ECOWAS mentioned that:  
This document presents ECOWAS policy framework for disaster risk reduction 
in the sub-region. The Policy would focus on areas of importance to the West 
African situation under the guidance of the Africa Union Strategy for disaster 
risk reduction and the Hyogo Framework for Action. … Issues of conflict and 
their humanitarian implications are at the centre of ECOWAS interventions 
currently and are providing the impetus for developing sub-regional capacities 
in disaster risk reduction (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 9). 
 
Looking at both statements, although both the UNISDR and ECOWAS acknowledged 
that the policy aligns with the DRR policies of the UN and AU, the UNISDR ascribed 
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a notable role to itself in describing the development of the DRR policy, whereas 
ECOWAS omits this depiction. So, rather than regard UNISDR as a benefactor, 
ECOWAS sets itself as a major actor taking action on ECOWAS DRR issues, 
particularly, by linking the development of the DRR policy to its efforts in managing 
conflicts in the region. Also, both statements mention that the ECOWAS DRR policy 
“would focus on areas of importance to the West African situation” (ECOWAS, 2006, 
p. 9; UNISDR, 2015, p. 1), which suggests that the recipient jurisdiction sought to 
maintain a distinct identity in the domestication of the HFA and African Strategy for 
DRR. This disposition is similar to the quest for distinction sought by the transfer 
recipients in the case of obligated transfer of energy policy by the EU to its MS 
(Padgett, 2003). In this instance, the EU MS demonstrated different levels of 
assertiveness in their compliance with the domestication of the EU directive on 
liberalisation of the electricity sector based on their country’s peculiar situation.  
With regards to this case, the assertion by the recipient that the ECOWAS DRR policy 
was developed because African RECs “are required to design disaster reduction 
policies and programmes under the Africa Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction” 
(ECOWAS, 2006, p. 8) helps to appropriately identify the mechanism operational in 
the policy transfer as obligation. Also, since the Africa Strategy for DRR was 
developed with the support of UNISDR, this explains why in fulfilling its obligation, 
ECOWAS aligned its DRR policy with the provisions of UNISDR’s HFA.  
Having discussed the involvement of policy actors in the transfer of renewable energy 
and DRR policies to ECOWAS and identified the policy transfer mechanisms 
operational in the two cases of policy transfer, the next section concludes this chapter 
and reiterates the different approaches that led to the policy transfers. 
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Conclusion  
As indicated in the introduction, the two cases represent instances of externally-
initiated policy transfers by IGOs, and based on the discussions about the transfer 
recipient, evidence of transfer, and transfer source, the chapter has highlighted the 
diversity of mechanisms observed in the two cases. The case of the renewable energy 
policy transfer showed the EU building on activities of the Austrian Development 
Cooperation and UNIDO in establishing ECREEE, to facilitate the development of a 
renewable energy policy, in order to provide the institutional framework for attracting 
investments and creating a renewable energy market in West Africa. On the other 
hand, the UNISDR was the dominant and seemingly the first organisation to involve 
ECOWAS in DRR concerns with an environmental perspective. Also, while the EU had 
a direct engagement with the recipient in relations to the transfer, UNISDR channelled 
its engagement with the recipient through organisations with which ECOWAS had 
hierarchical association and commitments i.e. the AU and NEPAD. In addition, 
whereas the primary objectives of the EU’s and ECOWAS’ renewable energy policies 
differed (with EU’s policy targeted at emission reduction and climate change 
mitigation, while ECOWAS’s policy was targeted at developing peri-urban areas), 
ECOWAS’ DRR policy objective aligned with that of UNISDR’s HFA, as the transfer 
object domesticated the provisions of the HFA.  
The chapter has therefore shown that the transfer mechanisms at play in both 
instances of transfer are not similar. An instance of transfer by obligation can be readily 
seen in the case of transfer of DRR policy, which was driven through involving 
ECOWAS in the development of the African Regional Strategy for DRR, and in 
awareness and training forums on DRR issues. Also, the transfer mechanisms behind 
the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS are identified as conditionality 
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and persuasion. In particular, the status of the EU as a donor for development activities 
hints at its possible potential for using financing opportunities as a bait for promoting 
its policy preferences, which in this case was the promotion of use of renewable energy 
for climate change mitigation and putting in place institutional frameworks for 
establishing renewable energy markets. However, the disparity in the objectives of the 
EU and ECOWAS renewable energy policies suggest a degree of freedom given to 
ECOWAS in deciding the content of the policy, and this was attributed to persuasive 
tactics to confirm to ECOWAS policy actors that the policy will be focused on 
development and not just climate change mitigation.  
From this chapter, we have seen that the transfer mechanisms differ in the two cases, 
but, what about the narratives that support them? To examine this, Chapters 6, 7 and 
8 present a detailed analysis of the policy narrative elements used by the actors. 
Drawing from the narrative analysis conducted for the research, the narrative setting, 
character, plot, and moral, which are portrayed by the actors are identified, and the 
chapters go on to discuss how the depiction of these narrative elements informed the 
transfer mechanisms. 
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Chapter 6 – Setting the Scene 
 
Introduction 
The last chapter described the events and actions that led to the transfer of renewable 
energy and DRR policies to ECOWAS. It also identified the transfer mechanisms that 
were at play in these two cases, and argued that the EU employed the mechanisms 
of conditionality and persuasion to facilitate the transfer of renewable energy policy to 
ECOWAS, while UNISDR employed the mechanism of obligation to ensure adoption 
of the ECOWAS DRR policy. In this chapter and in Chapters 7 and 8, we consider the 
influence of the transfer actors’ policy narratives on the manifestation of these 
mechanisms. Specifically, this chapter will discuss the influence of the narrative setting 
depicted by the actors, Chapter 7 will examine the influence of the narrative 
characters, while Chapter 8 will discuss the contribution of the narrative plot and moral 
portrayed in the policy narratives. 
With reference to the earlier explanation of the NPF, the use of narrative setting 
portrays the boundaries for the influence and actions of the characters introduced in 
the narrative. It outlines the target of the transfer object and its intended extent of 
coverage within the recipient jurisdiction. It also points to where the action of the actors 
will be directed. As noted, the narrative setting can be situated as bureaucratic, 
community, sectoral, or collective. If the setting is bureaucratic, this implies that the 
transfer object is targeted at institutional frameworks, and if the setting is collective, 
this implies that the transfer object is directed at the whole population of the 
jurisdiction. The use of these settings, therefore, can be seen as an indication that the 
intended extent of influence of the transfer agent on the recipient jurisdiction will be 
far-reaching, as the influence will be exerted on how government functions and the 
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people living in the jurisdiction. Conversely, if the narrative setting depicted is 
community or sectoral, this implies that transfer object is targeted at a particular group 
of the population or a specific sector within the jurisdiction, and it indicates that the 
transfer agent’s influence within the recipient jurisdiction will mostly be restricted to the 
group or sector. 
In both cases, the narrative setting was seen to be dominantly situated as bureaucratic 
as can be seen in Table 6.1. In the case of renewable energy policy transfer, 
community and sectoral settings were also used in the narratives, but the depiction of 
a community setting was more substantial. Also, in the case of DRR policy transfer, in 
addition to the depiction of a bureaucratic setting, a sectoral setting was depicted, but 
this was very minute in comparison to that of a bureaucratic setting. As such, to 
discuss the findings, the use of the narrative setting in relations to the transfer of DRR 
policy to ECOWAS is taken to be primarily bureaucratic setting, while in the transfer 
of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS, the depiction of setting is taken to be 
bureaucratic and community settings.  
With reference to the depiction of a bureaucratic setting in the two cases, one can say 
that the actors position the challenges to be addressed as those necessitating 
government actions that include administrative interventions, and changes to 
organisational structure and practices. This is aimed at influencing how things are 
done across the recipient jurisdiction, rather than on a select group within the 
population. The preference for this setting, particularly by the transfer agents, can in a 
way, be linked to the need to maximise the efforts and resources deployed for the 
actualisation of policy transfer, so that these contributions can be seen to be impactful 
and having the potential for a long-term effect.  
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Table 6.1: Depiction of Narrative Setting  
 
Renewable Energy 
Policy Transfer by 
the EU 
DRR Policy 
Transfer by 
UNISDR   
Total No of 
Documents  56   31    
  
No of 
Documents % 
No of 
Documents % 
Test of Difference 
(t-test) P<=0.05 
Narrative 
Element: Setting         
*s – Significant 
*ns - Not Significant   
Bureaucratic 17 30% 24 77% 
t= -5.07, 
p= 0.00 S 
Community 8 14% 0 0% 
t= 2.41, 
p= 0.02 S 
Collective 0 0% 0 0% n/a n/a 
Sectoral 4 7% 2 6% 
t= 0.12, 
p= 0.90 ns 
 X
2 (d.f=2) = 21.59, 
p<0.001 
X2 (d.f=1) = 18.62, 
p<0.001     
 
We can also infer that the level of influence that a transfer agent can wield within a 
recipient jurisdiction, also denotes the degree of access the transfer agent has. This 
is because being able to influence administrative arrangements and organisational 
structures within the recipient jurisdictions, will likely require reaching the top or central 
level of decision-making. This level of access can be seen in the two cases, as the 
IGOs utilised their access to the heads of states of ECOWAS Member States, and this 
access delivered the eventual adoption of the renewable energy policy and DRR policy 
by ECOWAS (ECREEE, 2013a; EUEI PDF, 2015; GIZ, 2017; Kan, 2005; UNISDR 
Africa, 2005a). The similarity in the demonstration of the level of access of the transfer 
agents is also noteworthy as there was an emphasis on high-level engagement in both 
cases, and this specifically referred to heads of states, leading figures in regional 
bodies, or highly positioned ministers. As shown in the picture in Appendix 8, the 
UNISDR held a meeting with President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was at the time not 
only the President of Nigeria, but also the president of the African Union (AU) summit 
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and a very influential figure in ECOWAS (Alter et al., 2013; Kan, 2005; Ojo, 1980). 
They then utilised their access to him to ensure that DRR is placed on the agenda 
within the African continent (Kan, 2005). The EU also facilitated a meeting of all African 
heads of states in Lisbon in 2007, where European heads of states were present and 
the two parties agreed to form the Africa-EU Energy partnership for promoting the use 
of renewable energy in Africa (GIZ, 2017), and this led to EU’s involvement in 
facilitating the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS. In addition, the EU 
had initially established connection with a key decision maker on energy issues within 
the region through its support for the West African Power Pool (WAPP), which had 
been setup by ECOWAS in 1999, and aimed at forming a single electricity market for 
the different ECOWAS MS (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009a; 
WAPP, 2017). The initiative, which was mainly driven by the Head of ECOWAS 
Energy Division, Mr Mahama Kappiah, received £3m from the EU in 2009 and Mr 
Kappiah went on to become the head of ECREEE and helped to facilitate the adoption 
of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy (ECREEE, 2015; European Union 
Delegation to the African Union, 2009a). 
Unlike the needed involvement of high-level officials when a bureaucratic setting is 
situated in a policy transfer narrative, a community or sectoral setting will likely not 
necessitate a similar involvement of highly placed officials, because it is aimed at a 
specific group or section rather than managerial functions. Accordingly, the access 
that is accorded transfer agents within a recipient jurisdiction sets the boundaries of 
what is to be done and who is to be involved over time, and these go on to inform the 
type of story to be told (Shanahan et al., 2017a). The next sections elaborate on the 
depiction of setting by the transfer agents and recipient in the two cases of policy 
transfer to ECOWAS, and discuss how the use of the narrative element may have 
 
 
214 
 
informed the transfer mechanisms that were operational in the policy transfers. The 
next section examines the case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by 
the EU.   
 
6.1. Setting the Scene in Renewable Energy Policy Transfer to ECOWAS 
“There are several things, there are never just one thing” (Interview 4, 2017) 
In the case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, the narratives 
of the transfer actors predominantly depict bureaucratic and community settings. While 
a bureaucratic setting was observed in 30% of the documents analysed, 14% of the 
documents featured a community setting, making their combination to account for 44% 
out of the 52% of documents that featured the narrative element. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the situation of the narrative setting as bureaucratic is seen in examples of 
conditional policy transfers, however, the situation of a community setting can be said 
to be more reflective of the mechanism of persuasion. This depiction of a community 
setting was primarily observed only in documents authored by the transfer recipient, 
but both the transfer agent and recipient portrayed a bureaucratic setting. First, we will 
look at how the bureaucratic setting was portrayed and examples of its depiction are 
presented in the quotes below. 
[T]here is a need to support Africa in strengthening its political and economic 
governance, and in reinforcing the regulatory, fiscal and business environment 
that allows better mobilising of the continent's own assets in a sustainable way 
(European Commission, 2010, p. 3). 
The inappropriate policies, targets and regulations are some of the constraints 
that limit the dissemination of RE (renewable energy) in these countries. The 
existence of comprehensive policy frameworks for the promotion of RE and 
incentive instruments like tax relieves are needed in ECOWAS states for 
favourable market conditions (N’Guessan et al., 2011, p. 3). 
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However, so far, West Africa is not attracting substantial investment in the 
renewable energy and energy sectors … This requires that governments 
support an enabling business environment to encourage financial institutions, 
private banks and private investors to come into the market to invest in green 
technologies … by catalysing the introduction of the necessary legal and 
regulatory reforms (ECREEE, 2012b, p. 4). 
The EU welcomed the efforts of ECOWAS to establish a common energy and 
electricity market …The Parties emphasised the importance of regional 
economic integration for … the eradication of poverty, and the development of 
all economic sectors in West Africa (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 
10). 
 
These quotes highlight the degree of structural change that the renewable energy 
policy was expected to deliver. Whereas the need for adopting a renewable energy 
policy may literally be perceived as a means to achieve climate change mitigation, the 
setting portrayed by the actors however, suggest more. Chiefly, the policy transfer was 
expected to create a favourable investment or market environment in ECOWAS 
countries. Furthermore, the transfer agent also intended for the proposed policy to be 
an instrument for regional integration (EUEI PDF, 2015; European Commission, 
2014). According to Shanahan et al. (2017b, p. 7), “the choice of settings and their 
descriptions are not neutral but rather are meaningful and purposive”, and as such, 
with the EU’s depiction of a bureaucratic setting, it aimed for conditioning the market 
environment within the region through reforms that cut across regulatory, fiscal and 
legal operations. This was to the end that there will be a “common energy and 
electricity market i.e. create a West African market as opposed to markets of individual 
countries” (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 10).  
In addition to seeking to modify the market environment at the regional level, the 
transfer object’s area of influence was also expected to extend to individual countries 
in the region. As one of the interviewees noted, “regional policies translate to national 
policies” (Interview 4, 2017) and another confirmed that “based on the regional policy, 
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there’s a mandate … (to) encourage all MS to develop RE policies” (Interview 2, 2017), 
we can therefore envision the spatial dimension underlining the policy transfer, since 
the adoption of the policy will bind individual MS to the provisions of the policy and 
oblige them to develop and adopt national renewable energy policies. To the transfer 
agent, the EU, such degree of intervention is necessary because it is “one of the 
boosters Africa needs to accelerate sustainable growth and lift its people out of 
poverty” (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010a, p. 9). As a result, 
the EU’s achievement of transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS is not 
regarded simply as a feat towards climate change mitigation, but is often heralded as 
a gain for West African regional integration and poverty eradication (ECREEE, 2013a; 
European Commission, 2015). 
Can such degree of external interference that accompanies a bureaucratic setting be 
the reason that conditional transfers are not usually observed in developed countries 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012)? One may have 
expected that in cases of accession to IGOs, developed countries may have been at 
the receiving end of conditional transfers. However, it seems that the countries prefer 
affinity to IGOs where the conditions for membership are already met based on their 
past domestic efforts, and this prevents them from having to significantly alter what is 
already existent domestically, just in a bid to join an IGO. For example, in the case of 
accessions to the EEC in 1961, where the candidate countries were mostly developed 
countries, these countries already had in place the core requirements for joining the 
EEC i.e. “functioning democracies and largely market-based economic systems” 
(Carroll, 2014, p. 284). Also, in the instance of accession of Australia to the OECD, 
the country did not embark on any significant change domestically in order to fulfil the 
requirement for accession, primarily because the country’s legislation was already 
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consistent with the demands of the OECD (Carroll, 2014). The likelihood of the use of 
a bureaucratic setting in conditional policy transfer, therefore, may explain why the 
manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality used to be considered a rarity in 
policy transfer studies (Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012). Albeit, with the 
increased attention paid to less developed countries and transitional countries, 
conditionality has been given more attention as a probable transfer mechanism 
(Pereira, 2014; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004). 
We may allude that situating a bureaucratic setting suggests a demand being placed 
on the recipient jurisdiction, such as embarking on institutional reforms, and this 
reflects the power dynamics that is associated with the relationship between the 
transfer agent and recipient. While the transfer agent is positioned as the party 
possessing significant wherewithal to meet certain needs of the transfer recipient, such 
as membership of an IGO, debt cancellation, or project sponsorship, the transfer 
recipient is positioned as the party in need of benefits that will be accrued to it upon 
meeting the demand(s) stipulated as conditions for receiving the benefits. This is also 
portrayed with the status of the EU vis-à-vis ECOWAS, as the EU is accorded to be 
the largest donor of funds to West African countries (European Commission et al., 
2008; Vervaeke, 2010) and “the motivation on the EU side is about influencing, … sort 
of soft power” (Interview 4, 2017). Also, the possession of the wherewithal to address 
the challenge of energy provision in West Africa is a key feature in EU’s heroic 
depiction of itself, and this will be elaborated in the next chapter on casting characters. 
This extent of influence that a bureaucratic setting portends, which echoes the power 
dynamic among the actors, thus sets the stage for a policy transfer with a hierarchical 
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dimension like conditional policy transfer (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Bulmer et al., 
2007). 
Moreover, considering that the proposition by an external actor to influence 
administrative arrangements within a jurisdiction will not be an easy one to agree to 
by domestic policymakers, this prompts the transfer agent to present an offer that will 
make it more attractive for the recipient to accede to the transfer object. This then sets 
in motion the manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality. Therefore, in the case 
of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS, the EU offered the facilitation of 
private investments to the region on the condition that a regional renewable energy 
policy is developed and adopted. Perhaps this may also explain why the level of 
depiction of other settings, specifically sectoral and collective settings, are at 7% and 
0% respectively, since what is promised will be of substantial value, and this likely 
makes the transfer agent to aim to secure a substantial rather than a localised 
influence.  
Based on this examination of the narrative element of setting, we can argue that 
different recipient jurisdictions will have different policy transfer experiences because 
of the level of their economic power and/or political position. So, with a bureaucratic 
setting characterising the mechanism of conditionality, developed countries will likely 
not find this favourable because such countries would not want to be viewed as being 
dictated to on domestic administrative arrangements. Also, since these countries will 
likely possess the wherewithal to maintain a relatively equal balance of power with the 
transfer agent, they can influence the preferable narrative setting and consequently, 
the preferred transfer mechanism. Albeit, with the power dynamics tipped in the favour 
of the transfer agents in instances of policy transfer to less developed countries, these 
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recipient jurisdictions are often left with no choice but to concede (Interview 2, 2017) 
to the use of bureaucratic setting and the conditions stipulated by the transfer agent. 
According to Singh (2002), the rise of the debt crisis in developing countries prompted 
the proposition of aid and loan conditionality by donor institutions and countries, and 
this was because the debt crisis led to a change in the balance of power in the relations 
between the donors and recipients. Also, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the 1997 
Asian financial crisis led to an increase in the number of countries in vulnerable 
positions and this broadened the array of possible recipients of conditional policy 
transfers, and with emphasis on a bureaucratic narrative setting, transfer agents 
facilitated conditional policy transfers to Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEEC) and some Asian countries. As remarked by Tews (2009, p. 133), 
[t]he joint notion is that there exists a kind of asymmetrical power relationship 
between the importer and the exporter of policies – usually resulting in the form 
that the ‘weaker’ one wishes to gain resources from the ‘stronger’ one, who 
then conditions access to its resources by making the ‘weaker’ one import a 
policy. This mechanism is relatively easy to identify. It is used regularly by 
international organizations – for instance, the World Bank – to force developing 
countries to adopt certain – sometimes even environmental – policies. 
Moreover, it is utilized by the EU as well in order to transfer the entire acquis 
communautiare to the accession countries. 
 
Bearing in mind the power dynamics between the actors in this case, the policy transfer 
can be said to be premised on the EU being “a major international donor and a … 
normative power” (Pereira, 2014, p. 389) and aware that ECOWAS is one of the 
poorest regions in the world (Ogbonna et al., 2013; Porter and Osei-Hwedie, 2015), 
and this informed the proposal for the adoption of a regional renewable energy policy 
focused on creating a favourable market environment, as a condition for facilitating 
investments from the private sectors for development of renewable energy projects in 
the region. This shows that the narrative setting tends to lay out the context upon which 
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a policy transfer is hinged, comprising the status of the recipient jurisdiction, an 
assumption of what problem there is, and what needs to be done. With regard to a 
bureaucratic setting, this context can be seen to be that of a jurisdiction that is weak 
in one form or the other and is in need of support, and the assumption that there is a 
necessity for altering administrative arrangements within this jurisdiction. These 
culminate in the manifestation of conditionality, whereby the transfer agent can exploit 
the need(s) of a jurisdiction to request for a change in the way things are done within 
the jurisdiction. 
The above description is unlike what may occur if focusing on other narrative settings, 
whereby the context may be the need to regulate how persons or businesses operate 
within a sector, providing universal assistance to a population, or meeting a specific 
need of a community, and with these contexts, the transfer agent will have less 
influence in how the affairs of the recipient jurisdiction is directed. We can assume that 
these other settings will inform the manifestation of mechanisms where the power 
dynamics does not heavily favour the transfer agent, such as obligation or persuasion.  
We can however question if the actors’ narratives do indeed reflect the narrative 
setting attributed to them. Considering the precise demarcation of the sector in some 
of the quotes stated above, we can simply assume that the setting implied is sectoral 
and not bureaucratic. However, this assumption would hold if the quotes were 
examined on the basis of individual words or phrases. Also, since narratives differ from 
lists, where individual words may hold cogent meanings, singular words in narratives 
are examined as part of a broader expression (Crow and Berggren, 2014; Gray and 
Jones, 2016). In addition to the findings from the narrative analysis, the interview 
responses also point to the intended far-reaching influence of the transfer object and 
its target on altering existing bureaucratic arrangement within the recipient jurisdiction. 
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An interviewee opined that the ECOWAS renewable energy policy was aimed at 
“translating energy to long-term frameworks and, finding financiers, for increased 
private sector involvement” (Interview 4, 2017), while another interviewee claimed that 
the policy was intended for maintaining peace and security through provision of 
electricity, in a bid to address the refugee crisis (Interview 1, 2017). Although, the latter 
might be taking it too far, but, the findings go to show that the stage set for the policy 
transfer i.e. “the focus (for) the audience attention” (Shanahan et al., 2017a, p. 4), was 
not confined to just renewable energy. 
As mentioned earlier, 30% of the documents analysed for this case portray a 
bureaucratic setting, and after considering who said what, it was noted that these 
documents were not only those of the transfer agent, the EU, but also that of the 
recipient, ECOWAS. However, the observation of community settings, which featured 
in 14% of the documents, was only in ECOWAS’ narratives, and this was used for 
designating specific groups in the region that the transfer object should focus on. 
Some examples of the depiction of a community setting are shown below. 
The conclusion is that to achieve the regional policy objective, ECOWAS 
Commission and relevant institutions engaged in the implementation process 
should adopt a comprehensive strategy that put more emphasis on ECOWAS’ 
LDCs (Least Developed Countries) (N’Guessan et al., 2011, p. 1) 
The ECOWAS Regional Renewable Energy Policy aims to ensure increased 
use of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, small-scale hydro and 
bioenergy for grid electricity supply and for the provision of access to energy 
services in rural areas (ECOWAS, 2013, p. 5).  
 
This finding is in contrast to the consistent depiction of a bureaucratic setting by the 
transfer recipient in the case of DRR policy transfer, as will be seen in the next section. 
In addition, this finding is also contrary to what is observed in most accounts of policy 
transfer driven by conditionality, whereby the transfer recipient has minimal leeway to 
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change the transfer object and/or present an alternative narrative setting (Gorton et 
al., 2009; Mkandawire and Soludo, 2003). For instance, in many of the cases of 
conditional policy transfer to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), based 
on their candidature for accession to the EU, the form in which the criteria for political 
and market reforms were presented were not negotiable nor liable to amendment by 
the recipient countries, as they could not re-situate the setting or specify that the 
criteria will be applicable to only selected sections of the society instead of the entire 
nation (Gorton et al., 2009; Lavenex, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). 
Also, looking at an example of policy transfer to developing countries based on loan 
or aid conditionality, specifically the transfer of SAP by the IMF and World Bank, it 
brings to light the rigidity that is often woven into the narrative setting associated with 
conditional policy transfers. With the policy transfer involving recipient countries in 
diverse geographical settings ranging from Asia to the Caribbean, these recipient 
jurisdictions had no choice in presenting alternative contexts for the transfer object. 
(Easterly, 2005; Mkandawire and Soludo, 2003). This is so much so that the 
nomenclature of the transfer object, which of itself unveils a bureaucratic narrative 
setting, remained the same across most of the recipient jurisdictions (Bacha, 1986; 
Idris et al., 2013; Foli et al., 2017). As Mkandawire and Soludo (2003, p.2) put it, the 
transfer agents, IMF and World Bank, “foreclosed the debate by literally insisting that 
it was either their way or nothing”. 
However, in this case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, 
ECOWAS was able to put forward a narrative setting that is different from what is 
portrayed by the transfer agent. With the depiction of a community setting, the recipient 
jurisdiction was making a case for a particular group within the region i.e. ECOWAS’ 
LDCs and those living in rural and peri-urban areas, and this was acknowledged by 
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the transfer agent (ECREEE, 2013a). We can say that the EU took this setting on 
board as a persuasive approach to ensure that ECOWAS adopts the renewable 
energy policy, so that even though its intent is emphatically presented as structuring 
the market environment in ECOWAS to be favourable for renewable energy 
investments, it still agreed to channel the policy for helping deprived communities in 
ECOWAS. This flexibility by the EU and its alignment with a community setting, signify 
a difference that can be observed between the transfer mechanisms of conditionality 
and persuasion. The often insistent and rigidity of transfer agents that use bureaucratic 
narrative setting and facilitate conditional policy transfers, as against the malleability 
of the transfer agents employing the mechanism of persuasion, shows that while the 
mechanism of conditionality engenders dictating to the recipients and making 
demands of them, persuasion espouses listening to them. This difference also seems 
inherent in the narrative settings, because a bureaucratic setting can be said to be 
impersonal since its focus is mostly structural, while with a community setting, there is 
a personal focus on a group within the society. Aptly put by French et al. (2017, p. 28), 
a “[b]ureaucratic setting is characterised by coordination and rules”, while a 
“[c]ommunity setting is characterised by cultural and social boundaries”. 
This attribute of the transfer mechanism of conditionality raises the question of whether 
a transfer agent’s engagement in conditional policy transfer connotes a tyrannical 
intent. With the exception of the examples of financial conditionality to poor countries, 
one can say that even though the transfer agent mostly takes advantage of the 
recipient’s vulnerability, what the policy transfer is expected to achieve sometimes 
necessitates the use of conditionality (Interview 1, 2017). So, in cases of accession to 
the EU, the conditions are prescribed because they are the key criteria for joining the 
EU and they are also aimed at ensuring the recipient countries demonstrate 
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commitment to the accepted tenets of the EU (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; 
Sedelmeier, 2010). Also, in this instance of renewable energy policy transfer to 
ECOWAS, the aim of attracting private investments for deployment of renewable 
energy projects in West Africa necessitates the condition of creating a favourable 
market environment (Interview 1, 2017).  
It seems that what matters is, to what end is conditional policy transfer being employed 
and a bureaucratic setting used in narratives. With the example of the transfer of SAP 
to developing countries by the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s, the transfer object 
was mainly targeted at ensuring the ability of recipient countries to pay back loans and 
so it was limited to administrative ramifications (Easterly, 2005). However, the transfer 
object in this case was not only intended for creating the necessary market 
environment, but also for poverty eradication. Indeed, this case of renewable energy 
transfer by the EU might have been a similar experience of transfer of SAP, since it 
was also aimed at securing investments, particularly from European private investors 
(Interview 1, 2017; Interview 4, 2017). Albeit, with the accompaniment of a community 
setting debuting the mechanism of persuasion, what would have likely been another 
harsh policy transfer instance was averted. The mechanism of persuasion helped to 
present a less intimidating narrative setting and perhaps more acceptable to the 
transfer recipient. What may have also enabled the EU to be at home with the situation 
of a community setting is its prior involvement in awarding unconditional aid to African 
states. This involvement took off from the time of the Schuman Declaration in 1950 
(European Union, 2017), continued after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, but 
was halted in 2011, when a new EU development policy, the Agenda for Change, was 
introduced, which stipulated that EU would now have political input in the affairs of its 
aid recipients (European Commission, 2011).  
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The depiction of the narrative setting by both the transfer agent and recipient tends to 
provide the backdrop for the role of characters, as well as the plot and moral of the 
story. So that with the consistent situation of a bureaucratic setting by both sides, just 
like in the case of DRR policy transfer and discussed in the next section, one can 
anticipate a policy transfer story where the agent and recipient are in sync with the 
acknowledgement of the need for a far-reaching action. On the other hand, the 
depiction of a bureaucratic setting by the agent and community setting by the recipient 
sets the stage for the involvement of a very influential transfer agent and a recipient 
that still has the ears of this powerful actor. 
Having considered the use of the narrative element of setting in the case of renewable 
energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, the next section will discuss the 
narrative setting portrayed in the instance of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS by the 
UNISDR. 
 
6.2 Setting the Scene in DRR Policy Transfer to ECOWAS 
“If you move to the national level of community level, there are specific issues 
which are different, but we’re looking at the whole or bigger picture” (Interview 
5, 2017). 
 
With reference to Table 6.1, more than 70% of the documents related to the ECOWAS 
DRR policy transfer depicted a bureaucratic setting and these depictions were 
observed in the narratives of both the transfer agent and recipient. In setting the scene 
for the problem of DRR in developing countries, the transfer agent, UNISDR, stated 
that: 
Strong legal, institutional frameworks (are) needed for disaster management 
(Kamara, 2004, p. 61). 
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UNISDR Africa will continue to encourage and assist national governments to 
create enabling environments consisting of national policies, legislations, 
strategies, institutional frameworks, human capacity and financial resources 
through advocacy, technical support, information-sharing and knowledge 
(UNISDR Africa, 2004a, p. 54). 
(African governments) have to demonstrate their commitments through 
providing national policies and strategy on disaster reduction to its population 
and involve all stakeholders in all processes (UNISDR Africa, 2004b, p. 49). 
 
With the use of a bureaucratic setting in its narratives, the UNISDR sets the scene for 
an obligatory policy transfer that will entail the creation of a new agency, specifically 
the establishment of national platforms on DRR in West African countries (AU and 
NEPAD, 2004a; ECOWAS, 2006; Interview 5, 2017; UNISDR Africa, 2005b). Based 
on the cases of obligated transfer discussed in Chapter 3, situating a bureaucratic 
setting for the DRR policy transfer is unexpected, since the likely settings that are 
noted to be associated with obligation are sectoral and collective settings. 
The incongruity of this finding can also be seen in the difference in the relations of 
UNISDR with other recipient jurisdictions of its DRR policy transfer that are in Western 
countries. With the activities of the UNISDR reaching across all the continents and 
several countries, and also aimed at securing acknowledgement and implementation 
of its international accords, notably the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), a 
consideration of how its influence is deployed in developed countries, shows that when 
the recipient jurisdiction is a developed country or region, the policy transfer 
experience seems to be different from what obtains in less developed countries and 
regions. In the developed countries, the transfer object is mostly in the form of policy 
ideas, while its access is often with street level bureaucracies and non-state actors in 
the recipient jurisdictions (DKKV, 2017; UNISDR, 2017a). This undoubtedly will limit 
its ability to facilitate the adoption of a new policy, much less being able to situate its 
narrative setting as bureaucratic. As such, in most of these recipient jurisdictions, the 
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policy idea was incorporated into existing government structures and the obligated 
policy transfer did not result in the creation of new administrative arrangements 
(UNISDR, 2017a). For instance, in Germany, the government designated a NGO, 
Deutsches Komitee Katastrophenvorsorge e.V. (DKKV), to work with UNISDR as 
fulfilment of its obligation to the UNISDR’s HFA (DKKV, 2017). Also, some other 
countries incorporated the recommendations from the UNISDR within existing 
government agencies instead of developing new policies for the establishment of a 
DRR national platform, and it is these existing agencies that relate with the UNISDR. 
In the UK, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat operates as a focal point for liaising with 
the UNSIDR; in Australia, it is the Attorney-General's Department; in Denmark, it is 
the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA); while in the United States, it is 
the U.S. Department of State (UNISDR, 2017a). 
If we look again at the above examples of the depiction of narrative setting, we may 
question if the UNISDR’s inclusion of providing a policy for the population does refer 
to a collective setting rather than a bureaucratic setting. While UNISDR’s statement 
may have indicated interest in the population, it is unlikely that its expected action 
would be directly focused on the population. The second line of the third quote notes 
that the policies have to be provided for the sake of the population, but does not say 
what will immediately accrue to the population as the governments demonstrate their 
commitment. The primary intent therefore, was the development of a national policy 
and strategy, and as such, the place of action for the policy transfer was with the 
government. In addition, the stated objectives18 in the policy document also indicate 
                                                          
18 “The objectives of the ECOWAS Policy for Disaster Risk Reduction Policy are to: 
 Provide an inter-governmental framework for collaboration and partnership for ECOWAS Member States in Disaster 
Risk Management;  
 Promote integration of disaster risk reduction into ECOWAS Member States National Development Policies, Plans 
and Programmes;  
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the specific deliverables of the transfer object and they are primarily focused on 
administrative arrangements and managerial functions (ECOWAS, 2006). Further 
interaction between UNISDR and ECOWAS may deliberately target the population, 
such as introducing taxation for disaster relief, but it can be seen that this instance of 
policy transfer was situated with a bureaucratic setting. 
Returning to the unforeseen finding of the depiction of a bureaucratic setting in this 
case of obligated transfer, this choice of setting in UNISDR’s narratives can somewhat 
be explained by its “significant involvement” (Marshall, 2005, p. 673) in the transfer 
process i.e. the direct and indirect contribution of funds to facilitate the transfer process 
(Interview 5, 2017; Interview 6, 2017; UNISDR Africa, 2006a; UNISDR and NEPAD, 
2004; UNISDR Africa, 2003). This manner of intervention in ensuring the occurrence 
of policy transfer gives the UNISDR an edge in relating with ECOWAS. With this 
advantage, the UNISDR is able to put forward the need for establishing and 
coordinating institutional frameworks for managing DRR issues within West Africa. So, 
contrary to what played out in the DRR policy transfer to the developed countries by 
UNSIDR as highlighted above, in the case of policy transfer to ECOWAS, UNISDR 
was able to push for the adoption of a new policy calling for the creation of a DRR 
National Platform in each of the ECOWAS MS. As such, even though the same 
mechanism of obligation was operational in these policy transfers, the creation of a 
new administrative unit was advocated for in the less developed countries, while the 
transfer object in many of the developed countries was more in the realm of introducing 
an idea within the existing structure.  
                                                          
 Facilitate ECOWAS Member States to develop and strengthen institutions, mechanisms and capacities for building 
resilience to hazards;  
 Promote incorporation of risk reduction approaches in emergency preparedness, rehabilitation and recovery 
programmes of ECOWAS Member States;  
 Enhance the contribution of disaster reduction to peace, security and sustainable development of the sub region” 
(ECOWAS, 2006, p. 9). 
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It may be argued that the reason for the different contexts for the DRR policy transfer 
by UNISDR, is because the developed countries may already have the relevant DRR 
organisational structures in place, while this was not so in the less developed 
countries. However, in the narratives of many of the ECOWAS countries, there was 
expression of existing organisational structures, such as the National Risk 
Observatory and National Disaster Prevention and Management Programme in 
Cameroon (Directorate of Civil Defence, 2006); National Disaster Management 
Organisation in Ghana (Odei, 2005); National Commission for Predictive Flood 
Management in Senegal (Dia, 2004); and National Environment Management Agency 
in Nigeria. Despite these, setting up new national platforms for DRR were advocated 
for by the UNISDR, thereby situating the problem of DRR in ECOWAS MS as one 
requiring altering the existing administrative arrangement.  
One would have expected this finding of situating a bureaucratic setting to be more in 
line with the transfer mechanism of conditionality, but the significant involvement of 
the transfer agent, which seems to be based on the economic circumstance of the 
recipient jurisdiction, likely informed the wielding of substantial influence by the 
transfer agent. This tends to show that there can be a difference in the manifestation 
of the mechanism of obligation depending on the recipient jurisdiction being targeted 
by the policy transfer. Such that when the transfer recipient has a weak economic 
standing and an expectation of support from the transfer agent, it is likely that the 
setting in the narratives of the transfer agent will be a bureaucratic setting, while 
obligated transfers to developed countries will likely feature other settings. 
In addition to the significant involvement of the transfer agent in the policy transfer, 
some of the African recipients maintained a disposition that made it seem as though 
they were at the receiving end of conditional policy transfers. Some of the countries 
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forthrightly expressed expectations of financial support from the UNISDR and other 
international development partners, upon their acknowledgement of the relevance of 
DRR and approval of a DRR policy. For instance, the Chad government asserted its 
dependence on the international community for dealing with “hazards with disastrous 
impact on ecosystems” (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 10), while the Nigerian government 
emphasised its reliance on the international community, particularly the UNISDR, in 
order to fulfil some of the provisions of the HFA (Ojo, 2004, p. 20). Also, the African 
Union’s NEPAD, as though forewarning the UNISDR on what should be their 
additional contribution after playing a “critical role … in shaping the agenda in disaster 
risk reduction” (Rukato, 2004, p. 4), advised the transfer agent that it should not 
absolve itself from bearing some of the responsibilities of carrying out the agenda. 
Such expressions, which can also be detected in ECOWAS’ consistent depiction of 
the character of victim in the two instances of policy transfer, as will be shown in the 
next chapter, made it seem that the recipient jurisdictions had conditioned themselves 
to expect conditional policy transfers. This further highlights the possibility of the 
narrative setting to inform the casting of characters, as was also observed in the case 
of renewable energy policy transfer and other NPF studies (Gray and Jones, 2016; 
French et al., 2017). 
With respect to ECOWAS MS’ expectation of engaging in a conditional policy transfer, 
as opposed to policy transfer by obligation, this may not be farfetched from their 
experience with some international development partners, as can be seen in the quote 
below.  
Often, international donor agencies tend to treat the national recipients of aid 
as being in an inferior bargaining position. There are many examples of 
inappropriate donor actions that were either useless or counterproductive …. 
For effective and timely disaster reduction, therefore, international donors and 
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recipients must interact as equal negotiating partners (UNEP et al., 2000, p. 
17). 
 
We can see from the quote that there is a caution against relying on demeaning tactics 
in promoting the concern of DRR, and it may be that the UNISDR in reaching out to 
African countries sought not to employ the mechanism of conditionality in advocating 
for the adoption of DRR policy, so as to heed to the above admonition. However, many 
African jurisdictions did not necessarily position themselves as equal partners, 
because if they did, they would not have viewed fulfilling their obligation to the HFA as 
an act that warrants (financial) support from the transfer agent in return. With such a 
disposition, the UNISDR may have had the leeway to situate its narrative setting as 
bureaucratic in communicating about the policy transfer. As shown below, the often 
culmination of reporting on DRR issues within their jurisdiction, with the request for 
support, or argument for inability to independently tackle their share of the solution 
suggest that the recipient jurisdiction is likely not yet at home with the idea of relating 
with international partners as equals.  
Given the critical role of development partners and institutions in shaping the 
agenda in disaster risk reduction, they should not be seen to absolve 
themselves from the outcomes of the implementation of these agendas, but 
rather embrace a shared responsibility between all partner institutions and the 
respective governments (Rukato, 2004, p. 4).  
Even though desertification is a hazard with disastrous impact on ecosystems, 
the Government’s meagre resources cannot help to handle it efficiently. Hence 
the need to mobilize the population and the international community (Ibrahim, 
2004, p. 11). 
To bring about decentralization in disaster risk reduction to the lowest 
community level in Nigeria, NEMA would need the support of relevant 
stakeholders locally and internationally, including the UNISDR (Ojo, 2005, p. 
20).  
 
Perhaps, the economic standing of the recipient jurisdiction may have hampered their 
possibility or capability of reciprocating the gesture of the UNISDR in facilitating the 
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policy transfer through obligation rather than conditionality. It could also be that upon 
the UNISDR realising the recipient jurisdiction will yet require significant support from 
it after acquiescing to acknowledge the policy issue of DRR, the transfer agent then 
sought to situate the bureaucratic setting in a bid to ensure there is a definite action 
taken (i.e. development and adoption of a policy document and creation of national 
platforms) in the recipient jurisdiction, and this can be recorded as part of the success 
of its advocacy effort. Other examples of obligated transfer to more economically 
advanced countries, in addition to those of DRR policy transfer to developed countries 
by UNISDR, show that this is unlike the prevailing scenario, whereby the recipient 
jurisdiction is often at liberty to decide how to meet its obligation and incorporate the 
transfer object within the governmental functions in its domain. For instance, in the 
introduction of the Freedom of Information to Ireland and Portugal, which was informed 
by an EU directive on Access to Information on the Environment (AIE), the two 
recipient jurisdictions were at liberty to devise the appropriate mode of incorporating 
the directive, so that Portugal went for enacting the Access to Documents Act, an act 
which also had a mix of French imports, while in Ireland, the directive was 
“implemented through regulations” (Bugdahn, 2007, p. 134). In addition, the transfer 
agent situated a collective narrative setting, as the policy was contextualised as an 
effort to give all citizens access to information on government activities and decisions 
(EUR-LEX, 2017; European Commission, 2016).  
However, in this instance of policy transfer, the target was specifically the adoption of 
a new DRR policy document and the establishment of national platforms in ECOWAS 
MS (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; ECOWAS, 2006; UNISDR Africa, 2005b), and this 
prescription gave the recipient jurisdiction little or no leeway in deciding how to meet 
its obligation to the Africa Regional DRR Strategy and HFA. The limited flexibility in 
 
 
233 
 
interpreting and actualising the obligation can also be seen in the prescription of the 
preferred language to be used, as the African recipient jurisdictions were told by 
UNISDR that “they need to speak in the language of donor countries”, even if they 
“may feel more ownership towards the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Reduction than towards the HFA” (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 42). The advice was 
given based on the expectation that the recipients would reach out to donors for 
assistance in meeting their obligations, and it further highlights the likelihood that 
although this instance of policy transfer was orchestrated to be driven by the 
mechanism of obligation, the economic situation in the recipient jurisdiction was taken 
into consideration. This consideration must have informed the nature of the 
relationship that existed between the transfer agent and recipient, and the use of 
narrative elements by the transfer agent to communicate the transfer process, which 
then shaped the mode of obligated transfer that manifested i.e. policy transfer by 
obligation and aided by significant involvement of the transfer agent. 
It can be argued that ECOWAS and its MS did not necessarily position themselves as 
equal partners with the UNISDR mainly because of their economic circumstance and 
this led them to lay emphasis on their needed dependence on the transfer agent and 
other international partners, for meeting their obligation to the Africa DRR Strategy 
and HFA. As mentioned earlier, this expectation of support may have conditioned the 
transfer recipient for the manifestation of a conditional transfer, and the situation of a 
bureaucratic setting, based on their experience with conditional transfers facilitated by 
international development partners (Koeberle et al., 2015; Tambulasi, 2013). As such, 
policy actors in the transfer recipient jurisdiction readily presented a bureaucratic 
setting in their narratives and examples of this depiction are highlighted below.  
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In the past, effective national disaster prevention and management came under 
serious criticisms due mainly to the existing structural and policy defects 
inherent in the process. This led to a conscious effort to review the policies and 
structures to bring disaster management in line with modern practices (Odei, 
2005, p. 10). 
To support the above proposals, further policy recommendations include the 
establishment of a formal institutional structure to manage a proposed National 
Disaster Risk Mitigation Fund (Olokesusi, 2006, p. 18). 
(We will be) re-energizing the institutional and strategic framework by 
establishing a National Platform for DRR … and … [s]trengthening the legal 
and sectoral framework in line with ongoing challenges in the fields of 
environment, land use and town and regional planning (Ndiaye, 2006, p. 41). 
 
We can assume that the depiction of a similar narrative setting implies that the transfer 
recipient acknowledges the existence of a common problem and agrees to the 
recommendation for addressing the challenge. However, this again, is not always the 
case in instances of obligated transfer, particularly to developed countries. With 
reference to the earlier mentioned instance of obligated policy transfer to Portugal and 
Ireland, there was disparity in the setting assumed for the transfer object. Although the 
EU designated a collective setting, Ireland went for a sectoral setting and Portugal 
favoured a community setting. The approach by Portugal was described as falling 
“short of the ambitions of the 1990 AIE Directive” (Bugdahn, 2007, p. 133) and it led 
to a contention between the transfer agent and recipient (Bugdahn, 2007). In contrast, 
decision makers in ECOWAS and its MS did not depict an alternative narrative setting 
that may reflect a possible “series of conflicts and negotiations” (Dussauge-Laguna, 
2013b, p. 686) during the policy transfer process, despite some domestic actors 
bemoaning the notion of developing a new DRR policy document and recommending 
that “[e]mphasis should … be put on testing existing policies and … implementing 
available policies … before coming up with new ones” (Ziervogel, 2006, p. 22). The 
absence of contestation of the setting situated by the transfer agent is quite 
noteworthy, knowing that the policy issue to which DRR is linked i.e. climate change, 
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is often a contentious topic between African policymakers and international actors. 
More so, the view that African nations need to make commitments to addressing 
climate change has often been countered with the concept of climate justice to 
maintain that the region had not contributed to the state of the climate, and because it 
would still be impacted negatively by the effects of climate change, it needs to be 
compensated (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010d).  
As noted earlier, an explanation for the situation of a bureaucratic setting by the 
transfer recipient in an obligated policy transfer could be that perhaps, the recipient 
jurisdiction was unaware of, or was not familiar with the possibility of having the liberty 
to meetup its obligation and situate its setting as it thinks best, and instead, it resorted 
to what it had been conditioned to expect from policy transfers. This then begs the 
question of whether this case of DRR policy transfer to ECWOAS can be regarded as 
an instance of obligated policy transfer, and if there is an element of conditionality 
involved therein, thereby making it an instance of policy transfer that is partly obligatory 
and partly conditional? To address this, there is a need to consider that the transfer 
agent does not present the transfer object as a condition to be fulfilled by the transfer 
recipient and neither does it offer a promise of support to reciprocate the fulfilment of 
the condition. Rather, UNISDR sought to engage with the topmost echelon of authority 
in ECOWAS and relevant officials in a bid to secure alignment with the HFA. UNISDR’s 
approach can be seen in these quotes: 
[T]o lobby heads of state … it was proposed that UNISDR participates in the 
upcoming AU summit by presenting results of the WCDR, reminding African 
heads of state of what they pledged in Kobe and what needs to be done for the 
implementation of the HFA (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 42). 
 
UNISDR supports regional and national implementation of the Global 
Framework and catalyses action and increases global awareness to reduce 
disaster risk. Actually, UNISDR has a consultant attached to ECOWAS 
Commission (Interview 6, 2017). 
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You’ll find that in each and every regional organisation, we have our person 
there …. If you look at most of these (African) countries, they have now their 
policies, they have their strategies and plans, and we have been involved 
(Interview 5, 2017). 
 
With the engagement of the African heads of states, UNISDR was able to ensure that 
the transfer recipient acquiesced to not only the idea of obligated policy transfer on a 
contentious issue by securing their commitment to the HFA, but also to align with its 
preferred context for domesticating the HFA. In addition, the UNSDR did not concede 
to committing funds in order to placate the recipient jurisdictions into adopting the DRR 
policy, as would have been the case in a conditional policy transfer, but it maintained 
that the African countries were obliged to honour the pledges they made (Interview 5, 
2017; Interview 6, 2017). Based on these, the possibility of the manifestation of the 
mechanism of conditionality can be negated even though the transfer recipient tacitly 
insinuated this approach. As a result, it can be asserted that the transfer mechanism 
operational in this instance of policy transfer was obligation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the start of this chapter, we looked at what the use of narrative setting implies in a 
policy transfer actor’s narrative, and noted that it lays down the area of influence and 
sets the boundaries of where the transfer object will take effect. It also contextualises 
the access and reach of the transfer agent, and its influence over the transfer recipient. 
According to the findings, both the EU and UNISDR depicted a bureaucratic setting, 
which hints at the target of altering bureaucratic structures in the recipient jurisdiction. 
While the use of this narrative setting was expected to be associated with the use of 
mechanism of conditionality in ensuring the adoption of the ECOWAS renewable 
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energy policy, the finding was however unexpected for the obligated policy transfer 
facilitated by UNISDR. As mentioned, UNISDR’s involvement in advocating for DRR 
takes a different approach in some developed countries, where the issue of DRR is 
absorbed within existing structures in the recipient jurisdictions, instead of creating a 
new department or developing a new policy document for the establishment of a new 
agency. ECOWAS’ use of a bureaucratic setting in its narrative on the development of 
DRR policy was also an unexpected finding, as this portrayal seemed to highlight an 
asymmetrical relationship between the transfer agent and recipient, and perhaps an 
expectation of receipt of support from the transfer agent upon adopting the transfer 
object.  
On the other hand, the narrative setting used by ECOWAS in the case of renewable 
energy policy transfer sometimes differed from that of the transfer agent. With the EU’s 
narrative depicting a bureaucratic setting, ECOWAS depicted both a bureaucratic and 
community setting. The incorporation of these two settings sets the stage for a 
conditional policy transfer that is unlike what is often observed, for example in the 
transfer of SAP to developing countries. Even though the transfer agent in this case 
possessed the clout and wherewithal to exert a broad influence on the recipient 
jurisdiction, the preference of the recipient was still put into consideration and this can 
be said laid the foundation for an amiable relation between the actors, and shaped the 
materialisation of the mechanism of persuasion. Therefore, this chapter argued that 
the narrative setting depicts the intent of actors with regards to where a transfer object 
would take effect in the recipient jurisdiction, which also illustrates the degree of 
access and influence of the transfer agent, and go on to shape the mechanism that is 
observed in policy transfers.  
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The next chapter focuses on the characters that are depicted in the narratives of the 
transfer agents and recipients in the cases of transfer of renewable energy and DRR 
policies to ECOWAS. 
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Chapter 7 – Casting Characters 
 
Introduction 
 
Stories, be they original or fictional, are imbued with messages. Such messages are 
directed at an audience and can be aimed at possibly convincing, contesting, or 
attesting. As observed in the last chapter, the use of the different narrative elements 
by policy transfer actors served as a conveying tool for messages that are targeted at 
a designated audience and intended to generate action. In both cases, the depiction 
of the narrative setting highlighted where the focus of the policy transfer will be centred. 
While the depiction of a bureaucratic setting was used in DRR policy transfer, to 
specify the target of creating national platforms for DRR in ECOWAS states, both 
bureaucratic and community settings were used in renewable energy policy transfer 
to stipulate the target of creating an enabling market environment and providing 
energy services for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and rural locations in 
ECOWAS. 
Likewise, the actors used the element of narrative characters to portray who plays 
what role in the policy transfer process. With reference to the earlier discussion on 
narrative character in Chapter 3, and the explanation of the different characters in 
Table 4.2, the hero is said to be an entity designated in the policy narrative as the fixer 
of a purported problem; allies are actors that are collaborating; the villain is the entity 
causing harm; while the victim is an entity that is negatively affected by a situation. As 
such, the characters of victim and villain are used to emphasise the existence of a 
problem that needs addressing, and the character of hero is used to showcase 
prowess and identify who is capable of solving the problem. EU’s narratives featured 
the story of a hero assisting an ally, UNISDR told a story of allies working together to 
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save victims from a villain, while ECOWAS’ narratives portrayed a victim in need of a 
hero. 
Table 7.1: Depiction of Narrative Characters 
  
Renewable Energy 
Policy Transfer by 
the EU  
DRR Policy 
Transfer by 
UNISDR   
Total No of 
Documents  56   31     
  
No of 
Documents % 
No of 
Documents % 
Test of 
Difference 
P<=0.05 
Narrative Element: 
Character         
Hero 36 64% 16 52% 
t= 1.15, 
p= 0.25 ns 
Ally 32 57% 20 65% 
t=-0.96, 
p= 0.34 ns 
Victim 11 20% 16 52% 
t= -3.23, 
p=0.002 s 
Villain 11 20% 17 55% 
t= -3.57, 
p= 0.001 s 
Antagonist 0 0% 0 0% n/a   
 
 
X2 (d.f=3)= 160.28, 
p<0.001  
 
X2(d.f=3)= 15.69, 
p<0.005      
 
The findings in this study show that rather than employ stories of contest as seen in 
many studies on policy narratives, and as often associated with policy actors (McBeth 
et al. 2010; Shanahan et al. 2013; Shanahan et al. 2014; Lybecker et al. 2013; Gupta 
et al. 2014), the stories by the actors were often meant for convincing an audience 
and/or attesting to the storyteller’s capabilities. This can be seen through the actors’ 
use of endearing tactics, such that the analysis shows 0% depiction of antagonists 
and more than 50% depiction of allies, as highlighted in Table 7.1. In addition, there is 
hardly any depiction of human villains and the recipient is often cast in positions 
contrary to their present predicament and station19. Such endearing tactics emphasise 
                                                          
19 The character of villain can be seen to feature considerably in the case of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS, however, these 
depictions are related to non-human identities, and this is discussed further in the section on villains and antagonists.  
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a significant message, which is that these are ally-seeking stories. The use of this 
tactic meant that there was a conscious attempt to avoid condescending expressions, 
be it from the transfer agent to the recipient, or the otherwise, and instead, there was 
a focus on working together and/or providing assistance. 
We may ask if the involvement of the mechanism of persuasion made EU’s narrative 
to be almost on par with that of UNISDR, with regards to the depiction of allies. Or, if 
at all the transfer mechanisms in the two cases are more similar than earlier observed? 
A close examination of the actors’ use of the individual narrative character, therefore 
is necessary. To do this, the chapter is structured to enable analysis of the depiction 
of each narrative character by the transfer agents, UNISDR and the EU, and then by 
the recipient, ECOWAS. This will allow the observation and comparison of how the 
actors apportioned the characters of heroes, allies, victims, villains, or antagonists 
(Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones et al., 2014; Shanahan, Jones and McBeth, 2017). 
It will also enable the examination of the perception of the transfer agents towards the 
transfer recipient and vice-versa, and how this may have informed the transfer 
mechanisms observed in instances of policy transfer. Based on this, the next section 
will discuss the casting of heroes and allies by the transfer agents, and this is followed 
by a section discussing the casting of heroes and allies by the recipient. 
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7.1 Casting Heroes and Allies by Policy Transfer Agents 
Plan with Africa, not for Africa (Interview 1, 2017).  
 
To identify the character casting of the policy transfer agents, the introductory 
editorials of the newsletters published by the EU and UNISDR seem to portray their 
envisioned roles of and relationship between the transfer agent and recipient. The first 
edition of the newsletter published by the EU, LINK!, features an introductory message 
from the Ambassador of the EU to the AU and it reads: 
I'm proud to present to you LINK!, the first newsletter from the European Union 
Delegation to the African Union, in joint cooperation with all EU Member States 
representations to the AU.  
The establishment of the EU Delegation to the AU last year was an important 
political statement by the EU: the recognition that the AU and its Commission 
had become a strategic partner in our relations with Africa, and that, if we 
wanted to be taken seriously in this partnership, we had to strengthen our 
presence in Addis. As many of our partners in the AUC put it: "now we know 
you take us seriously." In that sense, the Delegation will be an even stronger 
LINK! between Addis and Brussels.  
We are almost halfway through the first action plan of the Lisbon partnership. 
I'm confident that in the coming months we will be able to show that many new 
projects are ready to deliver. Our monthly newsletter aims also at raising 
awareness of important ongoing activities and mobilising further support. 
… Together we have to ensure that Africa recovers the momentum of economic 
expansion it has been building up for several years and that the important 
progress in the field of governance is strengthened (Vervaeke, 2009, p. 1). 
 
This story positions the EU in the heroic seat and as the driver of the Lisbon 
partnership, an agreement between the EU and African countries which also forms the 
basis for the engagement of the EU in the development of the ECOWAS renewable 
energy policy (Interview 2, 2017). It heralds the establishment of an EU Delegation 
that is dedicated to the organisation’s operations in Africa and the introduction of the 
newsletter. It also emphatically situates who is in charge of the newsletter and the 
projects on the Lisbon partnership. It can be argued that the mention of ‘we’ in the third 
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paragraph implies a collective expression and a sharing of the heroic status with the 
African strategic partner. However, the second sentence tends to clarify further which 
actors the ‘we’ in the earlier sentence refers to, as it directly links it to the publisher of 
the newsletter i.e. the EU. This bold declaration of the ownership of the Link! newsletter 
and leadership of project delivery under the Lisbon partnership however differs from 
how the UNISDR positions itself with respect to addressing DRR issues in Africa. The 
below excerpt shows the story told by the UNISDR in its introductory message of the 
newsletter, Disaster Reduction in Africa: ISDR Informs: 
Our initiative, your publication 
… Published by ISDR Africa, the present publication called “Disaster Reduction 
in Africa” seeks, in its own little way and in its own area of activity, to narrow the 
gap between the two camps in Africa: between those who “can” help to prevent 
and those who “cannot” circumvent; between those who “can” help to avert and 
those who “can’t” help being hurt. 
Therefore ADR Review is meant not only for disaster scholars, scientists, 
experts, policy makers, but also for grassroots “practitioners”, NGOs, 
communities and citizens, especially the vulnerable ones. 
On the same ground, it is not only published for all the above, but also owned 
by all the above. They are called upon to contribute to and shape, actively, ADR 
Review. The publication is theirs (Valency, 2003a, p. 1) 
 
This introductory message opens a space for co-ownership of the publication with its 
target audience, and with its call for a joint effort and shared responsibilities, it 
highlights the necessity of the direct contribution of other parties in addressing the gap 
identified, and portrays an envisioned alliance with those who are vulnerable to 
disasters. In particular, the UNISDR underplays its role and rather than make grand 
statements about its identity and endeavours, it opts for a modest narration. In many 
of the documents, it barely situates itself in a more significant position or assume 
supremacy over the intended transfer recipients, instead it relies on casting itself and 
the prospective transfer recipients as allies. In particular, many of the 52% depiction 
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of a hero, are in reference to the DRR activities of a specific individual, Mrs. Tadzong, 
a Cameroonian woman, and her receipt of an international UN award.  
We may assume that the difference in the manner of expression of the transfer agents’ 
achievements and actions, is primarily due to the styles of language that may be 
prescribed within the organisations to which the actors belong i.e. a UN or EU 
communication style. However, it seems that the reticence of the UNISDR reflects the 
assumed joint ownership of the problem, while on the other hand, the EU’s proactive 
tone seems to signal a bold ownership of the actions for addressing a problem that is 
existent in another jurisdiction. In general, the EU did not shy away from singing its 
own praises and this can be seen in the quotes below.  
The EU stands ready to allocate EUR 8M to …guide the integration of climate 
information into development planning and ensure the mainstreaming of 
climate considerations into policies aimed at achieving the MDGs (Vervaeke, 
2010, p. 1). 
The EU stands with countries in difficulty. We are a reliable partner even in 
times of economic downturn (Barroso, 2010a, p. 3). 
The European Union has not only been the largest provider of financial support 
… it has also been the most predictable one (European Union Delegation to the 
African Union, 2009b, pp. 9–10). 
The European Union is by far the largest donor of funds in the (ECOWAS) 
region, accounting for close on two thirds (64.9%) of the total regional aid 
committed, with 57% coming from the EC and 7.9% from the Member States 
(European Commission et al., 2008, p. 38). 
 
It is as though the knowledge of possession of the means for addressing a problem in 
the recipient jurisdiction may have informed the EU’s proactive expression of a heroic 
status, while on the other hand, the acknowledgement of joint ownership of the 
problem of DRR, and the required joining of resources to realise the solution, may 
have informed the less proactive expression of UNISDR’s achievements and actions. 
This notion was also observed in the interviews. The EU was often regarded as a 
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financial bigwig capable of providing support because it has the resources, and its 
acclaimed support to ECOWAS “in terms of infrastructure, free movement, road, 
energy, health and the rest” (Interview 2, 2017) could not go unnoticed. However, it 
was the collaboration with African regional bodies like ECOWAS that was emphasised 
about UNISDR (Interview 5, 2017; Interview 6, 2017).  
This observation can contribute to the understanding of and distinguishing between 
transfer mechanisms of obligation and conditionality. Owning that what prompts policy 
transfers driven by obligation is a drive for joint action to address a common challenge 
(Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Sobaci, 2009), the emphasis on joint effort and shared 
responsibilities portrays the envisioned role of the participants as allies operating on a 
similar pedestal. Perhaps, it is based on the aspiration of harmonisation (Jordan et al., 
2003; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012) that obligated transfers will likely employ 
narrative elements that facilitate the positioning of both the transfer agents and 
recipients on similar pedestal, despite the clear hierarchy that may distinguish the 
transfer agent from the recipient (Bulmer, 2007; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005). As 
Radaelli (2003, p.33) puts it, “[h]armonization reduces … diversity, typically by 
providing a level playing field”, and as such, the depiction of the transfer agent and 
recipient as allies tends to be a means for seeking that level playing field. With the 
transfer recipient in this case being a regional body consisting of countries that are 
classified as developing and least developed countries, the recognition of a possible 
capability of these countries to contribute (even in the least measure) to an 
international policy further highlights the acknowledgement of a shared problem and 
shared responsibility.  
This is however against the notion that the transfer mechanism of obligation implies a 
jurisdiction being “forced by some international obligation in a treaty” as remarked by 
 
 
246 
 
Lodge and James (2003, p.185). The depiction of the intended recipients by the 
UNISDR negates this explanation of obligated transfers, rather, the depiction of the 
recipients as allies by UNISDR reiterate the non-reliance on the use of force by the 
transfer agents in obligated transfers. So, even though there is a hierarchical 
difference in the position of the transfer agent and recipient e.g. international and 
national, this hierarchy is not inculcated into the transfer agent’s narration about the 
recipient. Some examples of the UNISDR’s casting of the recipient as allies are 
presented below. 
To face up this challenge, UNISDR Africa has forged a very sound partnership 
with African national governments and regional organizations to promote 
understanding of disaster risk reduction (UNISDR Africa, 2006a). 
 
Support nowadays is in the form of partnership. As partnership is about 
combining assets (strengths) not liabilities (weaknesses), Africa should 
contribute its assets - not its liabilities (Valency, 2004a, p. 1). 
 
To facilitate the advancement of the disaster reduction process, AU/NEPAD 
and UNISDR Africa have been taking a leading role in advocating and 
coordinating disaster reduction initiatives … in cooperation with … Sub-
Regional Economic Commissions (RECs). (UNISDR Africa, 2004b, pp. 1–2). 
 
 
From these quotes, the depiction of allies do not only ascribe an associate status to 
the recipient, but it also implies an emphatic call to the recipients to live up to their 
responsibility in addressing the challenge of DRR. The intent of association therefore, 
is made clear to be one of working together to solve a shared problem. In the case of 
renewable energy transfer, EU’s narrative consistently portrays its involvement in the 
policy transfer from a place of strength even though the intended relations with the 
recipient is in the form of partners. Its heroic positioning, particularly, the economic 
show of strength reflects its financial power and the kind of hierarchical relationship 
that typifies the transfer mechanism of conditionality (Bulmer et al., 2007). This quote 
below by the then European Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs, also 
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highlights how conditionality arrangements are predicated on incentives from an entity 
with significant economic and/or political power.  
[R]eforms such as providing a predictable legal framework for investors, 
improved judiciary or banking systems, are crucial for any economic investment 
to produce the expected results, and should be therefore pre-conditions for 
physical infrastructure financing. Without the implementation of the needed 
policy reforms, investments are not economically justifiable (European Union 
Delegation to the African Union, 2012, pp. 8–9).  
 
It is noteworthy that the throwing of financial weight is however tempered by the 
depiction of the recipient as an ally rather than an aid beneficiary. The EU maintained 
that the relationship was a “two-way process between equal partners that share 
common challenges and have complementary interests” (The Africa-EU Partnership, 
2010, p. 1). The EU’s declaration of African countries as equal partners, and its 
embrace of geographical and historical similarities (see quotes below) suggest a 
desire for cordiality, and for this to be a basis for its involvement in influencing the 
adoption of EU-favoured policy decisions in African countries.  
Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common 
future, as well as by a community of values (African Union and European Union, 
2007, p. 1). 
Africa’s 54 countries and the European Union’s soon-to-be 28 member states 
have a shared neighbourhood, history and future (European Union and African 
Union, 2012, p. 6).  
Europe’s relationship with Africa is not new. Geographical proximity, historic 
ties, evolving mutual recognition and accountability help to address common 
interests, would it be green growth or reforms of institutional and social systems 
(The Africa-EU Partnership, 2010, p. 1). 
 
The EU’s portrayal of the recipient as allies negates the wielding of power and/or the 
top-down relationship approach that is often linked to conditional transfers to 
developing countries and transition states. For instance, when the process of 
accession to IGOs require conditional policy transfers, especially in cases where the 
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candidate to the IGO happens to be a developing or transition country, the application 
process usually allows an “asymmetrical relationship” (Grabbe, 2003, p. 303). Also, in 
cases of policy transfers based on aid or loan conditionality by the World Bank and 
IMF, the recipients are usually at the mercy of the transfer agents (Chapman and 
Greenaway, 2006; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2009b). Although in the policy 
transfer literature, the EU is also sometimes banded with other IGOS and financial 
institutions that facilitate conditional policy transfers (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 
Bulmer et al., 2007), in this instance of transfer of renewable energy policy to 
ECOWAS however, the disposition of the EU can be said to be a deviation from the 
typical.  
The casting of African countries as allies and the assertion of amity, in a way, indicates 
the EU’s conscious effort at being persuasive, and avoiding a brash approach and 
perhaps, its associated consequence of inequality and dispossession (European 
Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010b). In particular, even though the EU 
indicated the development of a policy framework as a condition for facilitating 
renewable energy investments in West Africa (European Union and African Union, 
2012; European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2012), it frowns at being 
associated with the practice of aids and loan conditionality of the World Bank and IMF, 
because of its severe top-down relations with the recipients (Interview 1, 2017). So, 
despite its policy transfer approach of “you need to say this, then you get that” 
(Interview 4, 2017), one can say that the EU tempered the manifestation of the transfer 
mechanism of conditionality with the touch of the mechanism of persuasion. Also, this 
seemed to have restrained the hierarchical relations that otherwise might have 
dominated the conditional policy transfer, thereby making the transfer agent, the EU, 
to act in a manner expected of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). 
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According to Stone (2010), since INGOs do not have similar powers as that of IGOs, 
in acting as transfer agents, they focus on soft transfer i.e. transfer of ideas, and rely 
on persuasion and partnerships to facilitate such. Through its reliance on the 
mechanism of persuasion, the EU therefore partly puts itself in a position more 
synonymous with INGOs, while at the same time, it maintains the stipulation of 
adoption of a renewable energy policy as a condition for facilitating investments. As 
such, in marrying the mechanism persuasion with that of conditionality, the transfer 
agent conspicuously casts itself as a hero with the wherewithal to solve a problem 
within the recipient jurisdiction, but still considers the transfer recipient as an ally.  
This section has discussed the depiction of heroes and allies from the perspective of 
the transfer agents and as mentioned earlier, since the manifestation of transfer 
mechanisms is not only dependent on the actions of the transfer agent but also that of 
the recipient, it will be important to consider the narratives presented from the different 
ends of sending and receiving in the transfer process (Wolman and Page, 2002). 
Based on this, the next section discusses the depiction of heroes and allies by 
ECOWAS in the two instances of policy transfer, and how this may have shaped the 
observed transfer mechanisms.  
 
7.2 Casting Heroes and Allies by Policy Transfer Recipient 
We worked together from the beginning (Interview 2, 2017). 
 
Policy transfers driven by coercive transfer mechanisms are often externally initiated 
by the transfer agents, and if the recipients of such transfers are developing countries, 
the transfer agents will in many instances, not only initiate and drive the process, but 
also provide the funds that will be needed to ensure the development and adoption of 
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the policy (Kappiah, 2014; McNamara, 1980; Timms, 2011). With respect to this, one 
would expect that the heroes of the transfer stories will consistently be the initiator, 
driver, and funder of the policy transfer. Albeit, in presenting its narratives, ECOWAS 
and its MS often drew from their domestic endeavours to highlight their achievements 
thereby, positioning themselves in a heroic status, while the transfer agent is placed 
as an ally by making mention of their ‘support’ (ECOWAS, 2006; ECREEE, 2013a; 
Kappiah, 2014). 
In the case of the renewable energy policy transfer, there is no grand depiction of the 
EU in any similar fashion to how it depicted itself in its own communication materials. 
There is also no illustration that might suggest the EU’s ownership of the wherewithal 
to tackle the problem that is to be addressed by the policy transfer. Instead, just as the 
EU drew from historical relations and geographical proximity to ascertain the ally 
status of African countries, so also did ECOWAS draw from its past achievements and 
geographical boundaries to ascertain its heroic status. Some examples of ECOWAS’ 
and its MS depiction of hero are presented below and from the quotes, one can see 
that there is hardly an attribution of external input leading to the attainment of the 
achievements.  
Another major success of ECOWAS in the energy sector is the establishment 
of the WAGP project, which benefits from the 18 billion m3 of natural gas that 
Nigeria currently burns off with flare towers (N’Guessan et al., 2011, p. 14). 
 [T]he pioneering approach of ECOWAS in developing the region’s renewable 
energy and energy efficiency sectors, which subsequently led to the 
establishment of the first regional renewable energy and energy efficiency 
(REandEE) promotion agency in sub-Saharan Africa (ECREEE, 2012c, p. 3). 
[I]n the relatively short period since its establishment, ECREEE has rapidly built 
up an impressive portfolio of initiatives (Kappiah, 2012, p. 1). 
Today, ECOWAS stands as one of the most dynamic Regional Economic 
Community (REC) of the continent (N’Guessan et al., 2011, p. 1). 
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Based on the quotes, there is a self-positioning of ECOWAS as the hero of its own 
story even though in this instance, it is on the receiving end of a benefactor’s initiative 
and resource. Does this casting of heroes, therefore, portend a desire for the transfer 
recipient to be regarded as the initiator and driver of its own domestic policies? Or 
indeed, is it a reflection of an assumption that this instance of transfer of renewable 
energy was domestically initiated? The likelihood of observing combinations of 
mechanisms related to both domestically and externally-initiated policy transfers is 
noted in the literature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans and Barakat, 2012; Lavenex, 
2002; Unalan, 2009). However, as noted in Chapter 5, the policy transfer was 
externally-initiated and driven by the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion, a 
mechanism mix that perhaps, may be described as soft or indirect conditionality 
(Interview 2, 2017).  
To argue further for the occurrence of an externally-initiated transfer instance with the 
manifestation of a coercive transfer mechanism, examples of internally-initiated policy 
transfers from the literature show that the recipients in such instances scarcely refrain 
from casting the transfer source as a hero in their storytelling. Jacobs and Barnett 
(2000) provide an example of a transfer recipient’s acknowledgement of another 
jurisdiction’s successful policy instruments. In their study of health services reform in 
New Zealand, there was mention of the expression of admiration for the UK 
government’s dedicated funding of its healthcare reforms and the Oregon approach 
for defining core services in healthcare (Jacobs and Barnett, 2000). Also, in the case 
of transfer of welfare-to-work policy to the UK from the US, a UK policymaker lauded 
the approach of the U.S. and noted that “[t]he reason why I’m actually quite keen that 
we do use the lessons of the U.S. … is that … the U.S. have been very good at … a 
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couple of things in the general area of welfare. One is that the programmes that they 
do run are very effective, they are very business-like, very brisk, they’re very intensive” 
(Legrand, 2012b, p. 342). Even in instances of voluntary policy transfer where the 
recipient has been depicted as the hero of its own story and show expression such as 
“we do everything better than the others” (Lodge, 2003, p. 270), this disposition has 
often been with regards to experiences that end up as non-transfers. In such non-
transfer instances, despite considering another jurisdiction as a possible transfer 
source, there is no eventual adoption of the policy object being considered, because 
the intended transfer object is regarded as a representation of what not to do (Dunlop, 
2009; Lodge, 2003). Therefore, if the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS 
was an instance of voluntary transfer, then the recipient would more likely have 
heralded the achievements made by policymakers in the source jurisdiction, and 
acknowledged them as heroes.   
With regards to the case of the transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS, as though following 
in the footsteps of the transfer agent i.e. UNISDR, ECOWAS rarely deployed grand 
statements or depiction of heroism in referring to its own identify or activities. This is 
in contrast to the recipient’s enumeration of past successes in the instance of 
conditional transfer of renewable energy policy, such that in the place of heroic 
achievements, there was mainly an outline of past activities. One might say that this 
disposition may be in relations to the consciousness of the cooperation and 
contributions that solving the problem warrants. Whereas, with the instance of 
conditional transfer, the consciousness that is borne by the recipient is the 
actualisation of an assurance made by an external party. Based on this, we may infer 
that what is expected from engaging in the transfer process is a factor that can inform 
how the transfer recipient depicts itself in a policy transfer process, and how this 
 
 
253 
 
depiction shapes the transfer mechanism that plays out. Thus, with the expectation of 
joining in to address a global challenge, the recipient in an obligatory policy transfer 
will likely consider itself as a piece that is required to solve a big puzzle, while with 
regards to conditional transfer, the expectation of receipt of support will likely result in 
the recipient seeking self-assertion, perhaps as a reassurance of its sovereignty.  
In the next section, we will turn to how the actors have used the character of victim in 
their narratives. 
 
7.3 Casting Victims by Policy Transfer Agents 
Many African countries are often readily associated with a narrative of lack and 
distress, and as a result, these countries and its people are also usually depicted as 
victims by many external policy actors telling stories about the region, in a bid to 
emphasise the need for addressing the challenges in the countries (Hopkins, 2014; 
Piot, 1999). However, contrary to an expectation of casting of ECOWAS as a victim 
by both transfer agents, the findings show that it was only UNISDR that followed this 
line of casting, while the EU shied away from depicting ECOWAS as a victim in its 
narrative. In its narratives, the UNISDR positioned the recipients as a victim by telling 
stories of catastrophes that are being experienced by communities and persons within 
the region, even when these are not related to environmental hazards. Some of the 
depictions by UNISDR are shown below.  
All the countries most affected by HIV/ AIDS are in Africa, and nearly half of 
African countries have been involved in armed conflicts since 1990s (UNISDR 
Africa, 2003, p. 4). 
Sadly, Africa has only about 9% of the world’s water resources but 13% of the 
world’s population. It also has the highest population growth rate in the world, 
which means that the total amount of water available to each person per year 
is well below that of the world average (UNISDR Africa, 2003, p. 7). 
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Africa is prone to a wide variety of disasters, especially large-scale floods, 
drought, tropical storms and volcanic eruptions, with widespread poverty and 
high HIV/AIDS prevalence leaving a large number of Africans even more 
vulnerable to disasters … In the last two decades, African countries were very 
much overstressed by large-scale social, political and economic problems 
(UNISDR Africa, 2003, p. 4). 
Over the past 40 years, natural hazards, such as earthquakes, droughts, floods, 
storms and tropical cyclones, wildfires and volcanic eruptions have caused 
major losses of human lives in Africa (UNISDR and UNEP, 2004, p. 7). 
 
We can see that the threats and dangers, and the level of exposure to threats and 
dangers referred to in these quotes, are presented with elaborate expressions, such 
as major losses of life; highest population growth rate; large-scale floods; and 
widespread poverty. UNISDR’s depiction of victims and use of elaborate expressions 
to describe the circumstances of the victim are aimed at emphasising the existence of 
a problem by putting a face to it. They are also likely directed at being able to mobilise 
the necessary support from allies in order to address the problem. This reiteration of 
diverse challenges on the African continent (both disaster and non-disaster related) in 
a bid to justify the imminence of natural hazards is, however paradoxical. This is 
because, although meteorological and hydrological events have been identified as the 
major drivers for the occurrence of natural disasters globally (Adebayo, 2005), yet, 
most African countries have been noted to be places that suffer less from such events 
as compared to other parts of the world (Dilley et al., 2005; Odei, 2006). In particular, 
one of the editorials of the UNISDR’s newsletters noted that “the rest of the world 
knows that … Africa is not the most disaster-prone continent” (Valency, 2004b, p. 1). 
Also, considering the history of the UNISDR, the disasters that had caught the world’s 
attention, and which led to a global commitment by a group of countries to address the 
issue of disaster, had mainly occurred in Asia and the Americas (UNISDR, 2012a).  
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Facilitating an obligated policy transfer will likely require the identification of what the 
proposed policy will address i.e. there will be a need to establish a problem or 
challenge. It seems that it is in a bid to establish a policy problem and communicate 
this effectively, that the transfer agent cast the character of victim, and drew from 
existing non-disaster related circumstances to project the victim status. This is in line 
with the notion that commitments and contributions for addressing a challenge can be 
more guaranteed when there is an identifiable victim (Clemons et al., 2012), as this 
helps to give a face to the problem and clarify who needs to receive or benefit from 
any assistance to be given. As such, despite the issue of DRR being related to climate-
related events (Bojang, 2003), the UNISDR situated African countries as victims of 
diseases, poverty, armed conflicts, epidemics, and “large-scale social, political and 
economic problems” (UNISDR Africa, 2003, p. 4), to justify the existence of a problem 
worthy of attention.  
Also, the connotation of DRR with the existence of threats like HIV/AIDS and conflict 
seems to be a means of highlighting to the transfer recipient, the universality of the 
occurrence of disasters, so that even though the major disasters within its environs 
are not typically environmental, the transfer recipient can attempt to associate with the 
natural disasters that occur in other parts of the world. In addition, rather than its 
normal focus on the occurrence of major disasters, the message from the UNISDR to 
African countries centred on the vulnerability of the population based on their limited 
access to infrastructure and finance (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; Valency, 2005). This 
approach ensured the consolidation of the victim status, since the countries already 
suffer from developmental challenges, and this likely prompted an awakening to the 
reality of the raging problem of natural disasters. 
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According to Sobaci (2009, p.51) “[t]he emergence of common international problems 
that require the cooperation of nations inspire governments to implement similar 
policies for the solution of such problems”. So, beyond establishing the existence of a 
problem, the stories by the UNISDR also sought to highlight the commonality of the 
occurrence of disasters across the world20. By painting a picture of shared sufferings, 
where the African continent suffers from development challenges which could be 
aggravated by disasters and other parts of the world suffer from the debilitating 
aftermath of a natural disaster, the transfer agent aimed for the recipient to develop a 
sense of familiarity with the policy issue and agree to join forces with others to address 
the challenge. The casting of victims thus informs the manifestation of the transfer 
mechanism of obligation through its emphasis on the harm being done, which can then 
make a prospective transfer recipient to realise the need to take part and stop the 
harm. This quote below surmises the relevance of casting victims in obligated policy 
transfers.  
If a community does not believe it is at risk then it is unlikely to take part in 
disaster risk reduction programmes” (UNISDR Africa, 2004b, p. 5) 
 
As shown in Table 7.1, in the instance of renewable energy policy transfer to 
ECOWAS, there were few depiction of victims in the EU’s narrative. Unlike the case 
of obligated transfer, where there was a considerable effort to paint a picture of people 
under significant threat in the recipient jurisdiction, by drawing from existing 
developmental challenges in order to situate the problems that can be posed by 
disasters, the EU however, was restrained in its depiction of the problems existing 
                                                          
20 This message from the former Secretary-General of the United Nations also points to how the commonality of problem is 
emphasized in the transfer agent’s narrative: “Water-related disasters – including floods, droughts, hurricanes, typhoons and 
tropical cyclones – inflict a terrible toll on human life and property, affecting millions of people and provoking crippling economic 
losses. As ever, it is the poor and vulnerable who are most adversely affected, but as we saw in Central Europe in 2002, even 
industrialized nations can suffer immensely” (Annan, 2004, p. 33) 
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within the recipient jurisdiction. This is despite the presence of substantial threats and 
challenges in the policy area that is the focus of the policy transfer, and the awareness 
that “Africa's largest infrastructure deficit is in the energy sector” (European Union 
Delegation to the African Union, 2009c).  
With the EU’s limited depiction of a victim in its narratives, it refrained from exploiting 
the prevailing debilitating conditions for emphasising a story of sufferings. This also 
meant that there was a restrained personification of the reality being experienced in 
the energy sector and as such, it did not emphatically give a face to the problem. This 
restraint also prevented portraying the recipient in a weak or bad light. We may link 
this to the manifestation of the mechanism of persuasion, since an attempt to persuade 
another party will likely entail genteel expressions and/or flattering, in a bid to maintain 
cordiality. So that by not referring so much to the sufferings of the recipient, but what 
the transfer agent and recipient jurisdiction can achieve together i.e. as allies, the 
transfer recipient can be motivated to accept the proposition by the transfer agent. A 
message from the EU to African countries that they should cease perceiving 
themselves as donor recipients, but regard themselves as partners in development 
cooperation (Barroso, 2010b; European Commission, 2010), also highlight why the 
character of allies was used more to depict the transfer recipient, than the character 
of victims. In particular, the recipient jurisdiction was being made aware that it should 
not see itself in the light of a victim, but as an entity that can make contributions and 
address its own challenges while working with partners.  
Such emphasis on portraying a transfer recipient as an ally rather than a victim is also 
demonstrated in the involvement of international organisations in the transfer of 
security policy to Palestinian territories and Liberia (Schroeder et al., 2013). In these 
instances, there was a marked change in the depiction of the transfer recipients by the 
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international organisations, the U.S. and EU, from victims to allies. The changes in the 
depictions were also followed by a change in the transfer mechanism that associated 
the relations between the transfer agent and recipient. In the case of policy transfer to 
Liberia, there was a change from the mechanism of imposition to that of persuasion. 
Also, in the case of policy transfer to the Palestinian territories, the shift in the transfer 
agents’ perception of the territories from one of a victimised and helpless actor in grave 
need of unconditional support to that of an ally, saw the introduction of policy transfer 
driven by persuasion (Schroeder et al., 2013). The study also reported that with the 
manifestation of the mechanism persuasion, there was a warm acceptance of one or 
more of the multiple policy solutions put forward by the U.S. and EU, and from which 
the recipient could choose from. Along with the acceptance of the proposed policy 
solution, the transfer recipients also demonstrated strong ownership of the transfer 
objects. A similar demonstration of ownership by ECOWAS is also mentioned with 
regards to the transfer of renewable energy policy to  ECOWAS by the EU (Interview 
2, 2017), and this can be attributed to the policy transfer process being partly driven 
by the mechanism of persuasion. 
However, unlike the examples of instances of policy transfer by persuasion in 
Schroeder et al. (2013), where the transfer recipients i.e. Palestinian territories and 
Liberia, had the choice to select the transfer object from a pot of options, this scenario 
did not play out in this case. Instead, there was a definite policy solution put forward, 
which was primarily based on attracting private and public investments for deployment 
of renewable energy technologies and delivering of energy services. So, even though 
the story of a victim in need of hero is not reinforced in the EU’s narratives, a specific 
solution was yet put forward, which the recipient had to assent as an indication of 
willingness to accept the proposed support and agree to the conditions set. The 
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specification of a condition for attracting investment shows the conditionality 
dimension of the mechanisms that manifested in this transfer instance, but the story 
turns away from focusing on a hero backing a victim in need of support. This highlights 
the nature of the mix of the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion, such that 
persuasion tempered what would have been obtained with the sole manifestation of 
conditionality, as the recipient was ‘elevated’ from a character of victim to that of an 
ally. 
The next section will discuss the use of the narrative element of victims by the transfer 
agent in the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU.  
 
7.4 Casting Victims by Policy Transfer Recipient 
Similar to the casting of itself as the hero of its own story, ECOWAS and its MS also 
did not shy away from being situated as the victims in their narratives, in both instances 
of policy transfer. With respect to the case of DRR policy transfer, the opening lines of 
some of the articles authored by ECOWAS MS started with the information on the 
occurrence of natural disasters within their jurisdiction. Other events that are non-
environmental related were also cited in a bid to link these to an exposure to 
environmental hazards. Some of the depictions are presented below. 
Over the past ten years, The Gambia has experienced a number of natural 
disasters, man-made catastrophes and other calamities combining both natural 
and man-made factors, including: extensive flooding in 1999 and 2003, severe 
drought in 2002 which resulted in widespread and drastic reduction in 
household food stock and the loss of livestock (Nying and Nyangado, 2006, p. 
5) 
Over the last decade, Cameroon has experienced toxic gas emissions, two 
eruptions of Mount Cameroon, tornadoes, floods, landslides, fires, epidemics, 
locust invasions and damage caused by pachyderms (Directorate of Civil 
Defence, 2006, p. 22). 
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Sierra Leone, a West African country widely known for prolonged civil war in a 
not too distant past, is also prone to various natural and man-made hazards 
(Disaster Management Department of the Office of National Security, 2007, p. 
27). 
 
Also, the narrative on renewable energy policy decried the lack of energy access within 
the region and the reliance on unsustainable practices for meeting energy needs, as 
can be seen in the quotes below. These declarations by ECOWAS and its MS, in both 
instances of policy transfer, reflect not only an attempt to associate with the global 
challenges associated with the policy areas, but they also seal the status of ECOWAS 
as an entity worthy of receiving support in dealing with the challenges in the policy 
areas.  
The West African region is faced with interrelated challenges of energy access, 
energy security and climate change mitigation. About 60% of electricity used in 
the sub-region is generated through high-cost diesel fuels (ECREEE, 2013c, p. 
5). 
[E]nergy poverty is a common characteristic of all ECOWAS Member States as 
more than 75% of the population is deprived of electricity. The energy access 
situation is worsened by the lack of financing to build appropriate infrastructures 
to transform the market for modern energy services (N’Guessan et al., 2011, p. 
1). 
 
In a way, these depictions signify the recipient’s acknowledgement of the existence of 
challenges in DRR and renewable energy use in West Africa, so that the transfer 
agents’ efforts in mobilising for obligatory responsibility, persuading and offering 
conditionality, can be assumed to be consolidated by the recipient’s depiction of its 
own identity with the narrative character of victim. The depictions can also connote the 
validation of the transfer agent’s engagement in policy transfer by the recipient, as the 
alternative to the portrayal of a victim may imply an unwanted or unwarranted intrusion 
on the part of the transfer agent, in the domestic affairs of a jurisdiction. In the case of 
DRR policy transfer, ECOWAS MS’ use of the narrative element signifies its 
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association with the global problem of environmental disaster and this helps to readily 
suggest its acceptance of an obligatory responsibility. Also, ECOWAS’ casting of itself 
as a victim, signifies its assent to the reality of the challenge of energy poverty and 
climate change, and the need for securing financing for appropriate infrastructure. 
These portrayals therefore, reiterate the transfer agents’ positions on the existence of 
a DRR problem and the need for renewable energy investments, as well as the 
possibility for engaging in obligated and conditional transfers in order to address the 
challenges.  
 
7.5 Casting Villains and Antagonists by Transfer Agents 
In the NPF literature, the villain is depicted as the person, group or thing that is 
responsible for causing or worsening a particular problem (Lybecker et al., 2016). The 
identification of the villain also signifies the portrayal of who or what should be blamed 
for a problem, such as “profit-driven corporations that are polluting the environment, 
(or) radical environmental activists harming economic development and threatening 
individual liberty” (Pierce et al., 2014, p. 31). The villain is also noted to be the most 
frequently identified character in policy narratives (Pierce et al., 2014). However, the 
finding from this policy transfer study, showed a different level of depiction of villains, 
as most of the documents analysed, particularly those authored by the transfer agents, 
did not identify a villain, as can be seen in Table 7.1. Also, in all the places where the 
character of villain was depicted, it was associated with a non-human identity, and 
when humans are identified, there is no specific person, group, or organisation that is 
named, but a generalised reference to human beings is made. Examples of these 
depictions by the transfer agents include: 
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Climate change, increasing dependence on oil and other fossil fuels, growing 
imports and rising energy costs are making our societies and economies 
vulnerable (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009c, p. 11). 
The cumulated effects of the recent crises – food, energy, economic and 
financial – are even endangering the gains obtained so far (European Union 
Delegation to the African Union, 2010c, p. 4). 
The vulnerability of communities is growing due to human activities that lead to 
increased poverty, greater urban density, environmental degradation and 
climate change (Annan, 2003). 
 
The reason for the difference between the extent to which the character of villain is 
depicted in NPF studies and what can be observed from this study, may be the 
absence of “policy battles” (McBeth et al., 2014b, p. 52), whereby opponents with 
differing policy ideas spar using competitive stories. In policy transfer, especially with 
regards to the relations between the transfer agent and recipient, we can say that there 
will likely be no use of competitive stories, as the two parties are not opponents. 
Instead, the transfer agent will use stories to convince the transfer recipient to adopt 
a transfer object, while the transfer recipient will also use stories to indicate whether it 
accedes to the proposition by the transfer agent or not, based on a positive or negative 
portrayal of the transfer agent and the proposed transfer object. In line with the attempt 
to convince the transfer recipient, in these cases, the transfer agents sought not to 
ruffle feathers, and avoided pinpointing who might be causing harm or aggravating it. 
In addition to not casting a villain that can be held liable for harm, both the EU and 
UNISDR also did not cast anybody as an antagonist. They stayed true to the possible 
use of stories for wooing another party that is resident in a different jurisdiction, and 
avoided the depiction of a character with a distinctive negative connotation (Lybecker 
et al., 2016). Unlike the heroes and allies who are depicted as contributing towards 
addressing a challenge; or the victims, who are depicted as people who are being 
harmed and in need of support, the character of villain has a distinctive deleterious 
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connotation. Based on this, and as though following an approach of ‘see no evil, hear 
no evil, or speak no evil’, the transfer agents turned away their story lenses from 
capturing past or recent untoward intentions or deeds. This makes it look like there 
was a careful attempt to ensure that there was no pitting “heroes and victims against 
villains” (McBeth et al., 2012, p. 163) in the casting of characters. The observation of 
not capturing untoward deeds, and associating specific persons or groups with the 
character of villains, emphasise the role of narratives for convincing in transfer driven 
by the mechanisms of persuasion, conditionality, and obligation. Essentially, since the 
transfer agent cannot rely on ordering the prospective recipients, it uses narratives to 
engage in dialogue to ensure the participation of the recipient in the transfer process.  
An example that further demonstrates the avoidance of thorny references when aiming 
to convince can be seen in the case of transfer of language policy to Ireland (Rigg et 
al., 2013). The NGOs that facilitated the process, took careful precautions to ensure 
that they did not make reference to any controversial issue, particularly with regards 
to the dominance of the English language. They, therefore, did not take the story in 
the direction of positioning who is to blame for the situation where the use of Irish 
Gaelic language in Ireland had declined significantly from its level of use in 1600, when 
it was the dominant spoken language, and neither did they make mention of the 
continued decline from 1922, after the country gained independence from Britain (Rigg 
et al., 2013). To highlight their careful avoidance of identifying the likely cause of the 
decline in use of Irish Gaelic language in Ireland, the transfer agents noted that:  
the two issues you’d have to be careful with was ethnicity and 
nationalism … so you had to be careful with issues around … identifying 
language with a political agenda … certainly we had to be very careful 
we weren’t anti-English … it was a very targeted carefully planned 
strategy (Rigg et al., 2013, p. 155). 
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The reason transfer agents will likely shy away from casting villains may be because 
they don’t want anything to distract the prospective recipients from the issue at hand 
i.e. the transfer object, as the casting of villain seems to lean towards emphasising 
differences in opinions and winning people to one’s side of the argument. So, rather 
than go along the line of what obtains in many cases studied in the NPF literature, 
where advocacy coalitions use competitive stories, policy transfer agents will more 
likely opt to unite actors on both ends of the transfer process, regardless of differing 
opinions, in a bid to achieve a specific goal i.e. adoption of the transfer object. In 
addition, with many policy transfers by IGOs to developing countries, being facilitated 
in a project-like manner with specification of schedules and available resources (EUEI 
PDF, 2016b; UNISDR, 2017b), the transfer agents will also likely want to mind the 
tasks laid out, rather than introduce controversial topics that might derail the transfer 
process, such as causing dissent among the policy actors in the recipient jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, the transfer recipient did not employ the ‘see no evil, hear no evil 
or speak no evil’ approach like the transfer agents, as there was identification of 
specific groups in the depiction of who is causing harm and who needs to take the 
blame for an existing problem. The portrayal of villains and antagonists by the transfer 
recipient is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
7.6 Casting of Villains and Antagonist by Transfer Recipient 
Contrary to the cautious disposition of the transfer agent towards the depiction of who 
may be the cause of a problem and/or being a threat to victims, the narratives by the 
transfer recipient showed a portrayal of the character of a villain and in many 
instances, associated a specific identify with the character. In the case of renewable 
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energy policy transfer, the World Bank and ADB were cast as who to blame for the 
continued lack of energy access being experienced among poor people in ECOWAS 
countries. This can be seen in the quote below.  
World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) adopted specific 
approaches to energy in their countries of intervention … funds goes (sic) to 
electricity generation or transmission projects that are expected to translate into 
access for the poor. Such an approach that has been putting emphasis on 
access only for industry and the well off – left the poor yet again in the dark 
(N’Guessan et al., 2011, p. 3). 
 
The depiction of the World Bank and ADB was reiterated more than once in the same 
document to highlight the perception of the action of the actors as harming the poor, 
even if unintended. In the case of DRR policy transfer, an ECOWAS country depicted 
youth groups as those who put lives at risk by being involved in criminal activities that 
threaten passengers plying the inland waterways, while another country cast 
businesses that put-up buildings along the coast, as villains. These depictions are 
presented in the quotes below. 
However, … along the nation inland waterways … the youth have simply 
create(d) a world of their own. Like pirates or militants, they have constituted 
themselves into a law of which they are both enforcer and the court. To worsen 
the situation, the miscreants are now operating under the aegis of an 
unregistered body, like the one in Buruka in the north-central part of Benue 
State who call their union ‘Tombo Maritime Nigeria Workers’ Union’ (TMNWU), 
and the same tale in other parts of the country, putting all kind of river crafts not 
minding of its river worthiness, overloading passengers and goods without a 
single person using a life jacket (Abbas, 2006, p. 37). 
To the south of La Sablière zone, huge buildings have been constructed, 
including Dialogue and Dowe hotels. Over the years, the construction of these 
buildings in such a sensitive coastal area has destabilized the beaches. Chain 
reactions linked to neglect and the subsequent lack of maintenance of the said 
hotels are visible. Sea waters are accumulating near Dialogue Hotel, creating 
swampy grounds (Loubamono, 2006, p. 39).  
 
The outright naming of villains can be said to be in line with the narratives of policy 
actors on domestic issues that are pertinent to them, as against the narratives of 
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external actors on the same issue. For example, in the policy narratives presented by 
two American media outlets on the issue of snowmobiling in Yellowstone National Park 
(YNP), the media outlet which is based around the YNP, cast President Clinton, Judge 
Sullivan21 (a judge who had ruled against snowmobiling), and environmentalists, as 
the villains in their narrative (Shanahan et al., 2011b). However, the other media outlet 
which is based outside the location of YNP and operates nationally, used a 
generalised reference for the villain by casting the Bush administration22 (Shanahan et 
al., 2011b). We can see that the local media outlet did not mince words in saying who 
is responsible for causing harm. So, rather than use “vague references” such as “the 
public” (McBeth et al., 2005, p. 428), or the government, or humans; there is a direct 
pinpointing of who is to blame and/or shamed for the problem in question. The same 
is the case with the narratives of the transfer agents and recipient. Whereas the 
transfer agents portrayed non-human elements like climate change, economic and 
financial crises, and used vague references like humans and people, in identifying the 
character of villain, the transfer recipient cast the World Bank and ADB as villains with 
regards to the problem of energy poverty, and also, specific businesses and youth 
group, are identified with regards to the problem of disaster risks.  
It may be that the clear depiction of the character of villain by ECOWAS, is as a result 
of the issue upon which the policy transfer is premised, being resident within their 
jurisdiction, and as such, they have less reason to tread carefully in their utterances, 
unlike external actors, who may not want to become persona non-grata in the recipient 
jurisdiction. So, while the recipient uses the character of villain along the line of what 
is often obtained in stories of domestic policy actors, whereby actors engage in 
                                                          
21 The article specifies Judge Sullivan’s decision as the villain, but the decision on its own cannot be associated with an action, 
so since there is a human identity associated with the decision, the villain can be extrapolated to be the Judge.  
22 Similar to what is explained in the above footnote, the article specified Bush administration plan as the villain, but a plan cannot 
on its own take action, and as such, the villain can be inferred to be the Bush administration.  
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“crafting the story in order to attribute cause, blame, and responsibility” (Shanahan et 
al., 2014, p. 72), the transfer agents on the other hand, opted for a restrained and 
vague depiction of the character of villain.  
This mode of storytelling with restrained and/or vague depiction of a villain shows an 
ally-seeking strategy. An ally-seeking story portrays a relatively ‘nice’ story, where the 
heroes and allies are acknowledged and/or praised, victims are advocated for, and 
villains and antagonists are hardly mentioned or identified, because the story is 
targeted at making or winning allies, and securing support. As such, with an ally-
seeking strategy, there is not much emphasis on ascribing blame. This identification 
of an ally-seeking strategy can also help to explain the finding in the NPF case study 
of opposing groups on the policy issue of hydraulic fracturing in New York (Heikkila et 
al., 2014), which presented an unexpected finding where a group did not use a devil 
shift strategy i.e. depict a negative perception of its opponent (Shanahan et al., 2013; 
Heikkila et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2014). The researchers had expected that the pro-
group, made up of mainly of businesses in the extractive industry, would readily cast 
the anti-group as villains. They commented that “[w]hy the pro- groups are not using 
the devil shift in their documents is more puzzling” (Heikkila et al., 2014, p. 200). 
However, knowing that the businesses were looking forward to commence hydraulic 
fracturing, they were careful not to irk their opponent in the hope of nullifying the rivalry. 
In addition, even though the pro-group was engaging in a policy debate, and would 
have had the expectation of winning, the group did not mind sacrificing the policy battle 
of narratives, for the possibility of gaining support for hydraulic fracturing. The group, 
therefore resorted to the use of an ally-seeking strategy, instead of the devil-shift 
approach. 
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It can also be argued that ECOWAS used an ally-seeking strategy since it did not cast 
the transfer agents as villains and antagonists, but as allies. In particular, we may infer 
that this was ECOWAS’ suggestion of its willingness to be part of the policy transfer 
process, since it sought not to antagonise the transfer agents nor refer to any 
unwholesome past relationship that might ascribe a negative connotation to them or 
other notable actors that are crucial to the occurrence of the transfer. In a way, this 
reflects the back and forth that is entailed for effective communication between 
different parties (Park et al., 2014; Wolman and Page, 2002), since a message from 
the sender is only an initial step, and for the communication cycle to be complete, the 
receiver must also have an input in the process. Thus, ECOWAS’ use of an ally-
seeking strategy shows its contribution to the shaping of the transfer mechanisms. So, 
just like ascribing the character of victim to itself ceded ECOWAS as a jurisdiction in 
need of support, its limited depiction of villains and antagonist also portrays its 
approbation of the policy transfers. 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen from this discussion of the use of narrative characters that the actors 
sought to maintain cordiality through the depiction of heroes and allies, as well as 
through the omission of antagonists in their narratives, an approach that can be 
referred to as ally seeking. We have also observed how the emphasis of specific 
narrative characters may correspond to what a particular transfer mechanism implies. 
In the case of DRR policy transfer, the actors’ emphasis was on allies working together 
to stop harm being done by villains to victims, and we can infer that these were used 
to connote a need for collaboration and joint contributions from the transfer agent and 
prospective recipients in a bid to address a problem. The use of narrative characters 
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in the case of renewable energy policy transfer was however not so straightforward. 
While the EU portrayed itself as a hero, there was limited depiction of a victim and 
therefore limited emphasis on what problem will be addressed. Also, the use of allies 
in portraying ECOWAS does not reflect the reality of a conditionality arrangement. 
Being that the use of allies might have made ECOWAS to feel on par with the EU, this 
likely persuaded ECOWAS to engage in the transfer process, not minding that the EU 
levied a conditionality on it. As noted, this evolved in a conditional transfer tempered 
by persuasion, or what can be referred to as soft or indirect conditionality (Interview 2, 
2017).   
As argued, the characters cast in narratives highlights the roles apportioned to 
different actors and the essence of the different parts to fulfilling the occurrence of 
policy transfer. The chapter also shows that examining narrative characters can 
unmask how transfer agents and recipients perceive themselves and relate together 
with respect to the policy issue and the transfer process. In particular, we have seen 
that by using characters, actors specify who is what in the transfer process and this 
shapes the relational trait that will be observed in the mechanism driving the process. 
The next chapter presents the findings on the depiction of plot and moral in the 
narratives of the policy transfer actors and how this may have informed the policy 
transfer mechanisms that manifested in the two case studies.  
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Chapter 8 – Plot and Moral of the Story  
 
Introduction 
Scholars assert that narratives should have a beginning, middle, and end (Jones et 
al., 2014), and this characteristic of narratives can be seen in the narrative element of 
plot, which also links the characters to the setting. As such, what the storyteller 
portrays about the characters, with reference to the setting within which they are 
constrained, signifies a journey that can be envisaged by the audience (Shanahan et 
al., 2011b). The narrative plot thus represents a summary of what is being told in the 
story i.e. the long and short of the story, and stimulates inclusion of morals in stories. 
This is because the plot incorporates the experience of the characters in the story and 
it is from this that morals can be drawn and recommended. Narrative morals sum up 
stories, highlight what can be learnt from the story, and it is also referred to as the 
“takeaway of a policy narrative” (Jones and Radaelli, 2015, p. 341). 
Looking at each of the different plots that are outlined in this study and the different 
morals as well, we can say that the summary that is implied by the plots also leads on 
to the point that can be learnt from the stories. For instance, with the plot of overcoming 
the monster, the summary of the plot showcases a story of threat, and this can lead 
on to a moral of weighing options for getting rid of the threat, as can be inferred from 
the moral of managing costs and benefits. Also, with the plot of rags to riches, the 
summary of the plot presents a story of a state of want, and this leads on to a moral 
that highlights the possibility of provision by receiving an incentive, or denying the 
incentive and remaining in want (sanction) (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Stone, 2004). 
The plot of rebirth highlights a present state of obsolescence, and what can be learnt 
from the story is the need for embracing new values or upending existing ones i.e. 
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rebirth. This link between the plot and moral also helps to explain the reason behind 
the actions of the characters in the story, as these two narrative elements portray the 
journey and the summation of the story. They, therefore, underscore the answers often 
given to the question of why transfer. The plot and moral of a story (which are of 
themselves informed by the setting and characters) help to point to the causation that 
underpins the manifestation of transfer mechanisms, even if this is from the 
storyteller’s perspective. For example, if the plot of overcoming the monster and moral 
of managing costs and benefits are linked to the mechanism of obligation, the 
causation that underlines the mechanism can be explained as the need to address a 
threat by identifying an appropriate approach and working with allies within a particular 
setting. Another example is that if the plot of rags to riches and moral of incentives and 
sanctions inform the mechanism of conditionality, we will see that the causation that 
underpins the mechanism will be a perceived need to intervene in meeting the needs 
of certain victims within a particular setting. 
By considering the plot and moral from this dimension, the depiction of these narrative 
elements by the transfer agents, UNISDR and the EU, and by the transfer recipient, 
ECOWAS, can be explained with a view to show how they informed the transfer 
mechanisms manifesting in the transfer of DRR policy and renewable energy to 
ECOWAS. As shown in the table below, in the case of renewable energy policy 
transfer, the plot of rags to riches was depicted in 57% of the documents analysed, 
and even though there is a 7% depiction of overcoming the monsters and 2% depiction 
of value reorientation, these are minute. As a result, the discussion will primarily focus 
on the depiction of rags to riches for the case of renewable energy transfer. The case 
of DRR policy transfer, on the other hand, showed a significant depiction of the plot of 
overcoming the monster with 94%, while other plots are seen in very few documents. 
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The plot of rags to riches was identified in only 3% of the documents, while the plot of 
rebirth was not observed. With respect to the moral, in the case of renewable energy 
policy transfer, a moral of incentives and sanctions was the most prominent with 25% 
level of depiction, compared to the other two morals, managing costs and benefits 
(7%) and value reorientation (5%), while in the case of DRR policy transfer, the morals 
of managing cost and benefits and value reorientation were primarily depicted by the 
actors.  
 
Table 8.1: Depiction of Narrative Plot and Moral 
 
Renewable Energy 
Policy Transfer by 
the EU 
DRR Policy Transfer 
to ECOWAS by 
UNISDR 
  
  
Total No of 
Documents  56   31   
  
  
  
No of 
Documents % 
No of 
Documents % 
Test of 
Difference 
P<=0.05 
Narrative 
Element: Plot            
Overcoming the 
monster 4 7% 29 94% 
t= -15.06, 
p= 0.00 s 
Rags to Riches 32 57% 1 3% 
t= 5.80,  
p= 0.00  s 
Rebirth 1 2% 0 0% 
t= 0.74,  
p= 0.46 ns 
  X
2 (d.f=2) = 212.04, 
p<0.001 
X2 (d.f=2) = 137.03, 
p<0.001     
              
Narrative 
Element: Moral             
Incentives and 
sanctions 14 25% 2 6% 
t=2.17,  
p= 0.03 s 
Managing cost 
and benefits 4 7% 14 45% 
t= -15.06, 
p= 0.00 s 
Value 
reorientation 3 5% 15 48% 
t= -5.45, 
p= 0.00 s 
  X
2 (d.f=2) = 21.44, 
p<0.001 
X2 (d.f=2) = 24, 
p<0.001     
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In the next section, the plot and moral that are depicted in the narratives of the transfer 
agent and recipient in the instance of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS 
are discussed in more detail and after this, we will turn to the DRR policy transfer. 
  
8.1 Use of Narrative Plot and Moral in the Case of Renewable Energy Policy 
Transfer 
In this case, the emphasis on the plot of rags to riches reflects the perception of a non-
desirable condition within West Africa and which requires support to alleviate the 
suffering of persons within the region. Drawing from the words of the European 
Commission for Development, Andris Piebalgs, and the ECOWAS Executive 
Secretary, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the illustration of the ‘rags’ state within ECOWAS 
can be seen in the quotes below. 
We have just five years to achieve these essential goals before the 2015 MDG 
Review. We have to succeed. I know that this will be difficult, but they are 
serious promises, not just vague aspirations. The current picture does not 
permit any complacency; on the contrary. Some progress has been made in 
Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and in some African countries. But Sub-
Saharan Africa is lagging far behind. The cumulated effects of the recent crises 
– food, energy, economic and financial – are even endangering the gains 
obtained so far (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010c, p. 4). 
These populations jeopardize their health and that of their children by burning 
harmful domestic fuels; they spend a great part of their day trekking several 
kilometres with heavy loads; they give birth in semi-darkness; in short, they are 
deprived of economic opportunities because they do not have access to or 
cannot afford adequate energy services. In short, it is needless to say that our 
populations deserve better and we have to free them from these hardships 
(ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006, p. iii). 
 
This undesirable state within ECOWAS, therefore, prompted the transfer agent, the 
EU, to present an envisioned journey that can change the state of ECOWAS from one 
of rags to that of riches. By using the narrative element of plot, the EU does not 
romanticise the deprived state of ECOWAS countries, but foresees an improvement 
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and makes a proposition on what can be done to materialise this. Herein lies a general 
representation of the expectations of policy transfer, as it is presented as a go-between 
of what is and what can be expected. So, within a jurisdiction, policy transfer is targeted 
at making a difference in a specific policy area (Interview 2, 2017; Interview 3, 2017) 
and the narrative element of plot helps to indicate the manner of difference that is 
being pursued. The aim of making a difference also helps to explain why the plots in 
policy transfer narratives will likely not portray a static theme but imply a journey that 
will make a difference. It is also for this reason that Evans and Davies (1999, p.367) 
“argue that policy transfer is a model of policy change” and “scholars like Claudio 
Radaelli (2000) have shown how the policy transfer literature contributes to our 
understanding of policy change” (Béland, 2009, p. 710).  
With reference to the above, if we consider the type of plots presented in Stone (2002, 
2012) i.e. plots of decline, stymied progress, and helplessness and control, which are 
also often used in the NPF literature (Jones et al., 2014), we can maintain that these 
are more relevant to policy actors engaged in competitive policy battles than policy 
transfer actors, especially, transfer agents. This is because these plots do not indicate 
from where to where the story will journey to, nor does it paint a picture of the ending 
that will be arrived at, upon adoption of a transfer object. So, unlike the plots which 
focus on the present state of a policy area within a jurisdiction, the EU expresses 
where it hopes intervening in the food, energy, economic and financial crises in sub-
Sahara Africa will lead to. This can be seen in these quotes, which show its depiction 
of the plot of rags to riches in its narratives.  
The provision of infrastructure contributes to boosting economic growth and 
quality of life, reducing poverty and increasing sustainable development. In 
Africa, a lack of adequate infrastructure results in loss of potential economic 
growth, especially in low income countries (LICs) where the role of 
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infrastructure is even more critical in addressing the needs of the poorest 
(European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2012, p. 9).  
In cooperating with the EU, there is indisputable potential for the African 
renewable energy sector to develop a valuable industry, create jobs, increase 
energy access and thus contribute to socio-economic development and poverty 
eradication (AEEP, 2014, p. 9). 
It is time to consolidate EU-Africa relations, offering the prospect of a better 
more prosperous future for 1.5 billion people in 80 countries (The Africa-EU 
Partnership, 2010, p. 1). 
 
With respect to ECOWAS, it is not surprising that its narratives also portrayed a rags 
to riches plot. In casting itself as a victim, as noted in Chapter 7, it also portrayed the 
‘rags’ state within the region. Nonetheless, through the expression of a narrative plot, 
it presented its expectation of what will be achieved. ECOWAS’ story, therefore, 
doesn’t end with a portrayal of the undesirable state of its populace, but continues with 
the proposition of a change, a journey from rags to riches. It could be that ECOWAS’ 
use of rags to riches story, instead of a static plot, for expressing the situation within 
its jurisdiction, was prompted by its engagement with the EU. Specifically, the promise 
of support from the transfer agent, for the alleviation of the situation of its people, made 
ECOWAS join stories with the EU. A demonstration of this can be seen from the quote 
below, in which the ECOWAS Executive Secretary expressed that the offer for support 
from the EU prompted ECOWAS to consider addressing the challenge of energy 
infrastructure within the region. 
This … seeks to show how the region can meet the challenge of change of 
scale, at a time when our development partners, the UNDP particularly, the 
European Union and the OECD, show their increasing interest to give us their 
support and call for a new strategy in terms of energetic infrastructures in order 
to reduce poverty (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006, p. iii). 
 
ECOWAS’ non-contention of being in a ‘rags’ state and the need to move to a state of 
riches, can also be implied to be an indication of its acceptance of EU’s offer of 
 
 
276 
 
support, which was promised with a condition of adopting a renewable energy policy. 
This also shows its consent to engage in a conditional policy transfer along with the 
trappings that are associated with it, including a vulnerable positioning in relations with 
the transfer agent, allowing external influence to be centred on a bureaucratic setting, 
and being cast a victim in need of external support. However, since the EU opted to 
position ECOWAS as an ally rather than a victim, even though its narrative depicted a 
plot of rags from riches, an expected conditional policy transfer materialised otherwise, 
having been tempered with the transfer mechanism of persuasion. As such, the 
transfer agent did not exercise lofty powers over the recipient but was restrained in its 
disposition. In particular, by focusing more on the use of plot to show the undesirable 
state in sub-Sahara Africa, instead of using the narrative element of character to cast 
the countries and their citizens as victims, the EU did not personify the sufferings being 
experienced within the countries, and this may have allowed ECOWAS to view itself 
to be in a less vulnerable position than it really was, and also enabled the situation of 
a community setting in its own narratives on the policy transfer. 
A slight challenge with the depiction of the plot of rags to riches by the EU though, is 
the likely inability to decipher which mechanism is being reflected, since perceiving a 
need that is particular to another jurisdiction and developing a keen interest to 
intervene can be common to persuasion just as it is for conditionality. However, a 
plausible way to detect what voice is related to what mechanism is that with 
conditionality, there is a show of strength. Along with its depiction of heroic status and 
feats, this character is yet reemphasised in the narrative plot, as some of the quotes 
by the EU show the relevance of its role in the journey that will lead ECOWAS from 
rags to riches. With persuasion, however, a picture of what can be achieved is 
presented without referring to a dominant character that will make it happen. It is 
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possible to think that the plot of rags to riches seems to be the argument for persuading 
ECOWAS to acquiesce to the need for climate change mitigation, while conditionality 
was introduced to ensure that this conviction metamorphosed into real actions.  
As mentioned earlier, a narrative plot points to the causation for the manifestation of 
particular mechanisms and also prompts the moral that is depicted in narratives. In 
this case, the plot emphasised a move from a state of poverty to a more desirable 
state of prosperity, where infrastructure will be available, jobs will be created and there 
will be economic growth. The plot highlights the possibility of what can be achieved 
and this expectation of prosperity can be said to have led the transfer agent to develop 
an interest in engaging in policy transfer. The pursuit of this expectation was then 
expressed through the transfer mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion. 
Particularly, while persuasion was employed to make the recipients come around on 
the relevance of renewable energy and acknowledgement of climate change, that of 
conditionality was employed to give an incentive to make sure that they stay true to 
the new conviction, all to the end that climate change is being mitigated against and 
poverty in West Africa is addressed (Interview 1, 2017; Interview 4, 2017). The 
takeaway from the rags to riches story, therefore, was that: 
[g]ood governance, in its political, economic, social and environmental terms, 
is vital for inclusive and sustainable development. EU support to governance 
should feature more prominently in all partnerships, notably through incentives 
for results-oriented reform (European Commission, 2011, p. 5). 
 
This summation highlights the moral that is portrayed by the EU, which is the 
application of incentives and sanctions. Other examples of the depiction of the 
narrative element of moral in EU’s narrative are stated below. 
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Should a country loosen its commitment … the EU should strengthen its 
cooperation with non-state actors and local authorities and use forms of aid that 
provide the poor with the support they need. At the same time, the EU should 
maintain dialogue with governments and non-state actors. In some cases, 
stricter conditionality will be warranted (European Commission, 2011, p. 5).  
Reforms such as providing a predictable legal framework for investors, 
improved judiciary or banking systems, are crucial for any economic investment 
to produce the expected results, and should be therefore pre-conditions for 
physical infrastructure financing (European Union Delegation to the African 
Union, 2012, p. 9). 
 
Such moral, which shows a preference for incentivising reform in ECOWAS by offering 
support to ECOWAS MS, should they go along with the recommended policy, and 
withholding this support should they ignore the recommendation, show the build-up to 
the manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality. So, with the situation of a 
bureaucratic setting, which entails the engineering of the recipient’s institutional and 
administrative arrangement; and then a casting of the EU as both a hero and an ally 
capable of addressing challenges occurring in another jurisdiction, the policy transfer 
instance is already positioned as one that will be characterised with disparate power 
status, whereby ECOWAS holds a lower power status based on its need of significant 
support. Also, with the use of plot of rags to riches to tie the setting and cast together, 
the hero is put in a position for leading the recipient from the undesirable state of 
poverty to that of prosperity, and then by summing up the narrative with the moral of 
incentives and sanctions, the recipient jurisdiction is made to know that the possibility 
of benefitting from the capability and resources of the EU will be depended on fulfilling 
certain conditions. As for the EU’s support to facilitate private investments for 
renewable energy projects to West Africa, this became dependent on the development 
and adoption of a regional renewable energy policy, in a bid to put in place the relevant 
institutional framework that can help guarantee returns on private investments 
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(Interview 1, 2017; Interview 4, 2017). Altogether, the depiction of the moral of 
incentives and sanctions along with the use of the other narrative elements culminated 
in the manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality in achieving the policy transfer.  
With respect to the manifestation of the mechanism of persuasion, it can be argued 
that the limited depiction of a moral that likely corresponds to the mechanism of 
persuasion, despite aspects of the setting of the scene, casting of characters, and the 
plot aligning with persuasion, suggests that the transfer agent eventually relied more 
on the mechanism of conditionality than that of persuasion. Particularly, since the 
major takeaway from the EU’s narrative portrays the ability of the EU to give or 
withdraw support based on the condition specified. The suggestion that the transfer 
process was driven more by conditionality than persuasion can also be backed by the 
depiction of incentives and sanctions as the moral in ECOWAS’ narratives, as can be 
seen in the quotes below. Since ECOWAS followed suit with the EU to portray a 
narrative moral of incentives and sanctions, as well as give consent to the condition 
stipulated by the transfer agent in order to ensure access to the promised support, we 
can also base the argument for the more dominant manifestation of the mechanism of 
conditionality over that of persuasion, on the contribution of the transfer recipient to 
the transfer process. 
Governments and donors need also to use incentives and appropriate market 
development tools to leverage private sector interest where the commercial 
case is marginal (N’Guessan et al., 2011, p. 4). 
The right policies backed by incentives can foster renewable energy 
development in West Africa (Kappiah, 2011, p. 15). 
 
The use of conditionality for engaging in policy transfer is also a deliberate decision 
by the EU as its Agenda for Change policy specified a move away from giving free aid 
to engagement in government’s budget support and political involvement in the aid-
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receiving jurisdiction (European Commission, 2011). As such, with the EU seeking to 
materialise a shift from poverty to prosperity in ECOWAS, through influencing the 
institutional and administrative arrangement for the deployment of renewable energy 
in West African countries, it inclined its narrative moral in line with the view that “[t]he 
power to grant or to withhold aid money can be used, and should be used to induce 
governments” (Mosley et al., 1995, p. 29).  
 
8.2 Use of Narrative Plot and Moral in the Case of DRR Policy Transfer 
The main plot portrayed in the case of transfer DRR policy transfer is that of 
overcoming the monster, and the monster in the stories was stipulated to be disasters. 
These disasters, however, took on varying forms, which were often contested. At the 
onset of the operations of the UNISDR, the monster being tackled was in the form of 
environmental hazards such as hurricanes and earthquakes. However, upon its 
engagement with African countries, the form of disaster being contemplated extended 
from environmental hazard to conflicts. In particular, having conflict as the monster to 
be tackled under the issue of DRR was part of the debate that emerged between the 
transfer agent and the recipient, as the African RECS, including ECOWAS, expressed 
that “some space had to be provided for digressing views and interests if the synergies 
and energies of different stakeholders were to be captured” (UNISDR Africa, 2006b, 
p. 5). So, "[t]he question of whether disaster risk reduction could include conflict 
prevention was raised” in line with “the African context where it can be said that conflict 
is a disaster” (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 42). Without refuting the point raised by the 
RECS, UNISDR noted that “[c]onflict can sometimes be triggered by a disaster; 
disasters can sometimes represent a means of resolving conflicts - therefore reducing 
risk and vulnerability can also be applied to conflicts" (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 42). 
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As such, conflict was accommodated as what will be tackled under the policy issue of 
DRR and following this, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, in delivering an address 
on DRR “reiterated the determination of ECOWAS to reduce not only (natural) 
disasters but also armed conflicts”(UNISDR Africa, 2005b, p. 56). In addition, despite 
ECOWAS and other RECS being admonished to speak the international language of 
the HFA rather than that of the Africa Regional Strategy on DRR (UNISDR Africa, 
2005a), the inclusion of conflict as what will be tackled under the issue of DRR was 
upheld (Interview 5, 2017), and as such, the monster to be overcome remained natural 
hazards and conflict.  
This resolution between UNISDR and African countries that disaster will imply natural 
hazards and conflict, can also be seen from the text of the ECOWAS DRR policy, as 
it makes a case for addressing natural hazards, right from its first page (ECOWAS, 
2006). The policy also maintained that “[t]here exists a two-way relationship between 
(natural) disasters and conflicts” (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 9). To ensure the development 
and adoption of an ECOWAS DRR policy, UNISDR used the narrative element of plot 
to depict a story of overcoming the monster to portray the existence of an imminent 
threat and the need to take action against it. Examples of the expression of this plot 
are presented below. 
Climate change and climate vulnerability … have added urgency to this 
understanding. Climatic extremes and their meteorological manifestation may 
no longer be rare events. The response to this understanding was to encourage 
“mitigation” - to talk in the long term about reducing the risks from potential 
disasters, so that fewer and fewer people are exposed over time (Westgate, 
2003, p. 13).  
Recent news reports … indicate that, within months, 30 million Africans could 
be facing starvation, the immediate cause of which is drought (Hartnady, 2003, 
p. 26). 
In Africa, disasters are on the rise as is the impact of disasters on Africans. 
Each year, disasters not only deprive millions of people of food security, access 
to clean drinking water, social services, but also reverse past development 
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gains and impede further socio-economic progress. In addition, the enormous 
humanitarian relief necessitated as a result of preventable disasters diverts 
billions of US dollars, which could have been used for poverty reduction and 
socio-economic development. Disasters, therefore, prevent African countries 
from achieving sustainable development (UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004). 
Disasters in Africa are often a matter of “life and death”, so disaster reduction 
generates human and social interest and solidarity, as well as result-oriented 
action. Disaster reduction therefore makes human and social senses (Valency, 
2003b, p. 1). 
 
By using a plot of overcoming the monsters, stories of calamities that could happen 
within the African continent were told by the UNISDR to make the recipient recognise 
the danger that lurks ahead and motivate the decision makers within the recipient 
jurisdiction to take action. The portrayal of this plot, needless to say, necessitated 
presenting vivid pictures and relatable numbers such as “millions of people” (Annan, 
2004, p. 33; UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004, p. 1) and “decades” (UNISDR Africa, 2004c, 
p. 7; UNISDR, 2005a, p. 1; Valency, 2003a, p. 1) of development that will be lost, to 
depict what might befall the African continent should they not pay attention to DRR. In 
addition, future climatic events that could wreak havoc or gory stories (McBeth et al., 
2012), were also referred to, all in a bid to communicate the possible debilitating effect 
of the monster, the urgency of dealing with it, and the notion that it will be insufficient 
for individual countries to go at it alone. It is noteworthy that such dramatic descriptions 
were however, not used in the case of renewable energy policy transfer by the EU. 
The use of the plot of overcoming the monster seems to show the essence of the 
mechanism of obligation, as it indicates the transfer agent’s clarion call to the intended 
recipient to take action on an imminent danger or threat and for diverse jurisdictions 
to “come together to understand the problem, to stop the problem of disasters” 
(Interview 5, 2017). The use of the plot of rags to riches, on the other hand, aims at 
convincing the recipient that they do need the support being promised and it 
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encourages them to take the incentive and meet the conditions prescribed. What is at 
the disposal of the transfer agent, which is also implied through the expression of 
narrative plot, therefore shapes the transfer mechanism that plays out in particular 
instances of policy transfer. So, whereby the plot of overcoming the monster shows 
the transfer agent’s reliance on making a call to action to ensure the adoption of the 
transfer object23, the plot of rags to riches points to a reliance on promising support to 
the intended transfer recipient. 
Another relevant feature that is portrayed with the depiction of the plot of overcoming 
the monster is the emphasis on the inability of the transfer recipient to individually 
tackle the monster and the need for it to come on board an international movement. 
This realisation seems to have made the UNISDR go an extra length to accommodate 
the theme of conflict, even when it did not represent the original challenge identified. 
This also made it possible for ECOWAS to look past its heroic efforts in establishing 
the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, and to recognise that:   
[w]hile each State has primary responsibility for its own economic and social 
development, an enabling international environment is vital to stimulate and 
contribute to developing the knowledge, capacities and motivation needed to 
build disaster resilient nations and communities (UNISDR, 2005a, p. 13). 
 
The plot of overcoming the monster also points to the acknowledgement of the 
possibility of the recipient to make an input, rather than waiting to be helped, and this 
shapes what is manifested in the mechanism of obligation, whereby the transfer agent 
brings together and motivates willing and/or capable parties, to commit to addressing 
a challenge by signing an accord or agreement. The transfer agent then invokes the 
appending of the accord or agreement in engaging with the prospective transfer 
                                                          
23 An example of this call to action can be seen from this quote – “The vulnerability of communities is growing due to human 
activities that lead to increased poverty, greater urban density, environmental degradation and climate change. It is well within 
our power to do something about this” (Annan, 2003, p. 36). 
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recipient, so as to ensure the domestication of what was agreed. This form of 
relationship with developing countries and basis for policy transfer, seems to accord 
the recipient a decent degree of dignity and respect, such that the recipient is not 
viewed as a liability, but instead as possessing the capability to make contributions for 
solving the global challenge of DRR.  
Although ECOWAS MS stated their limited capability due to their economic status 
(Odei, 2005; Ojo, 2004), however, they demonstrated their willingness to commit to 
addressing the issue of DRR, by portraying the same plot presented by the transfer 
agent i.e. overcoming the monster. Again, this depiction of similar narrative plot points 
to the transfer recipient’s contribution to the shaping of the transfer mechanism, as it 
shows the recipient’s acquiescence to the proposition of engagement in obligated 
policy transfer. It also underlines how the eventual occurrence of the DRR policy 
transfer came about, since, should ECOWAS have rebuffed the notion of the 
mechanism of obligation, then, this would have been an instance of non-transfer. So 
with the portrayal of the plot of overcoming the monster, ECOWAS MS was giving a 
communication feedback of approval of the policy transfer proposition by the transfer 
agent. Some examples of ECOWAS’ portrayal of narrative plot of overcoming the 
monster are presented below.   
The economic and social impacts of desertification are alarming in northern 
Chad. The region, which invariably has experienced desertification, is 
ecologically vulnerable to wind erosion. In fact, ecological balance has been 
affected in the region. Reduced rainfall resulted in reduced vegetation and 
impacted on people’s livelihoods and on the relatively general stabilisation of 
well-established sand dunes (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 10). 
[E]mergencies have increased in frequency and intensity in the last decade, 
especially in recent times. Frequent oil spills within the Niger Delta (southern 
Nigeria) lead to irreparable damage to coastal biospheres. Global warming and 
phenomenon such as El Nino have been linked to the sudden rise in the number 
and severity of recent floods in … Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria have become 
increasingly at risk to a wide number of natural hazards … and [t]here is now a 
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growing recognition from the public and private sectors that the only way to 
address the escalating costs is not a reactive relief doling but a preventive, 
comprehensive and long-term approach to natural disasters (Ojo, 2005, p. 5). 
In 2003, as a result of excessive rainfall, Mali, like several countries of the 
subregion, experienced important damage as areas deprived of water for 
several years received an excessive quantity of water. In addition, crops are 
threatened every year by locust invasion and various epidemics, as was the 
case in 2004. The immediate consequence of these is poor, if not loss of crops 
(which often results in famine) and loss of livestock. These two consequences 
disrupt the national economy based mainly on rural activities carried out by 80 
per cent of the population (Traore, 2005, p. 33). 
 
By painting a picture of present dangers and likely future threats in their narratives, 
ECOWAS MS purport the devastating outcome that can happen if the concern of DRR 
is not addressed. The alignment with this plot also seem to be as a result of the West 
African states experiencing environmental hazards at a rate that is higher than the 
usual (Directorate of Civil Defence, 2006; Ojo, 2005), and also fearing that other 
environmental hazards that hitherto had not been common to the region, such as 
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, might start to occur (Hartnady, 2004). Another 
explanation for the depiction of this narrative plot might also be that, with ECOWAS 
MS already using the narrative character of victims to depict themselves, its alignment 
with the theme of overcoming the monster helps to reinforce this victim status, since 
the plot of overcoming the monster helps to situate the monster of disaster as a villain 
causing havoc and inflicting sufferings on victims.  
This reinforcement of the status of a victim without a doubt, further positions ECOWAS 
MS as a party worthy of support from the UN and other donor organisations. This 
interplay of the narrative elements of character and plot, shows how the use of one 
element can buttress what is being portrayed in the other, and also, it highlights the 
shaping power of narratives, as the interplay of narrative elements helps to reiterate 
the message being passed across by the transfer agent or recipient. For example, a 
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message highlighting a victim in need of a hero is further reinforced by the depiction 
of a rags to riches, as it further situates each of the characters in line with what the 
plot portends, so that the character of victim is seen in a place of rags, while the hero 
is seen as the character with riches and with the capacity to move the victim from the 
place of rags to a place of riches. Also, a message showcasing that allies are needed 
to tackle a villain is reinforced by emphasising the havoc being wreaked by the villain, 
through the depiction of the narrative character of victims. As such, the plot of 
overcoming the monster situates the transfer agent as a party seeking allies to help in 
defeating a monster. This reiteration of narrative characters through the narrative plot 
that is portrayed, therefore, buttresses the message being conveyed by the transfer 
agent or recipient and informs the manifestation of the mechanism that is observed.  
Returning to ECOWAS’ use of narrative plot, the depiction of the plot of overcoming 
the monster reinforces its portrayal as victims being stricken by a villain (disasters), 
thereby positioning itself to be in need of support, and we might opine that its 
expectation of the transfer process was to be incentivised to adopt the DRR policy. 
However, since UNISDR isn’t an aid awarding organisation (Interview 5, 2017), it could 
neither offer a promise of reward for adopting the policy, nor assume the character of 
a hero helping a victim. As such, ECOWAS consented to contribute to addressing the 
global challenge of DRR and fulfill its obligation to the African Strategy on DRR, by 
giving approval to the development of a regional DRR policy. In addition, since “[s]uch 
an endorsement by African leaders is the very key contribution that Africa can make” 
(Valency, 2004b, p. 1), ECOWAS was, therefore, fulfilling its ally role in overcoming 
the monster of disasters, when it gave assent to the domestication of the HFA and the 
African Strategy on DRR. Perhaps, if UNISDR possessed the wherewithal to solely 
provide the required resources for addressing DRR in West Africa, it may have 
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considered giving conditions to incentivise ECOWAS to adopt the regional policy, in 
addition to motivating ECOWAS to adopt the policy based on its commitment to the 
HFA and signing of the Africa Strategy on DRR. This would also have allowed the 
UNISDR to assume the character of a hero and present a plot of rags to riches, and 
these depictions may have resulted in a transfer instance driven by a mix of the 
mechanisms of obligation and conditionality. However, by not having the provision of 
development aid within its ambit (Interview 5, 2017), the UNISDR used relevant 
depictions in its narrative that helped to shape the manifestation of the transfer 
mechanism of obligation.  
With the possibility of incentivising ECOWAS beyond the capability of the UNISDR, it 
was not unexpected that the moral of incentives and sanction could not be depicted 
as the takeaway from UNISDR’s narrative. Instead, the transfer agent presented the 
morals of value reorientation and managing cost and benefit, as the takeaway from its 
narrative. In depicting the moral of value reorientation, the UNISDR called for a new 
approach to addressing disasters, which is focused more on disaster prevention rather 
than disaster relief, and examples of this depiction can be seen in the quotes below. 
To sustain gains in socio-economic development at country level, more and 
more governments have started to shift their emphasis from disaster response 
only, to disaster reduction, from an isolated disaster management approach to 
an integrated one, linking disaster reduction to development issues, such as 
water resource management, environmental protection, land use and planning, 
and poverty reduction (UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004, p. 1). 
While it is widely acknowledged that hydrometeorological hazards are on the 
rise due to human activities increasing vulnerabilities, there is still greater 
attention (and investment) paid to the disasters themselves and the resulting 
deaths and destruction. Rather, we should be looking at the longer-term 
investment of disaster risk reduction strategies – incorporating disaster 
preparedness, mitigation and prevention – that would in fact in the end 
significantly reduce their impacts and costs. We need to shift our focus: from 
disaster relief to disaster reduction (Briceño, 2003, p. 37). 
Africa has to shift from disaster response to disaster prevention/reduction 
(Valency, 2004b, p. 1). 
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Therefore, UNISDR’s narrative can be summed up as an affirmation that a change in 
the disaster management approach in West Africa is crucial, and that more attention 
should be devoted to disaster prevention. The moral also emphasises the need to 
move away from an approach where action is focused on post-disaster activities and 
particularly, pursuing provision for disaster relief after disaster events, to a more pro-
active approach, where disasters are prevented and vulnerability to disasters are 
reduced. In addition, by presenting the moral of value reorientation, UNISDR was not 
only asking ECOWAS to buy into changing its disaster management approach, but 
also commit to joining the international community in promoting and adopting a DRR 
approach. This is also because the policy transfer facilitated by UNISDR was not just 
about domestic affairs in West Africa, but mainly focused on the global platform 
(Interview 5, 2017).  
With respect to the depiction of managing cost and benefit as another narrative moral, 
the UNISDR tabled possibilities that could be considered in deciding whether or not to 
accept the concept of DRR. It noted the possibility of the increased cost of 
humanitarian relief if casualties are not averted in the event of environmental hazards. 
It also highlighted the development gains that can be achieved if disasters are 
prevented, especially by saving lives and property (UNISDR and NEPAD 2004; 
UNISDR Africa and UNDP 2004; Vordzorgbe 2006). By attempting to introduce 
financial undertones, such as “cost-effectiveness” (UNISDR Africa, 2004c, p. 52; 
Vordzorgbe, 2006, p. 3) and “investments” (UNISDR Africa and UNDP 2004, p.15; 
UNISDR Africa 2005, p.26), the UNISDR seemed to show awareness of its audience 
and their policymaking innings. It gave due regard to considerations that will be 
necessary for individual governments to make, particularly budgeting, and it also 
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presented content that can be useful for internal debates within the recipient 
jurisdictions. Examples of UNISDR’s portrayal of managing cost and benefit can be 
seen in the quotes below.  
In Africa, disasters are on the rise as is the impact of disasters on Africans. 
Each year, disasters not only deprive millions of people of food security, access 
to clean drinking water, social services, but also reverse past development 
gains and impede further socio-economic progress. In addition, the enormous 
humanitarian relief necessitated as a result of preventable disasters diverts 
billions of US dollars, which could have been used for poverty reduction and 
socio-economic development (UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004, p. 1).  
More effective prevention strategies would save not only tens of billions of 
dollars, but save tens of thousands of lives. Funds currently spent on 
intervention and relief could be devoted to enhancing equitable and sustainable 
development instead, which would further reduce the risk for war and disaster 
(Vordzorgbe, 2006, p. 2). 
The focus on disaster risk reduction is based on the understanding that with 
proper planning of development programmes and integrating disaster risk 
reduction in development strategies, the negative effects of development can 
be reduced, while the positive effects can be enhanced through the reduction 
of poverty, improvement of human livelihoods and coping strategies and overall 
reduction of vulnerability (UNISDR Africa and UNDP, 2004, p. 14). 
Building a culture of prevention is not easy. While the costs of prevention have 
to be paid in the present, its benefits lie in a distant future. Moreover, the 
benefits are not tangible; they are the disasters that did NOT happen 
(Vordzorgbe, 2006, p. i). 
 
We can see that the UNISDR’s narrative moral of managing cost and benefit differs 
from the EU’s moral of incentives and sanctions, in that the former identifies with the 
need for the recipient jurisdiction to consider the pros and cons of the proposition to 
adopt a DRR policy, while the latter presents a tough choice. Even though in both 
instances of policy transfer, the recipient is allowed to choose whether it will adopt the 
policy object or not, the expression of the narrative moral of managing cost and benefit, 
which is associated with the mechanism of obligation in this case, shows the transfer 
agent’s regard for the ability of the recipient jurisdiction to make that choice. Whereas 
the use of the narrative moral of incentives and sanctions, which is associated with the 
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mechanism of conditionality in the case of renewable energy transfer, restricts the 
ability of the recipient to make a choice with no strings attached. The morals portrayed 
in the different instances of policy transfer also point to the display of power by the 
transfer agent toward the transfer recipient. The portrayal of value reorientation and 
managing cost and benefit as the morals in UNISDR’s narrative, can be linked to the 
realisation that the transfer agent, in engaging in obligated policy transfers, banks on 
individual contribution of recipient jurisdictions to address a particular challenge, while 
the portrayal of incentives and sanctions by the EU can be linked to the realisation that 
the transfer agent banks on its own resources to address a particular challenge (even 
if partly). This again points to the difference in the degree of power and pressure that 
is exerted over the transfer recipient in in obligated and conditional policy transfers, 
whereby obligated transfers will likely show less display of power and application of 
pressure to ensure the adoption of the policy object than what will be obtained with 
the manifestation of the mechanism of obligation. 
The narrative of ECOWAS MS, on the other hand, with respect to the transfer of DRR 
policy, hardly depicted a narrative moral. Having observed similar depictions with that 
of UNISDR in the use of the other narrative elements by ECOWAS, it was somewhat 
expected that the moral will conform to what was depicted by the transfer agent. 
However, there was hardly a mention of what the story will culminate in with reference 
to the theme of the policy area, or what should be the takeaway from the story. Instead, 
many of the articles by ECOWAS MS were summed up by reiterating the limited 
resources at their disposal. Some of these expressions have been culled from the 
concluding sections of the articles by ECOWAS MS, and are shown below.  
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Even though desertification is a hazard with disastrous impact on ecosystems, 
the Government’s meagre resources cannot help to handle it efficiently. Hence 
the need to mobilize the population and the international community (Ibrahim, 
2004, p. 11).  
To bring about decentralization in disaster risk reduction to the lowest 
community level in Nigeria, NEMA would need the support of relevant 
stakeholders locally and internationally, including the UNISDR (Ojo, 2004, p. 
20). 
Local communities should be provided with a special fund for DRR 
management (Ndiaye, 2005, p. 8). 
The obvious challenge is to provide adequate financial and material support 
(Odei, 2005, p. 11). 
 
With reference to these expressions, we can again assume that ECOWAS followed 
suit with telling the story of DRR based on an expectation of engaging in conditional 
policy transfer, whereby its statement of commitment will be compensated through the 
receipt of support from the UN and possibly, other aid donors. The narrative moral can 
be said to portend a reflection of the policy story being told and perhaps, a depth of 
involvement with the policy area. With the issue of conflicts being more salient in 
ECOWAS than that of environmental hazards or even climate change (Schipper and 
Pelling, 2006; Souaré and Handy, 2013), the limited depiction of a narrative moral may 
be explained by a limited connectedness to the theme of DRR. This, however, did not 
deter ECOWAS’ connectedness to engagement in policy transfer. Having being 
positioned as a potential recipient of coercive policy transfer since the oil crisis of the 
1970s, which had unfortunately weakened the region’s economic independence 
despite gaining political independence from colonial powers a decade before that, 
ECOWAS countries were indeed no strangers to engaging with IGOs initiating policy 
transfers (Alter et al., 2013; UN, 1981). So, its depiction of narrative setting, character, 
and plot, in line with the language used by the UNISDR, can be said to reflect its 
expectation of “say this so that you can get that” (Interview 4, 2017), which was what 
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often occurred in its experience as a policy transfer recipient (Alou, 2009; Easterly, 
2005). As such, it could be that ECOWAS’ depiction of the other narrative elements, 
but not that of a moral, was its way of saying what needed to be said, and not 
necessarily a connectedness to the theme being purported in UNISDR’s proposition.  
Also, since the transfer agent in this case introduced a different expectation from that 
of the recipient, by requesting a commitment of responsibility rather than requiring the 
recipient to be incentivised before adopting the transfer object, ECOWAS’ 
disconnectedness is further seen in its depiction of victim to position itself as a group 
deserving of support and its direct request for funds. Despite the incongruity, we can 
surmise that the obligated policy transfer process went ahead nonetheless because 
of the mobilising efforts of the UNISDR, particularly in accommodating conflict in the 
development of ECOWAS’ DRR policy, and routing the obligation to the HFA through 
ECOWAS’ connection to the AU and the African Strategy for DRR. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that while the narrative plot links the characters to a setting, 
the narrative moral signifies what to deduce from the role of the characters within the 
stipulated setting. In the case of renewable energy transfer, both the EU and ECOWAS 
portrayed a plot of rags to riches to highlight the state of energy poverty in West Africa, 
and the need for the provision of sustainable energy solutions, which is expected to 
bring about prosperity within the region. Also, the transfer agent and recipient 
emphasised the rationale for incentives and sanctions, for actualising the provision of 
sustainable energy solutions in West Africa. With reference to the similar depictions 
by the EU and ECOWAS, it was argued that this demonstrates ECOWAS’ 
acquiescence to EU’s proposition of conditionality and it shaped the emergence of the 
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mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion. However, with the narratives of both 
actors emphasising the relevance incentives and sanctions, it was further argued that 
conditionality was likely the more dominant in the mechanism mix that facilitated the 
occurrence of transfer.  
In the case of DRR policy transfer, the narratives of UNISDR and ECOWAS MS 
portrayed the plot of overcoming the monster, but while UNISDR’s moral called for 
value reorientation and managing cost and benefits, ECOWAS’ narratives often ended 
with a call for assistance from the transfer agent and other international development 
partners. Thus, the chapter argued that ECOWAS was telling the story of overcoming 
the monster, in line with UNISDR’s plot, because it expected to be incentivised and 
‘rewarded’ for the adoption of the DRR policy. As such, it was surmised that even 
though the transfer agent, in this case, engaged with ECOWAS on an obligatory basis, 
ECOWAS still bore a perception of conditional transfer, and this was likely so, because 
conditional transfer was what it was mostly familiar with. Nonetheless, the transfer 
process went ahead because of the mobilising efforts of the UNISDR and its routing 
of obligation to the HFA through ECOWAS’ connection to the AU and the African 
Strategy for DRR. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
 
The thesis has examined policy transfer from the perspective of narratives. This has 
allowed us to highlight the underlying portrayals of identities and directions, which 
reflect the power dynamics and expectations that characterise the transfer 
mechanisms of conditionality, obligation, and persuasion. Specifically, the 
examination of actors’ narratives in the case of renewable energy policy transfer to 
ECOWAS by the EU, has shown how the depiction of narrative elements contributed 
to the manifestation of the mechanisms of persuasion and conditionality. Also, the 
examination of actors’ narratives in the case of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS by 
UNISDR, shows how the use of narrative elements informed the manifestation of 
obligation as the transfer mechanism. 
While the preceding chapters of the thesis have presented the conceptual background 
for the research, the methodology employed, the empirical case studies, and analysis 
of the findings, this final chapter answers the research questions, summarises the 
findings, and considers the contribution this study makes to the literature. With 
reference to the literature on transfer, the thesis of the interaction among policy 
transfer actors and for the least-addressed policy transfer research question i.e. why 
transfer?. With reference to the NPF literature, the thesis highlights its relevance and 
compatibility with various public policy theories, and the possibility of lending its 
methodological approach to certain aspects of policy transfer research. When thinking 
of further research, the findings point to the possibility of investigating the transfer 
object, to see how there have been changes in its configuration, nomenclature, or 
purpose, based on the perception and comprehension of actors from both the source 
and recipient side of the transfer process. Furthermore, based on the findings, the 
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chapter presents a reflection on policy transfers by IGOs to sub-Sahara African 
jurisdictions.  
 
9.1 Key Findings: Transfer Mechanisms 
To address the overarching question of the role of policy narratives in shaping transfer 
mechanisms, three sub-questions were posed. The first was on the mechanisms 
facilitating transfers; the second was on identifying the narrative elements used by the 
policy transfer actors; and the third question was on how the narrative elements are 
linked to the transfer mechanisms. This section addresses the first sub-question, while 
the remaining two questions are addressed in the next section. Considering the 
question on the transfer mechanisms, we can see that Chapter 5 illustrates how the 
case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU was driven by the 
mechanisms of persuasion and conditionality, and how the case of DRR policy transfer 
to ECOWAS by UNISDR was driven by the mechanism of obligation. Chapters 6, 7, 
and 8 corroborated this claim empirically.   
Regarding the case of renewable energy transfer, it was noted that hitherto, the 
relationship between West African countries and the European Union had been hinged 
solely on a donor-recipient affair, whereby the EU freely donated aid to African 
countries and the EU was acclaimed as the largest donor to the region. However, with 
the involvement of the EU in climate change concerns through its contributions to the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and its creation of the Africa-EU 
Energy Partnership (AEEP), the EU wanted ECOWAS to commit to addressing the 
challenge of climate change. On the other hand, ECOWAS and other African countries 
held the view that since they were not responsible for the problem, they did not have 
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to contribute to the international efforts aimed at averting climate change. However, 
by engaging with ECOWAS through the platform of the AEEP, the EU was able to 
involve ECOWAS in promoting the use of renewable energy. This was based on its 
reliance on dialogue and laying emphasis on the availability of foreign investments 
which could be accessed by African countries.  
With the EU’s strategic use of dialogue, African countries were often tenderly referred 
to as equal partners, even though the parties involved in this partnership are not at all 
on equal footing financially or otherwise. Also, unlike the major global message on the 
promotion of the use of renewable energy, which is centred on mitigating climate 
change, EU’s advocacy for use of renewable energy in ECOWAS was based on a dual 
purpose of mitigating climate change and reducing energy poverty. This warm 
approach in EU’s relations with ECOWAS and the inclusion of the primary concern 
that holds sway in sub-Sahara Africa i.e. poverty reduction, likely persuaded ECOWAS 
to warm up to EU’s proposition of developing and adopting a renewable energy policy.  
In addition to being persuaded to accept the issue of climate change and use of 
renewable energy on its policy agenda, ECOWAS was also assured of the EU’s 
assistance in facilitating foreign investments for the deployment of renewable energy 
solutions, but, on the condition of setting up necessary institutional and regulatory 
frameworks that are required by private investors. This conditionality and the reward 
it is expected to bring ensured that ECOWAS did not just buy into the idea of promoting 
renewable energy, but followed through with the EU’s proposition, by adopting a 
renewable energy policy. As a result, the EU sponsored the development of an 
ECOWAS renewable energy policy document in 2011, and the heads of states of 
ECOWAS MS eventually signed the policy in July 2013. Based on the above, we can 
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surmise that the mechanisms that led to the occurrence of renewable energy policy 
transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, are persuasion and conditionality. 
Regarding the case of DRR policy transfer, UNISDR leveraged on ECOWAS’ 
relationship with the AU and NEPAD to facilitate the adoption of a DRR policy for West 
Africa. The initiation of the transfer process can also be linked to the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development. At the summit, “concrete set of objectives” were 
agreed which tasked the UNISDR with turning its “attention and capacities to 
integrating and mainstreaming risk reduction into development policies and 
processes” (UNISDR, 2012b, p. 5). Following this, the UNISDR established the 
UNISDR African regional office in 2002 and set about engaging with all African 
regional bodies. It first engaged with NEPAD and the AU, which usually serve the role 
of an umbrella body for regional economic communities across the African continent, 
including ECOWAS. In 2003, UNISDR facilitated the development and signing of the 
African Regional Strategy for DRR by the different regional bodies, and ECOWAS’ 
engagement in this process, along with the ensuing responsibilities for implementing 
and monitoring the strategy in West Africa, led to its interest and commitment to 
address the issue of DRR. Notably, as part of the activities under the African DRR 
strategy, ECOWAS participated in a consultation meeting sponsored by UNISDR, to 
deliberate on the 2005 World Conference on DRR to be held in Hyogo, Japan. Its 
obligation to the African Strategy on DRR, therefore, necessitated the domestication 
of the Hyogo Framework of Action, which was agreed at the World Conference on 
DRR. As a result, ECOWAS developed a DRR policy, in line with the Hyogo 
Framework of Action and based on its commitment to the African DRR strategy, and 
the policy was adopted by the heads of states of ECOWAS MS, in 2007. Thus, the 
transfer mechanism operating in this case can be seen to be obligation. 
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9.2 Key Findings: Narrative Elements 
The findings show how the narrative elements used by the actors underscore the 
mechanisms that materialized in the transfer cases. Drawing from the narrative 
analysis in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, we also see that there are some significant 
differences and few similarities in how the narrative elements were used by the actors 
across the two cases. By setting the stage for introducing institutional frameworks and 
administrative arrangements in the recipient jurisdiction, the actors in both cases 
depicted a bureaucratic setting. However, in the case of renewable energy transfer, 
there was also an emphasis on targeting rural communities and addressing energy 
poverty in these areas. As such, while the narrative setting depicted in the case of 
transfer of renewable energy policy was partly a bureaucratic setting and partly a 
community setting, the narrative setting depicted in the case of DRR policy transfer 
was primarily a bureaucratic setting.  
With respect to the use of narrative characters, both cases stressed an ally 
relationship, but there was a self-portrayal of the transfer agent as a hero, in the case 
of renewable energy policy transfer, but this was not so in the other case. The 
difference in the depiction of narrative character can also be seen in the portrayal of 
villain and victim, as the policy narratives of the actors in the case of renewable energy 
policy hardly included these narrative characters, but were mostly featured in the case 
of DRR policy transfer. The portrayal of the plot and moral also showed a significant 
difference. The policy narratives relating to the renewable energy policy transfer 
featured a plot of rags to riches and moral of incentives and sanctions, while the policy 
narratives relating to DRR policy transfer featured a plot of overcoming the monster 
and moral of value reorientation and managing cost and benefits. 
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9.3 Key Findings: Narrative Elements and Transfer Mechanisms 
To address how the use of the different narrative elements by the transfer agents and 
recipient may have informed the transfer mechanisms, we can start with the narrative 
element that showed the most similarity between the two cases i.e. narrative 
character. With the identified emphasis on allies working together to end a menace in 
case of DRR policy transfer, and that of a hero helping an ally in the case of renewable 
energy policy transfer, the narratives highlight an underlying ally-seeking message. 
One can say that the ally-seeking narrative underscores the coercion and/or 
persuasion that often characterises externally-initiated policy transfers. In particular, 
the observation of similarities in the use of the narrative characters of hero and ally, 
across the two cases, point to an intent to befriend rather than an intent to battle. This 
ally-seeking strategy is perhaps, the first layer of shaping that policy narratives 
contribute to the transfer mechanisms preferred by IGOs. As seen from the analysis 
of the findings, the ally-seeking narrative can mask reality by painting a picture of 
cordial bond and equal standing. It can also downplay problematic conditions, if need 
be, by avoiding the casting of the transfer recipient as a victim. It suffices to say that 
the ally-seeking narrative helps to ensure affinity between the transfer agent and 
recipient, for without this, the eventual adoption of the transfer object may not occur. 
Building on the depiction of characters that engender an ally-seeking narrative, the 
transfer mechanism of obligation can be seen to embody a narrative that directs 
attention to a call for collective action to solve a common problem; the transfer 
mechanism of conditionality can be linked to a narrative that emphasises reward; while 
the transfer mechanism of persuasion prompts a narrative focused on ties and 
connections and appeal of the transfer object. Mainly, to address how policy narratives 
contribute to shaping of transfer mechanisms, the thesis has shown that the analysis 
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of all the narrative elements, namely setting, character, plot, and moral, can give an 
insight into how policy narratives can shape the mechanisms observed in policy 
transfers. We have seen that the use of narrative setting helps to situate where the 
action will take place, the narrative characters indicate what the action will be by 
defining who is what, while the plot and moral specifies the course of action. Based on 
the summary of the investigation of the two cases, these outlined roles of the narrative 
elements depicted in the policy narratives are further highlighted below.  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, by portraying a bureaucratic setting in the narratives, the 
stage was already set for wielding remarkable level of influence through intervening in 
governmental processes. In the two cases, this laid the foundation for the positioning 
of the transfer agent vis-a-vis the recipient i.e. it was premised on the superior political 
or economic prowess of the transfer agent, even if this was not always directly stated 
in the narratives. In the case of renewable energy policy transfer, where a community 
setting was also portrayed, this setting helped to soften the expected disposition of the 
transfer agent. As such, instead of assuming only the position of a superior party with 
economic and political prowess, there was a communal approach in the relationship 
between the EU and ECOWAS. 
With the narrative setting laying the foundation for the materialisation of the transfer 
mechanisms, the narrative characters also contributed to the build-up of the 
mechanism. The casting of the transfer agent and recipient as allies across the two 
cases suggests that there will be an alignment of their actions. Also, the casting of 
victim and villain in the case of DRR ECOWAS helped to strengthen the argument for 
aligned actions, as the UNISDR used these narrative characters to stress why 
ECOWAS needed to include DRR in its policy agenda and align with global efforts to 
address the challenge. On the other hand, the casting of the EU as a hero, while there 
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is also a limited identification of a victim and villain, blurs the realisation of which villain 
and victim is being tackled by the hero and the manner of alliance between the transfer 
agent and recipient. However, by considering the EU’s reference to ECOWAS as an 
ally instead of a victim, one could deduce that another transfer mechanism, the 
mechanism of persuasion, was taking form and co-driving the transfer process along 
with the mechanism of conditionality. So, rather than tell a story of a hero helping a 
victim, what was portrayed was a story of a hero helping an ally.  
We can therefore see that whereas the narrative setting lays the foundation of what to 
expect, narrative characters build on this foundation to define the roles of those 
involved in the transfer process. Turning to the narrative plot and moral, these specify 
the course of the action by highlighting the expected journey that the policy transfer 
will instigate and summing up what the policy narrative implies. With reference to the 
two cases, the use of narrative plot of rags to riches in the case of renewable energy 
policy transfer and the use of narrative plot of overcoming the monster in the case of 
DRR policy transfer, show the journey that the recipient jurisdiction will experience. In 
particular, the plot also illustrates a picture of the present, which further corroborates 
what is portrayed in the element of narrative characters. Whereas the plot of rags to 
riches points to an economically-challenged jurisdiction in need of a hero, the plot of 
overcoming the monster stresses an overwhelming situation in need of an ally. These 
illustrations therefore led on to painting a picture of an expected future of riches in the 
former and that of overcoming in the latter. The differences in the narrative plot used 
in the two cases shows the different directions taken by the actors in engaging in the 
policy transfers, and underlines the definitive action signified in the narrative moral.  
For the case of renewable energy policy transfer, the narrative moral of incentives and 
sanctions further indicated the economic dimension to the policy transfer and the 
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introduction of a proviso as a determinant of granting support to the recipient 
jurisdiction. Also, in the case of DRR policy transfer, the narrative morals of value 
reorientation and managing cost and benefit guided the policy transfer in the direction 
of changing the dominant perception of disaster management from disaster relief to 
disaster risk reduction, and vying for the cost-saving benefit of disaster risk reduction, 
in a bid to challenge a common problem.  
Thus, the narrative setting, character, plot, and moral, denote the level of influence by 
the transfer agent on the recipient jurisdiction; the relational dynamic between the 
transfer agent and recipient; the expected experience of the transfer process; and the 
way forward advanced by the actors. As such, the examination of the narrative 
elements brings to light the features that configure specific transfer mechanisms, as 
they mirror the intent and expectations of the transfer actors. Chiefly, we have 
observed how the use of narrative elements by the EU and ECOWAS informed the 
involvement of the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion in the case of 
renewable energy policy transfer, and how the use of narrative elements by UNISDR 
and ECOWAS in the case of DRR policy transfer, informed the manifestation of the 
mechanism of obligation. 
The next section discusses the conceptual contributions of this research to policy 
transfer and the Narrative Policy Framework. 
 
9.4 Conceptual Contribution 
As noted in Chapter 1, one of the gaps in the policy transfer literature that this research 
sought to address is expounding on transfer mechanisms in a bid to shed more light 
on one of the pertinent policy transfer research questions – why transfer? The 
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research has helped to demonstrate what likely underlies the differences in transfer 
mechanisms. Beyond the demarcation of mechanisms into voluntary and coercive, the 
research has shown that the narratives of actors can highlight the mechanisms that 
will drive instances of policy transfer, and that the difference in the narratives can 
signal the manifestation of different mechanisms. As a result, by knowing the stories 
presented by transfer actors, one can succinctly argue for the transfer mechanism at 
play. Also, by attempting to unfold transfer mechanisms through the examination of 
policy narratives and identifying the kind of stories that will likely characterise a specific 
transfer mechanism, the research also points to the possibility of packaging transfer 
mechanisms through conscious use of relevant policy narratives. This, for example, 
can be seen in the EU’s deliberate choice of words to its African counterpart and the 
portrayal of policy narratives that clearly aim to persuade and not impose.  
As often noted in the policy transfer literature, the answer to question of why transfer 
may not always be the importance of, or demand for, or likely superior performance of 
the transfer object, but it may be because of the association between the parties 
involved in the policy transfer. Regardless of this assertion, there has not been an 
explanation, which can be widely applied across policy transfer case studies, to 
demonstrate how the relations among actors contribute to the occurrence of policy 
transfer. This research has shown the relevance of the relations between the transfer 
recipient and agent or source, not by describing what transpired among the actors, but 
by analytically examining what constitute their policy narratives and the ability thereof 
to inform the transfer mechanisms that facilitate eventual occurrence of policy transfer. 
Considering the reverse of this contribution, the examination of policy narratives can 
also help to explain instances of non-transfer. Since the two case studies point to the 
use of similar policy narratives by the transfer agent and recipient in each specific 
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instance of policy transfer, so also, the identification of unaligned or dissimilar policy 
narratives by the transfer recipient and agent can imply friction in their relations and 
can explain non-transfer. The examination of policy narratives in policy transfer 
research can as such be used to partly address the research question of the 
constraints to policy transfer.  
Importantly, in line with the introduction of the multi-level perspective by Evans and 
Davies (1999) and that of the Information-theory approach by Wolman and Page 
(2002), this study has been able to capture the voice of not only the transfer agent or 
recipient, but both of these parties. By considering the policy narratives used by these 
actors in relations to the respective policy transfers, there has been a conscious 
incorporation of their contributions. This approach has particularly helped to give 
cognisance to a transfer recipient that may have likely been overlooked. For example, 
in an earlier study on how an instance of policy transfer to ECOWAS led to the creation 
of ECREEE, the primary “focus (was) on the actors who created the organization … 
three extra-regional states – Austria, Brazil, and Spain – are the key players behind 
the creation and support of ECREEE” (Hancock, 2015a, p. 105). Albeit, this study has 
helped to lend a voice to the recipient end of the transfer process, and to show how 
their input can inform the transfer mechanism that is operational in a policy transfer.  
With respect to the NPF, this research reiterate the significance of the framework and 
the potential of its utility for investigating the role of narratives in the policy process. 
By using the NPF’s explanation of the depictions of narrative elements to illustrate how 
the actors’ policy narratives shaped the transfer mechanisms, the research showcases 
the applicability of the framework for investigating circumstances that are not focused 
on ‘policy battles’. In the words of Weible and Schlager (2014, p. 239), this study has 
highlighted that policy transfer research “can both enrich and be enriched by the NPF, 
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and it points to new policy (process) areas to explore, moving the NPF away from its 
focus on highly conflictual … problems and policies”. Also, following suit in the 
application of NPF to public policy theories like ACF and MSF, the research highlights 
an opening for incorporation of the NPF to policy transfer research, by serving as a 
means for examining the communication content of transfer actors.  
In addition, based on the findings from the research, the identification of the ally-
seeking narrative adds to the explanation of how narrative elements can be 
strategically employed by policy actors. It shows that the identification of unexpected 
endearments among policy actors that otherwise will be pitted against one another is 
likely aimed at an attempt to draw in an erstwhile opponent, competitor or antagonist. 
This ensures that avenues for engaging are not jeopardised and there is still a 
possibility of wining over the opposing individual, group or organisation. Furthermore, 
by applying the NPF to policy transfer research, this study has enabled the contribution 
of the examination of international communication among policy actors, as against the 
communication on domestic issues within a specific jurisdiction. By investigating policy 
narratives of different jurisdictions, there is a broadened overview of how policy 
problems are perceived in different jurisdictions. For example, in the case of DRR 
policy transfer, whereas the international community defined the problem of disasters 
to be one of environmental concern, the West African community held a perception of 
disasters that pertained to conflicts. However, ECOWAS was able to come around to 
the internationally-held view of disasters through its relations with the UNISDR and the 
drive for the domestication of Hyogo Framework of Action. Again, with reference to 
Weible and Schlager (2014), one can say that this research has enriched the NPF by 
highlighting the difference in views held on policy issues by different jurisdictions and 
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also showing how this might be altered through the intervention of transfer 
mechanisms powered by ally-seeking policy narratives. 
 
9.5 Avenues for Future Research 
A direction for possible further research will be focusing on the transfer object. In the 
two cases of policy transfer to ECOWAS, this study primarily gave attention to the 
relations between the transfer agent and recipient, and this leaves room for the 
opportunity to focus on the specific policies that were transferred and how they have 
fared after their adoption. Since, “[a]t some point, the policy transfer process ends and 
endogenous forces of mutation take over” (Stone, 2012, p. 489), the two adopted 
policies i.e. ECOWAS renewable energy policy and ECOWAS DRR policy, can be 
investigated based on how they are understood and/or utilised by domestic policy 
actors. This focus on the transfer object can also lend itself to analysis under the 
concept of policy transfer and translation, so that the internal interaction with the 
adopted policies and perhaps, the performance or outcomes of the policies, and how 
this differs from what obtains in the transfer source jurisdiction, are analysed. 
Also, the NPF can play a part in a further research that is hinged on the examination 
of the transfer object. The use of narrative elements by domestic policy actors within 
West Africa can be examined for observation of internal conflicts on the policy issue 
or the policy transfer process, to identify if there is any difference in the outlook towards 
the transfer agent, or if transfer agent still plays any influential role in the recipient 
jurisdiction. Further research that is based on the input of the domestic policy actors 
to how the transfer object is perceived, and how it morphs and stabilises in the 
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recipient jurisdiction, can again help to provide an avenue for presenting the views of 
policy actors from sub-Sahara Africa. 
In addition to conducting research on the transfer object, another possibility for further 
research will be focusing on different transfer agents apart from IGOs, and this can be 
international businesses, INGOs, think thanks, or national governments. Particular 
cases of policy transfer facilitated by the actors can be investigated, specifically in 
relations to the type of policy narratives used, and how these may have informed the 
transfer mechanism observed. It is likely that the research may lead to the 
identification of other transfer mechanisms that are yet to be introduced or studied in 
the policy transfer literature, and also additional narrative elements that are yet to be 
introduced or studied in the NPF literature.  
Beyond possible further research in relations to the transfer object, there are other 
three distinct areas that can further this investigation. Firstly, is the possibility of 
applying multiple relational approaches to transfer studies, as well as comparing and 
contrasting these methods in a bid to get insight from varying dimensions. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the peculiarity of involvement of multiple actors, multiple 
political jurisdictions, and/or multiple geographical regions in policy transfer studies, 
enables the opportunity for exploring multiple methods, in understanding what goes in 
a transfer process and answering the research questions. This peculiarity can also 
enable comparing and contrasting the varying policy research methods that can be 
applied to policy transfer research. With regards to avenues for future research of this 
particular study, discursive institutionalism can be applied alongside the NPF in 
investigating the role of policy narratives in shaping transfer mechanisms. Particularly, 
this will enable the consideration of institutional factors in what narratives are told by 
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the actors and can further explain the rationale for the depictions used by the individual 
actors. 
Secondly, with reference to the multilevel perspective introduced by Evans and Davies 
(1999), this study represents a transfer pathway (i.e. IGO [regional authority] – IGO 
[regional authority]) and this pathway stems from the coordinated governance of 
specific activities of multiple sates by a supranational regional authority. The relevance 
of the aggregation of national political jurisdictions at a regional level can therefore link 
this study with the field of regionalisation. The experience of ECOWAS as a regional 
organisation and particularly, its transformation from an intergovernmental 
arrangement to a supranational authority, is crucial to policy transfers to the West 
African region. This is because, its new position allows it to perform oversight functions 
in different policy areas, and this gives credence to policies transferred to ECOWAS. 
Further research in the direction of regionalisation can investigate how the member 
states are responding to this authority, for example in terms of meeting up their 
obligations stated in the renewable energy and DRR policies. The research can also 
examine ECOWAS’ oversight role in and question if this has led to further integration 
or prompted disintegration in the region. 
The third area for further research are the other possible cases that were exempted 
from this study. This includes extending the investigation of the role of policy narratives 
to other types of cases apart from typical cases. This includes crucial cases, such as 
where policy transfer unexpectedly happens, or deviant cases, such as when policy 
transfer does not occur. 
In the next section, the thesis concludes with a reflection on policy transfers to sub-
Sahara Africa by IGOs. 
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9.6 Reflection on Policy Transfer by IGOs to Sub-Sahara Africa 
“We can no longer continue to make policy for ourselves, in our country, in our 
region, in our continent on the basis of whatever support that the western 
world … or the European Union can give us. It will not work. It has not worked 
and it will not work” (Nana Akufo Addo, 2017) 
 
The introduction of the concept of policy transfer in public policy research, especially 
the identification of coercive transfer mechanisms, has provided a conceptual lens to 
study many of the policy interventions by development partners in sub-Sahara Africa. 
From a policy transfer perspective and drawing from the findings of this study, many 
cases of policy transfer by IGOs to sub-Sahara African countries often feature a 
narrative whereby the transfer agent plays the part of a hero, while the recipient 
jurisdiction takes the role of a victim. By consciously playing the victim, African 
countries have often shelved making ample contributions to solve international 
concerns and are instead, positioned as deserving of special concessions. This can 
be seen in the climate change policy debate. As noted in Chapter 6, the position held 
by African countries has been a call for climate justice and this has ensured that the 
countries were viewed as deserving of support. As a result, the first international 
agreement on climate change, the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, was seen as "an 
opportunity for African countries to attract new financing for their own sustainable 
development" (Sebitosi and Pillay, 2005, p. 273). In the interim, this disposition may 
be beneficial and governments may enjoy the attention and financial support from the 
international community. However, as shown from the experience of policy-based 
intervention by the World Bank, engaging in policy transfer on the basis of receiving 
financial support does not often end well for the recipient. With the transfer agent 
playing the hero and heading the transfer process, the transfer object is mostly 
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designed and decided outside of the recipient jurisdiction, and represents the 
preference of the transfer agent. This reduces the possibility for involving local 
knowledge and experience, and oftentimes makes the transfer object seem foreign in 
its expected abode.  
Even though coercive policy transfers driven by the transfer mechanism of 
conditionality can be interesting to research and read about, they “have been 
substantially criticised for being ineffective and/or having perverse outcomes” (Stone, 
2004, p. 554). As the two case studies for this research indicate, IGOs are beginning 
to adopt alternative transfer mechanisms in engaging with sub-Sahara African 
countries and this is commendable. Nonetheless, the emphasis on enacting new 
policies and orchestrating new administrative arrangements can distract governments 
in the recipient jurisdiction from concentrating on the concerns of and suggestions by 
domestic policy actors. To limit the interference by external actors, sub-Sahara African 
leaders will need to adopt an alternative disposition from that of playing the victim 
when engaging in policy transfer. By assuming the role of an ally or hero, and truly 
playing the part, the recipient countries will be able to have substantial input in the 
transfer process, and in deciding what the transfer object will be. This can ensure that 
the adoption of the transfer object will not only be the fulfilment of the transfer agent’s 
proposition, but it will purposefully benefit the citizens of the recipient jurisdiction.  
Also, while adhering to the plot of rags to riches and playing the hero of the story may 
be suitable for IGOs facilitating policy transfer to sub-Sahara Africa, the use of these 
narrative elements emphasises the story of a victim in need of a hero and places the 
responsibility for developing solutions on the IGO. The onus for addressing a policy 
challenge involving a jurisdiction should reside with the domestic actors, but the 
depictions of the characters and plot connotes the lack of adequate capacity by the 
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recipient to present a policy solution. This approach can make governments assume 
they are relieved of their responsibility to their jurisdiction and have expectations of 
development partners to solve the problems that ensue domestically. In a way, the 
policy narrative of heroic rescuing of a victim plays out with the branding of some policy 
documents within sub-Sahara Africa with the logos of IGOs (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; 
ECREEE, 2013a). In a comment about policy transfer to developing countries, Porto 
de Oliveira (2017, p. 2) notes that “(international) organisations intervene in areas 
where competences should be of national states … for example … education, 
infrastructure and administrative modernisation”. One of the concerns about this 
approach to policy transfer is whether it can indeed deliver policy change that will be 
sustained. The experience of some Central and Eastern European countries in public 
administration reformation supported by the World Bank and EU, shows that although 
immediate gains can be achieved, such as ascension to membership of the EU, but 
the countries later get “accused of backsliding or failing to sustain reforms” (Common 
and Gheorghe, 2017, p. 18). Should this be the experience of African countries, then 
the time, funds, and efforts committed to the policy transfers by the IGOs, may have 
been in futility. 
Ultimately, what will be desirable for sub-Sahara African countries is to engage in 
policy transfer on a voluntary basis, whereby they make the choice of the transfer 
source, transfer object, and transfer mechanism. However, instances of externally 
driven policy transfer cannot be completely avoided, as there will be issues of 
international concerns that will necessitate the intervention of IGOs, and in such 
instances, it will be beneficial for sub-Sahara African countries to be involved on a 
contributory basis. This will ensure that the region is not viewed as a burden but as a 
viable and respectable ally. This will also likely ensure domestic ownership of the 
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transfer object that will be adopted in the recipient jurisdiction and could guarantee its 
longevity.  
In conclusion, changing policy narratives may prompt governments in sub-Sahara 
Africa to not only engage in voluntary policy transfers that will benefit the jurisdiction, 
but also assure their participation in international policy debates as a reputable 
member of the international community. By ceasing to play the victim and aiming to 
truly be the hero of their policy narratives, governments in sub-Sahara Africa may be 
inspired to transform the region and empowered to give back to the rest of the world. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Description of Parameters Used in the Review 
of the Policy Transfer Literature 
 
S/N Item Description 
1 Author Name(s) of the people who authored the article  
2 Year Year of publication of the article 
3 Title Title of article 
4 Conceptualisation / Case 
Study 
Does the article present further conceptualisation of policy 
transfer, building on Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000)? Or 
does it apply the policy transfer framework as it is presented 
by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000)  
5 Other theories, concepts, 
or frameworks drawn 
from 
Does the article draw from other theories, concepts, or 
frameworks in addition to the policy transfer framework? 
6 Research Methods Which research method(s) is/are used? 
7 Data collection method / 
analysis 
Which data collection method is used and how was the data 
analysed? 
8 Case(s) How many cases of policy transfer are featured in the article? 
What is/are the case(s)? 
9 Period of time covered Specifying the year or period of time when the case occurred 
10 Research questions What are the research questions stated in the article? 
11 Conscious/unconscious 
Transfer 
Do(es) the case(s) represent conscious or unconscious policy 
transfer? 
12 New Does the article introduce any new concept or approach for 
studying policy transfer? What is introduced? 
13 Actors Which group of actors are featured in the article? 
14 Mechanisms Which transfer mechanism(s) is(are) identified as facilitating 
the instance of policy transfer in the case(s)? 
15 Multiple/Single 
mechanism 
How many mechanisms are identified? 
16 Non-transfer? Does the article highlight any instance of initiation, but non-
realization of policy transfer? 
17 Hypotheses Does the article present any hypothesis? What is(are) the 
hypothesis(es) 
18 Findings What is(are) the finding(s) of the research? 
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Appendix 2: Documents used in Narrative Analysis 
 
Case 1: Renewable Energy Policy Transfer 
 
S/N
o 
Documents Document Type Author Year 
1 Scoping Report: ECOWAS - Study 
for a Regional Energy Access 
Agency 
Research report EU 2006 
2 ECOWAS RE Policy Policy document EU/ECOWAS 2013 
3 2014 Factfile on ECOWAS RE 
Policy Development 
Information flyer EU 2014 
4 EUEI-PDF Annual Report April 
2013 – March 2014 
Organisation 
Report 
EU 2014 
5 EUEI PDF Phase IIbis Report April 
2012 – March 2015 
Organisation 
Report 
EU 2015 
6 EUEI PDF Fact Sheet May 2012 Information Flyer EU 2012 
7 THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC 
PARTNERSHIP: A Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy 
Strategy Paper EU 2007 
8 Success stories: Developing 
renewable energy markets in 
Africa. 
Success story EU 2014 
9 LINK! 1 - July 2009 Newsletter EU 2009 
10 LINK! 2 - September 2009 Newsletter EU 2009 
11 LINK! 3 - October 2009 Newsletter EU 2009 
12 LINK! 4 - November 2009 Newsletter EU 2009 
13 LINK! 6 - February 2010 Newsletter EU 2010 
14 LINK! 7 - March 2010 Newsletter EU 2010 
15 LINK! 8 - April 2010 Newsletter EU 2010 
16 LINK! 9 - June 2010 Newsletter EU 2010 
17 LINK! 10 Newsletter EU 2010 
18 LINK! 11 - September 2010 Newsletter EU 2010 
19 LINK! 12 - October 2010 Newsletter EU 2010 
20 LINK! 14 - June 2011 Newsletter EU 2011 
21 LINK! 15 - August 2011 Newsletter EU 2011 
22 LINK! 16 – December 2011 Newsletter EU 2011 
23 LINK! 17 – March 2012 Newsletter EU 2012 
24 LINK! 18 – September 2012 Newsletter EU 2012 
25 LINK 19! - February 2013 Newsletter EU 2013 
26 3rd Africa - EU Summit, Newsletter 
nr. 1 
Newsletter EU 2010 
27 3rd Africa - EU Summit, Newsletter 
nr. 2 
Newsletter EU 2010 
28 3rd Africa - EU Summit, Newsletter 
nr. 3 
Newsletter EU 2010 
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29 3rd Africa - EU Summit, Newsletter 
nr. 4 
Newsletter EU 2010 
30 JAES Newsletter July 2013 Newsletter EU 2013 
31 JAES Newsletter Nov 2013 Newsletter EU 2013 
32 JAES Newsletter March 2014 Newsletter EU 2014 
33 EU-ECOWAS Regional Strategy 
Paper and Regional Indicative 
Paper 2008-2013 
Strategy Paper ECOWAS, 
UEMOA, EU 
2013 
34 16th EU-ECOWAS Ministerial 
Troika Meeting 2009 
Meeting report EU/ECOWAS 2009 
35 Draft Technical Discussion Paper 
On General Energy Access in 
ECOWAS for ECREE Regional 
Workshop 2011  
Conference 
Discussion Paper 
UNDP/ECREE
E 
2011 
36 Consolidated Paper on General 
Energy Access in ECOWAS 
Region 2011 
Research report UNDP/ECREE
E 
2011 
37 CEDEAO_Briefing_paper_for_Glo
bal Forum for Sustainable 
Energy_final 
Conference 
Briefing paper 
ECOWAS 2006 
38 ECREEE at a glance Information flyer ECREEE Not 
Date
d 
39 2012 Draft Concept Note on High 
Level Energy Forum 
Conference 
Concept Note 
ECOWAS-
GFSE-GEF-
UNIDO 
2012 
40 2012 Presentation by ECREEE 
(Hyacinth Elayo) Renewable 
Energy Trends in West Africa 
Conference paper ECREEE 2012 
41 2011 Increasing the impact of EU 
Development Policy: an Agenda 
for Change 
Internal memo EU 2011 
42 Factsheet on Energy Sector in 
West Africa 
Information Flyer EU Not 
Date
d 
43 ECREEE Newsletter Volume 1 Newsletter ECREEE 2010 
44 ECREEE Newsletter Volume 2 Newsletter ECREEE 2011 
45 ECREEE Newsletter Volume 3 Newsletter ECREEE 2011 
46 ECREEE Newsletter Volume 4 Newsletter ECREEE 2012 
47 ECREEE Newsletter Volume 5 Newsletter ECREEE 2012 
48 ECREEE Newsletter Volume 6 Newsletter ECREEE 2013 
49 ECREEE Newsletter Volume 7 Newsletter ECREEE 2013 
50 2010 Press release Africa-Europe 
in partnership for a better future 
Press release EU 2010 
51 COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
Internal memo EU 2010 
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THE COUNCIL on the 
consolidation of EU Africa relations 
52 2012 Press release  Increasing the 
Impact of EU Development Policy -  
an Agenda for change 
Press release EU 2012 
53 2006 White Paper on Energy 
Access 
Policy document ECREEE 2006 
54 2011 Presentation by Kappiah 
Mahama ED ECREEE 
Presentation ECREEE 2011 
55 2011 Presentation by ECREEE in 
Austria stating EU as new partner 
Presentation ECREEE 2011 
56 2 Continents 2 Unions 1 Vision 
Europe-Africa  
Brochure EU/AU Not 
Date
d 
  
Case 2: Disaster Risk Reduction Policy Transfer 
  
S/N
o 
Documents Document Type Author Year 
1  Africa regional strategy for 
disaster risk reduction  
Policy NEPAD, AU, 
AfDB, UNISDR 
2004 
2  Building disaster resilient 
communities: good practices and 
lessons learned 
Good practices UNISDR 2007 
3  Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR 
informs, issue 1, 2003 
Newsletter UNISDR 2003 
4  Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR 
informs, issue 2, 2003  
Newsletter UNISDR 2003 
5  Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR 
informs, issue 3, 2004  
Newsletter UNISDR 2004 
6  Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR 
informs, issue 4, 2004  
Newsletter UNISDR 2004 
7  Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR 
informs, issue 5, 2005  
Newsletter UNISDR 2005 
8  Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR 
informs, issue 6, 2006  
Newsletter UNISDR 2006 
9  Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR 
informs, issue 7, 2006  
Newsletter UNISDR 2006 
10  Guidelines for mainstreaming 
disaster risk assessment in 
development  
Policy NEPAD, AU, 
AfDB, UNISDR 
2004 
11  Lessons learned from the 1997-98 
El Niño: once burned twice shy? 
Reports UNISDR 2001 
12  Making the case for disaster risk 
reduction in Africa  
Research Report / 
Policy 
  2006 
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13  Programme of action for the 
implementation of the Africa 
strategy for disaster risk reduction 
(2005-2010)  
Policy NEPAD, AU, 
AfDB, UNISDR 
2004 
14  Safari’s encounter with a 
landslide  
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2003 
15  Towards a culture of prevention: 
disaster risk reduction begins at 
school, good practices and lessons 
learned 
Good practices UNISDR 2007 
16 Background Paper on African 
Regional Consultation on Disaster 
Risk Reduction 
Conference 
Background Paper 
NEPAD/UNISD
R 
2004 
17 ECOWAS DRR Policy Policy  ECOWAS 2006 
18 Hyogo Framework of Action Policy UNISDR   
19 International Decade for Natural 
Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) 
programme forum 1999 - 
proceedings 
Conference 
proceedings 
UNISDR 1999 
20 Johannesburg Recommendations 
for the 2005 World Conference On 
Disaster Reduction 
Position Paper   2004 
21 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 
Is 4 A school’s guide 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
22 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 
Iss 2 - Safari’s encounter with 
floods 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
23 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 
Iss 2 Water and risk in Africa - a 
school’s guide 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
24 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 
Iss 3 - Safari’s encounter with 
drought 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2006 
25 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 
Iss 3 2004 - A school's guide 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
26 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 2 
Is 2 2004- A community leader's 
guide 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
27 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 2 
Iss 1 A community leader’s guide 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
28 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 2 
Iss 3 A community leader’s guide 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
29 UNISDR Educational Series Vol 2 
Iss 5 Dec 2004 Poverty alleviation 
and DRR 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
30 UNISDR Educational Series 
Volume 2 Issue 4 2004 DRR 
Governance and Dev 
Education 
materials 
UNISDR 2004 
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31 UNISDR Presentation at The 
ProVention Global Forum Dar es 
Salaam, 13-15 February 2007 
Presentation UNISDR 2007 
          
  Total Number of documents   87   
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Appendix 3: Coding of Narrative Elements in Documents Analysed 
 
Code Name Definition Examples 
Hero An actor that has made a notable 
achievement, attained success, or has a 
remarkable capability.  
This policy is a continuation of successful actions already undertaken by ECOWAS 
and the UEMOA over a decade 
 
The EU stands with countries in difficulty. 
 
Collaborative efforts being promoted by UNISDR Africa with regional and UN partners 
are providing significant assistance in advancing better understanding of disaster risk 
reduction in Africa. 
 
The African regional consultations made a substantive contribution to the Second 
International Conference on Early Warning held in Bonn, Germany, in October 2003. 
Compared with other regions, the African report was more comprehensive and useful 
as reference. 
 
 
 
Victim Who or what is affected by a situation or 
challenge. 
Women, especially in rural areas, are affected in a disproportionately severe way by 
the lack of access to modern fuels and electricity. 
 
In Africa, many countries in the region have been hard hit by unreliable rainfalls and 
drought, negatively affecting hydro-power generation. 
 
The Sahel region has been the principal victim of drought-related disasters 
 
Mali, like several countries of the subregion, suffered considerable damage as areas 
deprived of water for several years received an excessive quantity of water.  
 
 
 
Villain Who or what is causing or contributing to 
harm. 
The (World) Bank’s approach to energy in developing countries … leaves the poor 
yet again in the dark. 
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These populations jeopardize their health and that of their children by burning harmful 
domestic fuels. 
 
‘Natural’ disasters are nature’s judgment on what humans have wrought. 
 
The vulnerability of communities is growing due to human activities that lead to 
increased poverty, greater urban density, environmental degradation and climate 
change. 
 
Ally A supporter of another actor, in relations to its 
identity, position, policy position, vision, or 
project. Or actors that are partnering together 
towards achieving an objective.  
Africa and the EU pursue their common vision and have engaged in political dialogue 
and an exchange on concrete actions to respond to climate change. 
 
The Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP) has been 
supporting African governments and regional organisations to develop their 
renewable energy markets. 
 
UNISDR Africa also supported Policy Makers participation to an International 
Conference on Disaster Reduction to increase their understanding and the integration 
of disaster risk reduction in development programme, planning at national level. 
 
To face up this challenge, UNISDR Africa has forged a very sound partnership with 
African national governments and regional organizations to promote understanding 
of disaster risk 
 
 
Adversary Who is antagonising/opposing another actor, 
or a policy stance or solution, or a project.  
Not identified in documents. However, it could be a statement such as – Some 
members are against our collaboration with international partners. 
Setting: 
Bureaucratic 
Situating the policy transfer in relations to a 
need for institutional and administrative 
frameworks.  
There is a need to support Africa in strengthening its political and economic 
governance, and in reinforcing the regulatory, fiscal and business environment that 
allows better mobilizing of the continent's own assets in a sustainable way. 
 
Sustainable development requires effective institutional coordination among various 
government, complex, working arrangements and mandates. 
 
Strong legal, institutional frameworks needed for disaster management 
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Setting: 
Community 
Situating the policy transfer in relations to a 
need for delivering service to a specific group 
in the population 
Give the poorest people greater access to basic social services. 
 
Develop, on the basis of national political frameworks, coherent energy policies 
based on reducing poverty in rural and peri-urban areas  
 
 
Setting: 
Sectoral 
Situating the policy transfer in relations a 
particular sector and addressing a challenge 
within the sector 
Having in place the right regulatory framework was considered to be the most 
important factor in expanding rural electrification. 
 
Ensure safety on the waterways … The regulations also cover operators of vessels 
who, on inland waterways, are to be examined to determine their competence. 
 
EREP (ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy) is designed to facilitate the 
development of standards in the region. 
 
Setting: 
Collective 
Situating the policy transfer in relations to 
providing service to all groups of the 
population in the recipient jurisdiction 
Not identified in documents. Not identified in documents. However, it could be a 
statement such as – Making everyone safe is our priority.  
Plot: Rags to 
riches 
Telling a story of a present state of lack and 
the possibility of achieving a better economic 
standing or prosperity 
Poverty is a characteristic of ECOWAS and the UEMOA countries, and the 
Millennium Development Goals will only be achieved by 2015 if at least half the 
population of rural and peri-urban areas of the region are provided access to modern 
energy services. 
 
 
There is an overall consensus on that fact that energy services undoubtedly help to 
reduce poverty and to stimulate economic development. 
 
Risk reduction is a developmental imperative for achieving sustainable growth, as 
well as a strategy that protects the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable, and 
hence a poverty eradication factor. 
Plot: 
Overcoming the 
monster 
Telling a story of the presence of an imminent 
threat and the possibility of overcoming it 
In terms of threat, the daily lives of people around the globe will be affected in a 
negative and dramatic way. Especially in the least developed countries, and for the 
most vulnerable countries, climate change makes daily life much harder. We need to 
act now to minimize such effects 
 
If we repeat the mistakes of the developed world by realising African development 
mainly on the burning of fossil fuels, climate change will have a disastrous effect on 
our countries”, 
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Disasters in Africa are often a matter of “life and death”, so disaster reduction 
generates human and social interest and solidarity, as well as result-oriented action. 
 
Climatic extremes and their meteorological manifestation may no longer be rare 
events.  
The response to this understanding was to encourage “mitigation” - to talk in the long 
term about reducing the risks from potential disasters, so that fewer and fewer people 
are exposed over time.  
 
Plot: Rebirth Telling a story of archaic identities or 
positions, and the possibility of reinventing 
these. 
Not identified in documents. However, it could be a statement such as - We have 
been on this spot for a long time, present challenges call for a turnaround. 
Moral: 
Incentives and 
Sanctions 
Recommending award of incentives and/or 
sanctions  
EU support to governance should feature more prominently in all partnerships, 
notably through incentives for results-oriented reform. 
 
Governments and donors need also to use incentives and appropriate market 
development tools to leverage private sector interest where the commercial case is 
marginal. 
 
Long-term investments are a prerequisite for effectively integrating disaster risk 
reduction in sustainable development. However, such investments can only happen 
with a coherent and integrated policy and institutional framework with clear mandates 
for stakeholder involvement. 
 
Indeed, Africa will not be able to develop and implement fully - and successfully - its 
future Programme of Action without some support from WCDR II. 
 
 
Moral: 
Managing costs 
and benefits 
Recommending managing cost and benefits  Whatever the conditions, at this stage of its market development, renewable energy 
is still an expensive solution … However, when looking at the long-term and 
considering the full life-cycle of the different energy solutions, renewables prove to 
be most cost-effective, healthy and environmentally-friendly compared to candles or 
diesel.  
 
Available solar, wind, bioenergy and small-hydro systems are already more cost-
effective than the widespread diesel based solutions - particularly when considering 
the life time costs and negative environmental externalities. 
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There is no gainsaying that disaster reduction is cheaper and better than cure. 
 
Building a culture of prevention is not easy. While the costs of prevention have to be 
paid in the present, its benefits lie in a distant future. Moreover, the benefits are not 
tangible; they are the disasters that did NOT happen 
 
 
Moral: Value 
re(orientation) 
Recommending a change in stance about, or 
understanding of, an issue or identity.  
Paradigm shift in relations from the donor recipient axis to a strategic engagement of 
equal and mutually beneficial partners  
 
Allow Africa to move away from continuous donor support and find its place in global 
markets. 
 
Africa has to shift from disaster response to disaster prevention/reduction; 
 
This will ensure a move away from the “victim” syndrome 
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Appendix 4: Events and Activities Related to the Policy 
Transfers 
 
 
Case 1: Renewable Energy Policy Transfer 
Year Event 
1975 Lomé 1 Convention between the EEC and ACP states, where EEC committed to give 
aid for the development of ACP states in a five-year agreement (1975-1980). Lomé I 
prioritised infrastructure; road building, bridges, hospitals and schools and 
sustainable agriculture  
1979 Signing of Lomé 11 for a five-year agreement (1980-1985). The priorities in Lomé 1 
continued under Lomé 11 
1981 ECOWAS Symposium on Energy for Survival 
1982 Adoption of ECOWAS energy policy 
1984 Signing of Lomé 111 for a five year agreement (1985-1990). Lomé 111 prioritised 
rural development projects to promote food security and combat desertification 
and drought.  
1990 Lomé IV. Lomé IV (1990-2000) marked a turning point in Lomé's history. The 
European Community (EC) embarked on dialogue with the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on how best to support structural adjustments 
as a means to economic growth 
1995 The EC drew up an initial general policy on regional cooperation strategies and 
programmes. Under the strategy, the aim was to help to strengthen regional 
integration and cooperation between the countries of West Africa and to integrate 
them into the world economy by consolidating the regional economic area 
1999 ECOWAS adopted, in December 1999, the principle of setting up a West African 
Power Pool system (WAPP), a project to be financed by a World Bank facility 
2000 End of Lomé agreements. New ACP-EU Agreement signed tagged Cotonou 
Agreement 
2000 191 countries adopted a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly called 
the Millennium Declaration 
2000 First Africa-EU summit was held in 2000 in Cairo 
2000 The Cotonou Agreement and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are 
specified as major EU trade and development policy 
2002 In 2002, African leaders established the African Union at the Durban Summit. The 
objective was to replace the Organisation of African Unity with a continental 
institution capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century and providing a 
new vision for the continent, promoting peace, good governance and integration. 
2004 launch of the Water and Energy Facilities in 2004 for Africa by the EU 
2004 Establishment of EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF) by the 
EU and some EU MS - Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden 
2005 Joint statement on EU development policy is issued by the Council of the European 
Union, the European Parliament and the European Commission stressing trade 
instead of aid 
2005 A convention signed between ECOWAS and UEMOA in Bamako on the 22nd of 
August 2005, on joint implementation of actions in the energy sector.  A joint 
ECOWAS/UEMOA Energy Committee was also set up 
2006 EUEI PDF sponsored a scoping report on establishment of a West African Regional 
Agency for Energy Access  
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2006 Publication of the Consultants' Report for the study on regional agency for energy 
access 
2006  ECOWAS presents briefing paper at 6th Global Forum for Sustainable Energy 
2007 Lisbon Summit - Launch of Africa-Europe partnership (adoption of joint strategy 
and plan of action based on eight areas of cooperation) 
2007 Launch of EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership in 2007 under the framework of EU-
Africa Joint Strategy  
2007 Approval of EUR 3m grant funding from the Trust Fund to be used by the West 
African Power Pool (WAPP11) to procure the services of an international consulting 
firm to conduct the preparatory studies for the planned West Africa Power 
Interconnector project, which will link power grids in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea 
and Sierra Leone 
2008 The 61st Session of ECOWAS Council of Ministers adopted the regulation 
C/REG.23/11/08 and gave the ECOWAS Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) a legal basis 
2008 Establishment of the EU Delegation to the AU 
2008 Creation of African Energy Commission 
2009 A joint ACP-EU declaration on climate change is issued in May 2009 
2009 EU-ECOWAS Ministerial Troika Meeting held on the 11th of May 
2009 ECOWAS participated in a workshop held in Uganda for the Africa-EU energy 
partnership 
2009 Release of EUR 3m grant to WAPP 
2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference is held in Copenhagen between 7th and 
18th December 
2010 Official inauguration of ECREEE 
2010 First High Level Meeting of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) in Vienna, 
Austria. A delegation of ECREEE participated in the meeting 
2010 Africa-EU energy partnership held a joint expert group (JEG) meeting in Cairo. The 
regional power pools were present. One of the outcomes of the meeting was a 
tentative agreement on setting out objectives for energy access, energy security, 
renewable energies and energy efficiency. 
2010 EU organised a conference on agriculture, food security and climate change for 
agreeing on a common African position on climate change and formulating key 
messages from the African continent for the global conference 
2010 Two-day technical workshop on the road map for the Africa-EU Energy Partnership 
is held in Entebbe, Uganda 
2010 ECOWAS Regional strategic plan is released 
2010 First High-Level Meeting of AEEP in Vienna, in September 2010. The AEEP Political 
Targets to be reached by 2020 were agreed and the Africa-EU Renewable Energy 
Cooperation Programme (RECP) was launched 
2010 in 2010 the European Commission launched a consultation on EU development 
policy 
2010 Secretariat for ECREEE was established during a six-month preparatory phase in 
Praia, Cape Verde, with the support of the ECOWAS Commission and the Austrian 
and Spanish Governments, as well as technical assistance from UNIDO 
2011 ECOWAS with support of UNDP organises regional workshop on general energy 
access in West Africa as part of its contribution to the 2012 International Year of 
Sustainable Energy For All 
2011 EU Member States are asked to align their development activities under a central 
umbrella of the EU 
2011 EU is announced as a new partner for ECREEE 
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2011 EU undertakes global review of its development policy putting a stronger emphasis 
on promoting an enabling environment for inclusive growth, private sector 
investment and job creation, including through innovative means of financing 
2011 EU publishes Development strategy - Increasing the Impact of EU Development 
Policy - an Agenda 
2011 EU improves its working relations with African RECS and not focus only on AU 
2011 European Commission publishes - Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: 
an Agenda for Change  
2012 The Government of France provided 60,000EUR to ECREEE for organisation of the 
High Level Forum where the renewable energy policy was adopted by ECOWAS 
energy ministers 
2012 Adoption of ECOWAS RE policy by the ECOWAS Ministers on Energy during the 
ECOWAS High Level Energy Forum, held from 29th to 31st October 2012, in Accra, 
Ghana.  
2012 Baseline report for ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy is published 
2012 ECREEE hosted a side event at Rio+20 tagged ‘Towards Universal Access to 
Sustainable Energy Services in West Africa' 
2012 EUEI PDF hosted a discussion forum at Rio+20 tagged 'Potential, Challenges and 
Needs of Private Sector in promoting Energy Access and Renewable Energy Markets 
in Africa' 
2012 EU announces the agreement with the UN, for it to lead the implementation of 
SE4ALL in Africa 
2013 President of the ECOWAS Commission, His Excellency Kadre Desire Ouédraogo, 
visited the Cape Verde-based ECOWAS Centre for Renewal Energy and Energy 
Efficiency (ECREEE) 
2013 ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government adopts the ECOWAS 
Renewable Energy Policy in  Abuja, Nigeria at the 43rd Ordinary Session, from 17th 
to 18th July 2013 
 
 
Case 2: Disaster Risk Reduction Policy Transfer 
Year Activity/Event 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg 
2002 The UNISDR Secretariat set in motion a two-year African Regional Outreach 
Programme, with the financial support of the Government of Germany and in 
cooperation with the UNEP in Nairobi. 
2002 ECOWAS Secretariat participated in discussions on disaster risk reduction organised 
by the UNISDR 
2002 Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, 
and Chad sought and secured funding (worth 5 million Canadian dollars) from the 
Canadian government towards the implementation of a project enhancing 
adaptation to climate change. 
2003 NEPAD Workshop on Disaster Management in April 2003. The Workshop called for 
interventions to address issues of food security and disaster management in Africa. 
2003 Baseline study of disaster reduction potential in Africa was conducted by NEPAD, 
Africa Union (AU) and UNISDR Africa 
2003 Africa DRR Strategy was developed 
2003 ECOWAS Council of Ministers 51st Session in December 2003 in Accra established a 
Technical Committee on Disaster Management to recommend ways to 
operationalize a disaster prevention and reduction capacity 
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2003 The NEPAD Secretariat organized a disaster management workshop, sponsored by 
the World Bank, to enable African and international experts to work with the 
Secretariat and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to develop a comprehensive 
programme on disaster management and food security.  
2003 African Regional Consultation in preparation for the Second International Early 
Warning Conference” (EWC– II) in Nairobi. The consultation was one of a series of 
preparatory regional consultations held in Asia, Europe and the American continent 
to provide regional input into EWC II. In consonance with EWC II, the theme of the 
African regional consultation was “Integrating Early Warning (EW) into Public 
Policy”. 
2003 2nd International Conference on Early Warning, EWC II, was held in Germany 
2003 Consultative Meeting on Disaster Risk Management in Africa held in Nairobi 
2003 The Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat held consultations with some UN 
agencies, including the Secretariat of the UNISDR, UNDP and UNEP as well as other 
stakeholders, in June 2003 in Nairobi, to plan the way forward towards the 
realization of the development of a disaster management mechanism. 
2003 Meeting of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction (IATF-DR) in 
Geneva 
2003 The 51st session of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers held in Accra from 15th to 18th 
December 2003 decided to establish a sub-regional disaster prevention and 
management mechanism 
2003 A meeting of the Technical Committee was convened from 8th to 10th March 2005 
to discuss the required institutional and legal framework, common policy, 
operational framework and resource mobilization, and to outline the modalities for 
the establishment of a disaster management mechanism in West Africa. 
2004 First meeting of the Working Group on Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa was 
convened from 26th to 27th April 2004 in Johannesburg, South Africa. The Working 
Group is a consultative forum for representatives of Regional Economic 
Communities (REC) 
2004 National Workshop on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Ghana to discuss national 
capacity building and the establishment of an ISDR National Platform 
2004 UNISDR held a preparatory session for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
(WCDR II) at Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland 
2004 Drawing and Essay Contest for children launched in Africa by UNISDR 
2004 The first meeting of the African Working Group was held in Johannesburg, South 
Africa from April 26th to 27th 
2004 The second meeting of the African Working Group was set for 3rd June 2004 and 
held in Johannesburg, South Africa 
2004 The Working Group meeting had its third session from the 9th to 10th December 
2004. 
2004 AU Head of States Summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2004. Participants 
recommended the African Regional Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
2004 An African Regional Consultation on Disaster Reduction was held in Johannesburg, 
South Africa from June 2nd to 3rd and the delegates released the Johannesburg 
Recommendations on the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
2004 African Experts’ Meeting on Disaster Reduction held at the same venue on 31st May 
and 1st June 2004 to finalise the draft document of the Africa Regional Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction developed by the AU and NEPAD with support from AfDB and 
UNISDR Africa. 
2004 African Heads of State 'received' the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
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2004 Natural disaster management capacity building project held in Mali by the UNISDR 
with an objective to work towards developing a coherent national plan for natural 
disaster management and reduction 
2004 The first meeting of ambassadors representing the four countries designated as 
members of the technical committee (Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Niger and Nigeria) was 
held on 27th May 2004 at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. 
2004 UNISDR organised a workshop towards establishing a DRR national platform in 
Ghana 
2005 UNISDR organised a workshop towards establishing a DRR national platform in 
Nigeria 
2005 UNISDR organised a workshop towards establishing a DRR national platform in 
Senegal 
2005 UNISDR organised a workshop towards establishing a DRR national platform in Mali 
2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) in Hyogo, Japan from 18th -22nd 
January and the development of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 
2005 A meeting of ECOWAS technical committee was held in March 2005, in Nigeria, to 
outline the scope of a disaster management mechanism for West Africa 
2005 First African Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction was held in 
December 2005 
2005 The International Day for Disaster Reduction - tagged as the International Year of 
Micro-Credit 
2005 Inauguration of the National Platform of Stakeholders in Disaster Risk Reduction in 
Nigeria 
2005 African Regional Consultation on the January 2005 World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction (WCDR) and review of the draft Africa Strategy for DRR 
2006 Inauguration of the Cape Verde DRR national platform is scheduled to take place on 
10 October 2006, the International Day for Disaster Reduction. 
2006 A second consultative meeting of African National Platforms for DRR was held 
bringing together Education Ministry Officials and representatives of National 
Societies of the Red Cross/Red Crescent to discuss the mainstreaming of DRR issues 
into school curricula and joint actions with National Societies of the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent. 
2006 A meeting to foster interaction amongst regional economic communities (RECs), 
development partners and specialized institutions to discuss and pave the way 
forward for the implementation of the “Africa Programme of Action for Disaster Risk 
Reduction” was held in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa 
2006 UNISDR Africa organized a consultative meeting for journalists (television, radio and 
print) from 13th to 15th June in Nairobi, Kenya. 
2006 ECOWAS Expert meeting on DRR for discussing the draft policy document was held 
from 8th to 10th of August 
2006 Inauguration of National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Ghana  
2007 West Africa Sub-regional Conference on Hazard Risk Reduction held in Abidjan, Cote 
d'Ivoire 
2007 ECOWAS Heads of States adopted the ECOWAS Policy and Mechanisms for Disaster 
Risk Reduction at their 31st Summit held on 19th January 2007 in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso 
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Appendix 5: Certificate for Ethics Approval 
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Appendix 6: Interview Questions and Information and 
Consent Form 
 
Interview Questions  
 
Transfer Agent (Recent 
and former officials of 
EUEI PDF and UNISDR, 
and Consultants)-  
- From your perspective, how did the EU/UNISDR help 
ECOWAS in having its own RE/DRR policy? 
- Why did the EU/UNISDR assist ECOWAS in 
developing and adopting a RE/DRR policy? 
- Why does ECOWAS need a RE/DRR policy? 
- How will the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy benefit 
ECOWAS? 
- How will the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy benefit the 
EU/UNISDR? 
  
 
Interview Questions  
 
Transfer Recipient 
(Recent and former 
officials of ECREEE and 
ECOWAS DRR 
Division)- 
- What led to the development and adoption of the 
ECOWAS RE/DRR policy?  
- Why do you think the EU/UNISDR got involved in the 
process? Or What led to the involvement of 
EU/UNISDR in the process? 
- How did EU/UNISDR assist ECOWAS in developing 
and adopting its own RE/DRR policy? 
- Why does ECOWAS need a RE/DRR policy? 
- How will the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy benefit 
ECOWAS? 
- How will the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy benefit the 
EU/UNISDR? 
 
Checks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology 
 Computer speaker and earphones are functioning 
adequately and set to comfortable volume levels 
 
 The recording function of the videoconferencing tool is 
working appropriately. Attempt a recording of a video 
chat to a friend/colleague and replay in order to test the 
function 
 
Participant 
 Information sheet has been sent to the respondent and 
he/she has acknowledged receipt and given assent 
 
 Familiarity with name and position of participant, and 
their involvement in the policy transfer process 
 
 Date and time of interview have been confirmed and 
Skype or Google Hangout IDs have been exchanged 
 
Materials 
 Interview guide  
 Pen and paper for taking extra notes or identifying 
probes 
 Information sheet 
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Opening 
17/01/2017 
 Express appreciation to the respondent for their 
participation in the research. Inform participant again 
on the anonymity of their contributions and responses, 
in reporting the findings of the research 
 
 If the participant has not received an information sheet, 
read out its content and ask for a verbal assent 
 
 Let the participant be aware of ongoing recording of 
the interview session and the possibility of asking for 
the recording to be stopped at any time during the 
interview. Also, let the participant be aware that they 
can stop or withdraw from the interview session, if 
necessary 
 
 Restate the title and objectives of the research, and 
how the interview fits into the overall research, and the 
expected duration of the interview session 
 
 To help a participant relax and freely narrate their 
experience and perceptions, the participant can be 
informed of other sources of information that are 
publicly available, and be made aware that their 
contribution will be used for additional information and 
corroboration, which is required for ensuring the 
validity of the research   
  
 
Closing/Referral Thank the participant for his/her kind contribution and ask if 
he/she can make a referral to other colleagues who can also 
be participants on the research, and if possible, speak with 
them to arrange interview sessions. 
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INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: The Role of Policy Narratives in Policy Transfer: The Cases of Transfer 
of Renewable Energy Policy and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy to ECOWAS 
 
1. What is this project? 
This project aims to understand how stories used in depicting a policy transfer process. Policy 
transfer refers to when a country or other political setting uses policy-related knowledge, which 
had been drawn from another political setting. The project also examines how stories used in 
depicting a policy transfer, can inform the factors that aid in facilitating the transfer process i.e. 
transfer mechanisms, such as obligation, conditionality, persuasion, or learning. In particular, 
it aims to understand how policy actors involved in policy transfers depict their counterparts, 
in serving the role of transfer agents or recipients; their understanding of the policy transfer 
process; and their involvement in it, through policy narratives.  
To investigate how policy narratives can inform the transfer mechanism that manifests in a 
policy transfer, the project will focus on two instances of policy transfer to ECOWAS, namely, 
the transfer of renewable energy policy and disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy to ECOWAS.  
 
2. Who is conducting this research? 
I am a PhD student at the department of Politics, University of Exeter, and this research forms 
part of my PhD. 
My supervisors are Dr Claire Dunlop and Prof Claudio Radaelli. They can be contacted via 
email at C.A.Dunlop@exeter.ac.uk, and C.Radaelli@exeter.ac.uk, respectively.  
 
3. What does being part of this study mean for me? 
It will involve one interview, either face to face or by telephone, which is likely to last about an 
hour. I would like to record this interview with your permission. You can stop the interview at 
any time and you do not need to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
Sections of the transcript of your interview may be published, either in journal articles or 
elsewhere, following this research. Your real name, alongside past or current positions held 
at your workplace will not be used. 
 
4. Who can I contact for further information? 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
Titilayo Soremi 
Department of Politics 
University of Exeter 
Amory Building 
Rennes Drive  
Exeter 
EX4 4RJ 
UK 
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Ts419@exeter.ac.uk 
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone 
else at the University, please contact: 
Dr Claire Dunlop 
Department of Politics 
University of Exeter 
Amory Building 
Rennes Drive 
Exeter 
EX4 4RJ 
UK 
C.A.Dunlop@exeter.ac.uk@exeter.ac.uk 
01392 724690 
 
5. What will happen to my interview data? 
Your interview data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act.  
The information you provide will be used for research purposes and your personal data will be 
processed in accordance with current data protection legislation. Your personal data will be 
treated in the strictest confidence and will not be disclosed to any unauthorised third parties. 
The results of the research will be published in anonymised form and anonymised data may 
be uploaded to the University of Exeter’s data storage system. 
a. Interview recordings 
The digital recording of your interview will be deleted as soon as there is an 
authoritative written transcript of your interview. 
b. Interview transcripts and contact details  
Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your 
name, but there will be a reference to the particular instance of policy transfer for which 
the interview is being held. Your personal and contact details will be stored separately 
from your interview transcript and may be retained for up to 5 years. 
If you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that 
you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below). 
Third parties will not be allowed access to interview tapes and transcripts except as 
required by law or in the event that something disclosed during the interview causes 
concerns about possible harm to you or to someone else. 
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CONSENT 
I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project. 
I understand that: 
 there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research project and, if I do 
choose to participate, I may withdraw at any stage; 
 I have the right to refuse permission for the publication of any information about 
me; 
 any information which I give will be used solely for the purposes of this research 
project, which may include publications or academic conference or seminar 
presentations; 
 all information I give will be treated as confidential; 
 the researcher will make every effort to preserve my anonymity. 
 
............................……………..……..     ..................……………..……. 
(Signature of participant)      (Date) 
 
………………………………………    ……………………………..…… 
(Printed name of participant)      Email address of participant  
 
............................……………….. .    .......................……………….. 
(Signature of researcher)      (Printed name of researcher) 
 
One copy of this form will be kept by the participant; a second copy will be kept by the 
researchers. 
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Appendix 7: Chi-Square and T-Test Analysis 
 
Chi-square Analysis for Case 1: Renewable Energy Policy Transfer 
Narrative Setting  
Type Category Frequency V4 V5 V6 V7 
a Bureaucratic 35 13.67 21.33 35 Bureaucratic 
a Community 24 2.67 21.33 24 Community 
a Sectoral 5 -16.33 21.33 5 Sectoral 
b Bureaucratic 21.3333333333333 13.67 21.33 35 Bureaucratic 
b Community 21.3333333333333 2.67 21.33 24 Community 
b Sectoral 21.3333333333333 -16.33 21.33 5 Sectoral 
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Narrative Character 
 
Type Category Frequency V4 V5 V6 V7 
a Ally 125 58.75 66.25 125 Ally 
a Hero 110 43.75 66.25 110 Hero 
a Victim 15 -51.25 66.25 15 Victim 
a Villain 15 -51.25 66.25 15 Villain 
b Ally 66.25 58.75 66.25 125 Ally 
b Hero 66.25 43.75 66.25 110 Hero 
b Victim 66.25 -51.25 66.25 15 Victim 
b Villain 66.25 -51.25 66.25 15 Villain 
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Narrative Plot 
Type Category Frequency V4 V5 V6 V7 
a Overcoming the Monster 6 -36 42 6 Overcoming the Monster 
a Rags to riches 119 77 42 119 Rags to riches 
a Rebirth 1 -41 42 1 Rebirth 
b Overcoming the Monster 42 -36 42 6 Overcoming the Monster 
b Rags to riches 42 77 42 119 Rags to riches 
b Rebirth 42 -41 42 1 Rebirth 
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Narrative Moral 
Type Category Frequency V4 V5 V6 V7 
a Incentives and sanctions 23 12.33 10.67 23 Incentives and sanctions 
a 
Managing cost and 
benefits 
5 -5.67 10.67 5 
Managing cost and 
benefits 
a Value re(orientation) 4 -6.67 10.67 4 Value re(orientation) 
b Incentives and sanctions 10.6666666666667 12.33 10.67 23 Incentives and sanctions 
b 
Managing cost and 
benefits 
10.6666666666667 -5.67 10.67 5 
Managing cost and 
benefits 
b Value re(orientation) 10.6666666666667 -6.67 10.67 4 Value re(orientation) 
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Chi-square Analysis for Case 2: DRR Policy Transfer 
Narrative Setting 
Type Category Frequency V4 V5 V6 V7 
a Bureaucratic 24 11 13 24 Bureaucratic 
a Sectoral 2 -11 13 2 Sectoral 
b Bureaucratic 13 11 13 24 Bureaucratic 
b Sectoral 13 -11 13 2 Sectoral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
340 
 
Narrative Character 
Type Category Frequency V4 V5 V6 V7 
a Ally 85 15 70 85 Ally 
a Hero 52 -18 70 52 Hero 
a Victim 88 18 70 88 Victim 
a Villain 55 -15 70 55 Villain 
b Ally 70 15 70 85 Ally 
b Hero 70 -18 70 52 Hero 
b Victim 70 18 70 88 Victim 
b Villain 70 -15 70 55 Villain 
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Narrative Plot 
Type Category Frequency V4 V5 V6 V7 
a Overcoming the monster 140 69.5 70.5 140 Overcoming the monster 
a Rags to riches 1 -69.5 70.5 1 Rags to riches 
b Overcoming the monster 70.5 69.5 70.5 140 Overcoming the monster 
b Rags to riches 70.5 -69.5 70.5 1 Rags to riches 
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Narrative Moral 
Type Category Frequency V4 V5 V6 V7 
a Incentives and sanctions 3 -18 21 3 Incentives and sanctions 
a Managing cost and benefits 33 12 21 33 Managing cost and benefits 
a Value re(orientation) 27 6 21 27 Value re(orientation) 
b Incentives and sanctions 21 -18 21 3 Incentives and sanctions 
b Managing cost and benefits 21 12 21 33 Managing cost and benefits 
b Value re(orientation) 21 6 21 27 Value re(orientation) 
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Test of Difference (T-Test) for Narrative Elements Identified in Case 1 (Renewable Energy Policy Transfer) and Case 2 
(DRR Policy Transfer) 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Setting: 
Bureaucratic  
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
5.698 0.019 -5.071 85 0.000 -0.503 0.099 -0.700 -0.306 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    -5.287 69.894 0.000 -0.503 0.095 -0.693 -0.313 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Setting: 
Community  
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
35.489 0.000 2.408 85 0.018 0.161 0.067 0.028 0.293 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    3.245 55.000 0.002 0.161 0.050 0.061 0.260 
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  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Setting: 
Sectoral  
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.697 0.407 -5.010 56 0.000 -0.929 0.185 -1.300 -0.557 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    -26.739 55.000 0.000 -0.929 0.035 -0.998 -0.859 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Character: 
Hero  
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.604 0.110 1.150 85 0.253 0.127 0.110 -0.092 0.346 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    1.134 59.473 0.262 0.127 0.112 -0.097 0.350 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
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Character: 
Allies 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.166 0.044 -0.964 85 0.338 -0.106 0.110 -0.325 0.113 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    -0.978 64.700 0.332 -0.106 0.108 -0.322 0.110 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Character: 
Victim 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
17.540 0.000 -3.233 85 0.002 -0.320 0.099 -0.516 -0.123 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    -3.022 50.948 0.004 -0.320 0.106 -0.532 -0.107 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Character: 
Villain 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
16.433 0.000 -3.567 85 0.001 -0.352 0.099 -0.548 -0.156 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    -3.337 51.115 0.002 -0.352 0.105 -0.564 -0.140 
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  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Plot: 
Overcoming  
the Monster 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.058 0.810 -15.057 85 0.000 -0.864 0.057 -0.978 -0.750 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
    -15.232 64.169 0.000 -0.864 0.057 -0.977 -0.751 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Plot: Rags to 
Riches 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
274.915 0.000 5.795 85 0.000 0.539 0.093 0.354 0.724 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    7.275 76.092 0.000 0.539 0.074 0.392 0.687 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
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Plot: Rebirth Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.285 0.134 0.742 85 0.460 0.018 0.024 -0.030 0.066 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    1.000 55.000 0.322 0.018 0.018 -0.018 0.054 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Moral: 
Incentive 
and 
Sanction 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
27.119 0.000 2.172 85 0.033 0.185 0.085 0.016 0.355 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    2.519 84.877 0.014 0.185 0.074 0.039 0.332 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Moral: 
Managing 
Cost and 
Benefits 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.058 0.810 -15.057 85 0.000 -0.864 0.057 -0.978 -0.750 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
    -15.232 64.169 0.000 -0.864 0.057 -0.977 -0.751 
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  Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Moral: Value 
Reorientation 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
118.322 0.000 -5.448 85 0.000 -0.430 0.079 -0.587 -0.273 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    -4.475 36.766 0.000 -0.430 0.096 -0.625 -0.235 
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Appendix 8: Picture of UNISDR’s Representative Meeting 
with President Olusegun Obasanjo 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kan (2005, p. 49) 
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